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Chapter One: Introduction - European Rights in Irish Courts 
 
Research Project Scope 
This project explores the extent that the European Convention on Human Rights (the 
“Convention’”), the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 (the “ECHR Act”), and 
the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (the “Charter”) have been utilised before Irish 
courts and specified tribunals. This remit of this research report explores rights under these 
instruments that have been: 
 Utilised in argument before Irish Superior Courts and specified tribunals, with a clear 
identification of the areas of law at issue, and the precise right under the ECHR Act, 
the Convention and the Charter, that has been argued and/or considered; 
 Relied upon by domestic courts and tribunals in coming to their decisions; 
 Interpreted in light of Ireland’s constitutional framework.  
 
Research Project Methodology 
The research for this project was desk-based, focusing on the extent that the Convention, 
ECHR Act 2003 and the Charter were utilised, successfully or otherwise before the Superior 
Courts: the Irish High Court, Court of Criminal Appeal and Supreme Courts from January 
2004 until December 2014. Specifically, each of the following databases (www.courts.ie, 
www.bailli.org, www.westlaw.ie, www.justis.com) were searched for a variety of different 
search terms covering the Convention, ECHR Act 2003 and the Charter as variously referred 
to by the courts.1 
The project team also considered reported cases from the District Court, as an increasing 
number of District Court decisions are being made available through the Courts Service 
website (www.courts.ie). No Circuit Court judgments were included; as there are no Circuit 
Court judgments publicly available online on any of the databases searched (the decisions of 
                                                             
1 The search terms used were: (1) for the Convention and ECHR Act 2003. “European Convention on 
Human Rights”, “European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”, “ECHR”, 
“ECHR Act 2003”, “Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”; (2) for the Charter. 
“Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000”; “EU Charter of Fundamental Rights”, 
“European Charter of Fundamental Rights”; “EU Charter”, “ Charter of Fundamental Rights”. 
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the Circuit Court have not been published on www.courts.ie or through any other public 
source). 
As well as looking at judgments of the courts insofar as reported, the project team included 
the decisions of a number of tribunals and quasi-judicial bodies in their search, to the extent 
that such decisions were published. These included:  
 The Broadcasting Commission of Ireland;  
 The Labour Court; 
 The Equality Tribunal; 
 The Irish Information Commissioners’ Decisions; and  
 The Irish Data Protection Commission Case Studies.  
While decisions of the Taxation Appeal Commissioners or the Competition Authority of 
Ireland (now the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission) were also searched, 
this revealed that no reference had been made in these decisions to the Convention, ECHR 
Act 2003 or the Charter during the relevant time period.  
Initially, it had been hoped to also analyse the engagement of the Refugee Appeals Tribunal 
with European rights issues. However, after some initial scoping of the volume of relevant 
decisions, it was agreed that this would not be possible within the time-frame of this report. A 
study on the engagement of the Refugee Appeals Tribunal with European rights remains an 
area of further research. 
 
Report Structure  
This report is broken down into eight chapters.  
The remainder of this Chapter provides an overview of the level of engagement with 
European (Convention/ECHR Act 2003 and Charter) rights by the Irish Superior Courts, 
District Court and relevant tribunals between 2004 and 2014, and considers the role of the 
Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission in this regard. 
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Chapter 2 provides an overview of core provisions of the Convention and ECHR Act 2003, 
the role of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in developing standards of 
interpretation, and Ireland’s record before the ECtHR.  
Chapter 3 explores horizontal issues relating to some common themes that cut across a 
number of significant areas of Convention-related jurisprudence, including the relationship of 
the Convention, ECHR Act 2003 and the Constitution, interpretative obligations under the 
ECHR Act 2003, retrospectivity, declarations of incompatibility and damages and other 
remedies under the ECHR Act 2003.  
Chapter 4 engages in a sectoral review of some key legal areas where the Irish Superior 
Courts, the District Court and quasi-judicial bodies/tribunals have engaged with rights 
protected under the Convention and ECHR Act 2003. There is a particular focus on mental 
health law, asylum and immigration law, criminal law including the European Arrest Warrant, 
family and child law, and social rights and employment rights.  
Chapter 5 provides a background to the Charter, its scheme and content, and compares the 
status of the Charter and Convention in the Irish courts.  It also considers the scope of 
application of the Charter and the relationship between the Charter, Convention, and 
national human rights law.  
Chapter 6 turns to consideration of the Charter before the Irish courts, considering the case 
law on a number horizontal cross-cutting issues, namely, the scope of the Charter, the 
relationship between the Charter, the Constitution and the Convention, the right to good 
administration and the right to an effective remedy.  
Chapter 7 reviews sectoral developments of Charter jurisprudence in the Irish courts, in the 
fields of asylum and immigration law, the European Arrest Warrant, data protection law, 
family law, companies’ rights and social and employment rights. 
Chapter 8 seeks to draw together some key conclusions on European rights as applied in 
Irish courts and tribunals. 
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European Rights before the Irish Superior Courts 2004-2014: The 
Empirical Data 
A full list of cases in which the Convention, ECHR Act 2003 and Charter has been 
referenced in the case law of the courts and decisions of tribunals searched is contained in 
Annexes 2 to 4 to this Report.  Annex 1 contains summary statistics of cases in which 
European rights were raised before these courts and bodies. 
 Unsurprisingly, the figures show a marked increase in the extent to which the Convention, 
ECHR Act 2003 and the Charter have been relied upon before the Irish Superior Courts 
between 2004 and 2014. From 36 cases referring to or relying on European (Convention) 
rights in 2004, in 2014, 66 cases of the Superior Courts engaged with European rights 
claims. 
Table 1.1: European Rights Referred to in Irish Superior Courts 
Year Published Judgments Utilising the 
Convention and/or the ECHR Act 2003 
and/or the Charter 
2004 36 
2005 55 
2006 42 
2007 47 
2008 44 
2009 53 
2010 56 
2011 54 
2012 69 
2013 59 
2014 66 
Total Cases 2004-2014: 581 
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Of these cases, the vast majority have involved the Convention and/or ECHR Act 2003, 
rather than the Charter; again, this is unsurprising, as the Charter only became legally 
binding on 1 December 2009 (see chapter 5).  
In some cases, counsel (and or the judge in summing up counsel’s arguments) do not seem 
to concurrently utilise the ECHR Act 2003, when seeking judges’ engagement with rights 
protections under the Convention, but rather only rely directly on the Convention rights.  
Table 1.2 The Convention and ECHR Act Pleaded Before the Irish Superior Courts 
Year ECHR & ECHR Act 2003 
Mentioned 
Convention, not ECHR Act 
2003,  Mentioned* 
2004 36 22 
2005 54 27 
2006 41 25 
2007 47 23 
2008 41 19 
2009 51 22 
2010 46 27 
2011 43 34 
2012 42 44 
2013 41 28 
2014 49 38 
 
* Some cases also raise issues under the Charter: see Annex 1 to this Report.  
There has been engagement across a range of rights protections under the Convention. 
Article 6 ECHR and Article 8 ECHR are the most referenced rights protections before the 
Irish Courts. Article 13 ECHR is the next most engaged or mentioned provision (see Annex 1 
to this Report for further statistics on this issue).  
In terms of legal field in which European rights are raised, the statistics show that 
Immigration and Asylum Law and Criminal Law are two of the fields where counsel and/or 
judges of their own motion have most frequently made reference to European rights 
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provisions.  As is explored in more detail in subsequent chapters, there is a high degree of 
engagement with precepts of Irish Constitutional and Administrative Law, that cross-cut 
many of the rights-based arguments.  
In terms of engagement with European rights before the District Court, the figures show that 
27 published District Court cases between 2004 and 2014 referred to the Convention and/or 
the ECHR Act and/or the Charter. However, a major caveat to these figures is that, to date, 
all of the published judgments of the District Court relate to child care law.  Clearly, 
therefore, this is an extremely limited sampling of the extent to which the District Court 
engages in European rights arguments. Nevertheless, within the judgments published, the 
District Court has referred to a much more limited set of rights under the European rights 
instruments (see Annex 1 to this Report for further statistics). As with the Superior Courts, 
the right to family and private life has been engaged with substantially. 
 
The Role of the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission (IHREC) 
On 1 November 2014, the Irish Human Rights Commission and the Equality Authority were 
fused to form the IHREC, pursuant to the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission Act 
2014.  
Section 9 of the 2014 Act provides that the IHREC is to be independent in the performance 
of its functions, although it is to have regard to, and be guided by, best international practice 
applicable to national human rights institutions and to equality bodies.  In furtherance of such 
independence, the IHREC is primarily accountable to the Oireachtas, with direct 
accountability of the IHREC’s Director due to the Public Accounts Committee of the Dáil 
(section 22, 2014 Act). 
While section 10(1) of the 2014 Act sets out what might be termed the IHREC’s “high level” 
functions, including the protection and promotion of human rights and equality, and working 
towards the elimination of human rights abuses and discrimination, the IHREC’s detailed 
functions are provided in section 10(2).  Certain of these powers go further than those of the 
Irish Human Rights Commission did.   
For the purposes of this Report the following functions set out in section 10(2) are of 
particular relevance. 
“(e) to apply to the High Court or the Supreme Court for liberty to appear before the 
High Court or the Supreme Court, as the case may be, as amicus curiae in 
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proceedings before that court that involve or are concerned with the human rights or 
equality rights of any person and to appear as such an amicus curiae on foot of such 
liberty being granted (which liberty each of the said courts is hereby empowered to 
grant in its absolute discretion);” 
The IHREC’s power to apply for leave to appear as amicus was also enjoyed by its 
predecessor institutions.  For its part, the Irish Human Rights Commission made use of this 
power in a wide variety of cases before the High Court and Supreme Court, making 
submissions in a large portion of the significant judgments on the ECHR discussed in this 
Report, as well as in numerous judgments raising Charter issues.1      
“(f) to provide such practical assistance, including legal assistance, to persons in 
vindicating their rights as it sees fit in accordance with section 40;” 
Section 40 of the 2014 Act specifies that, in the case of inter alia “legal proceedings involving 
law or practice relating to the protection of human rights which a person has instituted or 
wishes to institute”, or legal proceedings “in the course of which a person relies on or wishes 
to rely on such law or practice”, the IHREC may decide, if an application is made to it, to 
assist a party in such proceedings, including by providing or arranging for legal advice or 
representation.  Section 40(3) sets out a variety of factors to which the IHREC must have 
regard in deciding whether to assist an applicant, including whether the applicant would be 
eligible for legal aid. Section 40(5) provides that the arrangement reached between the 
applicant and the IHREC may include provision for the recovery of the IHREC’s expenses 
(raising the possibility of “no foal no fee” conditional fee-type arrangements).  
“(g) where it sees fit, to institute proceedings under section 41 […] as may be 
appropriate.” 
Section 41 provides that the IHREC may institute proceedings “in any court of competent 
jurisdiction for the purpose of obtaining relief of a declaratory or other nature in respect of 
any matter concerning the human rights of any person or class of persons.” Pursuant to 
section 41(2), such relief includes relief by way of a declaration that an enactment or a 
provision thereof is unconstitutional.  
                                                             
1 For instance, Digital Rights Ireland v Minister for Communications [2010] IEHC 221, discussed in 
chapter 6.  For a list of the cases in which the IHREC or its predecessor has intervened as amicus, 
see www.ihrec.ie (which includes, in many instances, the IHREC’s full written submissions in cases in 
which it intervened).   
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Also of relevance here is section 35(1) of the 2014 Act, which empowers the IHREC to 
conduct an inquiry into “any body (whether public or otherwise) institution, sector of society, 
or geographical area” where there is 
“(a) evidence of—  
(i) a serious violation of human rights or equality of treatment obligations in respect of 
a person or a class of persons, or  
(ii) a systemic failure to comply with human rights or equality of treatment obligations,  
and  
(b) the matter is of grave public concern, and  
(c) it is in the circumstances necessary and appropriate so to do.”  
The terms of reference of any such inquiry must be laid before the Houses of the 
Oireachtas.2   
Section 36(1) empowers the IHREC to serve an Equality and Human Rights compliance 
notice where, following such an inquiry, the IHREC is satisfied that, inter alia, a person has 
violated or is violating human rights.  Such notices may be appealed to the District Court 
(section 37(1)) and, thereafter, to the Circuit Court (section 37(5)); subsequent appeal to the 
High Court is on a point of law only (section 37(8)).  Pursuant to section 39 of the 2014 Act, 
the IHREC may apply to the Circuit Court to restrain a violation of human rights where, within 
5 years of making of a section 36 compliance notice, that Court is satisfied that there is a 
“likelihood” of further violation. 
 
                                                             
2 See also, Schedule 2 to the 2014 Act. 
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Chapter Two: The European Convention on Human Rights: 
Overview and Relationship with Domestic Law 
 
Overview of the European Convention on Human Rights 
The Convention was opened for signature and ratification in Rome on the 4th of November 
1950 and entered into force in 1953.1 The rights and freedoms protected include:  
 The right to life,2  
 The right to be free from torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,3  
 Freedom from slavery and forced labour,4  
 The right to liberty and security,5 
  The right to a fair trial6  
 The right to respect for family and private life.7  
 Freedom of expression8  
 Freedom of religious practice.9 
  The right to an effective remedy for a breach of Convention rights.10  
 The prohibition of discrimination in the enjoyment of Convention rights “on any 
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other 
status.”11 
 
                                                             
1 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 4 November 1950, E.T.S  5. 
2 Article 2 of the Convention.  
3 Article 3 of the Convention.  
4 Article 4 of the Convention.  
5 Article 5 of the Convention.  
6 Article 6 of the Convention.  
7 Article 8 of the Convention.  
8 Article 10 of the Convention.  
9 Article 11 of the Convention.  
10 Article 13 of the Convention. 
11 Article 14 of the Convention. 
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In addition to the rights agreed within the core human rights document, a number of other 
rights were added by means of Protocols which Contracting States are at liberty to sign and 
ratify. Some significant rights are protected within these protocols including: 
 The right to property and the right not to be denied an education;12  
 Freedom of movement for those lawfully in a country,13 
 Prohibition of collective expulsions of aliens,14  
 Procedural protection for aliens in the event of expulsion;15  
 The abolition of the death penalty.16  
 Protocol No. 12 is a free-standing prohibition of discrimination on “…any ground such 
as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”17  Ireland 
has not yet ratified Protocol 12.  
 
Some of the rights outlined above are absolute. Such absolute rights include: 
 Article 3 (prohibition of torture, or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment); 
 Article 4(1) (prohibition of slavery and servitude);  
 Article 7 (prohibition of retroactive offences);  
 Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) and Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination).  
 Article 1 of Protocol 13 (prohibition of the death penalty).  
 
Other rights in the Convention are qualified. Some of the qualified rights within the 
Convention include: 
                                                             
12 Protocol No. 1 of 20 March 1953.  
13 Article 2 of Protocol 4, 16 September 1963.  
14 Article 4 of Protocol 4.  
15 Article 1 of Protocol 7, 22 November 1984.  
16 Article 1 of Protocol 13, 3 May 2002. Protocol No. 6 allowed for the abolition of the death penalty, 
save in time of war or where there was an imminent threat of war.  
17  Article 1 of Protocol 12, 4 November 2000. Where discrimination is found then there will be 
consideration as to whether any objective or reasonable justification in that the discrimination may 
pursue a legitimate aim or where there is a “reasonable relationship of proportionality between the 
means employed and the aims sought to be realised.”  See Council of Europe Explanatory Report on 
Protocol 12 (para. 18). This report can be accessed here: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/177.htm. [last accessed, 14 July 2015].  
.  
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 Article 2(2)(sets down the limitations on the right to life);  
 Article 6 (allows for a trial otherwise than in public where it is the interests of morals, 
public order or national security, protection of young people, or where publicity would 
prejudice the interests of the parties);  
 Articles 8 to 11 (which are subject to restrictions which are prescribed by law and 
necessary in a democratic society), 
“in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being 
of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”  
 Protocol 1, Article 1, the right to property, may be restricted in accordance with the 
general interest or to secure payment of taxation. 
 
Once an interference with Convention rights is shown, it is for the State to bring itself within 
the limitations proscribed. Central to the ECtHR determination of rights claims will be the 
proportionality of the measures introduced by the Contracting State. Limitations to 
Convention rights are construed narrowly.18 
The Convention provides an important basis for protecting the rights of all persons in a 
State. While the rights protected in the Charter19 are only addressed to the institutions, 
bodies and offices of the European Union, and to EU Member States when implementing EU 
law20 there is no such limitation in the Convention. Everybody within the jurisdiction of a 
Contracting State enjoys the rights set forth in the Convention.21 In Austria v Italy it was 
stated that the Convention: 
“…not only applies to a States own nationals and those of other High Contracting 
Parties, but also to nationals of States not parties to the Convention and to stateless 
persons.”22  
 
                                                             
18 See for example, Hatton v United Kingdom (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 1 at para. 97. 
19 See below, pp. 104-108. 
20 See further discussion on scope and limitations on the application of the Charter below, pp. 111-
113.  
21 Article 1 of the ECHR.  
22 Austria v Italy, Yearbook IV (1961)  as quoted in Zwaak, L. “General Survey of the European 
Convention” in van Dijk, P. Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (4th 
edition, Oxford; Intersentia, 2006), pp. 13-14.  
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The Role of the European Court of Human Rights: Developing Normative 
Standards of Interpretation 
After exhausting domestic remedies, adjudication on rights compliance within the domestic 
sphere may be examined by the ECtHR.23 Contracting parties to the Convention agreed to 
limit their sovereignty and abide by the judgment of the ECtHR where a decision is taken in 
favour of a plaintiff. While national human rights protections are considered to offer the best 
guarantee to individuals that the State will protect their human rights (as they are easier to 
access, for instance), internationalised enforcement mechanisms provide incentives for 
States to comply with their international obligations.24 
Since its foundation in 1959, the ECtHR25 has been the guardian of the Convention. The 
ECtHR has played a pivotal role in developing the key principles of Convention law. Cases 
may be brought by individuals and groups26  or by a Contracting State against another 
Contracting State.27 States are obliged to abide by the judgments of the court in any case to 
which it is a party.28 The ECtHR has stated that the Convention is a “living instrument” which 
“…must be interpreted in light of present day conditions”.29 The ECtHR has noted that, while 
not formally bound to follow its own decisions, it is in the interests of legal certainty, 
foreseeability and equality before the law that it should not depart, without good reason, from 
decisions in previous cases.30  
The ECtHR has developed a number of core principles that relate to the interpretation of all 
the rights protected in the Convention. It does not necessarily separate these principles (in 
general), and on occasion may combine its legal analysis of State practices/laws across a 
number of these headings.  
Practical and Effective Rights: The ECtHR has emphasised that the rights protected under 
the Convention are to be “practical and effective” and not merely “illusory”.31  
                                                             
23 See Article 35 and Article 46 of the Convention. This is known as the principle of subsidiarity 
whereby an applicant must have exhausted effective domestic remedies, see A, B & C v Ireland, 
(2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 13, para. 152.  
24 Merrills, J.G. The Development of International Law by the European Court of Human Rights (2nd 
edition, Sheffield; Manchester University Press, 1993) at p. 1.  
25 Article 19 of the ECHR.  
26 Article 34 of the ECHR. 
27 Article 33 of the ECHR.  
28 Article 46 of the ECHR.  
29 Tyrer v United Kingdom (1979–80) 2 E.H.R.R. 1 at para. 31.  
30 See, Chapman v. UK (2001) 33 EHRR 18 at para. 70 and Goodwin v UK (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18 at 
para. 74.  
31 See Airey v Ireland (1979) 2 EHRR 305, para. 24 and McFarlane v Ireland [2010] E.C.H.R. 1272 at 
para. 112.  
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The Convention as a Living Instrument: The Convention is a living instrument in that, as 
society changes, so too might the interpretation of the Convention. The implementation of 
this principle is best seen in the case of Goodwin v United Kingdom.32 In Goodwin, the 
ECtHR departed from its previous jurisprudence on transgender rights:33 
“The Court observes that in the case of Rees in 1986 it had noted that little common 
ground existed between States, some of which did permit change of gender and 
some of which did not and that generally speaking the law seemed to be in a state of 
transition (see § 37). In the later case of Sheffield and Horsham, the Court's 
judgment laid emphasis on the lack of a common European approach as to how to 
address the repercussions which the legal recognition of a change of sex may entail 
for other areas of law such as marriage, filiation, privacy or data protection. While this 
would appear to remain the case, the lack of such a common approach among forty-
three Contracting States with widely diverse legal systems and traditions is hardly 
surprising. In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, it is indeed primarily for 
the Contracting States to decide on the measures necessary to secure Convention 
rights within their jurisdiction and, in resolving within their domestic legal systems the 
practical problems created by the legal recognition of post-operative gender status, 
the Contracting States must enjoy a wide margin of appreciation. The Court 
accordingly attaches less importance to the lack of evidence of a common European 
approach to the resolution of the legal and practical problems posed, than to the 
clear and uncontested evidence of a continuing international trend in favour not only 
of increased social acceptance of transsexuals but of legal recognition of the new 
sexual identity of post-operative transsexuals.” 
Positive Obligations: A State must not take action to bring about a Convention violation 
through their agents. This argument frames the Convention in “negative”, non-interference 
terms. However, the ECtHR has emphasised that certain positive obligations inhere within 
Convention rights. 34  Positive obligations require Contracting States to take action or to 
regulate certain types of State actors and non-state actors conduct to ensure compliance 
with the Convention35  
                                                             
32 Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18. 
33 (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18 at para. 85.  
34 On positive obligations generally, see: Starmer, K. “Positive Obligations under the Convention” in 
Jowell, J. & Cooper, J. Understanding Human Rights Principles (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001), pp. 
139-160 and Mowbray, A. The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention 
on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004).  
35 Ibid. at p. 51.  
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When examining positive obligations a fair balance has to be struck between an individuals’ 
Convention rights, the general community interest and the choices which elected 
governments must make in terms of priorities and resources.36 Positive obligations may 
differ depending on the diversity of situations within the Contracting States.37 States must 
have frameworks for the effective protection of Convention rights, 38  including means to 
prevent breaches of Convention rights by State39 and non-state actors.40 States are under a 
duty to respond to Convention violations by the provision of effective remedies.41 In some 
instances, most notably as regards civil legal aid, the State has a positive obligation to 
provide assistance to an individual in order to ensure protection of that individual’s 
Convention rights.42 
Margin of Appreciation: The margin of appreciation is a principle used by the ECtHR 
whereby: 
“national authorities [are], in principle, better placed than an international court to 
evaluate local needs and conditions.” 43 
The margin of appreciation in essence seeks to defer rights analysis onto national authorities 
(be it government, courts or administrative agencies). In many recent cases, the ECtHR has 
deferred to the national authorities’ margin of appreciation in finding no violation of the 
Convention where a State fails to permit abortion, or fails to allow for same-sex couples. 
In applying the margin of appreciation in A, B & C and deciding whether a violation of Article 
8 of the Convention had occurred, the ECtHR stated: 
“… that a number of factors must be taken into account when determining the 
breadth of the margin of appreciation to be enjoyed by the State when determining 
any case under Article 8 of the Convention. Where a particularly important facet of an 
individual’s existence or identity is at stake, the margin allowed to the State will 
normally be restricted (see Evans v. the United Kingdom [GC], cited above, § 77). 
                                                             
36 Ilascu et. al. v Moldova and Russia (2004) 40 E.H.R.R. 1030, at para. 332.  
37 Özgür Gündem v. Turkey (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 1082 at para. 43 
38 See, X and Y v The Netherlands (1985) 8 E.H.R.R. 235, at para. 23.  
39 See, Keenan v United Kingdom (2001) 33 E.H.R.R. 913, at para. 105.  
40 See, Marckx v Belgium (1979) 2 E.H.R.R. 330.  
41 In a number of cases taken by individuals against Turkey, the ECtHR has emphasised the duty on 
States parties to investigate and respond to alleged violations of Convention rights in a prompt and 
timely manner. For example in Aksoy v Turkey (1997) 23 E.H.R.R. 553, at para. 56, the Court noted a 
Turkish Prosecutor’s lack of action in investigating whether claims of torture constituted a violation of 
Article 13 of the Convention.  
42 See Airey v Ireland (1979) 2 EHRR 305 and for more recent invocation of this obligation (in the civil 
sphere), Steel and Morris v United Kingdom (2005) 41 E.H.R.R. 403.  
43 A, B & C v Ireland, (2011) 53 EHRR 13, at para. 229. 
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Where, however, there is no consensus within the Member States of the Council of 
Europe, either as to the relative importance of the interest at stake or as to the best 
means of protecting it, particularly where the case raises sensitive moral or ethical 
issues, the margin will be wider (Evans v. the United Kingdom [GC], cited above, § 
77; X., Y. and Z. v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 22 April 1997, Reports of 
Judgments and Decisions 1997-II, § 44; Frette v. France, no. 36515/97, § 41, ECHR 
2002-I; Christine Goodwin, cited above, § 85). As noted above, by reason of their 
direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, the State 
authorities are, in principle, in a better position than the international judge to give an 
opinion, not only on the “exact content of the requirements of morals” in their country, 
but also on the necessity of a restriction intended to meet them (Handyside v. the 
United Kingdom judgment and the other references cited at paragraph 223 above). 
There can be no doubt as to the acute sensitivity of the moral and ethical issues 
raised by the question of abortion or as to the importance of the public interest at 
stake. A broad margin of appreciation is, therefore, in principle to be accorded to the 
Irish State in determining the question whether a fair balance was struck between the 
protection of that public interest, notably the protection accorded under Irish law to 
the right to life of the unborn, and the conflicting rights of the first and second 
applicants to respect for their private lives under Article 8 of the Convention.” 44 
However, in relation to the third applicant (C), in finding a violation of C’s Article 8 
Convention rights, the ECtHR held that: 
“While a broad margin of appreciation is accorded to the State as to the decision 
about the circumstances in which an abortion will be permitted in a State (paragraphs 
231-238 above), once that decision is taken the legal framework devised for this 
purpose should be “shaped in a coherent manner which allows the different 
legitimate interests involved to be taken into account adequately and in accordance 
with the obligations deriving from the Convention” (S.H. and Others v. Austria, no. 
57813/00, § 74, 1 April 2010).” 
Proportionality: Unlike the Charter, which specifically provides for proportionality in its 
text,45  the doctrine of proportionality under the Convention has been developed by the 
ECtHR over many decades, as regards non-absolute Convention rights. This is closely 
linked with the necessity of interference with rights (in particular under Articles 8-11) and the 
                                                             
44 A, B & C v Ireland, (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 13, at para. 232-233. 
45 Article 52(1) of the Charter, discussed below, at p. 105. 
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margin of appreciation States enjoy under the Convention. In essence, the doctrine of 
proportionality seeks to ensure that Convention rights are not interfered with in an 
unnecessarily restrictive manner. The ECtHR has described proportionality in a number of 
different ways: as striking a “fair balance” in determining whether a particular restriction on a 
right is permissible. 46  However, on other occasions the ECtHR has categorised 
proportionality somewhat differently, asking whether the State can justify an interference with 
Convention rights that address a pressing social need, with the restriction of the Convention 
rights corresponding to that need.47 The ECtHR may inquire as to whether the legitimate 
aims sought by the State could have been achieved in a less intrusive manner.48  
 
Ireland before the European Court of Human Rights 
Ireland was one of the first countries to sign the Convention in 195049 and the first country to 
accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ECtHR in February 1953.50 There have been 32 
judgments of the ECtHR involving Ireland between 1959 and 2014. 51  In 21 of these 
judgments, a violation of at least one of the Convention rights has been found. In six of these 
judgments, no violation was found. There was one friendly settlement, and four other 
judgments relating to procedural issues at hand. Table 2.1 below provides an overview of 
the twenty-four substantive determinations by the ECtHR on human rights compliance. The 
ECtHR have assessed Irish law, policy and administration in the areas of criminal law and 
process (in particular as regards the right to silence); civil legal aid; criminalisation of sexual 
conduct between gay men; delay in court process and proceedings, and state responsibility 
for child sex abuse. 
                                                             
46, Applic. No. 45036/98, Bosphorus v Ireland, 30 June 2005, at para. 149-150.  
47 A, B & C v Ireland, (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 13,at  para. 229.  
48 For the most recent analysis of proportionality in this manner by the ECtHR, see Applic. No. 
43643/10, Hanzelkovi v Czech Republic, judgment of the ECtHR (Fifth Chamber) at paras. 74, 76 and 
78.  
49 De Londras, F. and Kenny, C. European Convention on Human Rights Act: Operation, Impact and 
Analysis (Dublin: Roundhall, 2010), at para. 1-04.  
50 Egan, S. “Introduction” in Egan, Thornton and Walsh, Ireland and the European Convention on 
Human Rights: 60 Years and Beyond (Dublin: Bloomsbury, 2014), para. 1.02-1.03. Ireland was the 
second country to accept the right of petition to the European Commission on Human Rights.  
51  Council of Europe, ECHR Overview 1959-2014, p. 7. Available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Overview_19592014_ENG.pdf. [last accessed 14 July 2015.]  
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 Table 2.1 Core Judgments on Ireland before the European Court of Human Rights52 
Case Name ECHR Articles 
Engaged 
Violation? Compliance Core Legal 
Area 
Applic. No. 332/57, 
Lawless v Ireland 
(No. 1; No. 2 & No. 
3), 1960-1961 
Article 7 No Violation  Criminal Law 
Applic. No. 
6289/73, Airey v 
Ireland, 09 October 
1979  
Article 6, Article 8, 
Article 13, Article 
14 
Article 6.1 and 
Article 8 
Introduction of 
non-statutory 
civil legal aid 
scheme (now 
see Civil Legal 
Aid Act 1995 
as amended) 
Access to 
Justice (Civil 
Legal Aid) 
Applic. No. 
9697/82, Johnston 
v Ireland, 18 
December 1986 
Article 8, Article 9, 
Article 12, Article 
14 
Article 8 Status of 
Children Act 
1987 
Family Law 
Applic. No. 
10581/83, Norris v 
Ireland, 26 October 
1988. 
Article 8 Article 8 Criminal Law 
(Sexual 
Offences) Act, 
1993 
Private Life, 
Gender, 
Sexuality 
Applic. No. 
12742/87, Pine 
Valley 
Developments v 
Ireland, 29 
November 1991 
Article 13, Article 
14, Protocol 1, 
Article 1 
Article 14 and 
Protocol 1, Article 
1 
Payment of just 
satisfaction 
Property Law 
Applic. Nos. 
14234/88 & 
14235/88, Open 
Door and Dublin 
Well Women v 
Ireland, 29 October 
1992.  
 
Article 10 Article 10 Thirteenth 
Amendment of 
the 
Constitution 
Act 1992 and 
Regulation of 
Information 
(Services 
outside the 
State for 
Termination of 
Pregnancies) 
Act 1995 
Access to 
Information, 
Reproductive 
Rights 
Applic. No. 
16969/90, Keegan 
v Ireland, 26 May 
Article 6.1, Article 
8, Article 14 
Article 6.1 and 
Article 8 
Adoption Act 
1988 
Family Law 
                                                             
52 For further information, including a review of some these cases, see O’Connell et al. The ECHR Act 
2003: A Preliminary Assessment (Dublin: Law Society, 2006), at pp. 1-10. See also, Egan, S. and 
Forde, A. “From Judgment to Compliance: Domestic Implementation of the Judgments of the 
Strasbourg Court” in Egan, S., Thornton, L. and Walsh, J. Ireland and the European Convention on 
Human Rights: 60 Years and Beyond (Dublin: Bloomsbury, 2014). 
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1994. 
Applic. No. 
36887/97, Quinn v 
Ireland, 21 
December 2000. 
Article 6.1, Article 
6.2, Article 10 
Article 6.1. and 
Article 6.2. 
Section 52 of 
the Offences 
Against the 
State Act, 
1939, remains 
on the statute 
books. See 
also, Quinn v. 
O’Leary and 
Others [2004] 
IEHC 103 
Criminal Law 
Applic. No. 
34720/97, Heaney 
and McGuinness v 
Ireland, 21 
December 2000. 
Article 6.1, Article 
6.2, Article 8, 
Article 10 
Article 6.1. and 
Article 6.2 
Section 52 of 
the Offences 
Against the 
State Act, 
1939, remains 
on the statute 
books.  
Criminal Law 
Applic. No. 
31253/96, 
McElhinney v 
Ireland, 21 
November 2011. 
Article 6.1 No Violation  Tort, Public 
International 
Law 
Applic. No. 
39474/98, DG v 
Ireland, 16 May 
2002. 
 
Article 3, Article 
5.1, Article 5.2, 
Article 8, Article 14 
Article 5.1. and 
Article 5.2 
Children Act 
2001 (although 
significant 
concerns as to 
whether this 
fully complies 
with ECHR 
obligations) 
Mental Health 
Law, Child Law 
Applic. No. 
44179/98, Murphy 
v Ireland, 10 July 
2003. 
Article 10 No Violation  Media Law 
Applic. No. 
50389/99, Doran v 
Ireland, 31 July 
2003. 
Article 6.1 and 
Article 13 
Article 6.1 and 
Article 13 
No clear 
compliance 
evidenced (see 
further: Barry v 
Ireland; Mc 
Mullen v 
Ireland and 
O'Reilly v 
Ireland below). 
Property Law, 
Court 
Procedure, 
Delay. 
Applic. No. 
54725/00, O’Reilly 
and Others v 
Ireland, 29 July 
2004. 
Article 6.1 and 
Article 13 
Article 6.1 and 
Article 13 
No clear 
compliance 
evidenced. 
Court 
Procedure, 
Delay. 
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Applic. No. 
42297/98, 
McMullen v Ireland, 
29 July 2004. 
Article 6.1 Article 6.1 No clear 
compliance 
evidenced. 
Court 
Procedure, 
Delay. 
Applic. No. 
55120/00, 
Independent News 
and Media v 
Ireland, 16 June 
2005. 
Article 10 No Violation  Tort, 
Defamation, 
Damages 
Applic. No. 
45036/98, 
Bosphorus v 
Ireland, 30 June 
2005. 
Protocol 1, Article 
1 
No Violation  Property Law, 
Sanctions 
Applic No. 8273/04, 
Barry v Ireland, 15 
December 2005. 
Article 6.1. and 
Article 13 
Article 6.1. and 
Article 13 
No clear 
compliance 
evidenced. 
Court 
Procedure, 
Delay. 
Applic. No. 
31333/06, 
McFarlane v 
Ireland, 10 
September 2009. 
Article 6 and 
Article 13 
Article 6 and 
Article 13 
No clear 
compliance 
evidenced. A 
further Action 
Plan for 
Compliance 
was recently 
submitted to 
theDepartment 
for Execution 
of judgments of 
the ECtHR in 
May 2015. 53 
Criminal Law, 
Court 
Procedure, 
Delay 
Applic. No. 
41130/06, Kelly v 
Ireland, 14 
December 2010 
Article 6 
Article 13 
No Violation  Criminal Law 
Applic. No. 
25579/05, A, B & C 
v Ireland, 16 
December 2010. 
Article 8 Article 8 (C) Protection of 
Life During 
Pregnancy Act 
2013 
Reproductive 
Rights, 
Abortion Law 
Applic. No. 
7812/04, 
Superwood 
Holdings PLC and 
Article 6.1 Article 6.1. No clear 
compliance 
evidenced. 
Court 
Procedure, 
Delay 
                                                             
53 As Member states undertake to comply with final judgments of the ECtHR (where it finds there have 
been violations of the Convention) (see Articles 46 of the Convention), the adoption by the Member 
State of the necessary execution measures to remedy violations is supervised by the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe, made up of representatives of the governments of the 47 member 
states, assisted by the Department for the Execution of Judgments of the Court (Directorate General 
of Human Rights and Rule of Law). For further info: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Presentation/Pres_Exec_en.asp (last accessed 14 July 
2015) 
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others v Ireland, 08 
September 2011. 
Applic. No. 
19165/08, 
Donohue v Ireland, 
12 December 
2013. 
Article 6 No Violation  Criminal Law, 
Evidence 
Applic. No. 
35810/09 O’Keeffe 
v Ireland, 28 
January 2014. 
Article 3 and 
Article 13 
Article 3 and 
Article 13 
No clear 
compliance 
evidenced. 
Action Plan for 
Compliance 
under review 
by Department 
for Execution 
of judgments of 
the ECtHR 
since January 
2015. 
Tort, Child Law 
 
The Convention and Irish Law 
In Re O’ Laighléis,54 the plaintiff was subject to internment by Ireland under the Offences 
Against the State (Amendment) Act 1940, due to his involvement with a 
proscribed/prohibited organisation, namely the Irish Republican Army. The plaintiff argued 
that this violated Convention rights under Article 5 and Article 6 ECHR (personal liberty and 
right to a judicial hearing on a criminal charge). Maguire C.J. noted: 
“The insurmountable obstacle to the importing of the [ECHR] into domestic law of 
Ireland-if they be at variance with that law, is that [the Constitution in Article 15.2.1] 
provides that “the sole and exclusive power of making laws for the State is hereby 
vested in the Oireachtas; no other legislative authority has power to make laws.” 
Maguire C.J. continued: 
“The Oireachtas has not determined that the [Convention] is to be part of the 
domestic law of the State.” 
This interpretation of the Convention and its relationship with Irish law continued until the 
ECHR Act 2003.  
                                                             
54 In re Ó Laighléis [1960] I.R. 93. For an overview of other cases invoking the Convention pre the 
ECHR Act 2003, see Hogan, G. and Whyte, G.  J.M. Kelly: The Irish Constitution (Dublin: Lexis Nexis 
Butterworths, 2004),  at pp. 794-797, at paras 6.2.91-6.2.93.  
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In Gilligan v Criminal Assets Bureau,55 McGuinness J. stated that since the Oireachtas has 
not adopted the Convention in a manner consistent with the Constitution (Article 15.2.1 and 
Article 29.6), there could be no question:56  
“…that this Court is entitled to have regard to the decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights in construing provisions of the Constitution [but] there can be no 
question of any decision of the European Court of Human Rights furnishing in and of 
itself a basis for declaring legislation unconstitutional…” 
At most, Convention jurisprudence was simply used as an interpretive tool to boost the 
judicial rationale for expanding Constitutional rights protection. It was never used as the sole 
basis for such expansion. However, judges of the Superior Courts (in at least one area as 
regards freedom of expression), noted that the approach of the Irish courts to constitutional 
rights were “closely comparable” to the approach of the ECtHR.57 
On 31 December 2003, the legal landscape changed when the Convention was indirectly 
incorporated into Irish law by the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003. 
 
The European Convention of Human Rights Act 2003: An Overview 
The European Convention of Human Right Act 2003 (hereinafter the ECHR Act 2003) 
indirectly incorporated the Convention into Irish law.58  The effect of the ECHR Act 2003 was 
to simply implement the rights that were protected under the Convention, without direct 
incorporation of the rights therein. In Foy v An tArd-Chlaraitheoir59 McKechnie J. described 
the position of the Convention within Irish law as follows:  
“It is a misleading metaphor to say that the Convention was incorporated into 
domestic law. It was not. The rights contained in the Convention are now part of Irish 
law. They are so by reason of the Act of 2003. That is their source. Not the 
Convention. So it is only correct to say, as understood in this way, that the 
Convention forms part of our law.”  
                                                             
55 Gilligan v Criminal Assets Bureau [1998] 3 I.R. 69. 
56 Gilligan v Criminal Assets Bureau [1998] 3 I.R. 69 at 102. 
57 See, Mahon v Post Publications [2007] 2 I.L.R.M. 1. 
58 See further, Hogan, G. “Incorporation of the ECHR: Some Issues of Methodology and Process” in 
Kilkelly, U. (editor) ECHR and Irish Law (Cork; Jordans, 2004), at pp. 13-14.  
59 Foy v An tArd-Chlaraitheoir [2007] IEHC 470 (19 October 2007) at para. 93 
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The 2003 Act was prospective in nature.60 The ECHR Act 2003 came about, in part, as a 
result of the Belfast Agreement61 and the pledge for comparable human rights protections on 
both sides of the border within the island of Ireland.62  
Section 1 of the ECHR Act 2003 defines “organs of State” as tribunals or other bodies which 
are established by law and which exercise legislative, executive or judicial power. This 
definition does not include the President, the Courts, either House of the Oireachtas, or any 
committees therein. 
Under section 3(1) of the ECHR Act 2003 organs of State must undertake their functions in a 
Convention compliant manner. Where organs of State fail to act in a Convention compliant 
manner, a person may commence proceedings in the Circuit Court or the High Court for 
damages.63  Under section 4 of the ECHR Act 2003 Irish courts (but not tribunals)64 must 
take judicial notice of judgments, decisions, declarations and advisory opinions of bodies 
that include the European Court of Human Rights.65 Section 2 of the ECHR Act 2003 poses 
an obligation on the Irish courts to interpret statutory provisions and rules of law in a 
Convention compliant manner. Section 2(2) of the ECHR Act 2003 states that this applies to 
statutory provisions and rules of law in force before and after the coming into operation of 
the 2003 Act.66  
Where it is not possible to interpret a rule of law in a Convention compliant manner, the High 
Court or Supreme Court may grant a declaration of incompatibility under section 5(1) of the 
ECHR Act 2003.67 Declarations of incompatibility may be made where no other remedy is 
available. Where a declaration of incompatibility is granted, under section 5(2) (a) of the 
ECHR Act 2003 the rule of law or statutory provision which is incompatible with the ECHR 
                                                             
60  In Dublin City Council v Fennell [2005] 1 I.R. 604, the Supreme Court held that despite the 
provisions of section 2(2) of the 2003 Act, which obliges the Court to interpret legislation in a 
Convention compliant manner, the 2003 Act was not retrospective in nature. 
61 See generally the “Human Rights” section of the Belfast Agreement, which obliged the United 
Kingdom to incorporate the European Convention of Human Rights into domestic law (para. 2 of the 
section “Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity”).   
62 However, it should be noted that there was no specified obligation upon the Irish government to 
incorporate the Convention into Irish law. See Hogan, G. “The Belfast Agreement and the Future 
Incorporation of the ECHR in the Republic of Ireland” (1999) Bar Review 205.  
63 Section 3(2) of the ECHR Act 2003. Damages are limited to that available within each Court as if it 
exercising its tort jurisdiction.  
64 See below, p. 46 et seq. 
65 In addition, Courts are expected to take notice of any decision of the European Commission on 
Human Rights and any decision of the Committee of Ministers, see section 4 of the ECHR Act 2003.  
66 See further, Hogan, G. “Incorporation of the ECHR: Some Issues of Methodology and Process” in 
Kilkelly, U. (editor) ECHR and Irish Law (Cork; Jordans, 2004), at p. 28.  
67 Section 5(1) of the ECHR Act 2003.  
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will continue in operation.68 Under section 5(3) of the ECHR Act 2003, the Taoiseach must 
bring the offending rule or statute to the attention of the Oireachtas within 21 days. Once an 
individual is granted a declaration of incompatibility, the individual is entitled to apply for an 
ex gratia payment to the Attorney General under section 5(2) of the ECHR Act 2003.69 The 
Government in its sole discretion will then consider whether any payment will be made.70  
Where a litigant seeks a declaration of incompatibility under the ECHR Act 2003, the 
Attorney General and the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission are to be provided 
with notice of the proceedings. The Attorney General is entitled to appear in proceedings.71  
Unlike the Charter when areas of European Union law are under judicial scrutiny in Irish 
Courts,72 the Convention does not have the potential to be directly effective in Irish law.73 
However, as will be discussed in chapter 4, the Convention is more broadly applicable to all 
fields of law. The scope of application of the Charter is limited, in the domestic setting, to 
matters falling within the scope of EU law (see chapter 5). 
In the next chapter, the authors explore some horizontal, cross-cutting issues that have 
arisen in the Irish jurisprudence to date applying the Convention and the ECHR Act 2003, in 
the years 2004-2014.  
                                                             
68 Section 5(2)(b) of the ECHR Act 2003 states that a declaration of incompatibility does not prevent 
an individual from bring a case against Ireland before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).  
69  To date, one such ex gratia payment of “about €50,000” has been made. Mac Cormaic, R. 
“Compensation paid to Lydia Foy over gender recognition failures”, Irish Times, 03 November 2014. 
70 Section 5(2)(c) of the ECHR Act 2003. The Government may appoint an adviser who will examine 
the level of payment which may be made. In doing so, the adviser is to have regard to the level of 
damages which the ECtHR awards.  
71 Section 6 of the ECHR Act 2003. For role of the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission, see 
above p. 13 et seq. 
72 The relationship between the Charter and the Convention in Irish law is explored in more depth 
below, see pp. 113-116. 
73 The distinction between the Charter and Convention as regards direct effect of EU law is discussed 
below, see pp. 104-107. 
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Chapter Three: The Convention/ECHR Act 2003 before Irish 
Courts/Tribunals – Horizontal Issues 
 
This chapter considers the following cross-cutting, horizontal issues relating to consideration 
of the Convention before the Irish courts: 
1. Sequencing and pleadings of legal claims as regards the ECHR and the Constitution; 
2. Cross-fertilisation between the rights protected in the ECHR Act 2003 and the Irish 
Constitution;1 
3. Convention rights, retrospectivity and the ECHR Act 2003; 
4. Interpretative obligations under the ECHR Act 2003;  
5. Damages & effective remedies for rights violations under the ECHR Act 2003; 
Declarations of incompatibility and the ECHR Act 2003 
 
Sequencing and Pleading of Legal Claims as regards the Constitution 
and the Convention 
The Irish Constitution contains a number of rights, explicitly or implicitly, which prima facie 
overlap with rights contained in the Convention. For instance, Ireland’s constitution, 
Bunreacht na hEireann (1937), recognises “Fundamental Rights” under Articles 40 to 44,2 
including the right to equality, personal liberty, education, family rights, property rights, 
freedom of expression, and peaceful assembly. Walsh J. in the Supreme Court in McGee 
held that,  
“…natural rights or human rights, are not created by law, but […] the Constitution 
affirms their existence and gives them protection.”3  
Fundamental rights provisions in the Constitution are regarded as being,  
“…of universal application and apply to all human beings.”4 
                                                             
1 The relationship between the Convention and the Constitution is also considered in Chapter 2. For 
the relationship between the Constitution, the Convention and the Charter, see below, Chapters 6 & 
7. . 
2 See Hogan, G & Whyte, G. The Irish Constitution (Dublin: Tottel, 2006 reprint), Chapters 7-10.  
3 McGee v Attorney General [1974] I.R. 284 at 318.  
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Due process in criminal trials and access to the courts are also guaranteed by Articles 38 
and 34 respectively of the Constitution.  
This potential overlap in the rights protected raises the question of the interrelationship 
between Constitutional and Convention protection in the case of these rights, and the order 
in which such claims should be considered by the courts.   
In Carmody v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform,5 the Supreme Court held that in 
any action that challenges the constitutionality of a legislative provision (and this would 
equally apply to any rule of law), as well as the compatibility of that provision with the ECHR 
Act 2003, the constitutional claim must be considered first.  
In the Superior Courts, since McD v L,6 judges have generally brought Convention rights into 
play via the ECHR Act 2003. As Murray C.J. held in that case: 
“Even though the contracting parties undertake to protect convention rights by 
national measures, the Convention does not purport to be directly applicable in the 
national legal systems of the high contracting parties. Nor does the Convention 
require those parties to incorporate the provisions of the Convention as part of its 
domestic law. So far as the Convention is concerned it is a matter for each 
contracting party to fulfil its obligations within the framework of its own constitution 
and laws. The Convention does not seek to harmonise the laws of the contracting 
states but seeks to achieve a minimum level of protection of the rights specified in 
the Convention leaving the states concerned to adopt a higher level of protection 
should they choose to do so.” 7 
In so holding, Murray J. overruled Hedigan J. in the High Court decision in McD v L which 
sought to identify independent autonomous claims arising under Article 8 of the Convention, 
i.e., a kind of direct effect. In the Supreme Court, however, this approach was criticised, with 
Murray C.J. holding that the High Court:8 
“had no jurisdiction to apply directly the provisions of the Convention in that manner. 
In considering and determining those issues the High Court was not exercising, or 
indeed purporting to exercise, a function pursuant to s. 2 of the Act of 2003 and no 
issue had arisen under ss. 3 or 5 of the Act of 2003. Accordingly there was no basis 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
4 Northampton Co. Council v A.B.F & M.B.F.. [1982] I.L.R.M. 164 at 166, per Hamilton J.  
5 Carmody v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] 1 I.R. 653. (See also, 2009 [IESC] 
71.) 
6 McD v L [2010] 2 IR 199 
7 McD v L [2010] 2 I.R. 199 at 248. 
8 McD v L [2010] 2 I.R. 199 at 255. 
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in law for applying article 8 of the Convention to the status of the respondents or any 
of the parties. On those grounds alone the ruling of the High Court that the 
respondents and the child were a family for the purpose of article 8, may be set 
aside.” 
Further, it is now settled by the Supreme Court that, when pleading the Convention before 
the Courts, this should be done solely by reference to the limited incorporation through the 
ECHR Act 2003. Reference should not be made to Irish law “violating the Convention”, but 
the precise statutory provision or rule of law that is being challenged must be identified, and 
arguments as to its compliance or otherwise with the Convention, must be based strictly on 
the interpretative obligation upon the Courts, the duty on any organ of State to act in a 
Convention compliant manner, and/or the duty on the Courts to grant a declaration of 
incompatibility regarding a precise statutory provision or rule of law. In M.D. (a minor) v 
Ireland,9 the Supreme Court made clear that claims asserting that particular statutory or 
administrative practices of the State are “in breach” of the Convention, without further 
reference to the ECHR Act 2003, should not entertained by the court. Denham C.J. stated:10 
“The claim, as pleaded, is simply that s. 3 is “in breach of” the Convention. That 
formulation is not acceptable. It treats the Convention as if it had direct effect and 
presumes that the Court has the power to grant a declaration that a section is in 
breach of the Convention. It is clear from the judgments of this Court in McD v L 
[2010] 2 IR 199 that the  European Convention on Human Rights  Act 2003 did not 
give direct effect in Irish law to the  European Convention on Human Rights. As 
Murray C.J. stated at page 248, ’The Convention does not of itself provide a remedy 
at national level for victims whose rights have been breached by reference to the 
provisions of the Convention.’”   
 
Cross-fertilisation between Rights Protected in the Constitution, the 
Convention and the ECHR Act 2003  
Writing extra-judicially in 2014, Hogan states:11 
                                                             
9 M.D. (a minor) v Ireland [2012] IESC 10, in particular see paras. 57-64.  
10 M.D. (a minor) v Ireland [2012] IESC 10 at para. 59.  
11 Hogan, G. “The Constitution and the Convention: Happily Married or a Loveless Co-Existence” in 
Egan, Thornton and Walsh, Ireland and the European Convention on Human Rights: 60 Years and 
Beyond (Dublin: Bloomsbury, 2014) at p. 73. 
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“The enactment of the 2003 Act was hugely important (both at a symbolic and 
practical level) and it has made a difference, in particular by raising the awareness of 
the Convention and by ensuring that (subject to certain conditions) it had the force of 
law in the State.  Further, there is no doubt but that the incorporation of the 
Convention has altered the perspective of the Irish courts in relation to some existing 
rights.” 
The extent of cross-fertilisation of rights standards between the Convention and Constitution 
can be hard to decipher. The clearest example of this cross-fertilisation of Convention rights 
with Constitutional rights has occurred in The People (D.P.P.) v Gormley.12 In this case, 
which concerned the issue of whether questioning of an accused person could take place in 
the absence of a solicitor, the Supreme Court noted significant Convention jurisprudence on 
the rights of accused persons in police custody. The Supreme Court held that, once an 
accused person had requested a solicitor, barring any exceptional circumstances, 
questioning of the accused should not commence until they have had the opportunity to 
consult a solicitor. Focusing on the fusion of Convention jurisprudence and constitutional 
rights, Clarke J. stated:13 
“The likelihood that the State would be required, as the UK Supreme Court put it in 
Cadder, to organise its systems to take account of such rights has been on the 
agenda for a sufficient period of time that a finding that the constitutional right to a fair 
trial encompasses the right to access to legal advice before questioning can hardly 
come as a surprise. If it be the case that the State has not, to date, organised itself in 
a manner sufficient to allow such questioning to take place in conformity not just with 
the Constitution but also with the well-established jurisprudence of the ECtHR, then it 
is those who are in charge of putting such provisions in place who must accept 
responsibility.” 
In C.A. & T.A.,14 Mac Eochaidh J., considering a number of human rights claims challenging 
the system of direct provision for asylum seekers, held that rights enjoyed under Article 3 
and Article 8 of the Convention were similar in scope to, if not the same as, rights under 
Articles 40.1, 40.3, 40.5, 41 and 42.1 of the Constitution.15  
                                                             
12 The People (D.P.P.) v Gormley [2014] 1 I.L.R.M. 377. Discussed in more detail below at p. 74. 
13 [2014] 1 I.L.R.M. 377 at 404. 
14 C.A. & anor v Minister for Justice and Equality & ors [2014] IEHC 532.  
15  [2014] IEHC 532, para 7.2 (Article 3 and the Constitution); paras 8.1-8.6 (Article 8 and the 
Constitution); para 8.9 (Article 8 (home), and Article 40.5). This case is discussed in more detail 
below, pp. 93 and 104, etc.  
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In O’Donnell (a minor) v. South Dublin County Council (2007),16 which concerned a human 
rights challenge to certain aspects of the Housing Acts 1996-2004, the High Court seemed 
less inclined to equate constitutional rights with Convention rights. While finding a breach of 
Article 8 of the Convention in this case,17 on the constitutional point, Laffoy J. stated: 
“The plaintiffs’ allegation of such breach, as pleaded, is that the defendant failed to 
properly respect, vindicate and act in accordance with their constitutional rights, 
including their right to bodily integrity, their right not to have their health endangered, 
and their right to respect for their private and family life… Counsel reminded the court 
of the caveats issued by the Supreme Court in T.D. v. Minister for Education [2001] 4 
I.R. 259: first that, save where an unenumerated right has been unequivocally 
established by precedent, for example, the right to travel and the right to privacy, 
some degree of judicial restraint is called for in identifying new rights (per Keane C.J. 
at p. 281); and, secondly, the inadvisability of the courts at any stage assuming the 
function of declaring what are frequently described as “socio-economic rights” to be 
unenumerated rights guaranteed by Article 40 (per Keane C.J. at p. 282)… I am not 
satisfied that a case has been made out that the defendant has infringed the 
plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.” 18 
A similar result emerged in O’Donnell & Others v South Dublin County Council & Others 
(2008),19 similarly in the field of housing law under the Housing Acts 1966-2004, where 
Edwards J. in the High Court held that, while the applicant’s Article 8 rights under the 
Convention were violated, there had not been a breach of any constitutional rights. However, 
the O’Donnell (2008) decision must now be read in light of the Supreme Court decision, on 
appeal.20 MacMenamin J. in the Supreme Court emphasised that the non-compliance of the 
local authority with the Housing Acts breached Convention rights. MacMenamin J., however, 
stated that the rights of the minor applicant should have been considered firstly “in light of 
the Constitution”. MacMenamin J. noted:21 
“The preamble to the Constitution outlines the values of promoting the common good 
with due observance of prudence, justice and charity, so that “the dignity and 
freedom of the individual may be assured”. It is clear that constitutional values 
                                                             
16 O’Donnell (a minor) v. South Dublin County Council [2011] 3 I.R. 417. This case, while raising 
similar issues as O’Donnell & Others v South Dublin County Council & Others [2008] IEHC 454, 
involve different plaintiffs.  
17 For discussion on Convention points for this and other similar cases, see below pp. 98-100.  
18 [2011] 3 I.R. 417 at 453-454.  
19 O’Donnell & Others v South Dublin County Council & Others [2008] IEHC 454.  
20 O'Donnell & ors v South Dublin County Council & ors [2015] IESC 28.  
21 [2015] IESC 28 at para. 68 
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established by our jurisprudence, specifically those of autonomy, bodily integrity and 
privacy, are engaged here (In the matter of A Ward of Court (withholding medical 
treatment) (No. 2) [1996] 2 I.R. 75, and Ryan v AG [1965] I.R. 294). The position of 
Ellen O’Donnell is distinct by virtue of the evidence. Of course, in every family 
situation, and in all forms of accommodation, the constitutional values just identified 
are compromised by the inevitable activities of other family members, or economics, 
or lack of space. But because of the exceptional overcrowding, and the destruction of 
the sanitation facilities, and in light of Ellen O’Donnell’s disability, her capacity to live 
to an acceptable human standard of dignity was gravely compromised. Her integrity 
as a person was undermined. Her rights to autonomy, bodily integrity and privacy 
were substantially diminished. The Council was aware of the issue.” 
MacMenamin J. then went somewhat further, than the High Court in finding: 
“insofar as Ellen O’Donnell is concerned, this is not only a case about parental 
choices, rights and duties (though these arise), but also about the duty of the 
Council, when faced with clear evidence of inhuman and degrading conditions, to 
ensure that it carried out its statutory duty. This was to vindicate, insofar as was 
practicable, in the words of Article 40.3 of the Constitution, the rights of one young 
woman with incapacities to whom, by virtue of the evidence, the Council owed a 
discrete and special duty under Article 40 of the Constitution. That statutory duty 
[under the Housing Acts] is to be informed with due regard to Ellen O’Donnell’s 
capacity as a human person (Article 40.1 Constitution of Ireland).” 
The legal duty on the Council by virtue of the Housing Acts, due to the high level of detailed 
knowledge that they had on the minor applicant’s living conditions, 
“…is sufficient to lead to the consequence of fixing the County Council with a duty 
under s.10 [Housing (Traveller Accommodation) Act, 1998] to take practicable steps 
on foot of the request for accommodation which was made to it (see s.10(2)). At its 
highest, that duty was, then, to “provide a homeless person with such assistance 
(including financial assistance) as the authority considered appropriate” (see 
s.10(1)(a)), or to “rent accommodation, arrange lodgings or contribute to the cost of 
such accommodation or lodging for this young person who was homeless” (see 
s.10(c))… The evidence, therefore, does not show that the County Council performed 
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its statutory duty, towards Ellen, “insofar as it was practicable” as the Constitution 
provides.”22 
However, the Supreme Court ruled,  
“…there was no basis “under the statutes or the Constitution, for a finding in favour of 
Mr, and Mrs. O’Donnell in their claim for a second caravan.” 
The only remedies open to the minor applicant were damages under the ECHR Act 2003, to 
be assessed with regard to the Civil Liability Act 1961.23 
In the two cases wherein declarations of incompatibility have been issued, the status of the 
successful Convention right invoked was discussed in context of the Constitution. 
In Foy (No. 1), the plaintiff, a post-operative male-to-female transgender person, claimed 
that the refusal of the Registrar General to correct mistakes to the plaintiff’s birth certificate, 
and to recognise that the plaintiff was of the female gender, violated constitutional rights to 
privacy, dignity, and the protection of her person under Articles 40.1, 40.3 and 40.3.2 of the 
Constitution.24 Rejecting this claim, (which came prior to the ECHR Act 2003 and dealt with 
legislation pre the Civil Registration Act 2004), McKechnie J. determined:  
“The State’s obligations under Articles 40.3.1 and 40.3.2 of the Constitution are 
circumscribed in that under the former section the law must respect “as far as 
possible” the rights in question and under the latter section must “by its laws protect 
as best it may” from unjust attack the right to life, person, good name and property 
rights of every citizen. When one therefore considers whether the existing situation 
represents a fair, reasonable and just balance, between the rights of those persons 
affected via their legal relationship with a transsexual and the rights of the latter, as 
asserted and sought to be vindicated in the manner requested in this case, I am of 
the view that it does. Of course I acknowledge that some inconvenience is still 
caused to the transsexual but I feel that this has been ameliorated very considerably 
in the past decade. A continuation of the applicant’s unease has to be viewed as 
against competing constitutional rights and the State’s entitlement to act for the 
benefit of the common good. I am therefore of the opinion that the degree of intrusion 
on the human dignity and privacy of the applicant is not so excessive or 
disproportionate in the circumstances outlined as would breach either of these 
                                                             
22 [2015] IESC 28 at para. 74.  
23 [2015] IESC 28 at paras. 85-87.  
24 [2012] 2 I.R. 1 at 11. 
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constitutional rights…. I am of the opinion that any difference of treatment between 
the applicant and a biological female is not in my view either unjust; invidious or 
arbitrary. Despite advances in surgery a male to female transsexual can never shed 
entirely, that persons male biological characteristics and likewise can never acquire, 
in many material respects, vital characteristics of the female sex.” 25 
In Foy (No. 2),26 the plaintiff sought a declaration of  incompatibility under section 5 of the 
ECHR Act 2003, in relation to the said refusal of the Registrar General. While succeeding on 
the Convention and ECHR Act 2003 arguments, 27  McKechnie J. again rejected the 
constitutional arguments,28 holding,29 
“The facts which she relies upon and the submissions which she makes in this regard 
are, subject to one variation, virtually identical to those previously advanced and 
dealt with in the July, 2002 judgment. Whilst this court at that time, both 
acknowledged and affirmed the applicant's right to equality, to privacy, to dignity and 
to freedom, it nevertheless concluded for the reasons set out, that the statutory 
provisions then applicable did not breach any of these rights. In addition at para. 175 
of the judgment, the court considered whether the prohibition on persons of the same 
biological sex from marrying each other could be said to be inconsistent with the 
constitutional right to marry. For the reasons again set forth in that judgment it 
concluded that such a prohibition did not violate any right of the applicant in this 
regard. Such findings, insofar are the same are applicable to the Act of 2004, remain 
binding on the applicant.” 
McKechnie J. noted the impact of the enactment of the ECHR Act 200330 and the significant 
shift in Convention interpretation and jurisprudence on transgender issues since Foy (No. 
1).31  The State argued that McKechnie J. should not grant a declaration of incompatibility 
as, 
“the applicant could not identify any particular provision(s) which prohibited the 
exercise of these rights. In other words, since the applicant's case was firmly based 
                                                             
25 Foy v An tArd-Chlaraitheoir (No. 1) [2002] IEHC 116, at paras 173-174. 
26 Foy (No. 2) v An tArd-Chlaraitheoir [2012] 2 I.R. 1.  
27 [2012] 2 I.R. 1 at 23-31 and 39-63.  
28 [2012] 2 I.R. 1 at 11. 
29 [2012] 2 I.R. 1 at 38.  
30 [2012] 2 I.R. 1 at 23-31.  
31 [2012] 2 I.R. 1 at 39-58. McKechnie J. noted in particular the decision of the European Court of 
Human Rights in Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 18.  
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on the State's failure to enact appropriate legislation, rather than in condemning an 
existing piece of legislation, she could not successfully seek these said remedies.” 32 
In granting a declaration of incompatibility, McKechnie J. held, 
“the failure by the State, through the absence of having any measures to honour the 
Convention rights of its citizens, is every bit as much a breach of its responsibility as 
if it had enacted a piece of prohibited legislation. On a daily basis the High Court 
sees constitutional actions being successfully taken by reason of the State's failure to 
have in place, for example, proper educational facilitates for its minors. Moreover in 
many of the cases dealt with by the European Court of Human Rights, and which are 
referred to above, that court has considered (and found) violations of articles 8 and 
12 expressly on the grounds of the respondent's State's failure to have in place a 
system of law affording to a transsexual person proper respect for his or her 
Convention rights.” 33 
In granting this declaration of incompatibility, McKenchie J. noted that this was “by far the 
most suitable remedy”, but 
“…the respondent State still retains a margin of appreciation as to the most 
appropriate method by which the applicant's rights can be vindicated. In so doing I 
see no reason why the State, consistent with upholding such rights, cannot also 
make provision for the accrued rights of others, meaning those who have been or are 
affected, impacted, or touched by this decision. Whilst in particular I have in mind the 
position of Mrs. Foy and the two children of their marriage, there is a wider 
community also involved. I said very much the same in the last para. of the July, 
2002 judgment (see para. 128 supra ). Therefore the precise model which might be 
used in still very much a matter for the Oireachtas and not this court.” 
The other declaration of incompatibility issued to date was issued by the Supreme Court in 
Donegan v Dublin City Council,34 which concerned section 62 of the Housing Acts.  The 
constitutionality of this section had been upheld previously,35 with the Supreme Court holding 
in Dublin City Council v Fennell:36 
                                                             
32 [2012] 2 I.R. 1 at 59. 
33 [2012] 2 I.R. 1 at 60. 
34 Donegan v Dublin City Council [2012] 3 I.R. 600. 
35 The State (O'Rourke) v Kelly  [1983] I.R. 58 
36 Dublin City Council v Fennell [2005] 1 I.R. 604 
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“…it is clear that the statutory process involved in an application for possession by a 
housing authority under s. 62 of the Act of 1966 has survived constitutional and 
judicial scrutiny, not least because of the obvious need of a housing authority to be 
able effectively to manage and control its housing stock without being unduly 
restricted or fettered whilst so doing. Obviously a housing authority must not abuse 
its powers of discretion when exercising those powers and where it does so the 
proper remedy is that of a judicial review application to the High Court.” 37 
In Donegan, the Supreme Court recognised that, while section 62 of the Housing Act 1966 
was constitutional as regards fair procedures under Article 40.3.1, it was not compliant with 
Article 8 of the Convention, in light of ECtHR jurisprudence.38 The substantive elements of 
this case are discussed in chapter four.39 
 
Convention Rights, Retrospectivity and the ECHR Act 2003 
In Fennell,40 the Supreme Court held that the ECHR Act 2003 did not have retrospective 
effect. The Supreme Court held that Dublin City Council, utilising its statutory powers under 
section 62 of the Housing Act 1966, did not have to perform its functions or exercise its 
powers in a Convention-compliant manner at the time.41 Kearns J. noted the relationship 
between the Convention and Irish law prior to the ECHR Act 2003: 
“Prior to the Act of 2003…the Convention was said to be "binding on Ireland, but not 
in it". The Government was obliged to accept the ruling of the European Court in 
judgments against it, but the Convention otherwise placed no direct obligations on 
public authorities. Furthermore, legislative, executive or judicial measures, which 
appeared to conflict with the Convention, could not be the subject of a Convention 
specific challenge in the domestic courts. Nor were the courts required to consider 
relevant Convention caselaw, although, of course, decisions of the European Court 
have frequently been cited over the years as persuasive authority for the guidance of 
Irish courts where a particular issue was not governed by any specific domestic 
                                                             
37 Dublin City Council v Fennell [2005] 1 I.R. 604 at 614, per Kearns J. 
38 Donegan v Dublin City Council [2012] 3 I.R. 600, in particular at pp. 624-636, where McKechnie J. 
outlines the key ECtHR jurisprudence on these issues. 
39 See below, pp. 94-100.  
40 Dublin City Council v Fennell [2005] 1 I.R. 604. 
41 See also, Rooney v Minister for Agriculture, Food and Forestry & Ors [2004] IEHC 305. As de 
Londras and Kelly note (p. 47), as per section 2 of the 2003 Act, pre-existing legislation/ common law 
etc. even if enacted prior to the enforcement of the 2003 Act, must now be interpreted, in so far as is 
possible, in a Convention compliant manner.  
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statutory provision or rule of law. However, the bottom line was that those who 
sought to have Convention rights vindicated could only do so before the European 
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, with the added requirements that they first 
exhaust all domestic remedies and then make application within a strict six month 
deadline.” 42 
In finding that provisions of the ECHR Act 2003 were not retrospective, Kearns J. stated: 
“[T]he proceedings were not merely pending but had proceeded to final determination 
in one court and a notice of appeal had been lodged to another court prior to the 
coming into operation of the new statute. The parties' legal rights and obligations 
were, in my view, fixed and determined once the wheel was set in motion by the 
service of a notice to quit, an act which triggered the provisions, requirements and 
consequences of Section 62 of the Housing Act…”43 
Therefore, administrative actions occurring prior to the entry into force of the 2003 Act could 
not be impugned on the basis that the relevant authority had (allegedly) acted in a manner 
that was not compliant with the Convention. The only option therefore for an applicant in 
Fennell’s position claiming a breach of Convention rights was to bring a case to the ECtHR. 
As Laffoy J. noted in Byrne v An Taoiseach,44 
“The Act of 2003 introduced a starting point at which the liability of an organ of the 
State for failure to perform its functions in a manner compatible with the provisions of 
the Convention arises under national law which is fixed in time, irrespective of the 
evolution of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights which may 
give rise to additional obligations on the part of the State at the level of international 
law.” 45 
So while the ECHR Act 2003 may act as a useful means of ensuring Convention 
compliance, there are limitations to its usefulness, in particular as regards State action prior 
to the ECHR Act 2003. While claimants may have to satisfy limitation periods under 
domestic law, recourse to Strasbourg may still, in certain instances, be the only effective 
remedy available to litigants. 
 
                                                             
42 [2005] 1 I.R. 604 at 615.  
43 [2005] 1 I.R. 604 at 338-339. 
44 Byrne v An Taoiseach [2011] 1 I.R. 190. 
45 Byrne v An Taoiseach [2011] 1 I.R. 190 at 218. 
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Interpretative Obligations (section 2, ECHR Act 2003) 
Legal practitioners have sought to utilise the interpretative obligation under the ECHR Act 
2003 as a means of enhancing discretionary, statutory and constitutional rights of 
individuals. The Irish Superior Courts have made clear:46 
 The Irish courts are bound to continue applying the rules of statutory construction 
which applied prior to the 2003 Act; 
 Courts must first consider the correct construction of the statutory provision (or rule of 
law) interpreted in the light of the Convention; 
 Courts must consider whether it is possible, without doing violence to the purpose of 
the statutory provision, to give the relevant provision a Convention meaning; 
 Irish courts should “not adopt interpretations of the Convention at variance with the 
current Strasbourg jurisprudence”;47 
 Where this is not possible, and if there is a breach of Convention rights, then the only 
solution open to the Court is a declaration of incompatibility.  
In McD v L, Murray C.J. stated that section 2 of the 2003 Act,  
“…is not a basis for founding an autonomous claim based on a breach of a particular 
section of the Act. It is an interpretative provision and is limited to requiring that a court, 
so far as possible, when interpreting or applying any "statutory provision" or "rule of law" 
do so in a manner compatible with the State's obligations under the Convention. In 
exercising its jurisdiction pursuant to s. 2 a court must identify the statutory provisions or 
rule of law which it is interpreting or applying. Even then it is subject to any rule of law 
relating to interpretation and application.” 48 
Murray C.J. analysed the section 2 of the 2003 Act obligation on the courts in interpreting 
statutory provisions and rules of law in a Convention-compliant manner, and recognised the 
fluidity of this obligation: 
“the Oireachtas in providing, in the most general terms, that the laws which it passes 
are to be interpreted to the extent possible in accordance with the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights (or decisions of the Committee of Ministers) that 
                                                             
46 See generally: Donegan v Dublin City Council [2012] 3 I.R. 600.  
47 McD v L [2010] 2 I.R. 199 at 316, per Fennelly J.  
48 McD v L [2010] 2 I.R. 199 at 250-251. 
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the Oireachtas itself will not always be in a position to perceive or even contemplate, 
by recourse to any objective considerations, the meaning, by reference to the 
Convention, which may subsequently be given to the provision of an Act which it is 
passing (and which it might have passed in altogether different terms if it could have). 
This raises questions as to how the intent of the Oireachtas by reference to the text 
of a statute which it has adopted in accordance with the Constitution is to be 
determined and the relevance of that intent to its interpretation. These questions are 
relevant to the role of the Oireachtas in whom ’the sole and exclusive power of 
making laws for the State‘ is vested by Article 15.2 of the Constitution. Perhaps the 
answers to such questions lie in whole or in part in the proviso in s. 2, by which the 
requirement to interpret a statute in a manner compatible with the Convention is 
’subject to the rules of law relating to such interpretation and application’” 49 
Fennelly J., in his judgment in the same case, struck a note of warning that, in interpreting 
statutory provisions: 
“The national courts do not become Convention courts." 50 
The Supreme Court has emphasised that, where courts are called upon to interpret a 
statutory provision in a Convention-compliant manner, the courts should not engage in a 
“redrafting exercise”,51 in order to read legislation in such a manner.  
An excellent example of this cautious approach by the courts can be seen in Ryan v Clare 
County Council. Section 34(8)(f) of the Planning and Development Act 2000 (hereinafter the 
2000 Act) provides that if a planning authority is silent as regards a planning application 
within eight weeks, planning permission is deemed to be granted: 
“Where a planning authority fails to make a decision within the period specified in 
paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d) or (e), a decision by the planning authority to grant the 
permission shall be regarded as having been given on the last day of that period.”52 
There was no requirement to notify the appellant planning applicant or any notice parties of 
this deemed grant of planning permission.  
Clare County Council argued on appeal that section 34(8)(f) of the 2000 Act had to be read 
in a Convention-compliant manner, namely, in conformity with Articles 6 and 8, and with 
                                                             
49 McD v L [2010] 2 I.R. 199 at 315 at 252.  
50 McD v L [2010] 2 I.R. 199 at 315.  
51 Ryan v Clare County Council [2014] IESC 67 at para. 54. 
52 Ibid. 
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Article 1 of Protocol 1, of the Convention, such that the objections of notice parties should be 
taken into account in all planning decisions. The Supreme Court noted that the respondents 
and notice parties to the proceedings did not seek a declaration of incompatibility under 
section 5 of the 2003 Act.53 While the Supreme Court accepted that such deemed planning 
permission may impact (even significantly) on the rights of the respondents and notice 
parties under the above-named Articles of the Convention, section 2 of the 2003 Act did not 
make it possible, 
“to construe the section so as to provide the form of protection of potential 
[Convention] right[s]…” 54 
The Supreme Court noted that in reality the arguments of the respondent and notice parties 
would effectively mean that the Court would be making additions to section 34(8)(f) of the 
2000 Act to read: 
“Where a planning authority fails to make a decision within the period specified in 
paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d) or (e), a decision by the planning authority to grant the 
permission shall be regarded as having been given on the last day of the period” and 
then to add the words ‘save where third parties have made submissions or 
observations pursuant to s.4(3)(b)’” 55 
To interpret the 2000 Act in such a manner would have obliged the Court to adopt a 
construction of section 34(8)(f) of the 2000 Act that,  
“could not be said to be implied in this section, nor could it be capable of implication, 
even if there was supporting ECtHR case law to support such an interpretation.”56 
In M.O.I v Refugee Appeals Tribunal57 the applicant challenged the decision of the Refugee 
Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) on the basis that the decision maker did not consider 
Convention rights grounds, in particular based on Articles 2, 3, 5 8 and 10 of the Convention. 
Counsel for the applicant argued that section 2 of the 2003 Act obliged the Tribunal Member 
to have regard to the substance of Convention rights in interpreting the Refugee Act 1996. 
Mac Eochaidh J. rejected this argument, holding that:  
                                                             
53 [2014] IESC 67 at para. 47. 
54 [2014] IESC 67 at para. 54.  
55 [2014] IESC 67 at para. 54. Emphasis in original judgment, outlining how the Court would have to 
read the relevant statutory provision if the respondent’s and notice parties arguments were accepted. 
56  In any event MacMenamin J. stated obiter that he did not believe Convention rights were 
necessarily engaged in this particular case, see: [2014] IESC 67 at para. 55. 
57 M.O.I v Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2014] IEHC 291. 
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“section 1 of the ECHR Act 2003 provides the definitions to be used throughout the 
Act and expressly refers to an "organ of the State" as including "a tribunal or any 
other body (other than...a court) which is established by law or through which any of 
the legislative, executive or judicial powers of the State are exercised." As such, the 
definition clearly indicates that the Refugee Appeals Tribunal comes within the 
provisions of s. 3 of the ECHR Act 2003 which is referable to an "organ of the State" 
rather than s. 2. It is clear that s. 2 applies specifically to "a court" which does not 
include the Refugee Appeals Tribunal for the purposes of the section and the 
applicant's claims in this regard must fail. 
I reject the argument that s. 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights Act 
2003 requires the Tribunal Member to apply or consider the provisions of the 
European Convention on Human Rights in deciding on an asylum claim. 
Self-evidently, the section is directed to the duties of a Court to interpret and apply 
the law of the State in a manner compatible with the State's obligations under the 
Convention.” 58 
Mac Eochaidh J. held that the “sole function” of the  Tribunal was to determine whether an 
individual was a refugee within the meaning of section 2 of the Refugee Act 1996 and,  
“while the rights available under the constitution and the convention are applicable to 
the manner in which the Tribunal carries out its functions, they simply do not arise in 
terms of making an assessment on refugee status.” 59 
As well as the Tribunal not being obliged to consider Convention rights, Mac Eochaidh J. 
further held that section 4 of the 2003 Act did not oblige Tribunal Members to take “judicial 
notice” of Convention jurisprudence from the ECtHR.60  
This interpretation of the ECHR Act 2003 was based on the limited role for the Tribunal in 
deciding an applicant’s refugee (and now subsidiary protection) claim. However, it will also 
impact on all other quasi-judicial bodies/tribunals in the State. While such bodies will have to 
act in a Convention-compliant manner, there is no obligation on these bodies to take “judicial 
notice” of Convention jurisprudence.  
                                                             
58 M.O.I v Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2014] IEHC 291 at paras. 10-11.  
59 M.O.I v Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2014] IEHC 291 at para. 18.  
60 M.O.I v Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2014] IEHC 291 at para. 22. 
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Remedies for Rights Violations under the 2003 Act 
Damages 
To date, damages have been awarded on a number of occasions under section 3(2) of the 
2003 Act.61 There has been one ex gratia payment made to Dr Lydia Foy.62  
Where the relevant breach is attributable not just to an organ of the State, but also to 
another party, the Civil Liability Act 1961 will apply. This can be illustrated in the recent 
Supreme Court decision of O’Donnell v South Dublin County Council63 where MacMenamin 
J. stated that Ms. O’Donnell’s parents may have “potential legal liability or part liability”64 in 
the context of a claim for failure to provide suitable accommodation under the Housing Acts.  
The levels of damages in O’Donnell are to be assessed at a further plenary hearing in the 
High Court.65 MacMenamin J. also noted that neither the Charter, nor the EU’s accession to 
the UN Convention on the Protection of Persons with Disabilities, could have been 
considered by the High Court in assessing damages, as these instruments were not 
pleaded.66 Therefore, it remains to be seen how the High Court will calculate damages under 
the 2003 Act in light of these clarified principles from the Supreme Court.  
Injunctions 
In Donegan, the High Court refused to grant an interlocutory injunction prior to the ultimate 
substantive ruling discussed above that section 62 of the Housing Act 1966 (as amended) is 
incompatible with the obligations of the State under Articles 6, 8, 13 and 14 ECHR.  In 
Gifford v Dublin City Council67, also a Housing Act case, Smyth J. held that the correct 
procedure in such cases was for the applicant to seek a judicial review of the Council’s 
removal of the tenant. Smyth J. stated: 
“[If] the Council had acted unreasonably, unfairly or from an improper motive or in 
breach of its obligations under Section 3 of the Act of 2003, [the applicant] should 
have applied to the High Court for judicial review. The availability of that remedy, 
coupled with the fact that the Council cannot recover possession of the dwelling 
                                                             
61 See: Pullen v. Dublin City Council (No. 3)[2009] IEHC 452 and O’Donnell (minor) v South Dublin 
County Council [2011] 3 I.R. 417. 
62 Mac Cormaic, R. “Compensation paid to Lydia Foy over gender recognition failures”, Irish Times, 
03 November 2014. 
63 O'Donnell & ors v South Dublin County Council & ors [2015] IESC 28.  
64 [2015] IESC 28, at para. 87. 
65 [2015] IESC 28, at para. 87. 
66 [2015] IESC 28, at para. 86. 
67 Gifford v Dublin City Council [2007] IEHC 387. 
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without a court order is sufficient to supply the necessary and appropriate degree of 
respect for the Plaintiff's rights under Article 6, 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention.”68 
However, in Byrne v Dublin City Council 69  (post the High Court decision in Donegan), 
Murphy J. granted an interlocutory injunction, restraining Dublin City Council from removing 
the applicant from her local authority house. Providing a detailed analysis of Article 13 
Convention jurisprudence70 as regards right to an effective remedy, Murphy J. noted: 
“Article 13 may therefore require the provision of relief which is such as to prevent a 
potentially irreversible violation of Convention rights, provided that such a violation 
flows from the execution of a particular measure rather than from the law itself.” 71 
Murphy J. stated that damages would not provide an adequate remedy for the applicant. The 
judge outlined the consequences that could follow if the injunction was not granted: 
“The consequences of the proposed eviction for the applicant would appear to be 
severe. It is submitted on her behalf that no alternative accommodation is open to her 
and the children who continue to reside with her. As a result of an eviction for anti-
social behaviour she would be deemed to have deliberately rendered herself 
homeless and would not be entitled to be re-housed. In addition, it is said that she is 
currently unemployed and might be precluded and/or prevented from obtaining social 
welfare supplementary allowance under s. 16 of the Housing (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act, 1997 if evicted. This would adversely affect her ability to secure 
private rented accommodation, rendering her situation still more difficult. Although 
the issue was not argued before this Court, it may be appropriate to note that in such 
circumstances, the loss of such welfare support might, by reason of its impact on the 
right of the applicant and her children to respect for family life, entail an infringement 
of the Convention (Anufrijeva v Southwark London B.C. [2004] 1 All ER 833 at para. 
43).”72 
Murphy J. noted that, unlike in the UK’s Human Rights Act 1998, Article 13 ECHR had been 
explicitly included within the remit of the ECHR Act 2003. Relying on the law on injunctive 
                                                             
68 Gifford v Dublin City Council [2007] IEHC 387. 
69 Byrne v Dublin City Council [2009] IEHC 122. 
70 With precise reference to Klass and others v Federal Republic of Germany (1980) 2 E.H.R.R. 214 
James and others v United Kingdom (1986) 8 E.H.R.R. 123, Leander v Sweden (1987) 9 E.H.R.R. 
433, Plattform Arzte fur das Leben v Austria (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 204, Conka v Belgium (2002) 34 
E.H.R.R. 1298 and Applic. No.  61444/00, Krasuski v Poland, judgment of 14 June 2005. 
71 Byrne v Dublin City Council [2009] IEHC 122 at para. 5.2.4.  
72 Ibid at section 8. 
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relief, and seeking to ensure this was exercised in a Convention-compliant manner, Murphy 
J. held, 
“As there exists a reasonable prospect of the perpetual injunction sought being 
obtained, and because there is a serious question to be tried as to whether the 
implementation of the warrant for possession would amount to such a breach [in light 
of Donegan], the Court proposes to grant the interlocutory injunction sought, the 
balance of convenience favouring such a course.” 73 
However, just a number of weeks later, in Pullen v Dublin City Council (No. 2),74 Irvine J. 
refused to grant an injunction restraining Dublin City Council from effecting an eviction 
against the applicants. This was despite a High Court declaration in a previous case75 that 
Dublin City Council failed to act in a Convention-compliant manner. Irvine J. examined the 
overall scheme of the ECHR Act 2003 and held: 
“Section 3(2) provides that a person who has suffered injury, loss or damage as a 
result of a contravention of s.3(1) may institute proceedings to recover damages in 
respect of such contravention….The court concludes that it has no jurisdiction to 
grant any relief other than an award of damages in the event of proceedings being 
instituted wherein it is established the plaintiffs have suffered injury, loss or damage 
arising from the defendant's contravention of the obligations under s.3(2). The court 
believes that its decision in this regard is consistent with the overall scheme of the 
Act and is one which upholds the doctrine of the separation of powers. Further, the 
court believes that the general rule in respect of statutory interpretation namely 
expressio unius exclusio alterius precludes the court from concluding that the 
plaintiffs are entitled to any relief by way of injunction. To grant an injunction would 
be to grant a relief not provided for in s.3(2) of the ECHR Act 2003 and would be an 
order that would conflict with the clear provisions of s.3(2), would offend the doctrine 
of the separation of powers and would be against the canons of construction already 
referred to.” 76  
While the applicants were subsequently awarded damages,77 this line of case law does not 
require the State (or organs of the State) to prospectively act in a manner that is Convention-
compliant. De Londras and Kelly argue that Pullen (No. 2) should be restricted to the 
                                                             
73 [2009] IEHC 122 at sections 7 and 8. 
74 Pullen v Dublin City Council (No. 2) [2009] I.L.R.M. 484.  
75 Pullen v Dublin City Council (No. 1) [2009] IEHC 452. 
76 Pullen v Dublin City Council (No. 2) [2009] I.L.R.M. 484 at 503.  
77 Pullen v. Dublin City Council (No. 3) [2009] IEHC 452. 
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particular peculiar facts at play, where the actions of the local authority were protected under 
legislation. Where an organ of State fails to act in a Convention-compliant manner in 
performing a statutory function or exercising a statutory discretion, 78  then the option of 
gaining an injunction may remain. This hypothesis has yet to be tested in the Irish courts. 
Other Remedies: An Obligation to have a Satisfactory Rights Protection System in 
Place 
In O’Keeffe v Ireland79 the applicant, who had been the victim of sexual abuse perpetrated 
by a national school teacher, argued80 that Ireland failed to meet its positive obligations 
under Article 3 and Article 8 of the Convention, and with Article 2 of Protocol 1, of the 
Convention, by not having a satisfactory system in place to effectively monitor safety of 
children in national schools. 81  While this argument was not pursued in domestic 
proceedings, the ECtHR noted: 
“having regard to the fundamental nature of the rights guaranteed by Article 3 and 
the particularly vulnerable nature of children, it is an inherent obligation of 
government to ensure their protection from ill-treatment, especially in a primary 
education context, through the adoption, as necessary, of special measures and 
safeguards...  this is an obligation which applied at the time of the events relevant to 
this case, namely in 1973…”82 
In addition, the ECtHR found that the applicant did not have any effective remedies for 
breaches of Convention rights, which is a requirement under Article 13 of the Convention.83 
The Strasbourg Court was not convinced that the remedies under Irish law were effective.84  
 
Declarations of Incompatibility to Date 
As noted above, to date two declarations of incompatibility have been issued under section 5 
of the ECHR Act 2003, in the fields of housing law85 and concerning the failure of the State 
                                                             
78 De Londras F. and Kelly, C. The European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 (Round Hall, 
2010), at para. 7-48.  
79 Applic. No. 35810/09, O’Keeffe v Ireland, 28 January 2014. 
80 For the 2008 Supreme Court decision in this case, see O’Keeffe v Hickey [2008] IESC 72.  
81 Applic. No. 35810/09, O’Keeffe v Ireland, 28 January 2014, at paras 123-129. 
82 Applic. No. 35810/09, O’Keeffe v Ireland, 28 January 2014,at  paras 146-147.  
83 For further analysis of the entirety of the judgment, see Kilkelly, U. “The State’s Duty to Protect 
Children from Abuse: Justice in Strasbourg in O’Keeffe v. Ireland”, available here and Utiz, R. “Grand 
Chamber Judgment in O'Keeffe v Ireland”, available here.  
84 Applic. No. 35810/09, O’Keeffe v Ireland, 28 January 2014, at paras. 183-186.  
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to permit transgender persons to recognition of actual gender.86 The time taken to remedy 
the declarations of incompatibility is of some concern. The Gender Recognition Bill 2014 was 
recently passed by the Oireachtas, some eight years after the declaration in Foy. Whether 
the significant length of time it has taken to remedy Ireland’s breach of the Convention 
satisfies the right to an effective remedy under the Convention remains to be seen. 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
85 See Donegan v Dublin City Council & anor and Dublin City Council v Gallagher [2012] 3 I.R. 600. 
The Oireachtas passed the Housing (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2014 in response to this ruling. 
This case is discussed above at pp.  39-40 and on Convention law, see below, pp. 94-100. 
86 Foy v Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2012] 2 I.R. 1. See above, pp.37-39. 
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Chapter Four: The Convention/ECHR Act 2003 before the Irish 
Courts – Sectoral developments 
 
This chapter considers the impact of the ECHR Act 2003 in areas where it has been most 
argued before tribunals, the District Court and the Superior Courts. This will be analysed 
under the following headings: 
(1) Mental Health Law; 
(2) Asylum and Immigration Law; 
(3) Criminal Law;  
(4) European Arrest Warrant; 
(5) Family and Child Law; 
(6) Social Rights and Employment Rights. 
As noted in Chapter 1, the Convention and ECHR Act 2003 have been pleaded to date 
across a wide variety of legal fields before Irish courts and tribunals. This chapter highlights 
some of the key legal areas where the Convention and/or ECHR Act 2003 were argued 
before the courts in which there was substantive engagement from judges on the arguments 
raised. While arguments have been raised in other legal areas, these have often been 
pleaded or utilised in argument, but not necessarily fully analysed by the Irish courts. 
Readers are directed to the full case list in Annexes 2-4 to this Report for a full list of these 
cases. 
 
Mental Health Law 
There have been a number of cases relating to the compliance of Ireland’s mental health 
legislation with Convention rights.  
In the area of committal to a designated centre1 for commission of offences that would 
otherwise have been criminal, the challenges have revolved around whether the Criminal 
                                                             
1 See section 3 of the Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006; section 3(2) states: “The Minister for Health 
and Children by order may after consultation with the Mental Health Commission established under 
section 32 of the Act of 2001, designate a psychiatric centre as a centre (in this Act referred to as a 
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Law (Insanity) Act 2006 (as amended) is Convention compliant. In B. v Mental Health 
(Criminal Law) Review Board & Ors,2  Mr. B had killed his daughter while suffering from 
mental illness and had been detained pursuant to the Trial of Lunatics Act 1883. Due to 
significant legal changes, and by virtue of section 20(2) of the Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 
2006, Mr. B. was entitled to a review of his detention by the Mental Health (Criminal Law) 
Review Board. The applicant made strides in recovering from his mental illness and was 
spending 4 days in his family home, and 3 days in the Central Mental Hospital in Dundrum. 
The applicant argued that, as he no longer suffered from a mental illness, he should be 
conditionally discharged under section 13 of the Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006. However, 
due to the wording of section 13 of the 2006 Act at the time,3 the Review Board feared that a 
conditional discharge as provided for in the Act of 2006 was, in effect, unconditional, and 
therefore refused conditional discharge. The conditional discharge scheme was challenged 
on the grounds that it breached Article 5 ECHR.  Hanna J. reviewed some of the key 
Convention jurisprudence on detention and mental health.4 He concluded: 
“The regime under which the applicant is living his life and working is very different 
from that experienced [in Johnson v United Kingdom [1999] 27 EHRR 296].5 We are 
not dealing here with the sort or level of “compulsory confinement”…. The Board, as 
mandated by statute, is overseeing a regime which is in the applicant’s interest… 
[W]hether the applicant’s current situation be unsatisfactory or otherwise, I do not 
perceive it to amount to a violation of Article 5 of the Convention... The applicant has 
been afforded a significant measure of liberty founded upon unanimous medical 
advice and the Board has properly and lawfully acted upon same.” 
In L v Kennedy,6 the applicant had been found guilty by reason of insanity of the murder of 
his mother.7  The applicant challenged his continued detention as incompatible with Article 5 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
“designated centre”) for the reception, detention and, where appropriate, care or treatment of persons 
or classes of persons committed or transferred thereto under the provisions of this Act.” 
2 B. v Mental Health (Criminal Law) Review Board & Ors [2008] IEHC 303. Please note that precise 
references to paragraph numbers are not provided in this judgment. The applicant appealed to the 
Supreme Court, but this appeal was struck out after the coming into force of the Criminal Law 
(Insanity) Act 2010 allowing for the enforcement of conditional discharge orders. 
3 See now, Section 13A of the Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006 (as inserted by the Criminal Law 
(Insanity) Act 2010).  
4  In particular, Winterwerp v The Netherlands [1979/1980] 2 EHRR 387 and Johnson v United 
Kingdom [1999] 27 E.H.R.R. 296.  
5 In this case, the ECtHR at para. 63 noted that conditions can be imposed on release of an individual, 
who had been confined to a mental health institution for his own protection and protection of others. 
The ECtHR did find that the delay in releasing the applicant in the UK did constitute a violation of 
Article 5 of the Convention.  
6 L. v Kennedy [2011] 2 I.R. 124.  
7 L. v Kennedy [2011] 2 I.R. 124 at 127.  
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ECHR. He no longer suffered from a mental disorder at the date of the hearing,8 but had 
been on temporary release in 2009 and had breached a condition of his release.9 Peart J. 
held that the Convention provides sufficient margin of appreciation for bodies such as the 
Review Board, so that: 
“It does not follow that because he no longer suffers from the mental disorder which 
justified his or her detention at the Central Mental Hospital in the first place that he 
must be discharged.”10 
Referring to the case of Kolanis v United Kingdom, Peart J. noted that where supports 
cannot be put in place outside the mental health detention setting,11 the failure to release an 
individual from detention does not necessarily violate Article 5(1) of the Convention.12 The 
applicant’s continued detention was in accordance with law and in accordance with Article 
5(1) of the Convention.13 Peart J. did however state that, while not challenged in this case, 
the general policy of the Review Board to refuse a conditional discharge under the 2006 Act, 
based on the presumption that a person will not abide by imposed conditions,  
“… will lead to arbitrariness in the decision to detain, and may constitute a breach of 
obligations under article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights.”14 
The issue of medical treatment for those detained under the Mental Health Acts has also 
been considered by the Superior Courts in the Convention context. In Health Service 
Executive v MX15 MacMenamin J. had to consider whether the provision of “treatment”16 
under the Mental Health Act 2001 could be provided to a patient who was suffering from 
paranoid schizophrenia and borderline personality disorder. The Court recognised that even 
if a person is suffering from mental illness, they continue to enjoy   free will, self-
determination, freedom of choice, dignity and autonomy.17 Where decisions are made to 
commence treatment, then fair and quality processes and procedures must be adhered to, 
                                                             
8 L. v Kennedy [2011] 2 I.R. 124 at 128.  
9 L. v Kennedy [2011] 2 I.R. 124 at 145 and 152.  
10 L. v Kennedy [2011] 2 I.R. 124 at 150.  
11 Kolanis v United Kingdom (2005) 42 EHRR 12.  
12 L. v Kennedy [2011] 2 I.R. 124 at 152-153.  
13 L. v Kennedy [2011] 2 I.R. 124 at 154. 
14 L. v Kennedy [2011] 2 I.R. 124 at 147-148. 
15 Health Services Executive v. M.X. [2012] 1 I.R. 81.  
16 See Section 2, Section 4 and Section 57 of the Mental Health Act 2001 (as amended). 
17 Health Services Executive v M.X. [2012] 1 I.R. 81 at 85. 
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given the significant abridgment of personal rights that may necessarily have to occur to 
instigate treatment.18 
MacMenamin J. noted that, in the arena of consent to medical treatment, while the 
Constitution and Convention provide “separate” safeguards, the same rights and procedures 
to vindicate these rights were at stake: 
“the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment, the right to autonomy and 
liberty, the right to fair procedures and rights to an effective remedy and to prohibition 
on discrimination.” 19 
MacMenamin J. did not see any disjuncture between constitutional rights and Convention 
rights in this arena. 
In concluding, MacMenamin J. stated: 
“I think a broad construction of the word ‘treatment’ will have the following 
consequences: it will respect the principles that allow for a broad interpretation; it will 
have regard to the other provisions of the Act; it will respect and reflect the 
constitutional values involved and the precedents which bind this court. But it must 
be emphasised it should be compatible with the Constitution itself and the terms of 
ss.2, 3 and 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003. I conclude 
that, after these hearings, the Court in its interpretation of the Act, and in the 
assessment of the defendant's best interest, should allow for a medical procedure 
which, albeit invasive, is ancillary to, and part of the procedures necessary to remedy 
and ameliorate her mental illness or its consequences. Clearly ‘treatment’ could not 
include measures or procedures which are entirely unrelated to a patient's mental 
illness.20 
Admission of children to psychiatric care and administering treatment without consent was 
considered in the case of XY (No. 2). 21  The different means of admitting children to 
psychiatric care were challenged. The Court refused to make an order that section 25(6) of 
the Mental Health Act 2001 was repugnant to the Constitution and/or the Convention. In 
                                                             
18 Relying on Shtukaturov v Russia (2012) 54 EHRR 27, see Health Services Executive v M.X. [2012] 
1 I.R. 81 at 86-87. 
19 Health Services Executive v M.X. [2012] 1 I.R. 81 at 108.  
20 Health Services Executive v  M.X. [2012] 1 I.R. 81 at 105. See also, In the matter of Article 40.3 of 
the Constitution and Article 41 of the Constitution and in the matter of section 25 of the Mental Health 
Act 2001, in the matter of XY, a minor: Health Service Executive v JM and RP [2013] 1 I.L.R.M. 30. 
21 XY (a minor suing by her guardian ad litem, Raymond McEvoy) v Health Service Executive and the 
Attorney General and Irish Human Rights Commission (notice parties) (No.2) [2014] 1 I.L.R.M. 170 
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doing so, Birmingham J. had due regard to the Constitution, the Convention, the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR, and the broad principles of the UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities.22 Distinguishing the case of X v Finland,23 Birmingham J. held that 
an independent court made a decision (subject to appeal) to commit the applicant,24 and 
there were clear restrictions on the circumstances under which the order to commit can be 
made. There must be no other alternatives open to the authorities.25 The District Court has 
the power to amend, vary or discharge the order, of its own motion, or upon the application 
of an interested party. This contrasted to the regime in X v Finland, where the detained 
person could not challenge his or her confinement.26 Therefore, the State’s approach to 
issues of detaining children under the Mental Health Act 2001, and provision of medical 
treatment, was in compliance with the Convention.  
Where an order is made by the Mental Health Tribunal as regards transfer to a different 
designated centre (e.g. the Central Mental Hospital in Dundrum), and where this order has 
not been effected for a significant period of time, the High Court stated that the failure to give 
effect to the order to transfer will not necessarily breach Convention rights or render 
continued confinement unlawful.27 While better treatment may have been available in the 
Central Mental Hospital, this did not automatically mean that the applicant’s rights under 
Article 3 and/or Article 8 of the Convention were violated.28 The Court accepted that,  
“there can be situations which fall so far short of acceptable as to the conditions of 
detention and treatment that confinement becomes unlawful. It is also the case that a 
situation of confinement that would ordinarily be lawful, may be rendered unlawful by 
reason of a medical condition…”29 
After reviewing core ECtHR jurisprudence,30 Charleton J. concluded: 
                                                             
22 XY (a minor suing by her guardian ad litem, Raymond McEvoy) v Health Service Executive and the 
Attorney General and Irish Human Rights Commission (notice parties) (No.2) [2014] 1 I.L.R.M. 170 at 
179, citing with approval, comments of MacMenamin J. in M.X. (a person of unsound mind) v Health 
Service Executive [2012] 3 I.R. 254 at 271-280.  For a comment on the applicability of the UN 
Convention in Ireland through European Union law, see [2012] 3 IR 254 at 272-277. 
23 X v Finland [2012] ECHR 1371, discussed [2014] 1 I.L.R.M. 170 at 181-183.  
24 XY (a minor suing by her guardian ad litem, Raymond McEvoy) v Health Service Executive and the 
Attorney General and Irish Human Rights Commission (notice parties) (No.2) [2014] 1 I.L.R.M. 170 at 
182.  
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 E.T. v. Clinical Director, Central Mental Hospital [2010] 4 I.R. 403. 
28 E.T. v. Clinical Director, Central Mental Hospital [2010] 4 I.R. 403 at 412-413.  
29 [2010] 4 I.R. 403 at 413. 
30 [2010] 4 I.R. 403 at 413-415, in particular: Aleksanyan v Russia [2011] ECHR 841 and Grori v 
Albania [2009] ECHR 1076, as well as the more general “detention conditions” jurisprudence.  
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“(iii)…the conditions of treatment and the confinement applied to her are not 
unreasonable. It is impossible to say that they are not mandated by her condition 
even though better treatment may be available elsewhere. They do not amount to 
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment; 
(iv) the applicant may receive some benefit through being transferred for a time to the 
Central Mental Hospital. The court cannot be expected to order her transfer, in the 
context of scarce resources, in preference to other patients on that waiting list who 
would have their necessary treatment put back in consequence; 
(v) the applicant's right to privacy has been briefly mentioned. That right is certainly 
infringed by her conditions of confinement, but this is necessary for her proper care 
and treatment so that harm may be avoided to herself and to those who come in 
contact with her. This is not a breach of her Convention rights or her right to privacy 
under the Constitution because it is necessary and is justified by the statutory 
scheme; and 
(vi) the applicant's detention is not therefore unlawful. There is no breach of article 3 
of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950. Whereas her constitutional 
rights have been severely circumscribed, this has been done in accordance with the 
paternal jurisdiction of the State to care for the severely ill.”31 
 
Asylum and Immigration Law 
As Annex 1 to this Report illustrates, the area of asylum and immigration law has been the 
most litigated as regards Convention rights within Irish law.32 The ECtHR has adopted a 
cautious interpretation of the Convention in the field of asylum and immigration law. There is 
no express obligation in the Convention for a State to admit an individual who claims asylum 
                                                             
31 [2010] 4 I.R. 403 at 415-416. 
32 While asylum and immigration law are evidently distinct fields of law, they are considered here 
together due to significant overlaps in the issues arising before the Irish courts, and judicial treatment 
of said issues, from a Convention perspective. 
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to a State.33 However, as can be seen below, the Convention can result in an additional 
measure of protection for asylum seekers and other migrants34  
Being physically present in a State entitles a person to protection under the Convention.35 
Differences in the extent of Convention rights protection may arise due to a person’s status 
as an asylum seeker or other migrant, 36  vis-à-vis citizens or other settled residents. A 
significant number of Irish Superior Courts’ case law relates to either general fair procedures 
or due process within asylum/immigration status determination mechanisms, or claims that 
Convention rights will be violated in the event of removal. 
 
Judicial Review, the Convention and Proportionality in Immigration Decisions 
Convention (and Charter)37 jurisprudence in the field of immigration and asylum law has 
been extensive as regards procedural propriety and administrative fairness in decision 
making, and as regards decisions on refugee status, subsidiary protection,38 leave to remain 
and the issuing of deportation orders. The concept of “anxious scrutiny” was suggested by 
some as the standard of review of refugee decisions.39 In I. v. Minister for Justice, McGovern 
J. stated: 
“Since the purpose of the [Refugee Act 1996], is, inter alia, to give effect to the 
Geneva Convention and other related conventions on the treatment of refugees I 
think the test of “anxious scrutiny” is one which the courts should use as well as the 
O’Keeffe principles when considering matters of this kind. Of course if a decision is 
made on irrational grounds it will be susceptible to   the O’Keeffe definitions of 
irrationality but might legitimately fall to be reviewed by the courts. It seems to me 
                                                             
33 Vilvarajah and Others v United Kingdom [1991] 14 EHRR 248, para. 102 and repeated in Ahmed v 
Austria [1997] 24 EHRR 278, para 38, where the ECtHR stated that “…the right to political asylum is 
not contained in either the Convention or its Protocols…” Ireland has clear obligations to assess 
applications for refugee protection under the Refugee Convention, 1951 (see Refugee Act 1996 (as 
amended) and to assess subsidiary protection applications, under European and domestic law.  
34 The impact of the Charter on Irish asylum and immigration law is considered below, see pp. 130-
136. 
35 D v UK (1997) 24 EHRR 423 at para. 49.  
36 Saadi v United Kingdom (2007) 44 EHRR 50. 
37 For an analysis of key issues from a Charter perspective, see below: right to an effective remedy, at 
pp.121-127; right to good administration, pp. 127-129 and Charter jurisprudence on asylum and 
immigration law, at pp. 130-136. 
38 This more so due to European Union law and the Charter, see below, p. 124-126.  
39 On subsidiary protection and the Charter, see below, p. 124.  
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that this could arise in circumstances of manifest error disclosing a reasonable 
possibility on the facts that the original decision was wrong.” 40 
At a minimum from the line of case law explored below, the Courts must be on heightened 
alert to ensure that decisions impacting on Convention rights take proper account of 
Ireland’s obligations under the Convention. Under a more traditional judicial review doctrine, 
the Superior Courts would only interfere with decisions (in particular as regards exercise of 
discretionary powers), where a decision maker: 
“must have gone completely and explicitly mad.” 41  
A clear impact of the Convention on the process of decision making is that courts will be 
more cognisant of whether fundamental rights have been impacted, and should at least 
provide some heightened review of administrative/quasi-judicial decisions. This heightened 
review will not solely be limited to immigration and/or asylum law.  
A similar “anxious scrutiny” may also be applied where an individual is not considered a 
refugee (or in need of subsidiary protection), but who is seeking humanitarian leave to 
remain under the Immigration Act 1999.42 In Meadows v Minister for Justice, Equality and 
Law Reform,43 the applicant had been refused refugee status; the decision makers (the 
Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner and the Refugee Appeals Tribunal) 
decided that the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of 
female genital mutilation and/or forced marriage in Nigeria.44 The applicant was refused 
leave to apply for judicial review under Section 3 of the Immigration Act, 1999, and sought to 
quash the decision of the Minister for Justice to issue a deportation order. The High Court, 
while refusing the applicant leave to bring a judicial review, certified a point of law of 
exceptional public importance,  
                                                             
40 I. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2008] 1 I.R. 208 at 213-214.  
41 Denny v Minister for Social Welfare [1998] 1 I.R. 34 at 37-38, per Hamilton C.J. 
42 As is highlighted below, only the Convention should be relied upon when a proposed deportation of 
a non-European Union citizen is at issue, see pp. 116-119 (unless it concerns a Zambrano parent, 
see further, p. 133). 
43 Meadows v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] 2 I.R. 701. See also, below for 
discussion within the Charter (Article 47) context, see p. 121. 
44 Meadows v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] 2 I.R. 701 at 806-809, which 
provides a full timeline of decisions reached and reasons proffered for rejecting the applicant’s 
refugee claim.  
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“in determining the reasonableness of an administrative decision which affects or 
concerns constitutional rights or fundamental rights, is it correct to apply the standard 
set out in  O'Keeffe v. An Bord Pleanála [1993] 1 I.R. 39?”45 
The applicant claimed that the Minister had not properly considered claims that removal to 
Nigeria might breach Article 3 and Article 8 of the Convention. The Supreme Court had to 
consider whether the judicial review of the Minister’s decision complied with the 
requirements of Article 13 of the Convention (right to an effective remedy). 
Denham J. stated: 
“When the decision being reviewed involves fundamental rights and freedoms, the 
reviewing court should bear in mind the principles of the Constitution of Ireland 1937, 
the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, and the rule of law, while 
applying the principles of judicial review. This includes analysing the reasonableness 
of a decision in light of fundamental constitutional principles. Where fundamental 
rights and freedoms are factors in a review, they are relevant in analysing the 
reasonableness of a decision.” 46 
Fennelly J. in his decision focused on the obligations of the State in decisions that impact on 
Convention (and Constitutional) rights. The ECtHR, in his view: 
“…accepted the adequacy of the traditional judicial review standard, subject to its 
modern development in the direction of ’anxious scrutiny.’” 47 
Fennelly J., summarising the requirements of effective remedies as developed by the ECtHR 
held: 
“it is relevant that s. 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights Act 2003 places 
an obligation on every organ of the State to perform its functions in a manner 
compatible with the State's obligations under the provisions of the Convention. In the 
Convention context, we must be conscious that the European Court of Human Rights 
is influenced by the effectiveness of legal remedies against administrative decisions, 
when it considers the effectiveness of a national remedy pursuant to article 13.” 48 
                                                             
45 Meadows v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] 2 I.R. 701 at 709.  
46 Meadows v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] 2 I.R. 701 at 741. 
47 Meadows v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] 2 IR 701 at 823. 
48 Meadows v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] 2 IR 701 at 826. 
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While “matters of policy are for the Minister”,49 the majority in Meadows seem to accept that, 
in issues of rights, the proportionality of the interference, and reasonableness of the 
decision, may form a core element of any judicial review. Nevertheless, Murray C.J. (with the 
majority, but on different grounds) focused on the constitutional duty of decision makers to 
provide satisfactory reasons for their decisions. The Supreme Court granted leave for the 
applicant to seek a judicial review of the Minister’s initial determination.  
Subsequently, Cooke J. in F. & Ors v Minister for Justice, Equality, and Law Reform 
summarised the Supreme Court decision in Meadows as holding that, 
“…while the judicial review remedies remain unchanged…the criteria by which they 
are applied are capable of evolving in order to accommodate rights to protection such 
as those created by the Constitution or the Act of 2003. By examining the substance 
of the effect of an interference brought about by an administrative decision on 
fundamental rights of an applicant for judicial review in order to assess whether it 
goes beyond a lawful encroachment, the Court is not substituting its own view of 
what the decision ought to be but is testing it by reference to what is objectively 
reasonable and common-sense”. 50 
In Efe,51 the applicant argued that judicial review did not constitute an effective remedy 
against breach of Constitutional and Convention rights (in particular Article 8 and Article 13), 
Hogan J. interpreting Meadows stated: 
“a majority of the Court was prepared to apply a general proportionality test in 
respect of all decisions affecting fundamental rights.”52 
Hogan J. stated that there was “no basis” for contending that common law rules for judicial 
review, as interpreted post Meadows, were not Convention-compliant.  While a degree of 
deference will be provided to specialised agencies tasked with assessing refugee and other 
immigration applications, proportionality in interference with Convention rights cannot be 
ignored.  
The Convention, along with the Constitution, has therefore enabled courts, where rights 
claims are at issue and contested, to at least consider whether the rights claims relied upon 
in asylum and immigration law have been properly considered by the relevant decision 
makers.  
                                                             
49 Meadows v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] 2 I.R. 701 at 831. 
50 F. & Ors v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] IEHC 457. 
51 Efe v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2011] I.L.R.M. 411.  
52 Efe v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2011] I.L.R.M. 411 at para. 28. 
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While Meadows arose in the context of asylum and immigration law, its principles are clearly 
of key import in determining the applicable standard of review in the judicial review of 
decisions in all fields of law where potential Convention/constitutional rights arguments 
apply.   
Refugee Definition, Determination and the Convention  
A large proportion of the case law set down in Annexes 2-4 of this report provides an 
overview of the engagement of the Irish Superior Courts with decisions of the refugee status 
determination bodies, and Convention arguments on due process and fair procedure rights.  
In M.C.A. v Refugee Appeals Tribunal 53  incorrect regard was had to Article 3 of the 
Convention. Rather than focusing on the test for refugee status (a well-founded fear of 
persecution on one of the nexus grounds set down in the Refugee Convention), the Tribunal 
Member had asked whether the treatment the applicant suffered would give rise to a breach 
of Article 3. Barr J. in the High Court stated: 
“This is an error of law. The applicant was required to show a well-founded fear of 
persecution, not that he was likely to suffer torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. The 
Tribunal here proceeded on an incorrect basis in reaching its decision.” 54 
As regards the definition of refugee for the purposes of the 1951 Refugee Convention, the 
Irish Courts, relying on Article 2 of Protocol 1 of the Convention, held that the potential denial 
of a basic education to the applicant, if returned to their country of origin, could constitute 
persecution for the purposes of section 2 of the Refugee Act 1996 (as amended). Hogan J. 
noted in E.D (a minor) v Refugee Appeals Tribunal:55 
“The right to education (and especially the right to basic education) is widely regarded as 
fundamental. This is reflected in Article 42 of the Constitution, Article 2 of the First 
Protocol of the ECHR and Article 14 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. It is also 
reflected in international agreements, such as Article 28 of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child.” 56 
                                                             
53 M.C.A. v Refugee Appeals Tribunal & Ors [2014] IEHC 504 
54 M.C.A. v Refugee Appeals Tribunal & Ors [2014] IEHC 504 at para. 27.  
55 E.D. (a minor) v Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2011] 3 I.R. 736. 
56 E.D. (a minor) v Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2011] 3 I.R. 736 at 746. As the refugee definition is now 
an issue of EU law relevance, Hogan J. also relied upon the Charter in coming to this conclusion, see 
below, p. 136-136. 
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Administrative Immigration Schemes and Convention Rights 
In Bode v The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform,57 the High Court attempted to 
infuse a Constitutional/Convention obligation on the Minister to consider the rights of the 
child when deporting their non-EU national parents. However, the Supreme Court rejected 
this interpretation. The focus of the decisions in the High Court on the Irish Born Child 2005 
Scheme (IBC/05) was centred on the citizen child. Finlay Geoghegan J. viewed the citizen 
child as a holder of rights,58 holding that, where consideration is being given to removing 
non-Irish national parents of minor Irish citizens, the Constitutional and Convention rights of 
the citizen child should be respected. On appeal however, the Supreme Court rejected the 
need for the Minister to enquire as to the rights of the citizen child under the IBC/05 
Scheme.59 The Supreme Court stated that the purpose of the IBC/05 Scheme was not to 
examine the rights or otherwise of the citizen child. Denham J., delivering the judgment of 
the Supreme Court, stated that the High Court judgment was ‘misconceived’ in considering 
human rights arguments.60 Ireland, in adopting and implementing immigration policies, was 
executing a fundamental function of a State. The grant of residency within Ireland on the 
basis of the IBC/05 Scheme was a mere “gift” by virtue of the exercise of executive power.61  
The IBC/05 Scheme did not set out to analyse whether rights to family life were respected. 
The IBC/05 Scheme was an exercise of executive power by the Minister for Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform. Issues relating to the Convention rights of the applicants were deemed 
irrelevant in that context.62  
                                                             
57 There were eight test cases in total and the judgments were appealed to the Supreme Court by the 
State: (i) Bode v The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2006] IEHC 341 (14 November 
2006) (High Court); [2007] IESC 62 (20 December 2007) (Supreme Court). (ii) Oguekwe v The 
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2006] IEHC 345; [2008] IESC 25 (iii) Dimbo v The 
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2006] IEHC 344; [2008] IESC 26 (iv) Fares v The 
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2006] IEHC 343; [2007] IESC 65 (v) Oviawe v The 
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2006] IEHC 342; [2007] IESC 66 (vi) Duman v The 
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2007] IESC 64 (vii) Adio v The Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform [2006] IEHC 346; [2007] IESC 63 and (viii) Appeal No. 005/200, Edet v The 
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform.  
58 Compare this with the views of the former Chief Justice in L and O wherein Keane CJ viewed 
minors rights being in abeyance until they reached an age wherein they could practically instigate and 
insist on the respect of their  rights, [2003] 1 I.R. 1 at 19.   
59 Bode and Others v Minister for Justice, Equality, & Law Reform & Others [2007] IESC 62 (20 
December 2007).  
60 [2007] IESC 62 at para. 24.  
61 [2007] IESC 62, at para. 22.  
62 [2007] IESC 62 at para. 24.  
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Denham J. went on to note that within deportation procedures, the Constitutional and 
Convention rights of the citizen child would be examined.63 The rights of the child were 
therefore relegated to consideration solely within the deportation process.  
From a literal reading of the ECHR Act 2003, there is an obligation of the Minister to 
consider Convention rights in the execution and administration of the IBC/05 Scheme.64 As 
is outlined below, while Convention rights did not aid the applicants in this case, the 
subsequent decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Zambrano, and its 
implementation by the Irish authorities, now provides residence rights for certain non-EU 
national parents of Irish (and hence EU) citizens.65 
In Gorry v Minister for Justice and Equality,66 the applicant was a Nigerian national who was 
subject to a deportation order. The applicant had married an Irish national and had been 
present in Ireland without permission for a four year period.67 The Irish Naturalisation and 
Immigration Service (INIS) refused to revoke the applicant’s deportation order, and stated 
there were no “insurmountable obstacles” to the applicant’s husband (an Irish citizen), 
relocating to Nigeria.68 Referring to extensive jurisprudence from the courts of England and 
Wales on Article 8 of the Convention and family life for transnational spouses, 69  Mac 
Eochaidh J. held that the correct test that had to be applied was: 
“…between State rights and family rights, and in particular, to decide whether a national 
of a deporting or excluding State should join his or her partner in a third country is not 
assessed by reference to an insurmountable obstacles standard, but rather by applying 
the age-old and most reliable of legal standards in administrative law: is it reasonable to 
expect a spouse to join the removed or excluded spouse in his or her country of 
residence? Thus the respondent erred in law because he refused to revoke the 
Deportation Order on the basis of the failure to demonstrate the existence of an 
                                                             
63 [2007] IESC 62 at para. 25.  
64 Under section 2 of the ECHR Act 2003, an “organ of State” specifically excludes the President, 
either House of the Oireachtas and committees of one or both houses and courts. Government 
ministers are not excluded. It was accepted in Bode that the Minister exercised an executive function 
in establishing and administering the IBC 05 Scheme. Executive actions are obliged under section 4 
of the 2003 Act to perform its functions in a manner compatible with Ireland’s obligations under the 
ECHR.  
65 See discussion below as regards EU citizenship, the Charter and residence rights on non-EU 
citizen parents, pp. 119 , p. 133 and pp. 132-136.  
66 Gorry & Anor v Minister for Justice & Equality [2014] IEHC 29. 
67 Gorry & anor v Minister for Justice & Equality  [2014] IEHC 29 at paras 4-9. 
68 Gorry & anor v Minister for Justice & Equality  [2014] IEHC 29 at para. 21. 
69 In particular, R. (Mahmood) v. Home Secretary [2001] 1 W.L.R. 840, LM (DRC) v. Home Secretary 
[2008] EWCA Civ 325 and V.W. (Uganda) and A.B. (Somalia) v. The Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2009] EWCA Civ 5, see [2014] IEHC 29 at paras. 22-30.  
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insurmountable obstacle to the second named applicant’s emigration to Nigeria to take 
up his family life with his wife. There is no such test.” 70 
The decision of INIS was therefore quashed due to their failure to properly assess the 
Convention and Constitutional rights of the applicant in the field of family life.71 
Deportation & Removal  
In the area of deportation and removal of foreign nationals, a significant amount of case law 
has emerged as regards the applicability of Convention rights, in particular under Article 3 
and Article 8 of the Convention. 
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment 
The Irish Superior Courts have accepted that Article 3 of the Convention is absolute. Where 
a foreign national is challenging a deportation order on the basis of Article 3, then leave to 
challenge this will only be granted where the applicant can show a “reasonable, rational” real 
risk of treatment contrary to Article 3.72 As determined by Clark J. in the case of P.B.N. (DR 
Congo) v Minister for Justice and Equality, concerning a female applicant from the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo who sought to principally rely on a report published by a 
UK charity (entitled ‘Unsafe Return – Refoulement of Congolese Asylum Seekers’), such a 
‘reasonable, rational risk’ may be established by country of origin information, that shows a, 
“credible basis for the contention that her life or freedom would be under threat upon her 
return to the DRC, or that she would suffer irremediable harm.” 73 
The Court will not generally interfere with the decisions of the Minister for Justice and 
Equality where the Minister properly concludes that there is not a “real risk” of an Article 3 
violation.74  
While many cases relate to alleged dangers faced by applicants in their countries of origin, 
the Irish Superior Courts have also had to consider situations where the violation of rights 
may arise from the lack of treatment of the physical or mental health of an individual in their 
country of origin. In Agbonlahor the issue arose as to whether the deportation of a family 
with a child with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), was contrary to the right for 
respect for private and family life under Article 8 of the ECHR in circumstances where it was 
argued that no sufficient treatment would be available in the State to which the child would 
                                                             
70 [2014] IEHC 29 at para. 31.  
71 [2014] IEHC 29 at para .56. 
72 P.B.N. (DR Congo) v Minister for Justice and Equality [2014] IESC 9 at para. 14.  
73 Ibid at para. 24.  
74 B.S. v Minister for Justice & Ors [2014] IEHC 502. 
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be deported.75 The Court concluded that State immigration policy is not directed at ensuring 
a proper standard of living for deportees. Unfortunate personal or medical circumstances will 
not necessarily result in permission to remain in Ireland. In dismissing the case, Feeney J. 
noted that the ECtHR had already stated that immigration policy of a contracting state is not 
reviewable under the Convention.76 The judge also noted that, while positive obligations may 
flow from Article 8 of the Convention,77 this did not mean that there was an obligation on the 
State to continue to allow a foreign national to benefit from medical, social, or other forms of 
assistance by the expelling State.78 Such arguments could only be accepted in the most 
exceptional of circumstances, such as in D. v UK.79 Feeney J. stated that in Agbonlahor, the 
child’s life was not in danger, but the issue was the absence of educational and medical 
facilities that would ensure his full development.80 The risks of attracting other people in the 
same position as the applicants were also highlighted by the judge.81 Feeney J. finally noted 
that only in the most exceptional of cases would applicants be able to successfully rely on 
the Convention in preventing deportation.82  
In MEO v Minister for Justice ,Equality and Law Reform,83 the High Court had to consider 
whether applicant should be given leave to challenge her removal from the State. A core 
question was whether the State had an obligation to permit the applicant to continue her 
medical treatment for HIV, and whether failure to allow this continuation would violate 
constitutional rights (right to life) and Convention rights (in particular Article 3 and Article 8). 
In granting leave to challenge her deportation order, Hogan J. distinguished the ECtHR 
decision in N.84 The seriousness of MEO’s medical condition85 meant that her case was 
more akin to the circumstances outlined in the decision of the European Commission on 
Human Rights, in BB v France.86 Where an applicant displays a suicidal ideation, then Article 
3 ECHR may be engaged, but only where: 
“(i) … there then existed to the respondent's knowledge, a real and substantial threat 
to the applicant's life by suicide as a direct consequence of his decision; 
                                                             
75 Agbonlahor and ors v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and ors [2007] IEHC 166. For a 
full analysis of the issues within the case, see Thornton, L. “Agbonlahor and ors v Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform and ors” [2007] Oxford Reports on International Law 820, 
http://www.oup.com/online/law/oril/ .  
76 [2007] IEHC 166 at para. 3.2., relying on Abdulaziz et al.  v UK [1985] 7 E.H.R.R. 471.  
77 Ibid. 
78 [2007] IEHC 166 at para. 3.10.  
79 Ibid. 
80 [2007] IEHC 166 at paras. 3.11-3.12.  
81 [2007] IEHC 166 at para.. 3.13.  
82 [2007] IEHC 166 at para. 3.14.  
83 MEO v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2012] IEHC 545. 
84 N v United Kingdom (2008) 47 EHRR 39.  
85 MEO v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2012] IEHC 545,at  paras. 7-10. 
86 MEO v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2012] IEHC 545 at, paras. 41-46. 
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(ii) the applicant's threatened act of suicide could only be forestalled by him acceding 
to the applicant's request and stopping the process of deportation and not by any 
other means such as medical intervention; 
(iii) the respondent either missed or disregarded, to the point of irrationality, 
compelling medical and other material evidence of the foregoing.” 87 
The Irish Superior Courts have accepted that where an asylum seeker is to be transferred 
under the Dublin Convention, this transfer can only be prevented where the applicant shows 
a “real risk” of an Article 3 violation if so transferred.88 The burden of proof for this rests with 
the applicant.89  
Private and Family Life 
In Oguekwe v. Minister for Justice90, Denham J. adopted the test set down by the English 
Court of Appeal 91  in determining whether removal from the State was a proportionate 
restriction of rights under Article 8 (and the constitution):  
“(1) A state has a right under international law to control the entry of non-nationals 
into its territory, subject always to its treaty obligations. 
(2) Article 8 does not impose on a State any general obligation to respect the choice 
of residence of a married couple. 
(3) Removal or exclusion of one family member from a State where other members 
of the family are lawfully resident will not necessarily infringe Article 8 provided that 
there are no insurmountable obstacles to the family living together in the country of 
origin of the family member excluded, even where this involves a degree of hardship 
for some or all members of the family. 
(4) Article 8 is likely to be violated by the expulsion of a member of a family that has 
been long established in a state if the circumstances are such that it is not 
reasonable to expect the other members of the family to follow that member expelled. 
                                                             
87 L.C. v Minister for Justice [2011] 2 I.R. 133 
88 JMO v Refugee Applications Commissioner & Ors [2014] IEHC 467, citing with approval the ECtHR 
decision in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (App 30696) (Grand Chamber, judgment, January, 21st 
2011). See also, Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N.S./M.E. [2011] ECR I-865.   
89 JMO v Refugee Applications Commissioner & Ors [2014] IEHC 467, para. 75. See also, Wadria v 
Minister for Justice [2011] 3 IR 53. For discussion and analysis on the Charter and removal under the 
Dublin Convention, see below, pp. 116 et seq. 
90 Oguekwe v. Minister for Justice [2008] 3 I.R. 795 
91 R (Mahmood) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 1 W.L.R. 840.  
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(5) Knowledge on the part of one spouse at the time of marriage that rights of 
residence of the other were precarious militates against a finding that an order 
excluding the latter spouse violates Article 8. 
(6) Whether interference with family rights is justified in the interests of controlling 
immigration will depend on (i) the facts of the particular case and (ii) the 
circumstances prevailing in the State whose action is impugned.” 92  
The interests of the State to a managed system of migration and the right to issue a 
deportation order cannot, generally, be defeated by claims of violation of Article 8 and/or 
Article 41 of the Irish Constitution rights,93 unless the decision, 
“absolutely offended logic or was something which…no reasonable decision maker could 
ever conclude.”94 
Failure by a decision maker to make a clear determination as to whether an applicant had 
established “private life” within the State, will result in the decision being found to be 
invalid.95 Once a proportionality analysis is conducted by the decision maker, as regards 
whether private (or family) life is established, it does not automatically follow that removal 
from the state is a violation of Article 8.96 Mac Eochaidh J. in C.I v Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform97, stated, in light of Convention jurisprudence: 
“Decision makers are not required to find that a deportation measure offends 
proportionality because it comprehensively interferes with established private life in 
Ireland. Given that it is lawful for the State to regulate the presence of non-nationals on 
its territory and that immigration control does not per se offend rights protected by the 
Convention, something other than the natural consequence of deportation involving, as it 
does, the cessation or termination of private life in the deporting state, will be required if 
the proportionality analysis is to yield a positive result for an applicant. As for family life, 
the same sort of approach is appropriate, but because persons other than the proposed 
                                                             
92 Oguekwe v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2008] 3 I.R. 795 at p. 812. 
93 For a recent application of this, see Khan & ors v Minister for Justice and Equality  
[2014] IEHC 533 and other cases in the Annex to this report.  
94 M.R.J. v The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform (Unreported, High Court, 22nd January, 
2014, ex tempore), at para. 32.  
95 See, R.B v Minister for Justice & Law Reform & anor [2014] IEHC 570, in particular para. 38, where 
Barr J. noted that the Minister had failed to consider whether the consequences for the particular 
applicant were of such gravity, so as to potentially invoke Article 8(1) ECHR, citing with approval R 
(Razgar) v.Home Secretary [2004] 2 A.C. 368. See also, J.S. & ors v Minister for Justice and Equality 
& anor [2014] IEHC 195 
96 See above, discussion on Gorry, p. 63. See also, Cirpaci (nee McCormack) & anor v The Minister 
for Justice, Equality & Law Reform [2005] 4 IR 109. 
97 C.I. & Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2014] IEHC 447 
68 
 
deportee may be affected, the consequences of the deportation for persons other than 
the deportee and the possibility of relocating family life in another State an: matters 
which may be appropriate to weigh in the balance in conducting a proportionality 
analysis where this point is reached.” 98 
In line with the approach of the ECtHR and Irish courts, only in the most exceptional of 
circumstances will this proportionality and rights analysis of the decision maker be interfered 
with.99  
The Irish Superior Courts’ capacity to review the legality of decisions of the Minister for 
Justice (in the exercise of her powers under section 3 of the Immigration Act 1999) has been 
found in B (a minor) to be an effective remedy in realising rights of applicants under Article 8 
(and Article 13) of the Convention.100 Article 13 ECHR, as interpreted via the ECHR Act 
2003, does not require an independent review of the exercise of ministerial discretion.101 
Family Reunification 
In exercising powers under section 18 of the Refugee Act 1996 (as amended) in relation to 
family reunification, the Minister for Justice and Equality is obliged to have regard to 
Convention rights,102 in particular Article 8.103 Recognised refugees have a right to apply for 
family reunification. Immediate family members have an automatic right to reunification, i.e., 
parents (if an applicant is under 18), husband or wife and any children (under 18). Other 
relatives (defined as “any grandparent, parent, brother, sister, child, grandchild, ward or 
guardian of the refugee who is dependent on the refugee or is suffering from a mental or 
physical disability to such extent that it is not reasonable for him or her to maintain himself or 
herself fully”) may be admitted into the State at the discretion of the Minister for Justice and 
Equality. In certain circumstances, grandparents,104 nieces and nephews105 (as well as the 
nuclear family) may be dependents of the refugee seeking family reunification. Throughout 
this line of jurisprudence, the Superior Courts have made significant reference to not only the 
                                                             
98 C.I. & Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2014] IEHC 447, para. 45.  
99 For examples of when the Irish courts used a proportionality and rights analysis to set aside 
Ministerial decisions on deportation, see: B.M. (Eritrea) v The Minister for Justice and Equality [2013] 
IEHC 324 and O'Leary & Ors v The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2012] IEHC 80; 
MEO v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform[2012] IEHC 545; S and Others v Minister for 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] IEHC 433. 
100 B (a minor) v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] IEHC 296. 
101 B (a minor) v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] IEHC 296,at paras. 7-10.  
102 See generally: Hamza v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] IEHC 427; Ducale & 
Anor v the Minister for Justice and Equality and the Attorney General [2013] IEHC 25; A.A.M. 
(Somalia) v the Minister for Justice and Equality [2013] IEHC 68; A.M.S. v. Minister for Justice and 
Equality [2014] IEHC 57 and F.B. v Minister for Justice [2014] IEHC 427. 
103 F.B. v Minister for Justice [2014] IEHC 427, para. 42 et seq.  
104 G.O. & Ors v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2008] IEHC 190. 
105 Hassan Sheikh Ali v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2011] IEHC 115.  
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constitutional family, as protected under Article 41, but also the impact of Article 8 of the 
Convention in recognising relationships of significant dependency, that may lead to a finding 
of a right to family reunification for families of refugees.  
In A.M.S. v. Minister for Justice and Equality,106 Mac Eochaidh J. stated that the concept of 
dependency under section 18(4) of the Refugee Act 1996 should not simply be correlated 
with financial dependency, something that the Minister had done in rejecting the applicant’s 
request for family reunification. Mac Eochaidh J. stated that when making decisions on 
whether to grant or refuse family reunification, the decision maker must engage with an 
explicit proportionality analysis, and should,107 
“… start by asking whether a negative decision on family reunification would interfere 
with article 8 rights and then ask whether that interference would have consequences of 
such gravity as to potentially engage Article 8 rights, bearing in mind the proper meaning 
of ‘consequences of such gravity’. Following that analysis, the decision maker may 
decide that the interference is justified notwithstanding the engagement of rights. I 
should also note that in order for the interference caused by the negative decision to be 
justified, it must…be necessary in the interests of the economic well-being of the 
country…If, for example, the state were overwhelmed by applications, one could see 
how a decision maker might say that refusal is economically necessary. For all of these 
reasons I uphold the complaint that no lawful proportionality assessment was 
conducted.” 
Therefore, even when exercising a discretionary power, evidence must be forthcoming that a 
proportionality analysis, as regards Article 8 of the Convention, was substantively engaged 
with by the decision maker. While recognising the relevance of Article 41 of the Constitution 
in this regards, the focus of Superior Court decisions have essentially explored Article 8 of 
the Convention. Mac Eochaidh J. noted,108  
“No stronger rights have been argued to exist under the Constitution and thus the failure 
to expressly weigh the competing rights by reference to Article 41 thereof was harmless 
error. I do not think it is necessary for me to decide whether a refugee seeking family 
reunification under section 18(4) is asserting or is entitled to the protections of 
Constitutional rights under Article 41 or any other provision of the Constitution. I accept 
of course that the refugee has a statutory right to seek family reunification and any 
                                                             
106 A.M.S. v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2014] IEHC 57.  
107 [2014] IEHC 57, para. 68. 
108 [2014] IEHC 57, para. 53.  
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decision on such application must not exceed the statutory scheme or offend the public 
law rules on decision making.” 
In F.B v Minister for Justice, 109  the decision maker failed to engage in a substantive 
proportionality analysis of the applicant’s Article 8 rights under the Convention.110 This was a 
fatal error of law that led to the quashing of the decision to refuse family reunification. 
In the field of family reunification, Article 8 of the Convention, along with equivalent 
constitutional protections, have therefore ensured that substantive rights analysis is engaged 
in by decision-makers.  
 
Criminal Law 
The Irish courts have engaged with a number of core arguments as regards criminal law, 
criminal procedure and the Convention and ECHR Act 2003. Most Convention rights 
arguments have been made in relation to the European Arrest Warrant and compliance with 
the Convention in individual cases, which case law is considered below.  
This section of the Chapter provides a selective overview of some of the key criminal related 
case law. Readers are referred to Annexes 2-4 to this Report for other areas of criminal law 
that have been considered by the Irish Superior Courts as regards the protection of rights 
under the Convention, and impact (if any) of the ECHR Act 2003. 
 
The Imposition of a Life Sentence is not Inhuman and Degrading 
In Lynch and Whelan111 the plaintiffs challenged the imposition of mandatory life sentences 
by courts for the offence of murder under section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1990. The 
plaintiffs argued that the automatic imposition of a life sentence was contrary to the 
Constitution, as it removed the power of a judge to determine the appropriate sentence. The 
plaintiffs further argued that Article 5 of the Convention was violated, as the Executive 
encroached on the judicial function in determining when a person sentenced under section 2 
of the 1990 Act would be released. The plaintiffs sought a declaration of incompatibility 
under section 5 of the ECHR 2003 Act. In refusing all grounds of challenge (and focusing on 
the Convention elements of this decision), Murray C.J stated: 
                                                             
109 [2014] IEHC 427.  
110 [2014] IEHC 427, at para. 43. 
111 See, Lynch and Whelan v Minister for Justice [2012] 1 I.R. 1.  
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“In Irish law any person detained following the imposition of a life sentence may only 
be detained for the purpose of giving effect to that punitive sentence. Therefore his or 
her detention is always and can only "depend upon" and be "by virtue" of the 
conviction.” 112 
While the Executive might have a role in determining when a prisoner was to be released, 
the imposition of the “punitive sentence”,the ECtHR has permitted the imposition of a, 
“…mandatory life sentence as a punitive measure for a serious crime…in accordance 
with national law does not as such offend against any provision of the Convention 
provided at least that national law affords the possibility of review with a view to its 
commutation or conditional release.”113 
The Supreme Court viewed the “discretionary” nature of compassionate or humanitarian 
release, as an executive function, unlinked to imposition of a criminal punishment.114  
It should be noted that, in Vinters v United Kingdom,115 the ECtHR stated that in light of the 
margin of appreciation, it was not the task of the Strasbourg Court, 
“to prescribe the form (the executive or judicial) which that review should take. For the 
same reason, it is not for the Court to determine when that review should take place.”116 
However, the imposition of whole life sentences, without any process or procedures on 
consideration of applications for release, violated Article 3 ECHR. As Judge Power-Forde 
stated in her concurring opinion: 
“Those who commit the most abhorrent and egregious of acts and who inflict untold 
suffering upon others, nevertheless retain their fundamental humanity and carry within 
themselves the capacity to change. Long and deserved though their prison sentences 
may be, they retain the right to hope that, someday, they may have atoned for the 
wrongs which they have committed. They ought not to be deprived entirely of such hope. 
To deny them the experience of hope would be to deny a fundamental aspect of their 
humanity and, to do that, would be degrading.” 
                                                             
112 [2012] 1 IR 1 at 31. The Supreme Court distinguished a line of ECtHR jurisprudence that emerged 
as regards the United Kingdom’s sentencing and conviction practices, where the decision for release 
was based on the “dual element of punishment and preventative detention”, see [2012] 1 IR 1 at 33-
36.  
113 [2012] 1 I.R. 1 at 35-36, citing  Kafkaris v. Cyprus  (2008) 49 E.H.R.R. 877. 
114 [2012] 1 I.R. 1 at 24.  
115 Vinter v United Kingdom [2013] E.C.H.R. 645. 
116 [2013] E.C.H.R. 645 at para. 120.  
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Whether this decision will impact on Irish process and procedure as regards life sentencing 
and decisions on release, remains to be seen. 
 
The Impact of the Convention on the Law of Evidence 
In Cash117 Charleton J. had to consider issues surrounding the obtaining of evidence by 
Gardaí. After reviewing issues of criminal due process under the Constitution, Charleton J. 
considered the impact of the Convention on this area of law: 
“A domestic legal obligation arises by virtue of ss.2 and 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights Act 2003. I consider that a rule providing for the 
automatic exclusion of evidence obtained in consequence of any mistake that 
infringes any constitutional right of an accused, may be incompatible with Ireland's 
obligations to provide, for both the accused and the community, a fair disposal of 
criminal charges.”118 
Charleton J. noted that the ECtHR has, 
“…held that it is not a principle of Convention law that unlawfully obtained evidence 
should not be admissible.”119 
Subsequently, in D.P.P. v JC120 a majority in the Supreme Court revised the exclusionary 
rule on unconstitutionally obtained evidence. While the majority decision was based on a re-
evaluation of constitutional jurisprudence, Convention rights were considered in some of the 
judgments. In the majority, MacMenamin J. stated: 
“The reputation and integrity of the system of justice should not be adversely affected 
by properly and faithfully applied good faith exception to the rule, constitutionally 
applied here, as in other jurisdictions. The bar set by the majority judgments herein is 
significantly higher than that to be found elsewhere in the common law world. It is in 
no way inconsistent with the ECHR (Schenk v Switzerland (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 242). 
It redresses the balance so as to encompass community interests, while ensuring 
that egregious breaches of a suspect’s rights and police misconduct are checked. It 
                                                             
117 Director of Public Prosecutions (Walsh) v Cash [2008] 1 I.L.R.M. 443.  
118 Ibid at 469; relying on  X and Y v Netherlands (1986) 8 E.H.R.R. 235 and Schenk v Switzerland 
(1988) 13 E.H.R.R. 242, along with analysis from the courts of England and Wales, the United States, 
Canada and New Zealand see [2008] 1 I.L.R.M. 443 at 470 et seq.  
119 [2008] 1 I.L.R.M.443 at 470.  
120 D.P.P. v JC [2015] IESC 31.  
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restores meaning to the terms “deliberate and conscious” which have caused a lack 
of clarity in the law.” 121 
The minority dissents also sought to rely on the Convention.122 
 
Scheme of Criminal Legal Aid 
Lawyers cannot utilise Article 6 of the Convention in claiming that there is a right to be 
placed on the criminal legal aid panel.  Legal aid is for the benefit of the accused, and failure 
by counsel to satisfy prerequisite conditions for gaining entry onto the criminal legal aid 
panel, does not engage Article 6 of the Convention.123  
While an individual has a right to be provided with criminal legal aid, this does not mean a 
person is entitled to “equality of arms” with the State prosecutor. In Carmody v Minister for 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform,124 the plaintiff was charged with 42 criminal offences 
relating to improper record keeping of cattle, their movements and failure to register control 
of certain cattle.125 If convicted of these offences, the plaintiff could have faced a significant 
monetary fine or up to two years imprisonment.126 He was granted legal aid in the District 
Court so as to instruct a solicitor to represent him in these criminal proceedings. However, 
the State sought to utilise both a solicitor and junior counsel.127 At that time, a District Court 
Judge could only grant a defendant a legal aid certificate that limited representation to a 
solicitor. Carmody argued that his constitutional and his rights under Article 6 of the 
Convention to criminal legal aid were violated due to the disparity in representation between 
him as a criminal defendant, who was only entitled to a solicitor, in comparison to the State 
utilising a solicitor and counsel.128  
As discussed in chapter 2. the Supreme Court noted that if it accepted the plaintiff’s 
contention that Section 2 of the Criminal Justice (Legal Aid) Act 1962 was incompatible with 
Ireland’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights, then the only 
                                                             
121 D.P.P. v JC [2015] IESC 31 at para. 78. 
122 D.P.P. v JC [2015] IESC 31, in particular, paras. 60-63 of Hardiman J.’s judgment and paras. 79-
83 of Murray J.’s judgment.  
123 See, Walsh v Minister for Justice [2010] 2 I.R. 463. See for example, Carmody v. Minister for 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2005] 2 I.L.R.M. 1; Murphy v. Director of Public Prosecutions 
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124 Carmody v The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] 1 I.R.. 635.  
125 [2010] 1 I.R. 635 at 640-641.  
126  [2010] 1 I.R. 635 at 641. 
127 [2010] 1 I.R. 635 at 641. 
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remedy open to the plaintiff would be a declaration of incompatibility (Section 5 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003), which would not resolve the issue before 
the Court, as it would ultimately be for the Oireachtas to determine how to remedy the 
alleged breach of Ireland’s obligations under the ECHR. The Court therefore decided to 
consider the constitutional question first, and resolved the case on this basis.129  Murray C.J. 
for the Supreme Court noted: 
“Sometimes simplistic and unthinking comments surface in the public arena 
suggesting that fairness and fair procedures at a criminal trial only exist for the 
benefit of criminals.” 130 
The Court noted that the amount of imprisonable offences now tried at the District Court 
level had increased dramatically since the introduction of criminal legal aid in Ireland in 
1962.131 Rather than finding section 2 of the 1962 Act unconstitutional, the Court stated,132 
“ [T]he absence of a right to apply for legal aid to include counsel in appropriate 
cases [in the District Court] must properly be considered as stemming from a failure 
of the State to make, by one means or another, specific provision for such legal aid 
rather than from any provision, in particular any prohibition, in the Act of 1962.” 
The Supreme Court therefore held that it would be unjust and contrary to the Article 38.1 of 
the Constitution (right to a fair trial) if the prosecution were to proceed, while the applicant 
did not have the opportunity to apply for legal aid, to include a solicitor and a barrister.133 The 
Supreme Court held that the State had to put in place a scheme (be it underpinned by 
legislation or statutory instrument) that provided the plaintiff an opportunity to apply for legal 
aid, to include both a solicitor and counsel.134 The Court was satisfied,  
“…that the remedies which are being afforded to the plaintiff in these proceedings are 
adequate to remedy the complaints which he has made with regard to his 
constitutional rights to legal aid, and therefore, the question of considering the 
compatibility of any provision of the Act of 1962 with the European Convention on 
Human Rights pursuant to s. 5 of the Act of 2003 does not arise.” 135 
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132 [2010] 1 I.R. 635 at 667. 
133 [2010] 1 I.R. 635 at 668.  
134 [2010] 1 I.R. 635 at 669.   
135 [2010] 1 I.R. 635 at 669.   
75 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, therefore, Carmody, is an important illustration of the Irish courts’ 
approach to sequencing of constitutional and Convention-based rights claims.  
 
Access to a Solicitor 
For 20+ years the High Court and Supreme Court had steadfastly rejected any attempt to 
interpret constitutional rights to a fair trial as including the right for questioning to be paused 
prior to an accused/suspect having access to her solicitor.  
In The People (D.P.P.) v Gormley136 the Supreme Court had to consider whether statements 
made by the accused, after he had requested a solicitor, but before the solicitor was 
available for consultation, were admissible in evidence. With reference to the approach of 
the European Court of Human Rights,137 the US Supreme Court,138 and other common law 
jurisdictions,139 Clarke J. held: 
“There would be little point in giving constitutional recognition to a right of access to a 
lawyer while in custody if one of the principal purposes of that custody in many 
cases, being the questioning of the relevant suspect, could continue prior to legal 
advice being obtained.” 140 
In justifying this approach from previous (and recent) decisions, Clarke J. noted that the 
Constitution is a “living document”.141 Clarke J. stated that the time had now arrived whereby 
once an accused had requested a solicitor, barring any exceptional circumstances, 
questioning of the accused some not commence until he has had the opportunity to consult 
a solicitor.142  
“The right to a trial in due course of law encompasses a right to early access to a 
lawyer after arrest and the right not to be interrogated without having had an 
opportunity to obtain such advice. The conviction of a person wholly or significantly 
                                                             
136 The People (D.P.P.) v Gormley [2014] 1 I.L.R.M. 377.  The Supreme Court also decided that there 
was no requirement for Gardaí to wait the presence of a solicitor, where, under operation of law, a 
forensic sample (i.e. blood, saliva etc.) was requested.  
137 [2014] 1 I.L.R.M. 377 at 390 -395. The Supreme Court in particular discussed the case of Salduz v 
Turkey (2009) 49 E.H.R.R. 19, where the European Court of Human Rights held that “Article 6 will 
normally require that the accused be allowed to benefit from the assistance of a lawyer…at the initial 
stages of police interrogation.”  
138 [2014] 1 I.L.R.M. 377 at 395-396. 
139 [2014] 1 I.L.R.M. 377 at 396-398, including a review of the legal frameworks as regards rights of 
detained persons to seek assistance of a lawyer in Canada and New Zealand.  
140 [2014] 1 I.L.R.M. 377 at 402.  
141 [2014] 1 I.L.R.M. 377 at 400.  
142 See also, D.P.P. v Ryan [2011] IECCA 6. 
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on the basis of evidence obtained contrary to those constitutional entitlements 
represents a conviction following an unfair trial process.”143 
While not argued in Gormley, Clarke J. did note that the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights and the US Supreme Court  
“recognises that the entitlements of a suspect extend to having the relevant lawyer 
present.”144   
It appeared from the decision of the Supreme Court that to some extent at least may have 
been anticipated by the Minister for Justice and Equality.145 Responding to Gormley, the 
Director of Public Prosecutions issued a practice direction on 7 May 2014, stating that 
solicitors may be present during the questioning of detained persons in a Garda Station.146 
It has to be highlighted that at no point during this case was the ECHR Act 2003 considered 
(as the Courts consider constitutionality arguments first, before moving onto arguments 
relating to the Convention). This nevertheless provides some indication of how Convention 
jurisprudence can influence constitutional rights, even where the ECHR Act 2003 had not 
been pleaded.  
 
Criminal Law and Delay: The Impact of the Convention 
A significant number of cases have considered the impact of Article 6(1) of the Convention 
and the rights to a trial within a reasonable period of time.147 In this arena, the ECtHR has 
ruled against Ireland on a number of occasions. In McFarlane v Ireland148 the ECtHR held 
that the 10 year and 6 month delay in the proceeding to trial (before the applicant was 
acquitted) was a violation of Article 6(1) of the Convention. The ECtHR recalled, 
                                                             
143 [2014] 1 I.L.R.M. 377 at 405.  
144 [2014] 1 I.L.R.M. 377 at 404-405. See also the 
145 See for example, Working Group to Advise on a System Providing for the Presence of a Legal 
Representative During Garda Interviews, Final Report, July 2013. The Working Group noted at pp. 2-
3 that “he trend in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights suggests that Ireland’s policy 
of not permitting solicitors to be present during interviews will come under pressure in the medium 
term.”  
146 E. Doocey and J. O'Neill, “Right of access to solicitor in Garda interviews” Irish Criminal Law 
Update No. 7 (Bloomsbury, 2014).  
147  See, for example, Sweetman v D.P.P. [2004] IEHC 56; McFarlane v. Director of Public 
Prosecutions [2008] 4 I.R. 11; J. Harris Assemblers v D P P [2009] IEHC 344 and McArdle v D.P.P. 
[2012] IEHC 286. See also Table 2.1. above for ECtHR jurisprudence on this issue and in particular, 
Applic. No. 31333/06, McFarlane v Ireland, 10 September 2009. 
148 (2011) 52 E.H.R.R. 20. See also, McMullen v Ireland; Doran v Ireland; O’Reilly and Others v 
Ireland, and Barry v Ireland, referenced above, at  pp. 24-27. 
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“its constant case law to the effect that the reasonableness of the length of 
proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with 
reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the 
applicant and of the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant.” 149 
Given the case law of the Irish Supreme Court on delay and prevention of prosecution was 
developing, the ECtHR therefore held that McFarlane’s challenges were not, 
“…so ill-conceived, and their initiation so unreasonably delayed, that the duration of 
those actions, should be attributed to the applicant.”150 
While accepting that certain actions of McFarlane may have contributed to the delay, this 
was not such so as to justify the 10 year and 6 month delay. Three of the significant periods 
of delay related to fixing a date for trial.151 Under Article 6(1) of the Convention, the State 
had a duty to organise court systems and processes in order to deal with issues within “a 
reasonable period of time.”152  
On the issue of whether damages would be an effective remedy for delay, following its 
decision in Barry v Ireland,153  the ECtHR noted there was significant uncertainty as to 
whether a damages claim under the Constitution would succeed.154 In addition, damages will 
not be an effective remedy as regards systemic delay in a case.155 It is important to note that 
nowhere in its jurisprudence against Ireland has the ECtHR stated that delay in bringing a 
prosecution should result in the dismissal of criminal charges against a plaintiff.  
In J. Harris Assemblers v D.P.P.,156 utilising Article 38.1 of the Constitution and Article 6(1) of 
the Convention, Hedigan J. held that the State was under an obligation,  
“to conduct the administrative aspects of a criminal investigation efficiently and without 
undue delay”.157  
In this case, the High Court held that the delay was excusable.  
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In determining whether a criminal trial should proceed where there has been prosecutorial 
delay, the Supreme Court has noted that the ECHR Act 2003 will be of relevance. The 
Superior Courts will take account of the following factors (where relevant): 
a. “Inordinate, blameworthy or unexplained prosecutorial delay may breach an 
applicant’s constitutional entitlement to a trial with reasonable expedition. 
b. Prosecutorial delay of this nature may be of such a degree that a court will presume 
prejudice and uphold the right to an expeditious trial by directing prohibition. 
c. Where there is a period of significant blameworthy prosecutorial delay less than that 
envisaged at (b), and no actual prejudice is demonstrated, the court will engage in a 
balancing exercise between the community’s entitlement to see crimes prosecuted 
and the applicant’s right to an expeditious trial, but will not direct prohibition unless 
one or more of the elements referred to in P.M. v. Malone [2002] 2 I.R. 560 and P.M. 
v. D.P.P. [2006] 3 I.R. 172 are demonstrated. 
d. Actual prejudice caused by delay which is such as to preclude a fair trial will always 
entitle an applicant to prohibition.” 158 
In Kennedy v D.P.P.,159 the applicant sought to prevent his trial on charges of corruption on 
grounds of delay. Referring to T.H. v D.P.P.160(amongst other cases), Hedigan J. in the High 
Court noted that while an individual might be entitled to damages for breach of Convention 
rights under the ECHR Act 2003 (in this case Article 6 rights), it does not follow that the trial 
has to be prevented.161 
In the Supreme Court, the majority also refused to prevent Mr. Kennedy’s trial from 
proceeding. Clarke J. noted: 
“[I]t does not follow that every case in which the ECtHR finds a breach of the right to 
a reasonably expeditious trial also involves a finding by that court to the effect that 
the trial was unfair…It does not, therefore, follow that the ECHR requires, for the 
avoidance of a breach of its provisions, that a trial be prohibited in every case where 
there has been a breach of the right to a reasonably expeditious trial.” 162 
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Clarke J., relying on decisions of the ECtHR and previous decisions of the Irish courts, 
expressed the view that the remedies under the Constitution (damages and/or potential 
prohibition on the trial occurring) were more extensive than damages remedies available 
under the Convention or the ECHR Act 2003.163 As the applicant had not pursued a claim of 
damages under the ECHR Act 2003, the Supreme Court could not rule on this.  
The Irish courts have, therefore, accepted (at least to a degree) that delay in speedy 
prosecution may result in damages, in criminal or civil proceedings, invoking the protection 
of Article 6(1) ECHR (and the corollary constitutional right).164 However, as is quite clear 
from long-standing ECtHR and Irish Superior Courts jurisprudence, there is no requirement 
for a trial to be prevented from occurring, even if the delay is inexcusable.  
 
Prison Law 
A small number of cases have come before the Irish courts as regards prisoners’ rights165 
and prison conditions.166 In Mulligan v Governor of Portlaoise Prison, McKechnie J. held that 
slopping out, without any other significant impact on personal space, sleeping space or 
hygiene issues, did not constitute inhuman and degrading treatment and a violation of 
private life for the purposes of ECHR Act 2003. McKechnie J. engaged in a significant review 
of key prison conditions jurisprudence from the ECtHR.167 In reviewing the particular case at 
hand, and the prison conditions Mulligan had been exposed to,168 McKechnie J. stated that 
this did not reach the requisite level of severity in order to be viewed as a violation of Article 
3 or Article 8 ECHR. Concluding, McKechnie J. stated: 
“Violations have been established where there have been what can only be described as 
extreme conditions of deprivation including the “cumulative vices” of overcrowding, poor 
hygiene, lack of movement and poor exercise facilities… there was an adequate supply 
of soap, disinfectant and bleach for use by all the prisoners, and he was able to 
purchase air fresheners from the prison tuck shop had he wished. Taking the issues 
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165 Holland v. Governor of Portlaoise Prison [2004] 2 I.R. 573 (right of prisoner to speak and contact 
the media); Gibbons v Governor of Wheatfield Prison [2008] IEHC 206 (disciplinary proceedings); Foy 
v Governor of Cloverhill Prison [2012] 1 I.R. 37 (non physical contact with family members, not in 
contravention of the ECHR). 
166 Mulligan v Governor of Portlaoise Prison & Anor [2010] IEHC 269. 
167  Mulligan v Governor of Portlaoise Prison & Anor [2010] IEHC 269, at paras. 128-143. 
168 Mulligan v Governor of Portlaoise Prison & Anor [2010] IEHC 269, see in particular paras. 44-109.  
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individually and cumulatively I am unable to find there is a breach of Article 3 or in 
conjunction with Article 8 by reference to any established Strasbourg decision.” 169 
 
European Arrest Warrant 
Convention rights have frequently been invoked in cases involving the European Arrest 
Warrant. Section 37 of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 provides that a person shall 
not be surrendered to the requesting State, if the surrender would be incompatible with the 
State's obligations under the Convention. Given the genesis of the European Arrest Warrant 
emerging from European Union law, there has also been significant interpretation of the 
relationship between Irish law and the Charter, discussed below.170 
In Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v McArdle,171 the applicant had failed to 
show any evidence that the Spanish legal system would violate any of his rights under the 
Convention. In Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v Stapleton, the length of time 
between the alleged offences (1978/1982) and the request for surrender of the applicant 
caused some concern for the High Court. Peart J. noted that his role was to ensure that 
there were adequate reasons for preventing surrender on the basis of the elapsed time 
between the charge and bringing an accused to trial. Peart J. stated:  
“The concept of what is or is not a reasonable period of time is an objective one to a very 
large extent, even though there can be subjective considerations to be borne in mind 
such as the degree to which the respondent himself has contributed to the delay in his 
arrest and hence his trial. … [I]n the present case there are perhaps unique 
circumstances arising from the fact that the earliest of the offences with which the 
respondent faces trial is May 1978. It is not unreasonable or fanciful in my estimation to 
suggest that if the respondent was to be surrendered, and everybody concerned worked 
with some dispatch hereafter in order to ensure as early a trial as possible, such a trial 
                                                             
169 Mulligan v Governor of Portlaoise Prison & Anor [2010] IEHC 269, paras. 161-164. McKechnie J. 
distinguished the case of Napier v The Scottish Ministers [2004] Scots C.S. 100, on the basis that 
there was significant over-crowding, the authorities had run a “chaotic” slopping out process, a person 
had to relieve themselves in front of others, and this caused severe physical and mental issues for the 
prisoners, which the relevant authorities had notice of. 
170 For an assessment of the impact of the Charter and the European Arrest Warrant, see, pp. 136-
142.  
171 Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v. McArdle [2005] IEHC 222.  
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might take place almost thirty years after the earliest of these offences, as a matter of 
fact.” 172 
In other cases, the lapse of time has also been fatal to an application to surrender an 
accused:  
“Article 6 is not directed to lapse of time between the commission of an offence and the 
trial: rather it is directed to ensuring that criminal proceedings, once initiated, are 
prosecuted without undue delay.” 173 
Where there is a real risk of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, then the Irish Courts 
will not surrender a respondent to the requesting State. In Minister for Justice, Equality and 
Law Reform v Rettinger,174 the Supreme Court noted that, once cogent evidence has been 
presented that a respondent faces a real risk of a violation of Article 3 ECHR if surrendered, 
it is for the requesting State to dispel or disprove this evidence.175 In Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform v McGuigan176 and Minister for Justice and Equality v Holden,177 
the Irish High Court refused to surrender the respondents to Lithuania, due to the real risk of 
torture, inhuman and/or degrading conditions of detention that would have to be endured 
prior to trial and in the event of any subsequent conviction. In both these cases, the High 
Court made reference to a wealth of reports (in particular from the Council of Europe’s 
Committee on the Prevention of Torture) on detention and prison conditions in Lithuania.  
In Minister for Justice and Equality v Rostas,178 the Irish High Court refused to surrender a 
Romanian national, who was Roma, on the basis that there would be a “flagrant breach” of 
Article 6, in conjunction with Article 14, of the Convention. The respondent had been 
convicted of offences in 1995, and Romania was seeking her surrender to serve the 
remainder of her sentence. The respondent had provided an account of the unfairness of her 
trial (no witnesses were called; she had never met her lawyer, she had not been informed of 
her right to appeal), with the general narrative supported by a lawyer with experience of 
practising criminal law in Romania at the time. 179  Relying on decisions of the ECtHR, 
                                                             
172 Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v Stapleton [2006] 3 IR 26 at 50.  
173 Minister for Justice v Corrigan [2007] 2 IR 448.  
174 Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v Rettinger [2010] IESC 45.  
175 See in particular Denham J.’s legal analysis of Article 3 ECHR and the European Arrest Warrant, 
[2010] IESC 45 at para. 27. Denham J. also noted that a trial judge may “attach importance” to human 
rights documents and reports of governmental and non-governmental bodies. 
176 Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v McGuigan [2013] IEHC 216, related to conditions 
of detention in Lithuania.  
177 Minister for Justice and Equality v Holden [2013] IEHC 62.  
178 Minister for Justice and Equality v Rostas [2014] IEHC 391. The Charter issues raised in this case 
are discussed below, at p. 139.  
179 Minister for Justice and Equality v Rostas [2014] IEHC 391 at paras. 107-117.  
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independent human rights reports from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and 
the European Roma Rights Centre, the High Court refused to surrender the respondent. 
Edwards J. refused surrender on the basis that, 
“There are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that the 
respondent suffered a flagrant denial of justice with respect to a trial that took place 
in a very different Romania from today’s Romania, can have no implications beyond 
the case presently before the Court. It represents a decision on the facts of the 
particular case before the Court which facts are unlikely to be exactly replicated. In 
so far as future cases are concerned, whether an objection to a respondent’s 
surrender based upon the unfairness of an underlying conviction could similarly 
succeed would depend on the nature and strength of the evidence adduced in the 
particular case.” 180 
In Minister for Justice and Equality v Nolan,181 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the 
High Court182 to refuse to surrender the respondent to the United Kingdom, where he would 
be subject to an indeterminate sentence under a system of sentencing that had been found 
to contravene Article 5(1) of the Convention by the ECtHR.183 
Another core issue that has arisen with European Arrest Warrant cases is that of the impact 
of surrender on a respondent (or his/her family) and respect for private and family life under 
Article 8 of the Convention.184 In a number of cases, the Irish Superior Courts have noted 
that only in exceptional circumstances would an interference with family life lead to a 
decision not to surrender.185 In Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v Gheorghe, 
Fennelly J. noted: 
“persons sought for prosecution in another state will very often suffer disruption of their 
personal and family life…No authority has been produced to support the proposition that 
                                                             
180 Minister for Justice v Rostas [2014] IEHC 391 at para. 117. 
181 Minister for Justice and Equality v Kelly aka Nolan [2013] IESC 54. 
182 Minister for Justice and Equality v Nolan [2012] IEHC 249.  
183 Minister for Justice and Equality v Kelly aka Nolan [2013] IESC 54, per Denham J., referring to the 
decision of James, Wells and Lee v. The United Kingdom, (2013) 56 E.H.R.R. 399.  
184 See, pp. 140-142 for Charter jurisprudence from the Irish courts on family life and implementation 
of the European Arrest Warrant.  
185 See generally: Minister for Justice and Equality v Leskiewicz [2014] IEHC 584; Minister for Justice 
and Equality v Craig [2014] IEHC 460; Minister for Justice and Equality v O’Donnell [2014] IEHC 138; 
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v M.M. [2013] IEHC 330; Minister for Justice and 
Equality v B.H. [2013] IEHC 443; Minister for Justice and Equality v T.E. [2013] IEHC 323 (discussed 
below, at p. 140); Minister for Justice and Equality v Ostrowski [2014] 1 I.L.R.M. 88 (discussed below, 
p.142); Minister for Justice v Machaczka [2012] IEHC 434; Minister for Justice v Staniak [2012] IEHC 
508; Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform  v Ciechanowicz [2011] IEHC 106; Minister For 
Justice v D.L. [2011] 3 I.R. 145; Minister for Justice v Gorman [2010] 3 I.R. 583 and Minister for 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform v Gheorghe & anor [2009] IESC 76. 
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surrender is to be refused where a person will, as a consequence, suffered disruption, 
even severe disruption of family relationships.”186 
Subsequent cases also emphasised that extradition under the European Arrest Warrant 
would interfere with family life, but that this interference would: (a) be capable of engaging 
the right to respect for (private or) family life; (b) in accordance with law; (c) pursue a 
legitimate aim (prosecution of criminal offences); (d) be necessary in a democratic society; 
and (e) be proportionate to the legitimate aim sought.187 In Minister for Justice and Equality v 
Leskiewicz,188 the High Court noted: 
“The respondent has failed to adduce evidence of sufficient cogency to demonstrate 
that to surrender him would represent a disproportionate interference with his rights 
to respect for family life in breach of article 8 of the ECHR. His evidence does not 
establish, or even come close to establishing either that he personally or that a 
member of his family would be so profoundly affected by a decision to surrender him 
such as to outweigh the significant public interest in his extradition…”189 
In only a small number of cases have respondents successfully argued Article 8 ECHR 
(family life) as a basis for the courts refusing an order to surrender. In Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform v Gorman,190 Peart J. refused to surrender the respondent to the 
United Kingdom. The respondent had initially been charged with murder and conspiracy to 
commit murder in 1992. At the initial trial, the prosecution had been withdrawn and the 
respondent moved to the Republic of Ireland. Due to a change in the law in the United 
Kingdom, the respondent was now sought again to stand trial for the 1992 offences. Peart J. 
provided a detailed background on the “exceptional” circumstances in this case. Peart J. 
noted that the surrender of the respondent to the United Kingdom would have a significant 
impact on the respondent’s family:  
“[The respondent’s family] would be parted from their friends, family and community and 
would be required to re-establish themselves in another environment. There are 
significant matters and ones which this court considers would in all probability result 
more likely than not in a decision to remain [in Ireland]. That as a matter of probability, in 
my view, means that a surrender of the respondent [to the United Kingdom] would result 
                                                             
186 Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v Gheorghe & anor [2009] IESC 76 at para. 48.  
187 See in particular, Minister For Justice v D.L. [2011] 3 I.R. 145; Minister for Justice and Equality v 
Jaroslaw Ostrowski [2014] 1 I.L.R.M. 88 (in particular pp. 112-120); Minister for Justice and Equality v 
Craig [2014] IEHC 460 and Minister for Justice & Equality v Leskiewicz [2014] IEHC 584.  
188 Minister for Justice and Equality v Leskiewicz [2014] IEHC 584.. 
189Minister for Justice and Equality v Leskiewicz [2014] IEHC 584, at para. 29. 
190 Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v Gorman [2010] 3 I.R. 583.  
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in a separation of the respondent from his wife and family, and this court must make its 
decision on the assumption therefore that his family would not feel able to go and join 
him.”191 
Peart J. held that the delay in requesting the respondent’s extradition,192 coupled with the 
impact that the extradition would have on family life,193 given that the respondent may not 
have reasonably foreseen the possibility of extradition to the United Kingdom, meant that 
surrender to the United Kingdom would not be ordered.194  
In Minister for Justice and Equality v. T.E.,195 the High Court summarised the principal legal 
considerations that Irish courts must consider when deciding whether or not to surrender a 
respondent who raises questions on the protection of family life (under the Convention or the 
Constitution). It is worth setting out in full the 22 considerations and questions which, 
according to the High Court, have to be considered in any argument that an extradition 
would violate Article 8 ECHR:196 
“1.The test imposed by article 8(2) is not whether extradition is on 
balance desirable but whether it is necessary in a democratic society; 
2.There is no presumption against the application of article 8 in 
extradition cases and no requirement that exceptional circumstances 
must be demonstrated before article 8 grounds can succeed; 
3.The test is one of proportionality, not exceptionality; 
4. Where the family rights that are in issue are rights enjoyed in this 
country, the issue of proportionality involves weighing the proposed 
interference with those rights against the relevant public interest; 
5. In conducting the required proportionality test, it is incorrect to seek to 
balance the general desirability of international cooperation in enforcing 
                                                             
191 Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v Gorman [2010] 3 I.R. 583 at 613.  
192 See, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v Gorman [2010] 3 I.R. 583 at 587-588 for a 
succinct summary of relevant timelines. It should be noted that the challenge of the extradition 
warrant on grounds of undue/unnecessary delay in issuing the warrant, and bringing the respondent 
to trial, failed, see pp. 590-594.  
193 Peart J. in particular referenced the decision of Boultif v Switzerland (2001) 33 E.H.R.R. 1179 
([2010] 3 I.R. 583 at 610-611) in examining the proportionality of the removal from Ireland for the 
purposes of extradition. While Boultif relates to immigration law, similar principles were applicable in 
this case.  
194 Minister for Justice v Gorman [2010] 3 I.R. 583 at 600-614. 
195 Minister for Justice and Equality v. T.E [2013] IEHC 323 (Unreported, High Court, Edwards J., 21st 
June, 2013). See issues of Charter relevance discussed below at p. 140.  
196 Minister for Justice and Equality v. T.E [2013] IEHC 323 at pp 110-115 of unreported decision.  
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the criminal law and in bringing fugitives to justice, against the level of 
respect to be afforded generally to the private and family life of persons; 
6. Rather, the assessment must be individual and particular to the 
requested person and family concerned. The correct approach is to 
balance the public interest in the extradition of the particular requested 
person against the damage which would be done to the private life of 
that person and his or her family in the event of the requested person 
being surrendered; 
7. In the required balancing exercise the public interest must be properly 
recognized and duly rated; 
8. The public interest is a constant factor in the horizontal sense, i.e., it is 
a factor of which due account must be taken in every case; 
9. However, the public interest is a variable factor in the vertical sense, 
i.e., the weight to be attached to it, though never insignificant, may vary 
depending on the circumstances of the case; 
10. No fixed or specific attribution should be assigned to the importance 
of the public interest in extradition and it is unwise to approach any 
evaluation of the degree of weight to be attached to it on the basis of 
assumptions. The precise degree of weight to be attached to the public 
interest in extradition in any particular case requires a careful and case 
specific assessment. That said, the public interest in extradition will in 
most cases be afforded significant weight. 
11.The gravity of the crime is relevant to the assessment of the weight to 
be attached to the public interest. The graver the crime, the greater the 
public interest. However, the opposite effect, namely ‘the lesser the 
crime the lesser the interest’ may not follow in corresponding proportion. 
Where on the spectrum the subject offence may sit, is an aspect of each 
case which must also be explored as part of the process. 
12. The public interest in extraditing a person to be tried for an alleged 
crime is of a different order from the public interest in deporting or 
removing an alien who has been convicted of a crime and who has 
served his sentence for it, or whose presence in the country is for some 
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other reason not acceptable. This does not mean, however, that the 
Court is required to adopt a different approach to article 8 rights 
depending on whether a case is an extradition case or an expulsion 
case. The approach should be the same, but the weight to be afforded to 
the public interest will not necessarily be the same in each case. 
13. Delay may be taken into account in assessing the weight to be 
attached to the public interest in extradition; 
14. In so far as it is necessary to weigh in the balance the rights of 
potentially affected individuals on the one hand, with the public interest in 
the extradition of the requested person, on the other hand, the question 
for consideration is whether, to the extent that the proposed extradition 
may interfere with the family life of the requested person and other 
members of his family, such interference would constitute a 
proportionate measure both in terms of the legitimate aim or objective 
being pursued and the pressing social need which it is suggested 
renders such interference necessary. 
15. It is self evident that a proposed surrender on foot of an extradition 
request will, if carried into effect, result in the requested person being 
arrested, being possibly detained in custody in this State for a period 
pending transfer to the requesting state, and being forcibly expelled from 
the State. In addition, he/she may have to face a trial (and may possibly 
be further detained pending such trial) and/or may have to serve a 
sentence in the requesting State. Such factors, in and of themselves, will 
rarely be regarded as sufficient to outweigh the public interest in 
extradition. Accordingly, reliance on matters which could be said to 
typically flow from arrest, detention or surrender, without more, will little 
avail the affected person. 
16. Article 8 does not guarantee the right to a private or family life. 
Rather it guarantees the right to respect for one’s private or family life. 
That right can only be breached if a proposed measure would operate to 
so as to disrespect an individual’s private or family life. A proposed 
measure giving rise to exceptionally injurious and harmful consequences 
for an affected individual, disproportionate to both legitimate aim or 
objective being pursued and the stated pressing social need proffered in 
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justification of the measure, would operate in that way and breach the 
affected individual’s rights under Article 8. 
17. It will be necessary for any Court concerned with the proportionality 
of a proposed extradition measure to examine with great care in a fact 
specific enquiry how the requested person, and relevant members of that 
person’s family, would be affected by it, and in particular to assess the 
extent to which such person or persons might be subjected to particularly 
injurious, prejudicial or harmful consequences, and then weigh those 
considerations in the balance against the public interest in the extradition 
of the requested person. 
18. Such an exercise ought not to be governed by any predetermined 
approach or by pre-set formula: it is for the Court seized of the issue to 
decide how to proceed. Once all of the circumstances are properly 
considered, the end result should accurately reflect the exercise. 
19. The demonstration of exceptional circumstances is not required to 
sustain an article 8 type objection because in some cases the existence 
of commonplace or unexceptional circumstances might, in the event of 
the proposed measure being implemented, still result in potentially 
affected persons suffering injury, prejudice or harm. The focus of the 
court’s enquiry should therefore be on assessing the severity of the 
consequences of the proposed extradition measure for the potentially 
affected persons or persons, rather than on the circumstances giving rise 
to those consequences. 
20. Where the article 8 rights of a child or children are engaged by a 
proposed extradition measure the best interests of the child or children 
concerned must be a primary consideration. They may be outweighed by 
countervailing factors, but they are of primary importance. 
21. If children’s interests are to be properly taken into account by an 
extradition court, it will require to have detailed information about them, 
and about the family as a whole, covering with all considerations material 
to or bearing upon their welfare, both present and future. Primary 
responsibility for the adduction of the necessary evidence rests upon the 
party raising article 8 rights in support of an objection to their surrender. 
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22. In an appropriate case, where it is satisfied that there are special 
features requiring further investigation to establish how the welfare of a 
child or children might be affected by a proposed extradition measure, 
and/or as to what the best interests of the child or children in question 
might require, an extradition court can, of its own motion, seek further 
evidence.” 197  
Overall, the Irish Courts have engaged extensively with the jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
(and, as discussed in chapter 7, the Charter) in determining whether to permit surrender 
under a European Arrest Warrant. The Irish courts have sought to outline clear tests as 
regards providing substantive reasons for accepting or rejecting a respondent’s request not 
to be surrendered to the requesting State.  
 
 Family and Child Law 
In the arena of family and child law, the 27 reported cases from the District Court evidence 
some engagement with the Convention. The Charter can only impact child and family law to 
the extent this field is within the scope of European Union law.198   
In the area of child care law, where the Health Services Executive, and more recently the 
Child and Family Agency, have sought various orders under the Child Care Act 1991 Judges 
of the District Court have emphasised the need for proportionate and limited interference 
with rights of the family.199 Some key principles emerging from the District Court cases have 
included: 
 The Health Service Executive is an “organ of the State” for the purposes of section 1 
of the 2003 Act and must act in a Convention compliant manner.200 
 The District Court is under an obligation to interpret child-care legislation in a 
Constitutional and Convention compliant manner when exercising its powers.201  
                                                             
197 See discussion in context of Article 24 of the Charter (rights of the child), below, pp. 140-143. 
198 See discussion of the Charter below, in particular as regards interpretation of Brussels II bis 
Regulation at pp. 145 et seq. 
199 See, Health Service Executive v SK & anor (Costs) [2010] IEDC 2 (09 June 2010), Health Service 
Executive v RB & anor (Care Order - CSA Allegations) [2011] IEDC 5 (30 September 2011), Health 
Service Executive v LL & ors (Full Care Order - NAI) [2011] IEDC 6 (11 October 2011), Health Service 
Executive v ON & anor (Care Order - Corporal Punishment) [2011] IEDC 8 (01 November 2011) and 
Health Service Executive v ED & anor (CO and SO - Neglect and Abuse) [2012] IEDC 1 (13 January 
2012). 
200 SB & anor v Health Service Executive (Direction to Prevent Change of Placement) [2011] IEDC 10 
(08 December 2011) 
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 When exercising powers to grant any form of care order under the Child Care Act 
1991 (as amended), there is a requirement under the Constitution and the 
Convention to have due regard to the rights of the parents and family. There should 
not be a presumption in favour of permanent separation of a parent-child relationship 
(unless there are exceptional circumstances).202 
As regards sexual abuse allegations, not proved to a criminal standard, the District Court 
has emphasised that it must be mindful of the rights of the alleged perpetrator under Article 6 
and Article 8 ECHR.203 The District Court must be satisfied on the balance of probabilities 
that such abuse occurred.204  Even where there may be a risk to life of a child, abuse 
allegations must be disclosed to the alleged perpetrator.205  
In Health Service Executive v M, X & ors, 206 the District Court took its obligations under 
section 2 of the ECHR Act 2003 into account in refusing to block disclosure of a sexual 
abuse allegation. The Court noted that there was a positive duty to prevent a loss of life and 
preserve bodily integrity of the complainant (X). This had to be viewed in light of the alleged 
perpetrator’s (M) significant due process rights. In this case, the high threshold for refusing 
to disclose information to M had not been met. X had in place significant supports to assist in 
his dealing with this disclosure of the sex abuse allegation to M.  
Issues relating to fair procedures in child care cases, including the right of the child to be 
consulted in any change of care placement, or in the case of a proposal to grant a full care 
order, must take cognisance of rights under the Convention.207 The District Court, while 
mindful of the voice of the child, has refused, in the particular circumstances of the case, to 
grant a request of two children (15 and 16 years of age) to be provided with legal 
representation through a solicitor. The judge decided that fair procedures under Article 8 of 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
201 Child and Family Agency and JO & Anor (Care Order - Proportionality) [2014] IEDC 11 (12 August 
2014). 
202 See, Child and Family Agency and KC & Anor (Care Order - Proportionality) [2014] IEDC 12, 
Tusla: Child and Family Agency and COS & Anor [2014] IEDC 16 (31 October 2014) and Tusla: Child 
and Family Agency and AC & Anor (Care Order - Proportionality) [2014] IEDC 17 (05 November 
2014). In the Charter context, see below, p. 146. 
203 Health Service Executive v B & anor (Lifting In Camera Rule) [2013] IEDC 13 (28 May 2013). 
204 DP v KS (Access Variation and Burden of Proof for Sexual Abuse) [2009] IEDC 3 (18 May 2009). 
205 Health Service Executive v M, X & ors (Joining of Party) [2013] IEDC 9 (25 March 2013) 
206 Health Service Executive v M, X & ors (Joining of Party) [2013] IEDC 9 (25 March 2013) 
207 See, Health Service Executive v SM & anor (Change of Placement and Wishes of Child) [2010] 
IEDC 1 (13 May 2010) and Health Service Executive v AM & anor (Care Order - Mental Illness) [2013] 
IEDC 10 (23 April 2013), relying on Hokkanen v Finland (1995) 19 E.H.R.R. 139 and Bronda v Italy 
(2001) E.H.R.R. 33. 
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the Convention (and Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child) had been 
respected by appointing a guardian ad litem for the children.208  
As regards the rights of parents, the District Court, with particular reference to Article 6 and 
Article 8 of the Convention, has held that in certain circumstances, representation outside 
the Legal Aid Board scheme must be provided to families involved in care proceedings.209  
In the Superior Courts, issues of child and family law have also been considered as regards 
the impact of the ECHR Act 2003. In two cases relating to marriage equality and rights of 
families, the Superior Courts have been cautious in going beyond minimum rights 
protections established by the ECtHR.  
In Zappone & Gilligan v Revenue Commissioners (somewhat reflecting the reasoning of the 
ECtHR in the 2010 case of Schalk and Kopf v Austria),210 Dunne J. held that there was no 
right, under the Constitution or the ECHR, for same-sex couples to marry.211  
In McD v L, the High Court,212 after an extensive review of ECtHR authorities, concluded that 
the natural mother of a child, and her lesbian partner, were a “de facto family”. Hedigan J. 
noted that while there was no jurisprudence from the ECtHR (at that time) where a lesbian 
couple living together and raising a child were considered a de facto family, the case of X, Y 
and Z v. United Kingdom,213 demonstrated a “substantial movement towards such a finding.” 
The court considered L, M and D to be a de facto family for the purposes of Article 8 of the 
Convention and, relying on an expert report ordered by the High Court, stated that the child 
did not have any close contact whatsoever with McD, and therefore McD could not rely on 
Article 8 in establishing family life with D.214  
However, on appeal, the Supreme Court rejected that there was any legal protection 
inhering in the “de facto family” by virtue of the Convention and/or the ECHR Act 2003. The 
reasoning of the High Court came under sustained criticism, with Fennelly J. noting that the 
judge failed to identify any statutory provision or rule of law to be interpreted in a Convention 
                                                             
208 Health Service Executive v M & anor (Children Request Solicitor) [2010] IEDC 4 (01 November 
2010).  
209 Health Service Executive v SK & anor (Costs) [2010] IEDC 2 (09 June 2010). See also, Health 
Service Executive v OA, judgment of O’Malley J., 12 April 2013. 
210 Schalk and Kopf v Austria [2010] E.C.H.R. 995. See also the more recent case of Hamalainen v 
Finland [2014] E.C.H.R. 787.  
211 Zappone & Anor v Revenue Commissioners & Ors. [2006] IEHC 404.  
212 McD v L & Another [2008] IEHC 96.  
213 X, Y and Z v. United Kingdom [1997] 24 E.H.R.R.143.  
214 In coming to this conclusion, Hedigan J. relied on the European Commission on Human Rights 
decision in Application no. 16911/90, M. v. Netherlands (8th February, 1993).  
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compliant manner.215 Fennelly J. also held that the High Court had attempted to give direct 
effect to the Convention, which conflicted with Article 29 of the Constitution.216 The ECtHR 
had not (at that particular time)217 recognised that homosexual couples could benefit from 
protections of family life under Article 8. Significantly, Fennelly J. held:  
“The Act of 2003 does not provide an open ended mechanism for our courts to outpace 
Strasbourg.”218 
 
Equality, Social and Employment Rights 
Irish courts and tribunals have considered the impact of the ECHR and ECHR Act 2003 in a 
range of equality, social rights and employment rights fields.219  
 
Employment 
As regards employment rights, the Labour Court has engaged with the ECHR in a limited 
manner since the commencement of the ECHR Act 2003.  
In Damery, the Labour Court held that the Convention could not impact on claims for 
diplomatic immunity in employment disputes.220 In two trade union disputes, the Labour 
Court had occasion to refer to the ECHR or ECHR Act 2003, without any core consideration 
of Convention rights.221 Within the Superior Courts, employment law related ECHR claims 
have revolved around issues relating to fair procedures in disciplinary tribunals.222 This line 
                                                             
215 McD v L [2010] 2 I.R. 199 at 303.  
216 McD v L [2010] 2 I.R. 199 at 312. 
217 As Hedigan J. had predicted, the ECtHR eventually recognized same-sex couples as potentially 
benefiting from the protection of family life under Article 8 ECHR in Schalk and Kopf v Austria  [2010] 
E.C.H.R. 995, see paras. 87-95.  
218 McD v L [2010] 2 IR 199 at 317. 
219 For a substantial review of the approach of the European Court of Human Rights and the Irish 
courts to issues relating to socio-economic rights and the ECHR and ECHR Act 2003, see Whyte, G. 
“Public Interest Litigation in Ireland and the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003” and 
Thornton, L. “The European Convention on Human Rights: A Socio-Economic Rights Charter?” and in 
in Egan, S., Thornton, L. and Walsh, J. Ireland and the European Convention on Human Rights: 60 
Years and Beyond (Dublin: Bloomsbury, 2014).  
220 Determination No.EDA0417, Italian Embassy v Damery (December 2004).  
221 See, Recommendation No. LCR18364, Dunnes Stores Tralee and Mandate (November 2005) and 
Decision No. REA 1120, MDY Construction Limited and Building and Allied Trade Unions (February 
2011).  
222 See, Burns & Anor v. Governor of Castlerea Prison [2005] IEHC 76, Kudelska v An Bord Altranais 
[2009] IEHC 68, Webster v The Commissioner of An Garda Síochána, Ireland and the Attorney 
General  [2014] 2 I.L.R.M. 144 and Cassidy v Martin Butterly and Company Ltd & ors [2014] IEHC 
203.  
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of case law augments the already strong constitutional fair procedures jurisprudence within 
employment law. There has been no significant consideration by the Superior Courts of the 
degree (if any) to which a Convention claim impacts on constitutional fair procedures 
jurisprudence in the employment setting. 
 
Equality 
The Equality Tribunal has explicitly engaged with rights claims under the Convention and/or 
ECHR Act 2003 on eight occasions.223 The Equality Tribunal has a duty to interpret Irish law 
in a Convention compliant manner (in so far as is possible).224 The ECHR Act 2003 does not 
extend the jurisdiction of the Equality Tribunal to determine whether breaches of Convention 
rights have occurred.225  
On just one occasion to date, within the scope of this study, has the Equality Tribunal 
engaged substantially with jurisprudence of the ECtHR. In McAteer v South Tipperary 
County Council,226 the Equality Tribunal had to assess whether the complainant was unfairly 
dismissed on grounds of his religious belief. The Equality Officer reviewed select 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR relating to rules on expression of religious belief within the work 
environment.227 In this case, the Equality Officer determined that the right to manifest one’s 
religious belief in the workplace is protected under the ECHR, and reasonable limitations 
may be placed on this right. The Equality Officer noted that the ECtHR accepted in its 
jurisprudence that the right to manifest one’s religious beliefs can be limited so as to avoid 
undue pressure being placed on work colleagues. Religious belief cannot justify a refusal to 
carry out otherwise lawful tasks in the employment setting, and for reasons of health and 
safety manifestation of religious belief may have to be restricted. After reviewing the ECtHR 
jurisprudence, the Equality Officer determined that the complainant had been unlawfully 
dismissed on the basis of his religious beliefs and an award of €70,000 was appropriate.228  
                                                             
223 See below for the eight cases where the Equality Authority explicitly engages with Convention 
and/or ECHR Act 2003 arguments.  
224 DEC-S2005/200, Sharkey v Danny Minnie's Restaurant, Donegal, December 2005. 
225 See generally, DEC-E2013-188, Mr L v A Medical Technology Enterprise , (20 December 2013), 
DEC-S2010-053, A Patient v Health Service Provider and A Hospital (1 December 2010) and DEC-
S2008-113, Mr Thomas O’Donnell v Roscommon County Council (2 December 2008). 
226 DEC-E2014-045, John McAteer v South Tipperary County Council (24 June 2014). 
227  The Equality Officer made reference to the following cases: Kokkinakis v Greece (1994) 17 
E.H.R.R. 397, Larissis & others v Greece [1999] EHRR 329 and Eweida and Others v United 
Kingdom [2013] E.C.H.R. 37. 
228 For a discussion of the Charter points raised in this case, see below, pp. 149-150.  
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The High Court dismissed a claim that, in a case of a four year delay between the Equality 
Tribunal’s receiving a complaint and making a determination (between 2002 and 2006), the 
Director of the Tribunal had breached his obligations under section 3 of the ECHR Act 2003 
and rights under Article 6(1) of the Convention.229 
In D(J) v Residential Institutions Review Committee 230  the High Court dismissed the 
applicant’s arguments under the ECHR Act 2003  that, by virtue of section 2(1) of the ECHR 
Act 2003 (the interpretive obligation) and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR under Article 8 and 
14, the term “child” in the Residential Institutions Redress Act 2002 should be read as 
including any person up to the age of 21, as this was the legal definition of childhood at the 
relevant time of the applicant’s complaints. O’Neill J. decided that, given that the events 
complained of occurred in the 1960s, neither Article 8 nor Article 14 could be engaged.231 
The Supreme Court upheld this decision.232 
 
Social Rights (Asylum Seekers) 
In C.A. & T.A,233 the operation of the system of direct provision for asylum seekers in Ireland 
was considered.234 Mac Eochaidh J. accepted: 
“…[W]here an applicant claims that ‘direct provision’ is having such adverse affects 
on her life as to cause serious harm and where such circumstances are backed up 
by appropriate medical and other independent evidence, a Court would be entitled to 
grant appropriate relief, even if the only remedy for the wrong involved the 
expenditure of additional resources by the State.”235 
                                                             
229 Kelly v Director of Equality Tribunal [2008] IEHC 112. The High Court noted that between 2002 
and 1 January 2004, the plaintiff’s claims under Article 6(1) ECHR could not impact the decision, 
given that the ECHR Act 2003 was not retrospective.  
230 D(J) v. Residential Institutions Review Committee [2009] 2 I.L.R.M. 65. 
231 D(J) v. Residential Institutions Review Committee [2009] 2 I.L.R.M. 65 at 73-76. The applicant 
initially succeeded in her claim that the definition of ‘child’ under the 2002 Act was unconstitutional. 
This aspect of the High Court’s decision was overturned by the Supreme Court on appeal, see [2010] 
1 IR 262.  
232 D(J) v. Residential Institutions Review Committee [2010] 1 I.R. 262.  
233  C.A. & anor v Minister for Justice and Equality & ors [2014] IEHC 532. For more detailed 
consideration of this judgment, see Thornton, L. “C.A & T.A.: The Direct Provision Case” (2014) 4 
Irish Journal of Family Law 116-118.  
234 For more on the human rights concerns with the direct provision system, see, Thornton, L. “Social 
Welfare Law and Asylum Seekers in Ireland: An Anatomy of Exclusion” (2013) 20(2) Journal of Social 
Security Law: 66; Thornton, L. “'The Rights of Others: Asylum Seekers and Direct Provision in Ireland' 
(2014) 3(2) Irish Community Development Law Journal 22 and Thornton, L. “Direct Provision and the 
Rights of the Child in Ireland” (2014) 17(3) Irish Journal of Family Law 68.  
235 C.A. & anor v Minister for Justice and Equality & ors [2014] IEHC 532, para. 12.6.  
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Unannounced room inspections, monitoring of presence and the requirement to notify 
intended absences, rules against having guests in bedrooms, and the overall complaints 
handling process by the Reception and Integration Agency were deemed to be violations of 
Article 8 ECHR as well as of constitutional rights.236  However, the core claim, that the 
treatment suffered by the applicant and her son in the system of direct provision was 
inhuman or degrading or a violation of the right to private and family life, was rejected.  
Mac Eochaidh J. analysed the key ECtHR jurisprudence in this area (in particular the case of 
M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece237). The facts presented by the applicant, as regards her life in 
direct provision, were in “stark contrast” to the total lack of reception conditions in M.S.S v 
Belgium and Greece. As evidence from the applicant could not be tested in this case (as the 
case was not a plenary action), it was not possible for the Court to assess whether the direct 
provision system is a breach of Article 3 ECHR. Similarly, as regards Article 8 ECHR, 
communal living in direct provision does impair the right to enjoy family life. However, the 
applicants failed to prove such impairment in relation to this case:  
“No professional evidence was sought to be adduced which would suggest an injury 
to family life occasioned by direct provision…[T]he applicants have failed to establish 
that ‘direct provision’, as experienced by them, unlawfully interferes with family 
life.”238 [Emphasis added.] 
As regards the “abnormal circumstances” that the child applicant is being reared in, Mac 
Eochaidh J. stated 239  that, although instinctively he felt direct provision is not an ideal 
environment for rearing a child, due to a lack of proof from the applicants, he could not find a 
breach of Convention and/or corollary Constitutional rights.240  
 
Social rights (including Housing Law) 
The Superior Courts have handed down a number of significant judgments applying the 
ECHR/ECHR Act 2003 to housing law, and to duties on local authorities under the Housing 
Acts.241 The case law has focused on two core issues: 
                                                             
236 C.A. & anor v Minister for Justice and Equality & ors [2014] IEHC 532, paras 8.1-9.11. 
237 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (App 30696) (Grand Chamber, judgment, January, 21st 2011) 
238 C.A. & anor v Minister for Justice and Equality & ors [2014] IEHC 532, para. 9.18 
239 C.A. & anor v Minister for Justice and Equality & ors [2014] IEHC 532, para. 9.19. 
240 For a consideration of the Charter issues raised in this case, see below, p. 119-120.  
241 The issue of retrospectivity in Dublin City Council v Fennell [2005] 1 IR 604, was considered in the 
previous chapter.  
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 The right for those in local authority (social) housing to be afforded an opportunity 
to challenge a proposed eviction order under section 62 of the Housing Acts; 
 Failure of the local authority to act in a Convention compliant manner as regards 
housing need allocation. 
 
Section 62 of the Housing Act 
In a series of cases, 242  culminating in the Supreme Court decision in Donegan, 243  a 
declaration of incompatibility under section 5 of the 2003 Act was made as regards section 
62 of the Housing Act 1996 (as amended).   
In Leonard v Dublin City Council244 the applicant suffered from heroin addiction and was a 
local authority tenant. As part of the applicant’s agreement to live in local authority housing, 
the applicant agreed that her partner would not be allowed to enter the house. Under section 
62 of the Housing Acts, the applicant could not challenge the facts as presented by the local 
housing authority (although in this case, the facts were not in dispute).245  The District Court 
duly granted the housing authority’s application for the applicant to vacate the premises. The 
applicant, in sum, contended that provisions of the ECHR Act 2003 were not complied with 
because she did not have legal representation at the District Court hearing (Article 6), the 
State failed to respect the applicant’s home (Article 8), there was no effective remedy to 
challenge the alleged breach of Convention rights (Article 13) and she was treated differently 
than a private tenant would have been in the same circumstances (Article 14).  
Ms. Justice Dunne, after considering ECtHR and UK jurisprudence on related issues,246 
concluded that there was no breach of Convention rights under the ECHR Act 2003. In 
relation to the claim under Article 6, Dunne J. concluded that if there was any procedural 
unfairness, the applicant could challenge this by way of judicial review, however this was not 
proven on the facts of the case. The applicant’s claim also failed under Article 8, since the 
local authorities had complied with the statutory methods of removing a tenant from local 
authority housing. Noting the decision in Connors v United Kingdom, Dunne J. stated that a 
                                                             
242 Leonard v Dublin City Council & Others [2008] IEHC 79, Donegan v Dublin City Council [2008] 
IEHC 288 (08 May 2008), Dublin City Council v Gallagher [2008] IEHC 354 and Pullen & Others v. 
Dublin City Council [2008] IEHC 379. 
243 Donegan v Dublin City Council [2012] 3 I.R. 600. 
244 Leonard v Dublin City Council & Others [2008] IEHC 79 (31/03/2008). There are no page or 
paragraph numbers in the judgment to which pointed reference can be made.  
245 Section 62 of the Housing Act 1966.  
246 Harrow London Burrow Council v Qazi [2003] 3 L.R. 792; Begum v London Bureau of Tower 
Hamlets [2003] UKHL 5; Kay and Others v. Lambeth London Borough Council and Leeds City Council 
v Price and Others [2006] 2 AC 465; Albert and Le Compte v Belgium [1983] 5 E.H.R.R. 533; Bryan v 
United Kingdom [1995] 21 E.H.R.R. 342; Blecic v Croatia [2004] 41 E.H.R.R. 185 and Connors v 
United Kingdom [2005] 40 E.H.R.R. 189. 
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number of Article 8 principles on housing emerged from these provisions, including: (a) there 
is a wide margin of appreciation for the State in housing matters; (b) a court should respect 
the legislature’s decision of protecting the community interest in housing; (c) judicial review 
was available to the applicant as a procedural safeguard. There was no violation of Article 
13. In relation to the argument that the applicant’s Article 14 rights (in conjunction with Article 
6 and/or Article 8) were breached, due to different procedures in place for public tenants and 
private tenants, the High Court stated that the,  
 “fact that a private tenant in this jurisdiction may have greater security of tenure than 
a local authority tenant is not in my view an element of discrimination but is merely one 
of the incidents of being a local authority tenant and is a reflection of the importance of 
the prudent management of the limited availability of local authority housing.”  
In May 2008, however, section 62 of the Housing Acts 1966-1998 was successfully 
challenged before the High Court. In Donegan v Dublin City Council247 the applicant claimed 
that the procedure for removing a local authority tenant from his house was contrary to 
Articles 6, 8 and 13 of the ECHR. In this case, the plaintiff was been removed from his house 
because of the actions of his son, who was a drug user and allegedly engaged in drug 
dealing. The allegation of drug dealing against his son was strenuously denied by the 
applicant. Ms. Justice Laffoy, distinguishing Leonard, stated that on the facts of this case,  
 “judicial review does not constitute a proper procedural safeguard where the tenant’s 
contention that the Council was not entitled to terminate his tenancy is based on a 
dispute as to the facts.”  
Laffoy J., after extracting principles from the ECtHR decisions in Blecic and Connors, and 
noting relevant differences to the case at hand, stated that the failure to provide a local 
authority tenant the opportunity to challenge the reasons for termination of his right to live in 
local authority housing before the District Court or an independent housing tribunal is not,  
 “proportionate to the need of the housing authority to manage and regulate its housing 
stock in accordance with its statutory duties and the principles of good estate 
management.”  
                                                             
247 Donegan v Dublin City Council [2008] IEHC 288 (8 May 2008). There are no page or paragraph 
numbers in the judgment to which pointed reference can be made. 
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Laffoy J. therefore granted a declaration that section 62 of the Housing Acts 1966-1998 was 
incompatible with the State’s obligations under Article 8 of the ECHR.248  
In Gallagher,249 O’Neill J. held that a District Court Judge could not interpret section 62 of the 
Housing Acts (as amended) as permitting the judge to explore the merits or procedure 
utilised to remove a local authority tenant. A defendant local authority tenant could not 
challenge the merits or procedure set down under section 62 in the District Court. Section 2 
of the 2003 Act did not place on a local housing authority an obligation to provide evidence 
justifying its termination of the tenancy. Therefore, the only remedy available to Gallagher 
was a declaration of incompatibility (section 5 of the 2003 Act) that section 62 of the Housing 
Acts (as amended) infringed the defendants’ rights under Article 8 of the ECHR. 
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court decisions in Donegan and Gallagher.250 The 
Supreme Court engaged in a detailed analysis of ECtHR jurisprudence,251 and an analysis of 
relevant jurisprudence from the courts in England and Wales. 252  McKechnie J., giving 
judgment for the Supreme Court, concluded that in light of Ireland’s obligations under the 
ECHR, as a result of the ECHR Act 2003, it was not possible to interpret section 62 of the 
Housing Acts in a Convention compliant manner.253 The only remedy available therefore was 
a declaration on incompatibility.254 The ECtHR had made clear255  that where there is a 
factual dispute as regards the removal of a tenant from local authority housing, there must 
be some forum for assessing whether this is a proportionate interference with Convention 
rights. Judicial review, in this instance, did not form constitute an adequate remedy, even if it 
could assess (in an overall sense) the proportionality of the decision.256 McKechnie J. held: 
“Certainly the court, on judicial review, could not enter into an assessment of the 
facts or personal circumstances behind the application, such matters are not even 
within the consideration of the District Court Judge. Judicial review of a s. 62 
                                                             
248 Similar decisions were subsequently rendered by the High Court in Dublin City Council v Gallagher 
[2008] IEHC 354 (11 November 2008) by Mr. Justice O’ Neill. This case originated from questions 
posed by a District Court judge by way of a case stated to the High Court. Mr. Justice O’Neill held that 
a declaration of incompatibility could be granted in this manner, and there was not a requirement for 
Mr. Gallagher to bring a judicial review. See also, Pullen & Others v. Dublin City Council [2008] IEHC 
379 (12 December 2008).  
249 Dublin City Council v Gallagher [2008] IEHC 354 (11 November 2008).  
250 Donegan v Dublin City Council and Gallagher v Attorney General [2012] 3 I.R. 600. Issues relating 
to interpretative obligations are explored in the previous chapter. 
251 Donegan v Dublin City Council [2012] 3 I.R. 600 at 646-651.  
252 Donegan v Dublin City Council [2012] 3 I.R. 600 at 651.  
253 Donegan v Dublin City Council [2012] 3 I.R. 600 at 625 and 645-646.  
254 Donegan v Dublin City Council [2012] 3 I.R. 600 at 655-660.  
255 See in particular, Connors v United Kingdom (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. 189 and McCann v United 
Kingdom (2008) 47 E.H.R.R. 40. 
256 See arguments presented on the basis of Meadows v Minister for Justice [2010] 2 I.R. 701; [2012] 
3 I.R. 600 at 652-655.  
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application could in no way be capable of resolving a conflict of fact between the 
Council and a person subject to the application…I do not believe that the remedy of 
judicial review gives any comfort in the context of the State's obligation to show 
respect for the right to one's home within article 8 of the Convention.” 257 
The declaration of incompatibility in Donegan was remedied by Part 2 of the Housing 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2014, which was commenced in April 2015.258 
 
Housing Authorities Acting in a Convention Compliant Manner: Provision and Adequacy of 
Accommodation 
In O’Donnell v South Dublin County Council259 the applicants, members of the Traveller 
Community who were living on a halting site, sought orders that their rights under the ECHR 
Act 2003 were violated. The respondents had failed to provide adequate accommodation for 
a fifteen year old child who suffered from cerebral palsy and was confined to a wheel chair. 
The applicants argued that the failure to provide a disability friendly caravan resulted in a 
breach of Article 3 and/or Article 8 rights under the ECHR.260 The accommodation the family 
occupied was overcrowded and cramped and both sides agreed that the conditions the 
family were living in were unfit for human habitation. The respondents argued that 
accommodation was provided to the applicants in the recent past; however they gave away 
one caravan and failed to maintain the other caravan in a suitable state of repairs.  
Edwards J., while appreciating the point of view of the council, stated that nevertheless the 
Convention rights of the child at issue must be vindicated. He stated that overcrowding 
alone, while unfortunate, is,  
“…to be endured on a “grin and bear it” as it would not be regarded as crossing the 
threshold between merely regrettable circumstances as opposed to breaching 
fundamental rights.”  
Quoting the judgment of Ms. Justice Laffoy in O’Donnell v South Dublin County Council 
(2007), Edwards J. held that the State had failed in its Article 8 duties towards the child at 
                                                             
257 Donegan v Dublin City Council [2012] 3 I.R. 600 at 653-654.  
258 See also, S.I.  No. 121 of 2015, Housing (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2014 (Commencement of 
Certain Provisions) Orders 2015. 
259 O’Donnell & Others v South Dublin County Council & Others [2008] IEHC 454 (11 January 2008). 
Pointed reference cannot be made to page or paragraph numbers in the judgment. This case should 
not be confused with O’Donnell v South Dublin County Council [2007] IEHC 204 (22 May 2007), 
different applicants were involved in both cases.  
260 An argument that the State violated Article 3 and/or Article 8 of the ECHR in conjunction with 
Article 14 (discrimination on ethnic grounds) was not substantiated.  
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issue. The High Court judge then proceeded to make a declaration requiring South Dublin 
County Council to provide temporary accommodation to relieve the housing conditions of the 
family (in particular the child at issue). However, he stated that he would not order that this 
temporary accommodation be provided by means of a caravan, and it would be for South 
Dublin County Council to decide how best to carry out the effect of the court’s declaration. 
Damages for a breach of the Convention rights of the child at issue were to be decided at a 
subsequent hearing.  
On appeal, MacMenamin J. in the Supreme Court considered the duties of the local authority 
under section 6, section 9 and section 10 of the Housing Act 1988, in light of the Constitution 
and the Convention.261 The minor applicant/respondent was living in accommodation that 
was “unfit for human habitation”, living in “overcrowded accommodation”, had a reasonable 
requirement for separate accommodation, was in need of accommodation for “medical or 
compassionate reasons” and was unable to meet the cost of the accommodation or to obtain 
other suitable accommodation.262 Relying on Costello J.’s unreported decision in O’Brien v 
Wicklow Urban District Council,263 MacMenamin J. stated that the obligations on the council 
had to be considered in the light of constitutionally protected rights and the exceptional 
circumstances of this case, known to the council since 2005. 264  The Supreme Court 
accepted that Ms. O’Donnell was subjected to inhuman and degrading accommodation 
conditions, infringing on  private and family life, and compromising the 
applicant’s/respondent’s rights to “autonomy, bodily integrity and privacy”.265 MacMenamin J. 
noted that while the minor applicant/respondent’s parents could be viewed as having some 
responsibility for this, the County Council, 
“when faced with clear evidence of inhuman and degrading conditions, [had] to 
ensure it carried out its statutory duty” 266  
in order to vindicate constitutional rights under Article 40 and Article 40.3 of the Constitution, 
with Convention rights being considered only where the constitutional claim does not 
succeed. The Council’s powers under section 10 of the Housing Act 1988, “could have” been 
exercised and executed by making offers of financial assistance, having repairs carried out 
at the Council’s expense, and/or,267  
                                                             
261 O'Donnell & Others v South Dublin County Council & Others, [2015] IESC 28, paras. 35-53.  
262 [2015] IESC 28, para. 60. 
263 O’Brien v Wicklow Urban District Council, ex tempore, unreported High Court, 10 June 2014.  
264 [2015] IESC 28, para. 65. 
265 [2015] IESC 28, para. 68. 
266 [2015] IESC 28, para. 70. 
267 [2015] IESC 28, para. 74. 
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“lending a second caravan so as to make temporary accommodation space for Ellen, 
her brothers and sisters.”  
MacMenamin J. did not find that other family members’ constitutional rights or rights under 
the ECHR Act 2003 had been violated. As regards the one minor applicant/respondent, 
MacMenamin J. varied the order of the High Court to a degree, making a declaration that the 
minor applicant/respondent was entitled to damages, which may be “moderate”, for the 
Council’s breach of statutory rights.268 
In Dooley v Killarney269 the applicants claimed that their Article 3 and/or Article 8 rights (also 
in conjunction with Article 14) under the ECHR were violated by the respondents’ failure to 
provide them with adequate housing. The High Court noted that the applicants were on the 
lowest priority list for housing, however this was in line with standards applied to all persons, 
whether members of the Traveller or settled communities. Mr. Justice Peart stated that 
Article 3 and Article 8 of the ECHR would only be breached where,  
“it can be established…that the respondents are simply permitting the applicants to 
needlessly languish, without any justification, in conditions which are such as to 
amount to inhuman or degrading treatment, or lacking in respect for their private and 
family life.”  
Peart J. went on to state that the local housing authority, which is required to respect 
Convention rights, also has a margin of appreciation to vindicate those rights with reference 
to their housing budget.270  
                                                             
268 [2015] IESC 28, para. 86. 
269 Dooley & Others v Killarney Town Council and Another [2008] IEHC 242 (15 July 2008).  No page 
or paragraph numbers are contained within the judgment; therefore it is not possible to make pointed 
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270 See also, Lawrence & Others v. Ballina Town Council & Others (unreported judgment, Murphy J., 
31 July 2008). For analysis of other similar and subsequent cases, see Whyte, G. “Public Interest 
Litigation in Ireland and the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003” in Egan, S., Thornton, 
L. and Walsh, J. Ireland and the European Convention on Human Rights: 60 Years and Beyond 
(Dublin: Bloomsbury, 2014). 
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Chapter Five: The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights - Overview 
and Relationship with Domestic Law 
 
Introduction: Background to the Charter 
As is well-known, in its original incarnation, the EEC Treaty made no mention of the 
protection of fundamental rights. While the Convention and EEC Treaty had a significant 
commonality of higher purpose – achieving greater unity within Europe - their methods of 
achieving this (aligning economic interests, versus ensuring protection of human rights) were 
very different.  
The story of the metamorphosis of the EEC, in the intervening years, to a European Union 
“founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule 
of law and respect for human rights” (Article 2, Treaty on European Union (TEU)) is well-
known.1 In essence, from the 1960s onwards, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) stepped into the breach caused by the Treaty’s silence, by developing its own 
doctrine of respect for human rights as a general principle of (what is now) EU law. Thus, in 
early cases such as Stauder2, for instance, the Court of Justice rejected a claim that a 
European Commission decision, which made the receipt of reduced prices for butter 
conditional on the identification of the recipient, breached the German constitutional right to 
dignity. Noting that identification was not in fact required by the decision, the Court of Justice 
observed that, 
“interpreted in this way the provision at issue contains nothing capable of prejudicing 
the fundamental human rights enshrined in the general principles of Community law 
and protected by the Court.”3  
In this way, the Court of Justice not only “discovered” the existence of a general principle of 
respect for fundamental rights within the Treaty, but also became the ultimate arbiter of the 
content of that general principle, i.e., the Court was responsible for deciding which rights 
were protected, and in which way.  However, it frequently drew, and draws, on what it terms 
                                                             
1 On the history of the gradual evolution of the EU’s human rights rules, see, G. de Búrca, “The 
Evolution of EU Human Rights Law” in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds.) The Evolution of EU Law (2nd 
ed., Oxford, 2011).  On the Charter generally, see S. Peers, T. Hervey, J. Kenner, and A. Ward (eds), 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Hart, 2014).   
2 Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] E.C.R. 419 
3 Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] E.C.R. 419, paragraph 7. 
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the constitutional traditions common to the EU Member States in support of its conclusions 
in that regard, as well as from international human rights treaties, with the Convention of 
“special significance” for this purpose.4  Indeed, the Convention was given special status in 
the EU Treaties with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which referred expressly to the 
Convention as a source of inspiration in the EU’s own respect for fundamental rights.  
Nevertheless, in developing the EU’s general principle of respect for fundamental rights, the 
Court of Justice remained free to diverge from the Convention as interpreted by the case law 
of the ECtHR, and indeed went beyond the Convention’s requirements at times.5   
At the same time, the Court of Justice was mindful that, even though the EU is (still) not itself 
a party to the Convention, the ECtHR has made clear that it will keep watch on the EU’s 
compliance with Strasbourg standards indirectly, through the actions of EU Member States 
(who are, of course, also Convention contracting parties). 6   In its so-called Bosphorus 
doctrine, the ECtHR held that, while the EU’s human rights regime in general could be 
considered to be “equivalent” to the Strasbourg regime, the presumption that EU Member 
States implementing EU law were Strasbourg-compliant could be rebutted if, in a particular 
case, the protection of rights was shown to be manifestly deficient.7   
The landscape of human rights protection within the EU changed significantly on 1 
December 2009, however, when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force.  Since that day, the 
EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights, first drawn up in 2000, has enjoyed binding force with 
the same status as primary EU law, i.e., on equal footing with the foundational Treaties of 
the EU, the TEU and the Treaty on the Functioning on the EU (TFEU). Although some had 
questioned whether the Charter would make much substantive difference to the level of 
rights protection within the EU, the CJEU’s rapidly developing jurisprudence interpreting the 
Charter in the intervening period can leave no doubt that the Charter marks, in the words of 
the Vice-President of the CJEU, Koen Lenaerts, a “new stage in the process of European 
integration”.8   This new stage will also be marked by the accession of the EU to the 
Convention, the terms of which are currently under re-negotiation following the CJEU’s 
rejection of the draft accession agreement put before it in Opinion 2/13. While the Treaty of 
Lisbon contained a specific provision enabling the EU to accede to the Convention, the 
Court of Justice in that Opinion held that the draft accession agreement, in the terms 
                                                             
4 See, for instance, Case 222/84 Johnston v RUC [1986] E.C.R. 1651; Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] 
E.C.R. I-2925; Case C-299/95 Kremzow v Austria [1997] E.C.R. I-2629.   
5 See, for instance, in relation to data protection, Case C-28/08 Commission v Bavarian Lager [2010] 
E.C.R. I-6055. 
6 See Matthews v UK, ECtHR, Grand Chamber, 18 February 1999, Application No 24833/94. 
7 Bosphorus Airways v. Ireland, ECtHR, Grand Chamber, 30 June 2005, Application no. 45036/98. 
8  K. Lenaerts, “Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights” (2012) European 
Constitutional Law Review 8: 375, at 375.   
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presented to the Court at that time, was not compatible with the EU Treaties and would, 
therefore, be unconstitutional as a matter of EU law.9 
The attribution of binding status to the Charter, as primary EU law, is clearly a significant 
change in the architecture of the EU’s human rights protection, which further adds to the 
plurality of human rights sources of potential application to individual cases coming before 
Irish judges: constitutional, Convention, EU general principles, and now the EU Charter.  
Given that the EU Charter covers virtually all the substantive rights of the Convention and, 
as considered below, goes significantly further in some fields (for instance, economic and 
social rights),10 it also raises the practical question: Which instrument should be relied upon 
in which case? 
 
Scheme and Content of the Charter 
It is notable that the scheme of the Charter does not adopt the traditional division between 
political/civil rights and economic and social rights: all are contained in one single document.  
Nevertheless, a distinction is made between rights and “principles”, with principles having, 
according to Article 52(5) of the Charter, a lower legal status: 
“The provisions of this Charter which contain principles may be implemented by 
legislative and executive acts taken by institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of 
the Union, and by acts of Member States when they are implementing Union law, in 
the exercise of their respective powers.  They shall be judicially cognisable only in 
the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their legality.” 
The substantive rights in the Charter are set out in six Titles, namely: 
 Title I on Dignity (Articles 1-5), which contains the right to human dignity, the right to 
life, the right to the integrity of the person, the prohibition of torture and inhuman and 
degrading treatment, and the prohibition of slavery and forced labour; 
 Title II on Freedom (Articles 6-19), which contains many of the traditional civil and 
political rights, including the right to liberty, the right to private life, the right to 
                                                             
9 Opinion 2/13, Opinion of 18 December 2014. By the Opinion procedure, the CJEU gives a ruling, 
prior to signature of an international agreement, on whether the EU has the competence to enter into 
that agreement.   See generally, J. Polakiewicz, “EU Law and the ECHR: Will EU accession to the 
European Convention on Human Rights square the circle?”, forthcoming European Journal of 
International Law.   
10 For instances where the Convention may impact on economic and social rights, see above, pp. 93-
100.  
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freedom of expression, the right to property, in addition to certain more “modern” 
rights such as the right to the protection of personal data.  Certain socio-economic 
rights, including the right to work and the right to education are also included.   
 Title III on Equality (Articles 20-26), which contains traditional equality rights such as 
non-discrimination on grounds of sex, race, sexual orientation, religion etc., which 
were largely contained in the EU Treaty prior to the Treaty of Lisbon; 
 Title IV on Solidarity (Articles 27-38), which contains social rights and “principles” 
such as the right to collective bargaining and action, including the right to strike and 
protection against unjustified dismissal, the right to fair working conditions, and 
“recognition” of social security and social assistance.  This Title is for obvious 
reasons controversial in certain Member States, notably the UK, which negotiated a 
Protocol stating inter alia that this Title does not contain “justiciable rights” in UK 
national law;11 
 Title V on Citizens’ rights (Articles 39 to 46), which by and large reproduces rights for 
EU citizens already contained in the EU Treaties; 
 Title VI on Justice (Articles 47 to 50), which includes the right to an effective remedy 
and to a fair trial, the right to be presumed innocent and the right of defence, and the 
principle of legality and proportionality of criminal offences. As discussed in chapter 
7, these rights have been some of the most widely invoked before the Irish courts. 
These substantive rights are coupled with the so-called “horizontal provisions”, Articles 51-
54 of the Charter, which contain important clarifications of the scope of application of the 
Charter, as well as its relationship with other human rights provisions in, for instance, the 
Convention and national law. Important provisions here include:12 
 Article 51 on the field of application of the Charter, discussed below; 
 Article 52 on the scope and interpretation of rights and principles, which includes the 
proportionality test for limitations on Charter rights (Article 52(1)); confirmation that 
the rights included therein apply subject to the limits set out in the EU Treaties 
(Article 52(2)); a provision on the relationship with the Convention (Article 52(3)) and 
with national constitutional rights (Article 52(4)), each discussed below; and 
clarification of the status of “principles” (Article 52(5)), discussed above. 
                                                             
11 Protocol No 30 on the application of the Charter to Poland and the UK. 
12 For discussion and explanation of the scope of the Convention, see above, pp. 18-23. 
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 Article 53, on the level of protection of Charter rights compared to international, 
Convention and national rights, discussed below; and, 
 Article 54 prohibiting abuse of rights. 
The Charter is accompanied by Explanations to which, as Article 6(1) TEU states, “due 
regard” must be paid when interpreting the Charter’s provisions (see similarly Article 52(7) of 
the Charter). 
Status of the Charter and Convention in the Irish courts compared 
As already noted, post-Lisbon, the Charter has the “same legal value” as the EU Treaties 
(Art 6(1) TEU).  By virtue of its status as EU primary law, the Charter has two main 
functions.13   
First, the Charter can serve as an interpretative tool for EU law, as well as for Irish law falling 
within the substantive scope of EU law.  This would include, for instance, reliance on Charter 
rights as justification for Member State measures that would otherwise breach EU internal 
market law – such as in the well-known Omega example, where Germany successfully 
justified a ban on laser quest-style games, involving “playing at killing”, on the ground of the 
need to respect the right to human dignity.14   
Secondly, by virtue of its status as a provision of EU primary law, the Charter can serve as a 
ground of invalidity of EU actions, as well as of Member State actions that fall within the 
scope of EU law, insofar as its provisions are sufficiently precise and impose binding 
obligations.15 By virtue of the twin constitutional doctrines of supremacy and direct effect of 
EU law as developed by the CJEU, this imposes a duty on national judges to disapply 
conflicting national law, including national primary legislation.16   
This represents a critical distinction between the status of the Charter, and that of the 
Convention, in Ireland.  Specifically, the effect of the Convention in Ireland is subject, as 
                                                             
13 The discussion here focuses on the specific functions the Charter enjoys by virtue of its post-Lisbon 
status as primary EU law.  Of course, the Charter may have broader functions, for instance, it may 
serve as persuasive authority for courts applying purely national rights.  The two subsequent chapters 
include discussion of some instances in which the Charter has played this role to date in Ireland. 
14 [2004] E.C.R. I-9609. 
15 This is not the case, for instance, with what the Charter terms “principles”, as distinct from “rights”, 
which distinction is discussed below.  
16  From the EU courts’ perspective at least, it even obliges national judges to disapply conflicting 
national constitutional provisions See, e.g., International Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr- und 
Vorratsstelle Getreide [1970] E.C.R. 1125.  However, this aspect of the supremacy doctrine has 
received pushback from national constitutional courts in many Member States, and has never resulted 
in disapplication of a provision of the Irish Constitution by an Irish court. 
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chapter 2 discusses, to the terms of the ECHR Act 2003.17  This reflects of course the fact 
that the Convention is still considered by Irish law as an instrument of international law, such 
that its effect in our legal order is dependent on, and dictated by, its domestic law instrument 
of transposition.  This fundamentally dualist approach to international law is expressed 
unambiguously in Article 29.6 of the Constitution, which provides, 
“No international agreement shall be part of the domestic law of the State save as 
may be determined by the Oireachtas.” 
As discussed in chapter 2, the implications of this for the ECHR have long been made clear 
by the Irish courts, from the historic Supreme Court judgment In Re O Laighléis18 to, more 
recently, its judgment McD v L,19 which emphatically rejected any argument that, following 
the ECHR Act 2003, the Convention could be said to be directly effective in Irish law 
(overturning the judgment of Hedigan J. in the High Court on this point, who had sought to 
apply the Strasbourg concept of the de facto family in resolving the dispute before him, 
despite the fact that this concept was unknown as a matter of Irish constitutional law).20   
This is in distinct contrast to the effect of (most of) EU law in the Irish legal order where, as 
long as the conditions for direct effect developed in the CJEU’s jurisprudence are fulfilled by 
the particular provision at issue,21 it takes effect automatically and without the need for 
domestic law transposition in the Irish legal order, i.e., it is directly effective.  Combined with 
the doctrine of supremacy of EU law, the potential ramifications of these seminal doctrines 
remain far-reaching, even years after their development by the CJEU.  As a matter of Irish 
                                                             
17 See above, pp. 28-30. For general analysis, F. de Londras and C. Kelly, The European Convention 
on Human Rights Act 2003 (Round Hall, 2010); O. Doyle and D. Ryan, “Judicial Interpretation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003: Reflections and Analysis” (2011) Dublin University 
Law Journal 1:369; and F. de Londras, “Using the ECHR in Irish Courts: More Whisper than Bang?”, 
paper delivered to the Public Interest Law Alliance, 13 May 2011.  For subject-specific analysis, see 
P. A. McDermott and M. W. Murphy, “No Revolution: The Impact of the ECHR Act 2003 on Irish 
Criminal Law” (2008) Dublin University Law Journal 1: 1; M. Cahill, “McD v L and the Incorporation of 
the European Convention on Human Rights” (2010) Irish Jurist 1: 221.   
18 [1960] I.R. 93, discussed above p. 28. See Maguire C.J., “No argument can prevail against the 
express command of section 6 of Article 29 of the Constitution before judges whose declared duty it is 
to uphold the Constitution and the laws.” 
19 McD v L [2010] 2 IR 199. Discussed above, p. 91. See especially the judgment of Murray C.J., at 
§24: “The European Convention on Human Rights may only be made part of domestic law through 
the portal of Article 29.6 and then only to the extent determined by the Oireachtas and subject to the 
Constitution. The Oireachtas may also, if it chooses, legislate to provide for express statutory 
protection of particular Convention rights as a means of fulfilling Convention obligations.”  The 
subsequent 14 paragraphs of the Chief Justice’s judgment set out a classic exposition of the 
conditions of, and limits to, the effectiveness of international law in a dualist system such as Ireland’s. 
See also, the judgment of Fennelly J., at §§88 et infra.  
20 See, W. O’R v E.H. (Guardianship) [1996] 2 I.R. 248. 
21 That is, the provision must be sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional.  See, B. de Witte, “Direct 
Effect, Primacy, and the Nature of the Legal Order” in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds.) The Evolution 
of EU Law, op. cit.    
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law, the direct effect of EU law is made possible by the enabling provisions contained in 
Article 29.4 specific to the EU, particularly Article 29.4.6°.22  The doctrine of supremacy of 
EU law remains, however, more controversial, particularly in cases where the conflict with 
EU law is at the constitutional level – although this is a difficulty in no way particular to 
Ireland.23   
Given the lack of direct effect of the Convention, the provisions of the ECHR Act 2003, as 
interpreted by the Irish courts, are critical to understanding the impact, and future impact, of 
the ECHR in Ireland.  As discussed in the preceding chapters, however, the first ten years 
since the entry into force of the ECHR Act on 1 January 2004 have made the limitations of 
these provisions clear.  Specifically, two of its three central provisions, sections 2, 3 and 5, 
have been shown to have weaknesses which significantly limit their impact in terms of 
human rights protection.  For instance, the section 2 interpretative obligation imposed on 
courts24 applies only where there is a “statutory provision or rule of law” that falls to be 
interpreted,25 and is “subject to” the Irish rules of statutory interpretation.26   
Where the problem is an incompatibility between a statute and Convention law that cannot 
be solved via section 2 interpretation, the limits of the ECHR Act are also evident. As 
discussed in the preceding chapters, the critical weaknesses of section 5 declarations of 
incompatibility are well-known: we are still awaiting legislation in one of the two cases in 
which a declaration has been granted to date,27 even years following such declaration.  As 
the Supreme Court’s judgment in Carmody has emphasised, in bringing human rights-based 
challenges to Irish primary legislation (in that case, section 2 of the Criminal Justice (Legal 
Aid) Act 1962), the court must consider any arguments as to the constitutionality of the 
legislation prior to considering a claim for a declaration of incompatibility under section 5 of 
the ECHR Act, primarily because such a declaration could not be said to constitute a 
                                                             
22 The relevant extract from Article 29.4.6° provides, “No provision of this Constitution…prevents laws 
enacted, acts done or measures adopted by…the European Union…or institutions thereof…from 
having the force of law in the State.” 
23  See Fennelly J., writing in his extra-judicial capacity that the application of the doctrine of 
supremacy of EU law in the constitutional context “represents an entirely novel and radical invasion of 
the principles of sovereignty enshrined in that Constitution from the outset of Irish national 
independence.” (N. Fennelly, “Human Rights and the National Judge: His Constitution; The European 
Union; The European Convention” (2011) ERA Forum 12: 87, at 94.  
24 Section 2(1) of the ECHR Act 2003 provides, “In interpreting and applying any statutory provision or 
rule of law, a court shall, in so far as possible, subject to the rules of law relating to such interpretation 
and application, do so in a manner compatible with the State’s obligations under the Convention 
provisions.” 
25 See Fennelly J., McD v L, op. cit, §87. 
26 See, e.g., Donegan v D.C.C. [2012] IESC 18, per McKechnie J., at §105: “Even in cases of doubt, 
an interpretation in conformity with the Convention should be preferred over one incompatible with it. 
However, this task must be performed by reference to the rules of law regarding interpretation.” 
27 Namely, Lydia Foy v An tArd-Chlaraitheoir [2012] 2 I.R. 1 and Donegan v Dublin City Council, op. 
cit. See above, pp. 97-98. 
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“remedy which would resolve the issue between the parties” (per Murray C.J., at §46).28  It 
should be recognised, however, that in cases where the problem is an act of an organ of the 
State, section 3 of the ECHR Act has been shown to have relatively strong force, albeit with 
remedies limited to damages.29 
Aside from these distinctions in function, the Charter’s status as binding EU primary law has 
the further vital practical effect of giving access to very different routes of access to justice 
than those available under Convention law.  As is well-known, if they are faced with an issue 
of EU law that is necessary to decide the case, national judges may use the Article 267 
TFEU preliminary reference procedure to refer the matter to the Luxembourg court; if they 
are the judge of last resort in the case (i.e., no appeal is possible), they are obliged to make 
this reference.  Contrary to Convention cases, there is no requirement that the plaintiff has 
exhausted all domestic remedies.30  This enables (or requires there to be) access to the 
Court of Justice in a time-frame that is far shorter than that required to access the 
Strasbourg court.31    
Further, depending on the facts of the case, it may be possible to access the Luxembourg 
court even more speedily through the expedited preliminary reference procedure (Article 105 
of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice), or the urgent preliminary reference 
procedure (Article 107 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice), which applies in 
the area of freedom, security and justice (the so-called “PPU” procedure).  Use of these 
procedures is normally requested by the referring court (although not all such requests are 
granted), but may be used by the Court of Justice of its own motion.  The PPU procedure 
has been used in a variety of cases involving Charter rights, including the reference from the 
Irish Supreme Court in McB, where judgment was given by the Court of Justice only two 
months from the date of receipt of the reference. 
 
                                                             
28 This case is discussed above, pp. 73-74. Carmody v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform 
[2010] 1 I.R. 653. (See also, 2009 [IESC] 71.) 
29 See the judgment of Irvine J. in Pullen (No. 2) [2009] 2 I.L.R.M. 484, denying the availability of 
injunctive relief for breach of section 3 of the ECHR Act 2003 (discussed above, pp. 46-49). See 
further, Doyle and Ryan, op. cit.   
30 On the principle of subsidiarity, see above, p. 19.  
31 Even looking purely at the time-frame once the matter gets to Luxembourg/Strasbourg, the average 
length of a CJEU preliminary reference procedure is around 16 months (2013 Annual Report of the 
Court of Justice, available at www.curia.europa.eu).  This can be contrasted with the long delays 
typical of cases lodged with the ECtHR, due to its case overload (which, as of 2012, stood at a 
backlog of 152,000 cases: see generally, Statement of the European Law Institute, “Case Overload of 
the European Court of Human Rights” (Vienna, 2012).     
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Brief Overview of the EU Courts’ Approach to the Charter to Date 
Since 2009, the Charter has become the primary point of reference for the Court of Justice in 
considering fundamental rights claims.  It might reasonably have been thought that, given 
that the CJEU already recognised respect for human rights as one of the general principles 
of EU law, which (judge-recognised) principles already enjoyed a status equivalent to 
primary Treaty law in the EU’s legal hierarchy, the Charter would not add much to the 
protection of rights in the EU. The brief answer, at least from the evidence to date, is that the 
Charter is making a real difference in the CJEU’s case law.  The President of the Court of 
Justice has described the Charter as of “primary importance in the recent case law of the 
CJEU”,32 and this approach can be seen clearly in the case law.  Empirically, research has 
shown that, from December 2009, the Charter was quickly embraced by the Court of Justice 
as the main, independent source of EU human rights law, with reliance on ECtHR case law 
becoming rare.  Thus, between December 2009 and December 2012, the Court of Justice 
referred to the Charter in 122 cases; of these, only 20 referred to the ECHR; and of these, 
only 10 referred to ECtHR case law.33   
In a variety of significant judgments, the Court of Justice has shown its willingness to forge 
its own distinct path in developing human rights protection in Europe. Perhaps the most 
high-profile recent examples have been its ground-breaking judgments interpreting Article 7 
of the Charter, on the right to respect for private and family life, and Article 8 of the Charter 
on the right to the protection of personal data.  A robust interpretation of these rights led, in 
the Grand Chamber’s April 2014 judgment in Digital Rights Ireland, to annulment of the 2006 
Data Retention Directive.34 Perhaps more controversially, it also led, in the Grand Chamber’s 
May 2014 judgment in Google Spain, to an interpretation of the EU Data Protection Directive 
in a manner that requires internet search engines to ensure a “right to be forgotten” on the 
internet, subject to certain conditions.35 In other areas, however, the Court of Justice has 
continued to consider and rely on ECtHR jurisprudence (such as, for instance, its ruling that 
the architecture of the EU’s competition regime does not as such breach the right to a fair 
                                                             
32 Joint Communication from Presidents Costa and Skouris, Strasbourg and Luxembourg, 24 January 
2011.   
33 G. de Búrca, “After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court of Justice as a Human Rights 
Adjudicator?”, forthcoming, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law.  As the subject of 
the present report is case law of the Irish courts applying the Charter, these paragraphs are 
necessarily a brief overview and do not purport to deal in any detail with the extensive jurisprudence 
of the CJEU and General Court applying the Charter.  For full discussion of this topic, see Peers, 
Hervey, Kenner and Ward, op. cit. 
34 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland, judgment of 8 April 2014, not yet 
reported. 
35 Case C-131/12 Google Spain, judgment of 13 May 2014, not yet reported.   
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trial, where the Court discussed ECtHR jurisprudence in detail, after noting however that it 
was not bound by such jurisprudence).36 
  
                                                             
36 Case C-501/11P Schindler [2013] E.C.R. I-522.   
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The Scope of Application of the Charter 
The Charter contains an express provision explaining its scope, and the entities which it 
binds: Article 51(1), which provides, 
“The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the 
Member States when they are implementing Union law…” 
This provision is coupled with Article 51(2) of the Charter, which provides, 
“The Charter does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers 
of the Union or establish any hew power or task for the Union, or modify powers and 
tasks as defined in the Treaties.” 
As the Explanations to the Charter confirm,37 Article 51(1) was not intended as any dramatic 
change in the scope of application of EU human rights law, but rather followed 
“unambiguously” from the CJEU’s pre-existing case law, such as ERT, where national rules 
were considered to fall within the “scope” of EU law (and thus subject to compliance with EU 
human rights standards) where they fell within the substantive scope of EU internal market 
law (in that case, free movement of services), even if they were not enacted by the Member 
States with the specific purpose of implementing EU law.38   
Nonetheless, some commentators interpreted Article 51(1) more narrowly, meaning that 
Charter rights only applied where the Member State measure was brought in with the 
express aim of giving effect to EU law – an obvious example being national measures to 
transpose Directives.  This narrow interpretation of Article 51(1) was, however, decisively 
rejected by the Grand Chamber of the CJEU in its February 2013 judgment in Fransson39 - 
contrary to the submissions of a variety of Member States, including Ireland.  In affirming the 
ERT line of case law, the CJEU held that the Swedish rules on penalties and criminal 
proceedings for breach of tax law fell should be evaluated for compliance with the EU 
Charter (in that case, the ne bis in idem principle contained in Article 50 of the Charter), 
because the penalties/proceedings were “connected in part” to Mr. Fransson’s breach of 
                                                             
37 OJ 2007 C 303/17.  Article 6(1) TEU specifies that the rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter 
“shall be interpreted” “with due regard to” the explanations.  The Preamble to the explanations further 
specifies that they “do not as such have the status of law” but rather constitute a “valuable tool of 
interpretation intended to clarify the provisions of the Charter.” 
38 Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] E.C.R. I-2925. 
39 Case C-617/10 Fransson, judgment of 26 February 2013, not yet reported (see especially, §27). 
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obligations to declare VAT, and therefore were “intended to implement” Member States’ 
general obligation to take all necessary measures to ensure the collection of VAT on their 
territories.40  Adopting a broad reading of Article 51(1), the CJEU emphasised that the fact 
that the national legislation upon which those tax penalties and criminal proceedings are 
founded had not been adopted to transpose the EU VAT Directive did not change matters, 
as its application was “designed to penalise an infringement of that directive.”41 
Since Fransson, the Court of Justice has handed down a considerable number of other 
judgments further clarifying the scope of application of the EU Charter, and the meaning of 
Article 51(1) of the Charter.  The Court has reaffirmed the Fransson extensive interpretation 
of Article 51(1) in cases like Pfleger, where the Court confirmed that Member States 
derogating from a free movement provision (in that case, by restricting gambling activities) 
must do so in a Charter-compliant manner.42  It has also provided some clarity in the factors 
that may be relevant in assessing whether a case falls within the scope of EU law for this 
purpose, namely, 
“whether [the national legislation] is intended to implement a provision of EU law; the 
nature of that legislation and whether it pursues objectives other than those covered 
by EU law, even if it is capable of indirectly affecting EU law; and also whether there 
are specific rules of EU law on the matter or capable of affecting it…”43 
Further, even where national rules do not fall within the scope of EU law as such, the 
Charter will still apply where the national rules were intended to make a renvoi to EU law 
(i.e., effectively to transplant EU rules into a purely national context), within the meaning of 
the Court’s long-standing case law.  This will occur when the renvoi made by the national 
law to EU rules is direct and unconditional, and do not allow the interpretation of those rules 
by the Court of Justice to be departed from.44 
In other cases, the Court has refused jurisdiction to deal with the matter on the grounds that 
the case does not fall within the scope of EU law, or at least that the national court’s Order 
for Reference does not specify how it could fall within the scope of EU law.  In Pelckmans 
                                                             
40 Ibid, §§24, 25 and 27.   
41 Ibid, §27. 
42 Case C-390/12 Pfleger, judgment of 30 April 2014, not yet reported.  See similarly, Case C-418/11 
Texdata, judgment of 26 September 2013, not yet reported (system of penalties for failure to comply 
with EU law-based accounting obligations must comply with the Charter),  
43  Case C-206/13 Siragusa, judgment of 6 March 2014, not yet reported (national law requiring 
restoration of a site to its former state not within scope of the Charter). 
44 Case C-313/12 Romeo, judgment of 7 November 2013, not yet reported, and jurisprudence cited 
therein.   
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Turnhout,45 for instance, reference was rejected as inadmissible, because the Belgian court 
had not explained how a generally applicable ban on Sunday trading fell within the scope of 
the free movement of goods. 
Of particular practical interest in this context is the judgment in Torralbo Marcos, where the 
Court of Justice was asked whether the Spanish system of court fees in employment cases 
infringed the right to an effective remedy under Article 47 of the Charter. Refusing 
jurisdiction, the Court of Justice distinguished between national cases to enforce rights 
provided by EU law (which fall under Article 47 of the Charter), and national cases to enforce 
rights provided by national law alone (which do not fall under Article 47 of the Charter).46  As 
Mr. Torralbo Marcos’ claim did not fall within the scope of any EU Directive, the reference 
was inadmissible.  Nonetheless, this still leaves a wide potential scope for the application of 
Article 47 of the Charter, i.e., anywhere a claim is based on EU law (see similarly, the 
judgment in DEB).47  In contrast, in Érsekcsanádi, the Court refused jurisdiction to consider 
whether farmers had a Charter right to compensation for profit lost following national 
measures prohibiting movement of birds potentially affected by avian influenza.  Interpreting 
the EU Decisions establishing measures for the control of the virus, the Court held that these 
Decisions did not establish any system of compensation for damage caused by these 
measures, and thus the matter fell outside the scope of EU law.48 
 
The Relationship between the Charter and the ECHR: The ECHR as a 
Floor, but not a Ceiling, for European Rights Protection 
Many of the rights in each document are identical, or almost so: for instance, Article 4 of the 
Charter is Article 3 ECHR on the prohibition of torture.  Other rights are similar in essence 
but significantly expanded in form in the Charter: the principle underlying Article 8(1) ECHR 
on the right to respect for private and family life, finds expression in the Charter not only in 
Article 7 on right to respect for private and family life, but also in Article 3 on right to integrity 
of the person, and Article 8 on the right to protection of personal data.  Still other rights are 
found in the Charter that go far beyond the substantive areas covered by the Convention: 
one might think here of the right to asylum contained in Article 18 of the Charter, which 
draws on the Geneva Convention; Article 24 on the rights of the child, which draws on the 
New York Convention on the rights of the child; or the workers’ rights contained in Chapter 
                                                             
45 Case C-483/12, judgment of 8 May 2014, not yet reported. 
46 Case C-265/13 Torralbo Marcos, jdugmetn of 27 March 2014, not yet reported, paras. 33-34.   
47 Case C-279/09 DEB [2010] E.C.R. I-811. 
48 Case C-56/13 Érsekcsanádi, judgment of 22 May 2014, not yet reported. 
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IV of the Charter, such as the Article 28 right of collective bargaining.  Broadly speaking, 
therefore, the Charter goes much further in terms of substantive rights than the Convention, 
as can be seen clearly from the Explanations, which detail the inspiration for the Charter 
rights.  Of course, the greater substantive reach of the Charter is no surprise given that, by 
definition, the EU Member States already have a large amount in common in many of these 
areas by virtue of the EU acquis. 
Nonetheless, in order to counter the risk of diverging interpretations from Luxembourg and 
Strasbourg on those rights which are similar in each document, Article 52(3) of the Charter 
provides: 
“In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 
meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said 
Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive 
protection.” (emphasis added) 
Linked to this, Article 53 of the Charter provides: 
“Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting 
human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of 
application by Union law and international law and by international agreements to 
which the Union, the Community or all the Member States are party, including the 
[ECHR], and by the Member States’ constitutions.” 
It is clear, therefore, that the Convention protection, as interpreted by the ECtHR, is a 
minimum level of protection below which the EU cannot venture. This provision will be of 
particular importance in assessing the extent to which the EU as such is in compliance with 
its Convention obligations following its accession to the Convention, which was enabled by 
the Lisbon Treaty, but which as noted above is at the time of writing on hold pending the 
Court of Justice’s rejection of the draft accession agreement in Opinion 2/13 as contrary to 
EU constitutional law. 
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The Relationship between the Charter and National Human Rights Law: 
Article 53 of the Charter 
Article 53 of the Charter provides: 
“Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting 
human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of 
application, by Union law and international law and by international agreements to 
which the Union, the Community or all the Member States are party, including the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, and by the Member States’ constitutions.” 
From this, it might reasonably be thought that, as a matter of EU law, the Charter represents 
a minimum level of rights protection, above which Member States are free to go according to 
their particular national constitutional traditions.  While this is indeed the general principle, as 
confirmed by the Explanations to the Charter, an important caveat should be added in the 
light of the Court of Justice’s judgment in Melloni, where the CJEU held that Spain was not 
entitled to apply its (higher) constitutional protection of human rights in that case, because 
the area was harmonised by the European Arrest Warrant.49  In other words, where there is 
applicable harmonising EU legislation which the Court of Justice interprets as covering the 
area exhaustively, leaving no scope for Member States’ discretion, Member States will not 
be free to apply their own (higher) level of constitutional rights protection. 
                                                             
49 Case C-399/11 Melloni [2013] E.C.R. I-107. 
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Chapter Six: The Charter before the Irish Courts – Horizontal Issues 
 
Having considered the differences in principle between the status of the Convention and the 
Charter in Ireland, this chapter gives an overview1 of the Irish case law on the Charter to 
date concerning what may be termed “horizontal” issues, in the sense of cross-cutting issues 
that are not specific to one substantive area of law, but which have arisen across a range of 
fields.  The horizontal issues covered are: 
(1) The scope of application of the Charter; 
(2) Relationship between Charter, constitutional and Convention arguments; 
(3) Article 47 of the Charter on the right to an effective remedy; and 
(4) Article 41 of the Charter on the right to good administration. 
 
Scope of Application of the Charter 
As with the EU courts, the issue of whether or not the Charter applies, in the sense of Article 
51 of the Charter, has been a key area of controversy to date before the Irish courts. 
Once again, Article 51 of the Charter, entitled “Field of application”, provides: 
“1. The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member 
States only when they are implementing Union law. They shall therefore respect the 
rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof in accordance with 
their respective powers and respecting the limits of the powers of the Union as conferred 
on it in the Treaties.  
2. The Charter does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers 
of the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers and 
tasks as defined in the Treaties.” 
                                                             
1 The discussion in the present chapter does not purport to cover in an exhaustive manner all cases in 
which the Charter played a role.  An extensive summary of cases in which the Charter has been 
raised and argued before the Irish courts up to 31 December 2014 is contained in the Annex to this 
report. 
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For the interpretation of this provision by the CJEU, see Chapter 5. 
In the Irish courts, the scope of application of the Charter has received particularly significant 
consideration in asylum and immigration cases, due to the fact that, while asylum law may 
have started out as a field of domestic and/or international law, the amount of EU law 
occupying the field has increased dramatically over the years, as EU legislation in the field of 
justice and home affairs has increased.  Many judgments have emphasised the continuing 
nature of certain powers – for instance, the power to deport - as sovereign to the State 
(meaning that the Charter does not apply; for instance, the Article 7 right to respect for 
private and family life).2  In Smith v Minister for Justice and Equality, for instance, Cooke J. 
took this position, noting that, 
“It is true of course that Article 7 of the Charter corresponds to Article 8 of the 
Convention in that it affirms that "everyone has the right to respect for his or her 
private and family life, home and communication". However, as Article 51 of the 
Charter makes clear, its provisions are addressed to the institutions of the European 
Union and its agencies; and to the Member States "only when they are implementing 
Union law". The revocation of a deportation order made under s. 3 of the Immigration 
Act 1999, does not involve, as such, any implementation of Union law. It is the 
exercise by the State of its sovereign entitlement to decide who shall remain within 
the territory of the State. The removal of a third country national from the State does, 
of course, also remove the individual from the territory of the European Union. In 
circumstances such as those in the present case, however, it is only where the 
principle of the Zambrano judgment is applicable that the Member State comes under 
any obligation derived from Union law not to effect the removal.”3 
In other words, it is only where the individual falls within the scope of EU law that the Charter 
applies, including where this is the case due to the Zambrano principle whereby EU citizens 
must not, as a result of Article 21 TFEU, be deprived of the genuine enjoyment of the 
substance of their right as EU citizens.  In Zambrano and subsequent case law developing 
this doctrine such as Dereci, the CJEU ruled that, in the case of an EU citizen child, this 
would be the case where the child was dependent on the individual liable to deportation, and 
would have as a result of the deportation to leave the territory of the EU.4   
                                                             
2 See above, chapter 2.  
3 Smith v Minister for Justice and Equality & ors [2012] IEHC 113, at para. 24.   
4  Case C-34/09; Case C-256/11, CJEU. For discussion on the impact of the Convention pre-
Zambrano, see above, p. 68. 
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Cooke J.’s judgment was upheld on appeal to the Supreme Court, although Clarke J. did not 
consider the Charter in his judgment in that court.5 
See also, Troci v Minister for Justice and Equality 6 , where O’Keeffe J. rejected the 
applicant’s attempts to rely on Article 7 of the Charter in connection with a challenge to a 
deportation decision, on the grounds that, absent the circumstances set out in Zambrano 
and subsequent CJEU case law such as Dereci, the Charter had no application to such 
decisions (see similarly Cooke J. in Lofinmakin (an infant) & Others v. The Minister for 
Justice ,Equality and Law Reform;7 and Cooke J. in S.P. v Minister for Justice8). 
In Mallak v MJELR, Fennelly J. in the Supreme Court expressly found it unnecessary to 
consider whether or not Article 41 of the Charter, on the right to good administration, applied 
to a decision refusing the applicant a certificate of naturalisation.  The argument in that case, 
on which Fennelly J. did not take a view, was that the matter fell within the scope of EU law 
because, by so depriving the applicant, he was also deprived of EU citizenship. 
Perhaps the closest consideration of the scope of application of the Charter in the Irish 
courts to date is that given by Hogan J. in AO v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform (No. 3), which concerned an application for injunction of execution of a deportation 
order.  Hogan J. noted that the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter was still being worked 
out by the EU courts; while certain cases were clearly within the scope of EU law:  
“Less straightforward cases present more difficulty. It may well be that where, for 
example, the State exercises a discretionary power pursuant to the European Arrest 
Warrant Act 2003 that the Charter will apply, although this matter is not at all free 
from difficulty, as Edwards J. acknowledged in Minister for Justice and Equality v. 
D.L. [2011] IEHC 248. Other difficult questions may possibly arise regarding the 
scope of application of the Charter where this is said to be triggered by the presence 
of possibly accidental factors of nationality and free movement in circumstances 
which might otherwise suggest the happening of events purely internal to this 
Member State. Might the Charter apply to the issues in the present case if, for 
example, Ms. K. happened to be a Belgian national who was exercising free 
movement rights in this State?  
                                                             
5 Smith & ors (minors) -v- Minister for Justice and Equality & anor [2013] IESC 4. 
6 Troci & Anor v The Minister for Justice and Equality and Ors [2012] IEHC 542. 
7 Lofinmakin (an infant) & Others v. The Minister for Justice ,Equality and Law Reform [2011] IEHC 
116. 
8 S.P. v Minister for Justice and Equality & ors [2012] IEHC 18. 
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It is not necessary for me to examine these wider questions because, as I have 
already noted, the right of Ms. K. and Baby C to reside in this State derives entirely 
from Article 9 of the Constitution by virtue of their status as Irish citizens. Neither can 
the deportation power of the State be said to derive from European Union law, since 
as reflected in the Immigration Act 1999 - it is rather a legislative expression of the 
inherent right of all states under international law to regulate and control their own 
borders: see, e.g., the comments of Keane J. and Denham J. in Laurentiu v. Minister 
for Justice [1999] 4 IR 26.”9 
See also, Dos Santos v Minister for Justice, where MacEochaidh J. held the Charter to be of 
no application in a case of deportation where no EU citizens were involved.10 
In a significant judgment, MacEochaidh J. in C.A. v Minister for Justice and Equality11 held 
that the Charter was of no application to a claim that the State’s direct provision system for 
subsidiary protection applicants breached fundamental rights, including Charter rights.  In so 
holding, he based his reasoning on the fact that Ireland had, pursuant to Protocol No 21 to 
the TFEU, an opt out of measures in the field of freedom, security and justice.  While Ireland 
had chosen to opt in to certain measures in asylum law, including the Qualification Directive 
and the Procedures Directive, it had not opted in to the Reception Conditions Directive.  He 
concluded: 
“11.9. To uphold the applicants’ position on the applicability of the Charter would be 
to create an EU law obligation for Ireland in respect of the manner in which it 
provides for protection applicants in the teeth of Protocol No. 21 which says that a 
Directive such as the Reception Directive has no application in Ireland unless a 
positive decision is taken by the State to be governed by such a measure. The 
manner in which Ireland provides material support to protection applicants is not any 
form of implementation of Union law and therefore, in accordance with Article 51 of 
the Charter, that Charter does not govern Ireland’s actions in this area. The manner 
in which material support is provided is well within the sphere of national autonomy. 
Though the obligation to provide support for destitute protection applicants is related 
to the EU obligation that such persons be allowed to seek protection (as stated in 
para 9.4 above), this does not mean that the provision of material support to 
protection applicants implements EU law. The provision of the support certainly 
facilitates Ireland’s implementation of the Qualifications Directive in that it allows 
                                                             
9 A.O. v Minister for Justice ,Equality and Law Reform (No. 3) [2012] IEHC 104, at paras. 31-32. 
10 Dos Santos v Minister for Justice [2013] IEHC 237. 
11 C.A. & anor. v Minister for Justice and Equality and ors [2014] IEHC 532 
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persons to stay in Ireland until their request for protection is determined but the 
provision of support is not thereby the implementation of EU law.  
11.10. The combined effect of Protocol 21 TFEU and Article 51 of the Charter is that 
protection applicants in Ireland do not have Charter rights in relation to their reception 
conditions.”12 
In D.F. v Garda Commissioner, Hogan J. ruled that claims for a jury trial and, subsequently, 
damages for false imprisonment by Gardaí fell outside the scope of application of the 
Charter, reasoning that, 
“Even taking the broadest possible view of the meaning of the phrase “implementing” 
Union law, it is well nigh impossible to see how the Charter could come into play in 
relation to events which are wholly internal to this State and in respect of which Union 
law plays no role or part.”13 
In other cases, the Charter has been taken into account without any discussion of whether or 
not the matter satisfies the requirements of Article 51 of the Charter, i.e., falls within the 
scope of EU law.  See, for instance, Health Service Executive v C.B. (Care Order – Neglect 
and Abuse), where Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter were taken into account in the context of 
an application for a care order pursuant to s. 18 of the Child Care Act 1991, although the 
nexus to EU law is not immediately evident.14  It is fair to say, however, that the reference to 
the Charter does not seem to have affected the substantive outcome of these cases.  
  
                                                             
12 Ibid at para. 11.9. 
13 [2013] IEHC 5, para. 14 (application on motion to determine whether jury trial was required); [2014] 
IEHC 213, para. 43 (determination of substantive damages claim).  The citation appears in both 
judgements. 
14 Health Service Executive v C.B. (Care Order – Neglect and Abuse) [2012] IEDC 5.  See also, 
Health Service Executive v A.M. (Care Order – Mental Illness) [2013] IEDC 10, paragraph 38 (“The 
Court must have regard to the legislation and to the constitutional rights of the parents and the 
children, as well as to the rights of the parents and children set out in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union and to the rights to private and family life set out in Article 8 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights. Where there is a conflict of rights a balance must be struck.”) 
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Relationship between Charter, Constitutional and Convention 
Arguments 
There has not yet been any equivalent judgment to Carmody in relation to the Charter, i.e., it 
has not been explicitly held that constitutional rights must be considered prior to Charter 
rights, as is the case for proceedings raising Convention and constitutional issues (see 
chapters 2 and 3).  However, certain cases indicate that de facto this is occurring in many 
instances.  See, for instance, A.P. v Minister for Justice and Equality (No. 2) where, in the 
case of failure to give reasons for a naturalisation decision for a declared refugee, 
McDermott J. relied solely on the Supreme Court’s decision finding a constitutional duty to 
give reasons in Mallak v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform 15 , and did not 
consider it necessary to consider the submissions relating to breach of Article 41 of the 
Charter.16   
As regards the Charter/Convention relationship, as already discussed, in many cases judges 
have engaged in substantive reasoning on whether or not the matter falls within the scope of 
EU law in deciding which provision to apply.  However, in other cases, judges have simply 
applied the ECHR even in circumstances where it would seem likely that the Charter might 
apply, without giving any reason for such decision.  See, for instance, the discussion of 
European Arrest Warrant cases such as Ostrowski, Jermolajevs and Ciesielski in chapter 6. 
 
Article 47 of the Charter: The Right to an Effective Remedy 
Article 47 of the Charter, on the right to an effective remedy, constitutes a key article of 
horizontal relevance.  It is unsurprising that, within the cases surveyed, this provision 
constitutes the Article most frequently invoked in the Irish case law in the period surveyed.   
Article 47 provides, 
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are 
violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the 
conditions laid down in this Article. 
                                                             
15 Mallak v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2012] IESC 59 
16 A.P. v Minister for Justice and Equality (No. 2) [2014] IEHC 241. 
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Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. 
Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented. 
Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as 
such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice.” 
Looking at the components of Article 47 in turn, the question of the right to a fair and public 
hearing within a reasonable time (Article 47(2)) has been raised in a number of cases.  
 In Minister for Justice, Equality, and Law Reform v Adam,17 a case concerning surrender 
pursuant to Part 3 of the EAW Act 2003, Edwards J. considered that the question whether 
the matter fell within the scope of EU law or not (which he accepted was probably the case 
on the facts) was 
“to a large extent academic in the circumstances of this case because the 
respondent’s right to an expeditious trial is more or less identical regardless of 
whether it derives from Article 47 of the Charter, or from Article 6 of the Convention. 
Moreover while Article 47 of the Charter speaks expressly of “the right to an effective 
remedy” where “rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are 
violated”, Article 13 of the convention covers similar ground in guaranteeing “an 
effective remedy before a national authority” for “everyone whose rights and 
freedoms … are violated.” 
Nevertheless, drawing on previous Convention case law and applying it in the Charter 
context, Edwards J. concluded that, 
“In circumstances where both Ireland and the Czech Republic are members of the 
European Union and are obliged by the Charter to respect fundamental rights when 
acting “in the scope of Union law”; and also in circumstances where both Ireland and 
the Czech Republic are signatories to, and have ratified, the Convention; it is strongly 
to be presumed by this Court that the respondent will have available to him an 
effective remedy before the Courts of the Czech Republic in respect of any historical, 
or continuing, breaches of his expeditious trial right. That such a presumption should 
operate is consistent in this Court’s view with the principles and objects recited in the 
preamble to the framework decision when it refers to mutual recognition of judicial 
                                                             
17 Minister for Justice, Equality, and Law Reform v Adam [2011] IEHC 68. See similarly, considering 
Article 47 together with Article 6 ECHR in relation to the right to reasonable expedition in having one’s 
case heard, Minister for Justice and Equality v Gordon [2013] IEHC 515 (Edwards J.). 
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decisions, judicial cooperation and a high level of confidence between member 
states.” 
In those circumstances, the applicant bore, 
“what is, in effect, an evidential burden to provide this Court with cogent evidence 
tending to suggest that that might not be so, before this Court would be put on 
enquiry as to what remedies might or might not be available to the respondent before 
the courts of the Czech Republic.” 
In S.K.T. (DRC) v Refugee Appeal Tribunal, Eager J. applied inter alia Article 47 of the 
Charter in quashing the RAT’s decision to affirm a finding of ineligibility for refugee status on 
the ground of inordinate and unreasonable delay in holding the RAT hearing, and in issuing 
the decision after such hearing.  Eager J. noted that, while the specific provision on 
appropriate time limits for consideration of refugee applications in the Procedures Directive, 
as implemented by s. 13 of the Refugee Act 1996, only applied to first instance decisions, 
Article 47 of the Charter was of broader application.18  Nevertheless, it should be noted that, 
as a matter of Irish law, the principle that the RAT must act with reasonable promptitude in 
carrying outs its functions has long been well-established.19 
Concerning access to justice and locus standi, in Digital Rights Ireland v Minister for 
Communications,20 McKechnie J. relied on Article 47 of the Charter, as well as the general 
principle of effectiveness of EU law, in holding that the plaintiff – despite being a corporation 
- had locus standi to bring its claim, as: 
“the Courts may be required to take a more liberal approach to the issue of standing 
so that a person’s rights thereunder are not unduly hampered or frustrated. The rules 
on standing should be interpreted in a way which avoid making it “virtually 
impossible”, or “excessively difficult”, or which impedes or makes “unduly difficult”, 
the capacity of a litigant to challenge EU measures of general application under Art. 
267 TFEU…That is not to say that where questions of EU law are raised and a 
preliminary reference requested, the Court is automatically precluded from refusing a 
plaintiff standing. However, as was the case with regards to the power to grant 
interim relief in The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame 
Ltd & Ors. [1990] ECR I-2433, if the Court would be otherwise minded to allow 
standing in relation to the questions raised, but for a strict application of the national 
                                                             
18 S.K.T. (DRC) v Refugee Appeal Tribunal [2014] IEHC 572, at para. 24. 
19 See the overview at paragraph 28 ff of the SKT judgment. 
20 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd -v- Minister for Communication & Ors [2010] IEHC 221. 
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rules on locus standi, the Court should nonetheless grant standing where to do 
otherwise would render the plaintiff’s Community rights effectively unenforceable.”21     
By contrast, in An Taoiseach v Commissioner for Environmental Information,22 O’Neill J. held 
inter alia that Article 47 of the Charter did not mean that the Commissioner for Environmental 
Information must be entitled to disapply national law which was in conflict with EU law, as 
long as there was some access to the courts.  In that case, such access was expressly 
guaranteed by the relevant implementing regulations on access to environmental regulation, 
which provided for a referral on a point of law to the High Court. As a result, the 
Commissioner was not entitled to hold that the government’s refusal to allow access to 
cabinet discussions on greenhouse gas emissions was contrary to EU law. 
Concerning the right of defence and due process, in Dellway Investments v NAMA, 23 
Macken J. noted the relevance of Article 47 of the Charter in finding that the applicant had a 
right to make representations prior to, as in that case, NAMA’s decision to take over his 
loans from affected banks. Nevertheless, Macken J. noted that the Constitution remained the 
primary source of the right to make such representations, as while Article 47, 
“patently grants a right to be heard in respect of properly invoked rights. Its ambit is 
not, however, clearly spelt out. Although it suggests a hearing must be “public”, there 
is no guidance on what precisely is meant by or is included in “rights” in the first 
paragraph of Article 47.” 
See similarly, in relation to Article 47 and the right to an effective remedy in the subsidiary 
protection context, the judgment of Cross J. in OJ (Nigeria) v Minister for Justice and 
Equality,24 holding that the constitutional protection conferred by Article 40.2.3, insofar as 
relevant to that case, was at least as extensive as that conferred by Article 47.  
In Celtic Salmon Atlantic (Killary) v Aller Acqua (Ireland) 25 , Hogan J. interpreted the 
provisions of the Brussels I Regulation in the light of Articles 41, 47 and 48 of the Charter, to 
hold that the plaintiffs in that case were not precluded from raising by way of counterclaim an 
issue which they had failed to raise in Danish proceedings on the matter.  In so holding, 
Hogan J. held that the plaintiff had not had the chance properly to exercise its right of 
defence in the Danish proceedings which led to that judgment because, pursuant to Danish 
procedural law, only expert evidence which had been ordered by the Danish court was 
                                                             
21 Ibid at para. 46. 
22 An Taoiseach v Commissioner for Environmental Information [2010] IEHC 241. 
23 Dellway Investments & ors -v- NAMA & ors [2011] IESC 4, at [487]. 
24 OJ (Nigeria) v Minister for Justice and Equality [2012] IEHC 71. 
25 Celtic Salmon Atlantic (Killary) v Aller Acqua (Ireland), [2014] IEHC 421 
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admissible.  This meant that an Irish company such as the plaintiff could not have effectively 
complied with this requirement so far as evidence-gathering in Ireland was concerned, which 
in turn meant that it was effectively impossible for the plaintiff to have advanced its 
counterclaim in the Danish courts.  As a result, denying the plaintiff the possibility to bring 
the counterclaim in the Irish courts would be manifestly contrary to public policy for the 
purposes of Article 34.1 of the Brussels Regulation.26 
The question whether judicial review satisfies the Article 47 requirements of an effective 
remedy has been raised in a large number of cases.  It has been accepted that Article 47 
does not in itself require a full de novo hearing, but rather an effective remedy, in which (at 
least post-Meadows)27 judicial review will normally suffice: see VN (Cameroon) v Minister for 
Justice28, where Cooke J. noted that, 
“the [Article 47 right to an effective remedy] is provided for in Irish law by the 
availability of judicial review and, as has been held in a number of judgments of the 
Court, that remedy is adequate to guarantee the validity, reasonableness and 
lawfulness of a determination of subsidiary protection. (P.M v MJELR (Unreported, 
High Court, Hogan J. 28th October 2011) [2011] IEHC 409, ISOF v Minister for 
Justice (Unreported, High Court, Cooke J. 17th December 2010) [2010) IEHC 457, 
and Lofinmakin v Minister for Justice ((Unreported, High Court, Cooke J. 1st 
February 2011) [2011] IEHC 38).”29 
In A.A. v Minister for Justice, Cooke J. held that the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter 
should be interpreted according to any applicable EU legislation (in that case, the 
Procedures and Qualification Directives in the asylum context): 
“[Article 47] does not mean however, in the view of the Court, that Article 47 in 
conjunction with Article 51 constitutes the source of a stand-alone right in favour of 
individuals against Member States independently of the terms and contents of the 
law being implemented. Where, as in the case of the Procedures Directive, the Union 
legislator has given effect to the requirement of Article 47 by obliging, in Article 39, 
the Member States to provide for an effective remedy against specific decisions and 
has defined its scope in paragraph 1 of that article, Article 51 does not, in the view of 
the Court, provide a legal basis upon which an applicant can require a Member State 
to provide a different or more extensive remedy which goes further than the law in 
                                                             
26 Ibid at para. 124. 
27 This decision is discussed in detail above, pp.43-49 and below, p. 154. 
28 V.N. (Cameroon) v Minister for Justice and Law Reform & anor, [2012] IEHC 62 
29 Ibid at para. 21.  
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question requires. A Member State must respect relevant rights and principles of the 
Charter when adopting the national rules, conditions, time limits and other matters 
which Article 39 requires. Otherwise, however, the extent of the respect for the right 
to an effective remedy required by Article 47 is that defined by the Union legislator in 
the Procedures Directive and in Article 39 thereof in particular. Because the Charter 
is addressed primarily to the institutions, including especially the legislating 
institutions of the Union, it falls to the Union legislator when adopting a law, the 
implementation of which may affect the rights and freedoms of individuals, to ensure 
that a relevant right such as that of Article 47 is adequately safeguarded by the 
manner in which the scope and application of the law is defined.”30 
However, this judgment should now be read in light of the CJEU’s subsequent judgment in, 
for instance, M.M., which demonstrates that, even in a field covered in part by EU legislation, 
Article 47 may provide stand-alone rights.31 
A further debate has concerned the fact that, in the case of reliance on judicial review as an 
effective remedy, it is not possible for the judge to take into account facts that arose after the 
original decision, and does not entail automatic suspensive effect of the decision at issue.  In 
M v L, Clark J. refused an application for leave on, inter alia, these grounds.32 In Okunade v 
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, the Supreme Court applied the requirements 
for the grant of an interlocutory injunction preventing the respondent from deporting the 
applicants pending determination of an application for subsidiary protection in the light of 
Article 47 of the Charter.33  
As regards the right to legal aid, in Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v 
McGuinness,34 Edwards J. dismissed the respondent’s argument that the Attorney General’s 
scheme did not, due to its non-statutory and administrative nature, satisfy the requirements 
of Article 47(3) of the Charter (although he did not give substantive reasoning justifying this 
conclusion, as distinct from the similar conclusion reached on the basis of the EAW 
Framework Decision).   
It is important that the Charter is expressly pleaded.  See, for instance, A (a minor) v Minister 
for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, where an application for a certificate for leave to 
appeal to the Supreme Court and/or a reference to the CJEU was refused by Smyth J. on 
                                                             
30 [2012] IEHC 222, paragraph 15.,  
31 Case C-277/11 M.M., judgment of the CJEU of 22 November 2012.  
32 M v L [2012] IEHC 485.   
33 Okunade v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2012] IESC 49 (Clarke J), at para. 10.7.   
34 Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v McGuinness [2011] IEHC 289. 
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the basis that the relevant provisions of the Charter (Articles 18 and 24) had not been 
expressly pleaded.35  
It is of note that, in Pringle v Government of Ireland, Laffoy J. held in the High Court that the 
ESM Treaty was consistent with Article 47 of the Charter;36 upon reference by the Supreme 
Court to the CJEU, however, the CJEU held that in fact Article 47 was of no application to 
Treaties concluded outside the architecture of the EU Treaties, as the ESM Treaty was.37 
 
Article 41 of the Charter: The Right to Good Administration 
Article 41 of the Charter provides, insofar as relevant: 
“1. Every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and 
within a reasonable time by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the 
Union. 
2. This right includes:  
(a) the right of every person to be heard, before any individual measure which would 
affect him or her adversely is taken;  
(b) the right of every person to have access to his or her file, while respecting the 
legitimate interests of confidentiality and of professional and business secrecy;  
(c) the obligation of the administration to give reasons for its decisions.” 
In C.A. v Minister for Justice and Equality, MacEochaidh J. noted that the right contained in 
Article 41 of the Charter is not present, at least in the same way, in the Constitution or 
Convention.38 
In H.N. v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, the Supreme Court referred the 
question whether it was compatible with the Qualifications Directive in EU asylum law for 
Irish law to provide that an application for subsidiary protection will not be considered unless 
                                                             
35 A (a minor) v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2011] IEHC 323. See similarly, S (a 
minor) v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform (Hogan J) [2011] IEHC 31. 
36 Pringle v The Government of Ireland & Ors [2012] IEHC 296, at para. 89. 
37 Case C-370/12 Pringle, judgment of 27 November 2012. 
38 C.A. v Minister for Justice and Equality [2014] IEHC 418.  The judge specifically noted that Article 
41 had not been pleaded in that case, which concerned the legality of the State’s direct provision 
system: paragraph 11.8. 
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the applicant has already applied for and been refused refugee status.39  The CJEU held 
that, while this did not breach the Qualifications Directive, it was a requirement of the 
principle of effectiveness of EU law and Article 41 of the Charter that the entirety of the 
procedure thereby established was concluded within a reasonable period of time: 
“…where, in the main proceedings, a Member State implements EU law, the 
requirements pertaining to the right to good administration, including the right of any 
person to have his or her affairs handled impartially and within a reasonable period of 
time, are applicable in a procedure for granting subsidiary protection, such as the 
procedure in question in the main proceedings, which is conducted by the competent 
national authorities.  
51 It is therefore necessary to ascertain whether the right to good administration 
precludes a Member State from including in its national law a procedural rule to the 
effect that an application for subsidiary protection must be covered by a separate 
procedure and can be made only after an asylum application has been refused.  
52 As regards, in particular, the requirement for impartiality, that requirement 
encompasses, inter alia, objective impartiality, in so far as there must be sufficient 
guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt as to bias on the part of the national 
authorities concerned (see, by analogy, Case C-439/11 P Ziegler v Commission 
EU:C:2013:513, paragraph 155).  
53 It should be noted, first of all, that in circumstances such as those in the main 
proceedings, the fact that, before commencing the examination of an application for 
subsidiary protection, the national authorities inform the applicant that they are 
considering making a deportation order cannot, of itself, be construed as a lack of 
objective impartiality on the part of those authorities.  
54 It is in fact common ground that the reason for that disclosure on the part of 
the competent authorities is that it has been found that the third country national does 
not qualify for refugee status. That finding does not, therefore, mean that the 
competent authorities have already adopted a position on whether that third country 
national satisfies the requirements for being granted subsidiary protection.  
55 Accordingly, the procedural rule at issue in the main proceedings is not at 
odds with the requirement of impartiality pertaining to the right to good administration.  
                                                             
39 H.N. v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2012] IESC 58.   
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56  Nevertheless, that right ensures, in the same way as the requirements 
imposed by the principle of effectiveness [of EU law] that the entire procedure for 
considering an application for international protection does not exceed a reasonable 
period of time.”40 
Upon return to the Supreme Court, the application was rejected as, on the facts of that case, 
the applicant had refused to make an application for refugee status and where the delay had 
largely been as a result of the applicant’s own judicial review proceedings, and had resulted 
in a benefit for him in terms of changed circumstances which were favourable to his 
application.41  As a result, O’Donnell J. in the Supreme Court refused the application and, 
with it, the claim for damages for breach of Article 41.   
In Tagni v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Edwards J. granted a declaration 
that the respondent failed to render his decision on the applicant’s resident permit 
application within a reasonable time, contrary to Article 41 of the Charter.42  In so holding, 
Edward J. noted that the relevant Directive on free movement of EU citizens, plus the 
implementing national regulations, provided that such a decision should in principle be made 
within six months. 
In O’Connor v The Environmental Protection Agency43 and No2GM v The Environmental 
Protection Agency44, Hogan J. relied on the right to be heard pursuant to Article 41 of the 
Charter in rejecting the applicant’s claim, made on an ex parte basis, that they should be 
assured that they would not be liable to costs at a level that was prohibitively expensive 
within the meaning of Article 9(4) of the Aarhus Convention.45  
 
                                                             
40 Case C-604/12 H.N., judgment of 8 May 2014.   
41 [2014] IESC 30 (2015). 
42 Tagni v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] IEHC 85.   
43 O’Connor v The Environmental Protection Agency & Anor [2012] IEHC 370 
44 No2GM Ltd v The Environmental Protection Agency & Anor [2012] IEHC 369 
45  Affirmed on appeal (without consideration of the Charter) in Applications by Coffey & ors v 
Environmental Protection Agency & anor [2013] IESC 31. 
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Chapter Seven: The Charter before the Irish Courts – Sectoral 
Issues 
 
This Chapter focuses on the use of the Charter before the Irish Courts in six substantive 
fields in which the Charter has, to date, had perhaps most impact, namely: 
(1) Asylum and immigration law; 
(2) European Arrest Warrant and criminal law;  
(3) Data protection law; 
(4) Family and child law; 
(5) Companies’ rights; 
(6) Social and employment rights. 
 
Asylum and Immigration 
The Charter has had perhaps its greatest impact in the Irish courts to date in the asylum and 
immigration context, and there is potential for it to have even greater impact in the coming 
years.1 
An early example is M.E., where a reference from the Irish High Court (Clark J) 
subsequently led, along with a reference from the English Court of Appeal, to the Court of 
Justice’s seminal judgment in N.S./M.E., ruling that Article 4 of the Charter, prohibiting 
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, meant that Member States, including national 
courts, may not transfer asylum seekers back to the Member State of first entry into the EU 
as would normally occur under the Dublin II Regulation, where they cannot be unaware that 
systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and reception conditions in that Member State 
                                                             
1 While asylum and immigration law are evidently distinct fields of law, they are considered here 
together due to significant overlaps in the issues arising before the Irish courts, and judicial treatment 
of said issues, from a Charter perspective. 
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mean there are substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real 
risk of having his/her Article 4 rights breached.2   
In F.O. v Refugee Appeals Tribunal, O’Malley J. applied N.S. to overturn the decision of the 
Refugee Appeals Tribunal that the asylum seeker in that instance should have first applied 
for asylum in Greece and/or the UK, on grounds that the Tribunal should have considered 
whether he had made out reasonable grounds for applying for asylum first in Ireland.3 
Conversely, the Charter has also frequently been used as a “sword” in the Irish courts to 
reject arguments that other Member States do not offer a sufficient level of rights protection.4  
In J.M.O. v Refugee Applications Commissioner, McDermott J. noted: 
“in rebutting the presumption of compliance with European Union law and Article 4 by 
the responsible receiving Member State, cogent evidence is required. The onus is on 
the applicant to rebut the presumption and to establish on the balance of probabilities 
the facts from which the inference may be drawn that substantial grounds were 
established for concluding that the applicant faced a “real risk” of being subject to a 
breach of Article 4 (or Article 3) rights, if returned. In contrast to the overwhelming 
body of evidence concerning the Greek cases, the nature and extent of the evidence 
available to the Commissioner adduced by the applicant and from the inquiries made 
by the Commissioner, was minimal in support of the applicant’s contention.”5 
On this basis, he rejected the argument that the respondent was obliged, pursuant to N.S., 
to refuse to transfer the applicant back to Slovakia pursuant to the Dublin II Regulation, in 
circumstances where the applicant argued that the Slovak authorities did not grant asylum to 
people in the applicant’s position, and transferred Chechen people back to Russian in 
breach of the principle of non-refoulement.  
A raft of judgments have concerned the compatibility with EU law, including the Charter, of 
Ireland’s bifurcated system of international protection for refugees.   
In M.M. v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform,6 one of the issues that arose was 
the compatibility of this system with the Article 41(2) Charter right to be heard and the Article 
                                                             
2 Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N.S./M.E. [2011] ECR I-865.   
3 F.O. v Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2014] IEHC 123.   
4 See, for instance, J.G. v Refugee Applications Commissioner [2013] IEHC 248 (McDermott J); 
Minister for Justice and Equality v Strzelecki (No. 2) [2013] IEHC 477 (Edwards J); Minister for Justice 
and Equality v Eglitis [2013] IEHC 215 (Edwards J); Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v 
Marjasz [2012] IEHC 233. 
5 J.M.O. v Refugee Applications Commissioner [2014] IEHC 467, at para. 68.   
6 M.M. v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2013] IEHC 9. 
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47 right to an effective remedy.  This case constitutes a good illustration of the inherent 
uncertainty that making a reference to the Court of Justice brings into litigation, as the 
Luxembourg court may potentially offer an answer to a question that was not expressly 
posed, or phrase its response in a way that goes well beyond the facts of the particular case 
at hand.  In that case, following a reference to the Court of Justice by Hogan J., the 
Luxembourg court went beyond the express terms of the reference “in order to provide the 
referring court with a useful answer”, holding that a further “hearing” must be held in the 
context of the second (subsidiary protection) procedure. 7   In so holding, however, the 
Luxembourg court appeared, at least on the face of it,8 to have misunderstood the workings 
of the Irish asylum procedure, as in fact a written hearing was given to subsidiary protection 
applicants – but not an oral hearing.  Hogan J.’s subsequent judgment, applying the Court of 
Justice’s judgment to the facts of the case, is interesting for its attempts to reconcile the 
Luxembourg court’s judgment with the realities of the Irish system, by inter alia examining 
different language versions of the Luxembourg judgment, concluding that the subsidiary 
protection regime as it then functioned did not entail an effective hearing, particularly as 
regards findings of credibility.9  This ultimately led to a change in the Irish asylum procedure 
with the European Union (Subsidiary Protection) Regulations 2013. A further reference in the 
M.M. case, this time from the Supreme Court, is currently pending before the CJEU. 
M.M. was followed by a reference from the Supreme Court - on the compatibility of the Irish 
asylum procedure with the Article 41 Charter right to good administration - in the H.N. case, 
considered in Chapter 5; specifically, the compatibility of the requirement to have applied 
first for refugee status in order to be eligible to apply for subsidiary protection.  Upon 
reference, the Court of Justice ruled that such a system is compatible with the right to good 
administration, provided that both applications can be submitted at the same time, and if this 
does not mean that the application for subsidiary protection is considered only after an 
unreasonable length of time.10 
A variety of cases have considered the question whether Articles 7 and/or 24 of the Charter 
have been appropriately considered by decision-makers in circumstances where the case 
involves an EU citizen child which may be deprived of the genuine enjoyment of the 
                                                             
7 Case C-277/11 MM [2012] ECR I-744. 
8 See, for instance, paragraph 80 (“With regard more particularly to the right of the applicant to be 
heard before a decision is adopted, the High Court has stated in its order for reference that, according 
to national case‑law, it is not necessary to observe that procedural requirement when dealing with an 
application for subsidiary protection made following rejection of an asylum application, given that the 
applicant will already have been heard in the examination of his asylum application and given that the 
two procedures are closely linked”). 
9 M.M. v Minister for Justice [2013] IEHC 9, judgment of Hogan J.   
10 Case C-604/12 H.N., judgment of 8 May 2014, not yet reported.   
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substance of his/her citizenship rights as a result of the decision, pursuant to the Zambrano 
doctrine. It is clear that, in such cases, the courts will examine carefully whether the 
Zambrano criteria (dependency, deprivation of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of 
EU citizenship rights) are in fact fulfilled.   
In J.S. v Minister for Justice and Equality, for instance, McDermott J. rejected the 
applicability of Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter in a case of affirmation of a deportation order, 
reasoning that,  
“The provisions of s. 3(1) and 3(11) of the Immigration Act 1999, are part of domestic 
legislation concerned with the implementation of immigration policy. Having regard to 
the fact that the state is not precluded from deporting a third party national even 
though that person is a parent of a European citizen child, when that child is not 
dependent upon the applicant and will not be deprived of the genuine enjoyment and 
substance of his/her rights as a European Union citizen by reason of that deportation, 
I am satisfied that Article 7 has no application.”11 
In A.N. v Minister for Justice and Equality, Clark J. rejected the argument that the judgment 
of the CJEU in Zambrano and the rights which flow from Article 20 TFEU precluded the 
Minister from considering whether it would be reasonable to expect an EU citizen to relocate 
outside of the EU to maintain family life with a non-EEA national in the event of his / her 
deportation. In so holding, Clark J. considered that it remains a matter for the Minister to 
weigh all relevant facts and circumstances in the balance so far as they are known to him 
and to reach a reasonable and proportionate decision on a case-by-case basis; and that this 
was compatible with Article 8 of the Convention, which she considered to be equivalent to 
Article 7 of the Charter.12 
The equivalence of Article 7 of the Charter to Article 8 of the Convention was also 
considered in B. v Minister for Justice and Equality, 13 in which McDermott J. considered that, 
where the respondent had taken Article 8 ECHR considerations into account, this sufficed in 
that case to show consideration of Article 7 of the Charter also: 
“54. In interpreting Article 7 and Article 24 of the Charter, Article 52(3) provides that 
insofar as the Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 
                                                             
11 J.S. v Minister for Justice and Equality [2014] IEHC 195, at para. 33. 
12 A.N. v Minister for Justice and Equality [2013] IEHC 480.   
13 B & ors v Minister for Justice and Equality [2013] IEHC 246. For cases of Convention relevance, 
see above, pp. 64-68. 
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meaning and scope of those rights shall be “the same as those laid down by the said 
Convention”. This does not prevent European Union law providing more extensive 
protection for children but it is a tool of interpretation. There is an extensive body of 
jurisprudence in relation to the application of Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights in respect of deportation orders and applications to revoke them under 
s. 3 of the Immigration Act 1999. The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights is, as a matter of course, applied in such cases (as indeed it was in this case) 
to considerations of the applicants’ rights to private and family life under Article 8. 
This assessment was carried out prior to the making of the deportation order and in 
the course of the consideration of both applications to revoke the deportation order, 
as is evident from a reading of the examination of file and the considerations of the 
file carried out by the officials in this case. That process has never been the subject 
of challenge by way of leave to apply for judicial review or otherwise by the 
applicants. Though the applicants contend that a different test should have been 
applied in the application of Article 7 of the Charter in respect of the private and 
family lives of the applicants on the application to revoke, the applicants have not 
advanced to the court any test different to that which was applied in respect of Article 
8 of the European Convention throughout this process. The court is satisfied having 
regard to Article 52(3) of the Charter that the meaning and scope of Article 7 is the 
same as the meaning and scope of Article 8. The court is not satisfied that there is 
any stateable ground upon which it can be argued that Article 7 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights was in any respect misconstrued or breached. The best 
interests of the child were considered both in relation to the children’s constitutional 
rights and Convention rights in accordance with the principles laid down in Boultif and 
Uner.”14 
McDermott J. reached a similar conclusion of equivalence in relation to Article 24 of the 
Charter and the requirements of the Constitution and the ECHR, refusing leave to apply for 
judicial review on this ground.15  
In TD v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, the Supreme Court considered the 
question whether the 14 day time limit for bringing an application for leave to issue judicial 
review proceedings under s. 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 breached the 
EU law principle of equivalence of remedies for breach of national and EU law rights.  In the 
High Court, Hogan J. had answered in the affirmative to this question, comparing the 14 day 
                                                             
14 Ibid at para. 54. [Also discussed above at pp. 65-67.] 
15 Ibid at para. 56.  
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period with the comparator 8 week period for planning and development applications. 
Allowing the appeal, Fennelly J. noted that, 
“The areas of power or jurisdiction which are indisputably within the competence of 
the European Union are, firstly, all matters concerning the free movement of persons 
within the EU, i.e., between Member States, and, secondly, asylum and refugee 
status and international protection generally. It is almost certain that any proceeding 
whereby an individual claims rights either pursuant to the law of free movement or of 
asylum will be the subject of EU law.”16 
Albeit dissenting on the specific issue on whether or not planning/development law was an 
appropriate comparator to EU asylum law for the purposes of the principle of equivalence, 
Murray J.’s judgment is interesting for its strong rights-based approach to refugee law, based 
on Article 18 of the Charter.  Murray J. noted that, while the right to asylum had originally 
been derived from national/international law, it now constituted an EU law right: 
“the right to asylum and refugee status is now guaranteed by Article 18 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Ireland, along with other Member 
States, has a duty to grant refugee status to those who qualify as refugees in 
accordance with the criteria set out in Directive 2004/83/EC (the Qualifications 
Directive). The rights which the respondents seek to assert derive exclusively from 
the law of the European Union since the State is obliged to give effect to European 
law and it cannot, by way of legislation or otherwise, deny or limit the rights conferred 
by the Charter and the relevant Directives given the primacy which is accorded by 
the Constitution to the law of the European Union.”17 
Murray J. went on to specify that, albeit that it was passed prior to the Charter, the Refugee 
Act 1996 now constituted the means by which Ireland complied with its Charter and EU law 
obligations in the field of refugee and asylum law.18  The judgment clearly recognises that 
the right to refugee status is an “autonomous fundamental right” under EU law, 19  and 
represents a significant confirmation that refugee law was about giving effect to this 
fundamental right, not about border control: 
                                                             
16 [2014] IESC 29, paragraph 12. 
17 [2014] IESC 29, at para. 18. 
18 Ibid at para. 82. 
19 Ibid at paras. 120, 133. 
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“143. The purpose of the proceedings in this case is to claim an autonomous right to 
a status, refugee status, which is a fundamental right. In short, these proceedings are 
not about controlling borders but about a right to a status guaranteed by the Charter.” 
In A.M. v Refugee Appeals Tribunal, McDermott J. relied upon Article 10 of the Charter, on 
freedom of conscience, in interpreting the definition of refugee in the Refugee Act 1996, 
holding that the Qualification Directive, which includes the definition of refugee, must be 
interpreted in line with the Charter.  Further, section 2 of the Refugee Act 1996 interpreted in 
line with the Constitution and with the ECHR Act 2003 gave a similar result.  Nevertheless, 
the applicant’s application to quash the refusal to grant her refugee status was refused in 
circumstances where a provision existed in Israeli military law for her to apply for an 
exemption from military service on grounds of conscience.20  
In D. (a minor) v Refugee Appeals Tribunal,21 Hogan J. relied on inter alia Article 14 of the 
Charter, on the right to education, in holding that the potential denial of a basic education to 
the applicant, who was of Roma origin, if returned to their country of origin constituted a 
sufficiently severe violation of basic human rights amounting to persecution within the 
meaning of  section 2 of the Refugee Act 1996. 
The Charter has also been successfully used to quash a decision to transfer a heavily 
pregnant woman by ferry to the UK under the Dublin II Regulations (held in Aslam to be 
contrary to Article 1 of the Charter),22 and the view has been expressed obiter by Hogan J. 
that Article 24 of the Charter, on the rights of the child, “might yet have considerable 
implications for immigration law and practice”.23  
 
European Arrest Warrant and Criminal Law 
The Charter has also featured prominently in a number of recent cases concerning 
European Arrest Warrants (EAWs), due in part to the fact that the relevant EU legislation, 
the EU EAW Framework Decision,24 refers expressly to the Charter in its preamble.25   
                                                             
20 A.M. v Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2014] IEHC 388.   
21 D. (a minor) -v- Refugee Appeals Tribunal & anor [2011] IEHC 431. See discussion on Convention 
application above, p.61. 
22 Aslam v Minister for Justice and Equality [2011] IEHC 512 (Hogan J.). 
23 AO v Minister for Justice and Equality (No. 3) [2012] IEHC 104 (Hogan J), holding however that 
there was no entitlement to rely on the Charter in that case, because the conditions of Article 51(1) of 
the Charter were not made out.   
24 Framework Decision 2004/584/JHA OJ 2002 L 190/1. 
25 For a discussion on the Convention and the European Arrest Warrant, see above, pp. 79-82.  
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The first reported case in which the Charter was substantively discussed in the Irish courts 
was, indeed, an EAW case dating from 2005.  In Dundon v The Governor of Cloverhill 
Prison, 26  the Supreme Court considered the Charter in interpreting a time limit in the 
European Arrest Warrant Act 2003, which in turn was based on the EU EAW Framework 
Decision.  The plaintiff’s case was that the expiry of this time limit, read in conjunction with 
Chapter VI of the Charter, meant that he had an automatic right to be released at that point.   
Dismissing this claim, Fennelly J. in the Supreme Court noted that, although the 
interpretation of the Framework Decision was far from clear, at that point it was not possible 
for the Supreme Court to make a preliminary reference to the ECJ as Ireland had not made 
the relevant declaration which was, at the time, necessary in order to empower the Irish 
Supreme Court to seize the ECJ in a criminal case. Nevertheless, in that case, Fennelly J. 
considered that it was clear that the provision at issue did not have direct effect as a matter 
of EU law such as to confer rights on individuals. 
More recently, the Charter has been increasingly expressly been taken into account in 
judgments concerning EAWs.   
In Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform v Pollak,27 Peart J. applied Articles 18 and 
19(2) of the Charter in holding that the State could not surrender, pursuant to an EAW, an 
individual to his country of origin in circumstances where he held refugee status in the State.  
However, Peart J. also relied heavily on Article 3 of the Convention, interpreting s. 37 of the 
EAW Act 2003 in the light of that provision (and not in the light of the Charter). 
In other cases, the existence of the Charter has meant that the Irish courts have undertaken 
a more stringent review of conditions in the state of transfer where that state is a non-EU 
state, as compared to an EU state where the principle of mutual trust justifies a strong 
presumption of rights compatibility.  In Attorney General v O’Gara28, for instance, Edwards J. 
noted, in the context of arguments that the risk of rape in the US prison system justified a 
refusal to extradite, that, 
“though it is by no means perfect, there is. by virtue of the fact that all member states 
operating the European arrest warrant system are signatories to the Convention, a 
greater common understanding between the States operating the European arrest 
warrant system of what constitutes an individual’s fundamental rights, and what is 
required to be done to defend and vindicate those rights. Such is the level of mutual 
                                                             
26 Dundon v The Governor of Cloverhill Prison [2005] IESC 83. 
27 Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform v Pollak [2010] IEHC 209. 
28 Attorney General v O’Gara [2012] IEHC 179 
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trust and confidence in other member states who are parties to the European arrest 
warrant system that the Oireachtas has given statutory effect to the presumption that 
arises -in s.4A of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 (as inserted by s.69 of the 
Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005). S.4A provides that ''It shall he 
presumed that an issuing state will comply with the requirements of 'the Framework 
Decision, unless the contrary is shown” Neither the Extradition Act 1965, nor the 
Washington Treaty contains a comparable provision. That is not to say that no 
presumption at all arises, but as the Court has stated it is very much weaker and 
more easily rebutted than is the case under the European arrest warrant system.”29 
This kind of reasoning displays much similarity with that of the CJEU in Melloni, discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
Conversely, in Minister for Justice and Equality v Marjasz, 30  Edwards J. held that, 
notwithstanding the principle of mutual recognition, it might be possible, in an exceptional 
case, for a respondent to resist surrender on foot of a European arrest warrant seeking his 
or her surrender for the purpose of executing a sentence, on the basis that the underlying 
conviction was the result of an unfair trial.  In so doing, he relied on Article 6 of the 
Convention as well as Article 47 of the Charter, but noted that, 
“having appropriate regard to the implications of the s.4A [of the EAW Act 2003] 
presumption for the way in which an issuing state / issuing judicial authority is 
required to conduct itself; the principles of mutual trust and confidence between 
member states; the further principle that there should be mutual recognition of judicial 
decisions and actions; and the aforementioned duty of utmost good faith, this Court 
considers that it is entitled to expect in respect of any conviction which is the subject 
of a European arrest warrant that the issuing judicial authority would not knowingly 
seek a respondent's rendition in circumstances where he had not received a fair trial 
(as judged against widely accepted norms such as those expressed in provisions 
such as Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, to which instrument 
all member states operating the European arrest warrant are signatories; 
alternatively Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights which is also binding on 
such member states post the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty), and that it is 
therefore to be presumed that the respondent did in fact receive a fair trial that 
respected his fundamental rights. Such a presumption is, of course, capable of being 
rebutted in any particular case but the Court would require to have adduced before it 
                                                             
29 Ibid at para. 10.3. 
30 Minister for Justice and Equality v Marjasz [2012] IEHC 233 (no paragraph numbers in judgement). 
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very cogent and compelling evidence tending to rebut that presumption before it 
would be put upon enquiry and be justified in seeking to look behind the 
presumption.” 
In Minister for Justice and Equality v Rostas,31 Edwards J. held that this presumption had 
been rebutted, and the respondent would not be surrendered, in circumstances where the 
evidence showed that there were substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk 
that the respondent suffered, as a person of Roma ethnicity, a flagrant denial of justice with 
respect to her trial in Romania in the 1990s, resulting in the conviction and sentence to 
which the European arrest warrant relates. 
In other cases, Charter-based arguments have been considered but have proven 
unsuccessful.  In Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v Biggins, Peart J. 
considered but rejected arguments that execution of the EAW in that case was contrary to 
the requirement of non-discrimination set out in Article 23 of the Charter, as well as Article 
14 of the Convention.32  In Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v Dillon,33 Peart J. 
applied Article 50 of the Charter, on ne bis in idem, in holding that the High Court was not 
precluded from consenting to the surrender of an individual to the UK pursuant to an EAW in 
circumstances where that person had originally been acquitted, but fresh DNA evidence had 
subsequently become available allowing an appeal in the English courts of that acquittal.  
In O’Sullivan v The Chief Executive of the Irish Prison Service,34 McKechnie J. rejected the 
argument that the insertion of s. 16(12) into the EAW Act 2003, by which certification from 
the High Court was necessary in order to appeal an EAW judgment to the Supreme Court, 
breached inter alia Article 47 of the Charter on the right to an effective remedy.  McKechnie 
J. held that s. 16 did in fact provide an effective remedy within the Charter and Convention 
sense, in that it provided for: 
(a) A fair and public hearing; 
(b) An independent tribunal; and 
(c) An effective remedy. 
                                                             
31 Minister for Justice and Equality v Rostas [2014] IEHC 391. For discussion on Convention aspects 
of this case, see above, pp. 81 et seq.  
32 Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v Biggins [2006] IEHC 351. 
33 Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v Dillon [2010] IEHC 196. 
34 O'Sullivan v The Chief Executive of the Irish Prison Service & ors [2010] IEHC 301. 
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While the first two requirements concerned the issue of systemic and actual bias, the final 
requirement constituted an “extension of the right of access”, in that 
“it is fundamental to governance based on the rule of law that access to the courts be 
both meaningful and purposeful. For such right to have any substance this must of 
course include the potential for an effective remedy…the threshold of “exceptional 
public importance … in the public interest” is not insurmountable…it is clear that 
notwithstanding the possibility of an appeal, s. 16 itself is an effective remedy which 
an applicant may use to vindicate his rights. Again, there have been many cases in 
which persons have successfully challenged an EAW seeking their surrender.”35 
In sum, therefore, McKechnie J. considered that the effective remedy requirement was 
satisfied by the very existence of section 16, and did not require a further possibility of 
appeal following an initial judgment. 
As in the asylum context, the implications of Article 24 on the rights of the child have been 
raised and considered in a number of EAW cases, but Article 24-based arguments have 
been unsuccessful to date.36  This issue will undoubtedly be developed further in the future.  
See, for instance, the judgment of Edwards J. in Minister for Justice and Equality v T.E., in 
which he noted that, while Ireland (in contrast to the UK) had not incorporated the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child into its domestic law, by virtue of Article 24 of the 
Charter, read in conjunction with its Explanations, that Convention nevertheless had some 
effect in the Irish courts.37 
In Minister for Justice v D.L.38, Edwards J. considered whether Article 24 of the Charter 
applied to the question whether, in taking a decision to surrender an individual pursuant to 
an EAW, humanitarian grounds (in that case, the fact that the accused’s daughter was 
seriously ill) for postponing the decision on surrender applied.  Edwards J. discussed the 
issue of the scope of application of the Charter in some detail, concluding that, on balance in 
that case, it was unnecessary to rely on the Charter: 
“The Court, in making an assessment as to whether a postponement is warranted, in 
circumstances where Article 8 [of the Convention] is engaged and prejudice to a child 
of the proposed extraditee is relied upon as constituting the humanitarian grounds, is 
                                                             
35 Ibid at para. 91. 
36 See, e.g., Minister for Justice and Equality v P.G. [2013] IEHC 54 (Edwards J.). See also, Minister 
for Justice and Equality v T.E. [2013] IEHC 323 (Edwards J). 
37 Minister for Justice and Equality v T.E. [2013] IEHC 323, at para. 121.  
38 [2011] IEHC 248. 
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entitled, and is indeed obliged having regard to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, to 
have regard to the best interests of the child as “a” primary consideration. The Court 
agrees with counsel for the applicant that it is not necessary for the respondent to 
rely on the Charter in this regard.  
While the Charter has been relied upon by the respondent it is not necessary for the 
purpose of giving judgment in this case for the Court to decide definitively whether or 
not it may be relied upon in the European arrest warrant context, and if so in what 
circumstances it may be relied upon. The Court will not decide a moot. That said, and 
subject to the possibility of being persuaded otherwise after full argument in a future 
case in which the issue requires to be adjudicated on definitively, I see no reason at 
the present time to deviate from a provisional view which I have expressed previously 
in an obiter dictum in Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v Adam (No 1) 
[2011] IEHC 68 (Unreported, High Court, Edwards J., 3rd March, 2011), that in an 
appropriate case (i.e., where a right is being relied upon rather than a principle) the 
Charter can be relied upon in the European arrest warrant context.  
The Court holds its provisional view notwithstanding that the Charter must be 
regarded as forward looking and therefore did not apply at the time of the legislative 
implementation of the Framework Decision in terms of the enactment by the 
Oireachtas of the Act of 2003. However, the Court tends to agree with the 
respondent that in operating the Act of 2003 which incorporates the underlying 
Framework Decision, the Court, as a relevant Member State authority, is ostensibly 
acting within the scope of EU law. However, the Court also tends to agree with 
counsel for the applicant that Article 24(2) of the Charter contains an expression of 
principle rather than the enumeration of a right that can be relied upon directly. Be all 
of that as it may, these issues are academic in the circumstances of this case 
because under the Convention the Court is obliged in any event to have regard to the 
best interests principle.” 
However, the application for postponement was refused in that case.  
The Charter has frequently been relied upon in conjunction with constitutional and 
Convention arguments; in some cases, the relevant constitutional right has been considered 
to go further.  In Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform v Nolan,39 for instance (which 
concerned the issue of the obligation to surrender for the purposes of preventative 
detention), Edwards J. considered that the constitutional right not to be deprived of liberty 
                                                             
39 Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform v Nolan [2012] IEHC 239 
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save in accordance with the law went further than analogous rights under the Charter and 
Convention: 
“The Court is further reinforced in its view that the right in Article 40.4.1 ° is a truly 
fundamental right that is intended to benefit a citizen both within and without the 
national territory, by the fact that rights framed in a broadly analogous way are also 
guaranteed both by Article 5 of the ECHR and Article 6 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. However, the right to liberty is 
guaranteed in somewhat stronger terms under Article 40.4.1 °, or perhaps it is more 
correct to say that it is less heavily circumscribed. It is presumably for this reason that 
counsel for the respondent has focused the entirety of his argument on Article 
40.4.1…”40 
In still other cases, while the Charter has been argued, the Court has ignored the Charter in 
its judgment and reasoned solely on the basis of the relevant Convention right, without 
providing any reason for so doing.41 
In Minister for Justice and Equality v Ostrowski42, the Supreme Court was asked to consider 
whether a decision to surrender an individual pursuant to a European Arrest Warrant was 
compatible with Article 8 of the Convention, in circumstances where it was alleged that 
surrender would be disproportionate due to the trivial nature of the offence at issue.  The 
Supreme Court rejected this argument on grounds that a decision to surrender that 
otherwise fell within the terms of the EU Framework Decision on the EAW would only 
exceptionally be reviewed for proportionality.  It would seem that the court was only asked to 
consider compliance with Convention and constitutional rights, and compliance with the 
Charter was apparently not pleaded.43   
Finally, it is of interest that, in Gilligan, the Supreme Court (MacMenamin J.) relied on Article 
49(3) of the Charter, requiring that penalties be proportionate to the criminal offence, when 
considering the sentencing power of the judiciary in a purely domestic criminal law context.44   
 
                                                             
40 Ibid at para. 119. 
41 See, for instance, Minister for Justice and Equality v Jermolajevs [2013] IEHC 102 (Edwards J.); 
Minister for Justice and Equality v Ciesielski [2013] IEHC 101 (Edwards J.). See further cases 
discussed above, pp. 82 et seq. 
42 Minister for Justice and Equality v Ostrowski [2013] IESC 24 
43 Ibid; see judgment of McKechnie J. at para. 38 and (considering the Charter in interpreting the 
principle of proportionality of criminal penalties) para. 82.   
44 Gilligan v Ireland & ors [2013] IESC 45, at para. 40. 
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Data Protection 
The relevance of Article 8 of the Charter, on protection of personal data, was raised before 
the High Court in Digital Rights Ireland, which resulted in the reference and important 
judgment of the Court of Justice annulling the EU’s 2006 Data Retention Directive. 45  
McKechnie J. relied on Article 47 of the Charter, as well as the general principle of 
effectiveness of EU law, in holding that the plaintiff – despite being a corporation - had locus 
standi to bring its claim, as,  
“the Courts may be required to take a more liberal approach to the issue of standing 
so that a person’s rights thereunder are not unduly hampered or frustrated. The rules 
on standing should be interpreted in a way which avoid making it “virtually 
impossible”, or “excessively difficult”, or which impedes or makes “unduly difficult”, 
the capacity of a litigant to challenge EU measures of general application under Art. 
267 TFEU…That is not to say that where questions of EU law are raised and a 
preliminary reference requested, the Court is automatically precluded from refusing a 
plaintiff standing. However, as was the case with regards to the power to grant 
interim relief in The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame 
Ltd & Ors. [1990] ECR I-2433, if the Court would be otherwise minded to allow 
standing in relation to the questions raised, but for a strict application of the national 
rules on locus standi, the Court should nonetheless grant standing where to do 
otherwise would render the plaintiff’s Community rights effectively unenforceable.”46    
More recently, in Schrems, the High Court (Hogan J) has referred the question whether the 
Irish Data Commissioner is bound, notwithstanding Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, by the 
decision of the European Commission of July 2000, implementing the 1995 Data Protection 
Directive, which provides that the data protection regime in the United States is adequate 
and effective where the companies which transfer or process the data to the United States 
self-certify that they comply with the principles set down in this Commission decision, i.e., 
the Safe Harbour regime. 47 The applicant has claimed in the Irish proceedings that the Irish 
Data Protection Commissioner should exercise his statutory powers to direct that transfer of 
personal data from Facebook Ireland, who was a designated data controller under the EU 
regime, to its parent company in the US should cease.  The Commissioner, however, has 
                                                             
45 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd -v- Minister for Communication & Ors [2010] IEHC 221. 
46 Ibid at para. 46. 
47 Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner [2014] IEHC 310.   
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argued that he is bound by the terms of the European Commission decision. The case is 
pending before the CJEU.48   
It is of interest that, in the referring judgment, Hogan J. considered that the position under 
EU law as regards the rights to privacy and data protection is equally clear and parallels the 
position under Irish law, albeit “perhaps that the safeguards for data protection under the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights thereby afforded are perhaps even more explicit than under 
our national law.” He continued to offer the following view, 
“…it is not immediately apparent how the present operation of the Safe Harbour 
Regime can in practice satisfy the requirements of Article 8(1) and Article 8(3) of the 
Charter, especially having regard to the principles articulated by the Court of Justice 
in Digital Rights Ireland. Under this self-certification regime, personal data is 
transferred to the United States where, as we have seen, it can be accessed on a 
mass and undifferentiated basis by the security authorities. While the FISA Court 
doubtless does good work, the FISA system can at best be described as a form of 
oversight by judicial personages in respect of applications for surveillance by the US 
security authorities. Yet the very fact that this oversight is not carried out on 
European soil and in circumstances where the data subject has no effective 
possibility of being heard or making submissions and, further, where any such review 
is not carried out by reference to EU law are all considerations which would seem to 
pose considerable legal difficulties. It must be stressed, however, that neither the 
validity of the 1995 Directive nor the Commission Decision providing for the Safe 
Harbour Regime are, as such, under challenge in these judicial review proceedings.  
The Safe Harbour Regime was, of course, not only drafted before the Charter came 
into force, but its terms may also reflect a somewhat more innocent age in terms of 
data protection. This Regime also came into force prior to the advent of social media 
and, of course, before the massive terrorist attacks on American soil which took 
place on September 11th, 2001. Outrages of this kind - sadly duplicated afterwards in 
Madrid, London and elsewhere - highlighted to many why, subject to the appropriate 
and necessary safeguards, intelligence services needed as a matter of practical 
necessity to have access to global telecommunications systems in order to disrupt 
the planning of such attacks.”49 
                                                             
48 Case C-362/14. 
49 Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner [2014] IEHC 310, at paras. 62-63. 
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Family and Child Law 
The Charter ‘s impact has also been felt in family law, in cases that have primarily focused 
on the implications of Article 7 on the right to respect for private and family life, and Article 24 
on the rights of the child.   
In J. McB v L.E.,50 the Supreme Court referred a question using the urgent PPU preliminary 
reference procedure, in a case concerning inter alia the compatibility with EU law of the Irish 
law requirement of an agreement or court order in order for an unmarried father to have 
custody rights of a child.  The Court of Justice held such requirement to be compatible with 
the Brussels II bis Regulation, interpreted in the light of Article 7 of the Charter.  Importantly, 
the CJEU held there to be no significant difference between the requirements of Article 7 of 
the Charter and Article 8 of the Convention in this respect. 
In M.N. v R.N., Finlay Geoghegan J. used Article 24 of the Charter to interpret the Brussels II 
bis Regulation to hold that a six year old child must have the opportunity to be heard in an 
application to be returned to his place of habitual residence (a principle which has 
subsequently been affirmed by the Supreme Court).51   
By contrast, in R v R,52 Sheehan J. took Article 24 of the Charter into account in holding that 
the age and maturity of the minor at issue in that case were such that it was appropriate to 
have her views taken into account in deciding whether or not to order a return of an 
unlawfully removed child pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child 
Abduction and the Brussels II bis Regulation, in circumstances where the child objected to 
such return.   
In M.N. v R.N.,53 Sheehan J. considered, again, that the child at issue was of an age and 
maturity such that it would be appropriate to take into account his views in circumstances 
where he had been unlawfully removed from the country of residence of his father.  
However, he relied on Article 24(3) of the Charter, which provides that,  
“Every child shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis a personal relationship and 
direct contact with both his or her parents, unless that is contrary to his or her interests.”  
Sheehan J. held that the child’s wish to remain with his mother must be treated with care as, 
                                                             
50 J. McB. -v- L.E. [2010] IESC 48. 
51 M.N. v R.N. [2009] 1 I.R. 388.   
52 R v R [2008] IEHC 162. 
53 M.N. v R.N. [2009] IEHC 213.  Considered in Li. v La. [2009] IEHC 585 (Edwards J.).   
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“While it is clearly important to take the objections of the child into account, one has 
to be careful when considering the views of a young male child who has expressed a 
preference for his mother. The importance of a father’s role in a child’s upbringing 
may not be sufficiently appreciated by a young person, and is something that this 
Court is obliged to acknowledge. Indeed, this seems to be implicit in Article 24(3) of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union… 
In light of the above I hold that the child’s views in this case cannot be determinative, 
particularly when one takes into account his young age.” 54 
In M.H.A. v A.P., Finlay Geoghegan J. ruled that Article 24(2) of the Charter must be taken 
into consideration in an interlocutory application by a father for an order for return of his child 
to Ireland pending a full custody hearing and decision on the question of custody. 55  
Similarly, in V. v U., MacMenamin J. expressly took Article 24(3) of the Charter into account 
(as interpreted by the CJEU in McB) in holding that the best interests of the children in that 
case militated in favour of keeping the children in a jurisdiction where they had access to two 
parents, rather than just one.56 
The reliance on the Charter is also evident in family law decisions at District Court level: see, 
for instance, Health Service Executive v A.M. & H.I.,57 where Article 24 was relied upon in a 
judgment on a care order under section 18 of the Child Care Act 1991 (i.e., a purely 
domestic context).58   
 
Companies’ Rights 
The implications of the Charter for companies’ rights have also come before the Irish courts. 
In McDonogh v Ryanair, the Dublin Metropolitan District Court referred a question to the 
Court of Justice on the rights compatibility of the EU rules requiring airlines, subject to 
certain conditions, to provide passengers with compensation in the event of flight 
cancellation.  Ryanair challenged these rules in the context of the airspace closure following 
the Icelandic volcanic eruption, arguing inter alia that this breached its Article 16 Charter 
freedom to conduct a business, and its Article 17 Charter right to property.  In rejecting this 
                                                             
54 M.N. v R.N. [2009] IEHC 213 at para. 32. 
55 M.H.A. v A.P. [2013] IEHC 611. 
56 V. v U. [2011] IEHC 519.   
57 Health Service Executive v A.M. & H.I. [2013] IEDC 10. 
58 For an overview of further District Court cases on child law and the Convention, see above, pp. 88-
90.  
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argument, the Court of Justice emphasise the need to strike a “fair balance” between 
competing rights, viz. the Article 38 Charter requirement that Union policies ensure a “high 
level of consumer protection”.59  
The relevance of the right to have one’s intellectual property protected, contained in Article 
17(2) of the Charter, was considered in EMI Records (Ireland) Ltd v Data Protection 
Commissioner, in the context of the need to balance the right to privacy of internet 
subscribers against the right of recording companies to protect their intellectual property.60  
However, the Charter was not decisive in the outcome of that case.  
 In Dowling v Minister for Finance, in the context of an interlocutory application to prevent the 
Minister for Finance from selling off Irish Life Group, the applicant argued that the conditions 
for granting interlocutory injunctions as a matter of Irish law were so strict as to breach the 
Article 47 Charter right to an effective remedy.  While the Supreme Court rejected that 
argument, the judgment of Clarke J. discusses the relevant requirements and implications of 
EU law in detail.61  In a subsequent judgment, the High Court has decided to make a 
preliminary reference to the CJEU on a substantive issue of the compatibility of the 
Directions Order of the High Court made pursuant to the Credit Institutions (Stabilisations) 
Act 2010 with, inter alia, the Second Company Law Directive.  The Directions Order had the 
effect of recapitalising Irish Life and Permanent via an injection of €2.3 billion by the State, in 
return for shares, thus severely reducing the value of the equity held by existing 
shareholders.  The applicant has argued, inter alia, that this breached Article 17 of the 
Charter on the right to property.62   
 
Social and Employment Rights 
A final field in which the impact of the Charter has begun to be felt is that of 
social/employment rights.  This is particularly noticeable in the determinations of the Labour 
Court and the Equality Authority, which have cited the Charter in a number of important 
rulings.   
In Ms Z v A Government Department, the Equality Authority rejected the complainant’s claim 
that the respondents discriminated against her on the grounds of gender and disability 
                                                             
59 Case C-12/11 [2013] ECR I-43. 
60 EMI Records (Ireland) Ltd & Ors -v- The Data Protection Commissioner & Anor [2012] IEHC 264 
(Charleton J).   
61 Dowling & ors v Minister for Finance [2013] IESC 37. See also, Okunade v Minister for Justice 
[2012] IESC 49 (in the immigration context).   
62 Dowling & ors v Minister for Finance [2014] IEHC 418 (O’Malley J.).   
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contrary to sections 6(2)(a) and (g) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 to 2011, by not 
granting her either paid maternity leave or paid leave similar to adoptive leave on the birth of 
her daughter to a surrogate mother. This conclusion followed a preliminary reference which 
had been made by the Authority to the CJEU raising, inter alia, the questions whether the 
relevant EU Directives, Directive 2006/54 on equal treatment of men and women in 
employment and occupation, and the broader Directive 2000/78 on equal treatment in 
employment and occupation, should be interpreted to mean that the respondent’s refusal 
constituted unlawful discrimination and, if not, whether such Directives were invalid.  The 
complainant relied, inter alia, on Articles 21, 26 and 34 of the Charter (on non-discrimination, 
integration of persons with disabilities, and social security and social assistance, 
respectively).   
In its ruling on the reference in Case C-363/12, the CJEU (Grand Chamber) ruled that the 
situation of a commissioning mother did not fall within the scope of Directive 2006/54.  As a 
result, the CJEU held it to be unnecessary to examine the question of the compatibility of 
these Directives with the Charter.  Further, while the fact that the commissioning mother did 
not have a uterus constituted a disability in the broad sense, it was not a relevant disability in 
the sense of Directive 2000/78, as it did not hinder her access to employment.  However, the 
CJEU held that the Directives must be interpreted, so far as possible, in the light of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
Applying the CJEU’s ruling to the facts of the case upon its return, the Authority ruled that 
there had been no discrimination in the case at hand.63 
In Trailer Care Holdings v Healy, which concerned a claim of pregnancy-related 
discrimination in the form of dismissal from employment, the Labour Court noted that, while 
the principle prohibiting discrimination on grounds of pregnancy as a form of sex 
discrimination had long been established by the EU Courts,  
“Equality on grounds of gender is now expressly guaranteed by Article 23 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Article 33.2 of that Charter 
also incorporates the prohibition of dismissal on grounds of pregnancy established in 
jurisprudence of the CJEU. It provides: -   
To reconcile family and professional life, everyone shall have the right to protection 
from dismissal for a reason connected with maternity and the right to paid maternity 
leave and to parental leave following the birth or adoption of a child. 
                                                             
63 DEC-E2014-050 (9 July 2014).   
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The Charter is now incorporated in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (the Lisbon Treaty) and has the same legal standing as all preceding and 
current Treaties. It can thus be properly regarded as part of the primary legislation of 
the European Union.”64 
The Labour Court further noted that, in recent CJEU jurisprudence on pregnancy-related 
discrimination, the CJEU had referred to Article 23 of the Charter.  See similarly, Ger Lally v 
Siniecka Rusek; 65 Gillick t/a Twist Foods v Rosploch;66 Moonlite Clearning Services Limited 
v Drabik.67 
In John McAteer v South Tipperary County Council, the Equality Authority awarded the 
complainant €70,000 in a claim brought by an evangelical Christian for discrimination in 
relation to his conditions of employment and dismissal from the Council contrary to section 
6(1) & 6(2)(e) and in terms of section 8 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998, on grounds 
of manifestation of religion (see also, the discussion of the ECHR analysis in chapter 4 
above).  Specifically, the complainant had been instructed to desist from speaking about his 
faith during normal working hours.  The Equality Authority first considered the question 
whether discrimination on grounds of religion was covered by the Employment Equality Acts 
and the EU Directive 2000/78 on equal treatment in employment.  The Authority noted that, 
while discrimination on grounds of manifestation of religion was not expressly covered by the 
Directive, Article 10(1) of the Charter provides, 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right 
includes freedom to change religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or in private, to manifest religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance.” 
For this reason (and also in light of Article 9 ECHR), the Equality Authority held that 
discrimination on grounds of manifestation of religion should be considered as covered by 
the Employment Equality Acts.  On the facts, the prima facie evidence of indirect 
discrimination on this ground had not been rebutted, as the respondent had failed to show 
that it was objectively justifiable to maintain a ban on the complainant speaking about his 
religion when there was no evidence that it had any impact on him carrying out his duties for 
                                                             
64 Determination EDA128 (March 2012). 
65 Determination EDA1314 (July 2013). 
66 Determination EDA1329 (November 2013). 
67 Determination EDA1416 (May 2014). 
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the Council or that what he was doing was either offensive or inappropriate, or constituted 
harassment.68 
 
                                                             
68 DEC-E2014-045 (24 June 2014).  The Convention aspects of this decision are discussed above, 
pp. 92-92. 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusions - European Rights in Irish Courts 
 
Overview 
This Report explored the extent to which the Irish Superior Courts, the District Court and 
select tribunals have engaged with rights-based arguments under the Convention, ECHR 
Act 2003 and the Charter over the 10 years from 2004 to 2014.  
As the figures show, Convention/Charter issues have been considered 581 cases in the 
Superior Courts during this time period (see chapter 1 and the statistics provided in Annex 1 
to this Report).  From a purely numerical perspective, this unquestionably represents a 
significant level of engagement with European rights in our courts.  Notably, the figures show 
that the level of reliance on Convention/Charter rights before the Irish Superior Courts has 
increased markedly over this period.   
 
 
Figure 8.1 
Drilling down into these figures, however, reveals that much of this increase has been due to 
reliance on Charter arguments, with references to Convention arguments remaining 
relatively stable over the 10-year period. 
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Figure 8.2 
While Convention arguments have been considered across a greater variety of fields of law 
than Charter arguments, it is striking that the highest level of engagement with European 
rights is to be found, for both the Convention and the Charter, in the fields of 
asylum/immigration law and the European Arrest Warrant.   
Conversely, areas such as housing law and mental health law show high levels of 
engagement with the Convention, but not with the Charter as these fields at present largely 
lie outside the scope of EU law.  Other fields, such as employment law, show a higher 
degree of reliance upon Charter rights, drawing on the long-established body of case law on 
discrimination in employment rights which developed in EU law even prior to the attribution 
of binding force to the Charter in 2009. 
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The Convention and ECHR Act 2003 
Writing in 2003, Hogan believed that the ECHR Act 2003 would not result in any “huge” or 
“immediate” improvement to the existing corpus of constitutional rights1 and this could lead 
to either a “levelling up” or “levelling down” of rights protection.2  
This Report demonstrates that Irish courts have, overall, sought to substantially engage with 
the Convention within the limits of our constitutional framework (see chapter 2 above). While 
there may be areas in which this rights analysis is not as piercing or as rights-orientated as 
one might expect, at times this is due to limitations in the ECtHR’s own jurisprudence (see, 
for instance, in the mental health law field, L v Kennedy, considered in chapter 4 above).   
At other times, problems have emerged in the Irish courts due to a lack of clarity in the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence.  For instance, the significant differences between the High Court and 
Supreme Court decisions in Bode in defining the precise requirements of the Convention on 
immigration and family issues, discussed in Chapter 4, are in some ways mirrored by the 
very confused Strasbourg jurisprudence on these issues.  
Further, the Irish courts have been cognisant of the limits placed on the effectiveness of the 
Convention by the ECHR Act 2003 (see, for instance, McD v L, considered in chapter 3 
above).  Crucially, as McD illustrates, the Convention does not have direct effect in the Irish 
courts. 
The courts’ cautious approach to the interpretive obligation provided under section 2 of the 
ECHR Act 2003 (see further, chapter 3) emphasises traditional rules of and approaches to 
statutory construction.  The courts have often exercised significant restraint when invited by 
applicants to read a statutory provision in a manner which may seek to imbue this provision 
with a more Convention-compatible interpretation (see, for instance, Ryan v Clare County 
Council, discussed in chapter 3). Similar restraint is evidenced in the housing law cases of 
O’Donnell (2007), O’Donnell (2008) and O’Donnell (2015) (discussed in chapter 4). The 
Supreme Court in particular has cautioned against courts contemplating “judicial 
legislation”,3 and interpreting legislation well beyond the bounds of what the Oireachtas 
                                                             
1 Hogan, G. “Incorporation of the ECHR: Some Issues of Methodology and Process” in Kilkelly, U. 
(editor) ECHR and Irish Law (Cork; Jordans, 2004), p. 16. 
2 Ibid. In relation to the 2003 Act as a whole, Hogan and Whyte have called the declaration of 
incompatibility provisions as “cumbersome (albeit ingenuous)”, see supra. fn. 54 at p. 800, para. 
6.2.105.  
3 This particular phrase was recently utilised by MacMenamin J. in O’Donnell v South Dublin County 
Council [2015] IESC 28 at para. 74. 
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intended. The cautious approach of the courts towards the “interpretative duty” under section 
2 of the ECHR Act 2003 will be viewed by some as a carefully calibrated and reflective 
approach towards the constitutional separation of powers (see further, chapter 3). To others, 
it may be viewed as a lost chance for a more rights-orientated approach.  
While the approach of the Superior Courts to their interpretative obligations is, in certain 
cases, disappointing, this has not prevented engagement with the core content of 
substantive rights. The references to the Convention/ECHR Act 2003 by the District Court (to 
the extent these judgments are published), as well as by some of the tribunals examined by 
this Report, show a promising permeation of rights discourse across the judicial spectrum. In 
the Superior Courts, chapter 4 provides numerous examples of cases where, even when 
Convention/ECHR Act 2003 arguments do not result in a preferred outcome for an individual 
litigant, the Superior Courts have engaged with Convention/ECHR Act 2003 arguments in a 
substantive and thoughtful manner.  
One of the most striking contributions of the Convention and the ECHR Act 2003 to Irish law 
has been the move to a more rights-based judicial review process post-Meadows.  While 
Meadows is also, of course, a constitutional rights case, the judgment of Fennelly J. in 
particular shows the clear influence of the Convention, holding that, in assessing the 
effectiveness of a remedy (in that case, judicial review),4 
“…it is relevant that s. 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights Act 2003 
places an obligation on every organ of the State to perform its functions in a manner 
compatible with the State's obligations under the provisions of the Convention. In the 
Convention context, we must be conscious that the European Court of Human Rights 
is influenced by the effectiveness of legal remedies against administrative decisions, 
when it considers the effectiveness of a national remedy pursuant to article 13.” 
Meadows means that where issues of constitutional or Convention rights arise, first-instance 
decision-makers should now feel the impact of human rights norms and standards on their 
substantive decision-making function. While Meadows relates to the field of asylum and 
immigration law, its impacts will therefore be felt across many of the legal fields discussed in 
this Report. 
The potential cross-fertilisation of constitutional rights with Convention rights is also 
evidenced by cases such as Gormley, where the Supreme Court relied significantly on 
ECtHR jurisprudence in re-interpreting the extent of constitutional rights of an accused to 
                                                             
4 Meadows v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] 2 IR 701 at 826. 
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consult a lawyer prior to questioning continuing. In addition, the right to have a lawyer 
present during questioning, while not specifically argued in Gormley, now seems to have a 
constitutional grounding, supplemented by Convention jurisprudence. This cross-fertilisation 
is not solely limited to the criminal sphere. As the 2015 Supreme Court decision in 
O’Donnell, and the 2014 High Court decision in C.A and T.A show, there has been more of a 
tendency to interpret constitutional rights in light of Ireland’s obligations under the 
Convention, through the prism of the ECHR Act 2003 (see further chapters 3 and 4). 
Other clear examples of the engagement of the Irish courts, such that Convention arguments 
have made a real difference, include the following: 
 In asylum/immigration law, family rights under Article 8 of the Convention now need 
to be explicitly considered by administrative immigration authorities: see in particular 
the discussion of Gorry and F.B in chapter 4.  
 
 In criminal law, ECtHR jurisprudence has been important in a variety of judgments 
concerning the admissibility of evidence, the question whether whole life sentences 
are inhuman and degrading, the scheme of criminal legal aid, and access to a 
solicitor, discussed in chapter 4; 
 
 In family and child law, the District Court has recognised the usefulness of the 
Convention in balancing the best interests of the child, with the rights and obligations 
of parents and guardians. The courts have, as seem in Supreme Court decision of 
McD v L and High Court decision in Zappone, been wary of going beyond the strict 
confines of ECtHR decisions (see also, chapter 2). 
 
 In equality, housing and social rights cases, there has been some re-evaluation (see 
C.A. and T.A. and O’Donnell cases) of the potential applicability of the 
Convention/ECHR Act 2003 to social and economic rights. However, as evidenced in 
Dooley (see chapter 4), again, the Superior Courts will be cautious about applying a 
Convention right beyond the strict confines of ECtHR decisions.  
This does not mean that the engagement with substantive Convention rights jurisprudence 
has been all positive. The issue of delays in accessing justice in the criminal and civil 
spheres still occur. The difficulty in identifying what precisely individuals’ rights are (in 
particular in immigration and asylum law, and also in relation to social rights) is evidenced in 
our discussion of the case law in chapters 3 and 4 above. 
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Remedies to date provided by Irish courts as regards Convention compliance have been 
somewhat limited: see our discussion of injunctions in chapter 3, for instance. Further, where 
courts have made declarations of incompatibility, this has not to date resulted in a speedy 
resolution of a successful rights claim, as seen in chapters 3 and 4. However, this is 
attributable more to the failure of the Oireachtas to bring Irish law into Convention 
compliance with any reasonable expedition, rather than to the approach of the courts. 
Indeed, the scheme of the ECHR Act 2003 specifically envisaged the Oireachtas in having a 
substantial role in bringing Irish law into line with Convention obligations. As is noted in 
chapter 2 (see particularly the list of ECtHR cases brought against Ireland at Table 2.1), and 
in our discussion of remedies in chapter 3, recourse to the ECtHR may therefore be the only 
option for some litigants.  
 
The Charter 
Overall, the evidence to date shows that the Charter is making a real difference to judicial 
rights protection in Ireland in many cases, although judicial approaches to the Charter are 
not yet entirely consistent. 
At its most basic level, some idea of the increasing impact of the Charter before the Irish 
courts may be gauged from Figure 8.2 above, showing an explosion in cases in which the 
Charter has been raised before the Superior Courts, particularly since becoming legally 
binding qua EU primary law in December 2009. As chapters 6 and 7 demonstrate, since this 
date, the Irish Superior Courts, and the legal representatives appearing before these courts, 
have largely embraced the Charter and have been generally willing to add it to the ultimate 
sources of fundamental rights protected by the Irish courts, within its scope of application.  
Further, such influence has by no means been confined to the Superior Courts.  In particular, 
the level of reliance of the Labour Court and Equality Authority on the Charter as a relevant 
source of rights protection during the period surveyed is striking (drawing on, as noted 
above, a rich vein of previous EU law jurisprudence on non-discrimination in employment).  
The openness of the Equality Authority to the influence of EU law in this respect is 
particularly remarkable in its important preliminary reference in the Z case, concerning inter 
alia the question whether the refusal to grant maternity leave to a commissioning mother in 
case of surrogacy infringed EU law, as interpreted in light of the Charter.5  
                                                             
5 See Chapter 6. 
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Nevertheless, the case law highlights some key issues of controversy in evaluating the 
Charter as a source of rights protection within Ireland. 
First, it is clear that the question of the scope of application of the Charter remains, in many 
cases, a critical issue.  As discussed in chapter 6, in many instances, Charter-based 
arguments have failed on this ground.  In some such cases, the lack of nexus with EU law 
has been evident: see, for instance, the comments of Hogan J. in the right to jury case, D.F. 
v Garda Commissioner.6 Conversely, in other cases, the Charter has been applied in cases 
where there is no apparent link with EU law, such as the child-care field.  
In still other cases, the Charter has not been applied, because (it would seem) it was not 
pleaded in the particular case at hand, and the Charter is as a result not mentioned. This 
gives rise to an inconsistency of application of Article 51 of the Charter and, ultimately, of 
rights protection before the Irish Courts.  This is, in our view, probably best seen as a 
teething problem which is to some extent inevitable with the addition of a major source of 
fundamental rights law to the already existing constitutional and ECHR sources. As judges 
and counsel become more familiar with the function and content of the Charter, and as 
CJEU jurisprudence develops giving meat to those Charter rights, it may be assumed that 
the Charter will be overlooked in fewer cases. 
In other cases, while the Charter has been invoked, what may have seemed like promising 
efforts to invoke the Charter in individual cases have failed on the ground that they do not 
satisfy the requirements of Article 51 of the Charter, in circumstances where was not 
necessarily evident that this was so.  This is a particular problem in cases in fields which are 
in part, but not entirely, covered by EU law, especially where such coverage may be 
increasing.  As chapter 7 notes, the asylum/immigration field is a classic example, where the 
Irish opt-out from measures in the freedom, security and justice field adds further 
complication to the mix.  
Much of this uncertainty may, however, be traced to the parallel uncertainty in the CJEU’s 
jurisprudence on the meaning of Article 51 which, as Hogan J. has noted in AO v MJELR 
(No. 3),7 is currently in a rapid state of development (see further, chapter 6).  Just as we 
noted in the case of the Convention, therefore, a not insignificant part of the confusion in the 
Irish courts as to the meaning of Article 51 may stem from the ambiguities and lack of clarity 
in the CJEU’s own jurisprudence on this issue.   
                                                             
6 See Chapter 5. 
7 Ibid. 
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Nevertheless, it may reasonably be predicted that, as the EU acquis continues to grow, 
these difficult questions of Charter applicability will spread to other fields of EU law such as, 
for instance, criminal law.   
Secondly, linked to this, the relationship between ECHR, constitutional and Charter rights 
continues to be worked out before the Irish courts.  As noted in chapter 5, Articles 52 and 53 
indicate that Charter rights will generally be interpreted consistently with relevant ECHR and 
constitutional rights, although the Charter may go further than the ECHR in its rights 
protection.  While the Irish courts have not yet had an explicit Carmody turn in relation to the 
Charter, holding that constitutional rights must be considered prior to Charter rights, they 
have effectively adopted this position de facto in certain cases: see chapter 6.  In many 
cases, as shown in chapters 6 and 7, however, the Irish courts have considered Charter 
rights alongside constitutional rights, and have read the relevant Irish constitutional 
jurisprudence and Charter jurisprudence, as Article 52(4) suggests, “in harmony” with each 
other. 
In other cases, the relevant constitutional right has been held to go further than the Charter 
right: see, for instance, the discussion of the right to liberty by Edwards J. in Minister for 
Justice v Nolan (see chapter 7). Perhaps the strongest role for the Charter, therefore, is 
likely to occur in fields where no equivalent constitutional right exists, or where the 
equivalent constitutional right is less strongly phrased, or has been interpreted less forcefully 
by the Irish courts than the CJEU’s interpretation of the Charter right.  A prime example of 
the first category is Article 41 on the right to good administration, discussed in chapter 6, 
which does not have a constitutional equivalent.  A further example is the right to protection 
of personal data, which is provided for expressly in the Charter (Article 8) but not in the 
Convention.  Irish preliminary references have to date been central to the CJEU’s rapidly 
developing case law on this issue (see Digital Rights Ireland and Schrems (pending), each 
referred by the Irish High Court). 
Needless to say, a critical test of the Irish courts’ approach to the Charter would arise in 
circumstances where a constitutional right and a Charter right were in conflict.  No such case 
has yet arisen, and it may be recalled that, in the last instance where the possibility of a 
conflict between a right contained in the Constitution and a right of primary EU law emerged 
(in that case, the constitutional right to life of the unborn, and the economic right of free 
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movement in the internal market), the CJEU deftly avoided the conflict by holding the 
relevant EU right to be inapplicable on the facts.8  
Thirdly, a further remarkable feature of the engagement of the Irish courts and tribunals with 
the Charter over the past years has been the willingness to make preliminary references 
raising Charter issues to the CJEU.  Prominent such references, discussed in chapters 6 
and 7, have included: 
 The reference from the High Court in M.E., on the interpretation of the Dublin II 
Regulation in light of Article 4 of the Charter (2010);9 
 The reference from the District Court in McDonogh v Ryanair, on the compatibility of 
EU rules on airline passenger compensation with Articles 16 and 17 of the Charter 
(2011); 
 The reference from the High Court in M.M., on the compatibility of the Irish bifurcated 
system for international protection in asylum law with Articles 41/47 of the Charter 
(2011);  
 The reference from the Supreme Court in Pringle, on inter alia the compatibility of the 
ESM Treaty and other elements of the EU’s response to the financial crisis with 
Article 47 of the Charter (2012); 
 The reference from the Supreme Court in H.N., on the compatibility of the asylum 
procedure with Article 41 of the Charter (2012); 
 The reference from the Equality Authority in Z, on the interpretation of EU non-
discrimination legislation in the surrogacy context and in light of Articles 21, 26 and 
34 of the Charter (2012); 
 The reference from the High Court in Digital Rights Ireland v Minister for 
Communications, on the compatibility of the EU Data Retention Directive with inter 
alia Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the Charter (2012); 
 The reference from the High Court in Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, on 
the compatibility of the Irish Data Protection Commissioner’s refusal to order 
                                                             
8 Case C-159/90 SPUC v Grogan ECLI:EU:C:1991:378. 
9 Dates indicated represent the date in which the referring order was made, not the subsequent CJEU 
judgment. 
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Facebook to cease transfer of data to the US with Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter 
(2014). 
Certain of these cases have been dealt with via the CJEU’s expedited mechanisms available 
in cases where an urgent response is necessary (see M.E. and Pringle).  Notably, 
McDonogh v Ryanair and Z illustrate that judges and decision-makers of all levels have been 
willing to make preliminary references; again, this is a possibility of direct access to the 
CJEU in a manner which is distinctive to EU law, and which does not exist within the 
Convention’s architecture of judicial protection. 
Overall, therefore, the evidence shows that the importance of the Charter in Irish 
jurisprudence is already considerable in fields such as asylum/immigration law, European 
Arrest Warrant law, data protection, family law, and social/employment law, but its 
importance has also been felt in the field of companies’ rights, for instance.  As the scope of 
EU law expands, it is undoubtedly the case that the influence of the Charter will continue to 
grow to include fields currently considered to be purely domestic in nature. 
In sum, while the ECHR Act 2003 has had significantly more bedding-in time in comparison 
to the Charter, judges and decision-makers at all levels have certainly become more 
confident in their interpretation and application of European (Convention and Charter) rights 
during the 10 years reviewed. In turn, this reflects increased practitioner engagement and 
awareness with these rights, to which it is hoped this Report will contribute.  
***
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Annex 1: Statistics on use of European rights before Irish courts and tribunals 2004-2014 
For the research methodology used in compiling these statistics, see chapter 1 of the Report.  
These tables were prepared by Dr Suzanne Kingston and Dr Liam Thornton with the assistance of Leanne Caulfield, LLM Candidate, UCD School of 
Law, who was research assistant for this Report.  
 
Articles of the Convention Referred to in Judgments of Irish Superior Courts (Where Explicitly Identified in 
Judgment Only) 
 
Article 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 17 18 35 41 46 A1P1 A2P1 A4P2 A1P4 A2P7 A2P4 A3P7 A4P7 A3P4 
2004 1 3 1 0 2 15 0 7 1 4 1 0 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2005 0 3 3 0 3 24 0 9 0 3 1 0 4 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
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2006 0 0 2 0 2 22 1 14 0 0 1 1 2 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2007 1 1 7 0 4 15 0 20 0 2 0 1 2 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2008 1 2 6 0 3 10 1 22 0 1 0 0 9 5 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2009 2 2 4 0 2 22 0 24 0 1 0 0 5 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
2010 0 2 8 0 3 15 1 31 1 3 1 2 8 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2011 0 1 6 0 7 20 1 17 0 0 0 0 12 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2012 0 2 13 0 5 18 1 29 0 3 0 0 14 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2013 0 4 7 0 2 9 0 26 0 0 0 0 5 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2014 1 0 11 0 4 15 0 32 1 1 0 0 5 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Total 6 20 68 0 37 185 5 231 3 18 4 4 70 40 1 1 1 2 1 1 6 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
Articles of the Charter Referred to in Judgments of the Irish Superior Courts 
 
Article 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 11 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 23 24 33 41 45 47 48 49 50 51 52 
2006                   1           
2008                    3          
2009   1                 2          
2010      3 1   1     1 1  1  1  2  4   1  1 
163 
 
2011 1     2     1    1     9  1  4     1 
2012 1   1 1 3 1 1  1   1 2    2  3 1 4  13  2  6  
2013  1  2  5  2 2  1 1      1  5 1 2 2 5  1  4 1 
2014 1  2 3 1 7 1  1   1  1 1  2 1  6  4  3 2 1  5 3 
Total 3 1 3 6 2 20 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 3 3 1 2 5 1 29 2 13 2 29 2 4 1 15 6 
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Judgments of the Irish Superior Courts referencing European Rights per legal field 2004-2014 (Note: There May 
be More than One Relevant Legal Field Per Case) 
 
Area of Law 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Administrative Law 13 21 3 5 7 11 5 2 10 9 7 
Company Law 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Constitutional Law 4 8 7 11 6 11 12 4 6 1 5 
Contract Law 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Criminal Law 
(including 
extradition, 
European Arrest 
Warrant and Bail) 
15 18 16 12 6 12 13 20 21 20 12 
Employment Law 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 
Family and Child 
Law (including 
adoption, custody) 
0 0 3 4 4 6 4 4 3 3 3 
Gender Law 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Health Law 
(including Medical 
Law) 
1 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 1 6 0 
Housing (including 
Landlord and 
Tenant) 
1 2 2 4 5 2 3 1 2 1 1 
Immigration and 
Asylum Law 
5 10 14 13 18 16 20 19 26 18 34 
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Insurance Law 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Legal Aid (Criminal 
and Civil) 
1 2 0 1 0 3 1 1 0 1 1 
Legal Procedure 3 5 6 1 3 3 4 1 4 5 0 
Media Law  2 4 1 0 0 1 1 0 2 0 1 
Property Law 
(including 
Succession & 
Planning Law) 
0 2 0 0 3 0 2 2 1 2 2 
Revenue Law (incl. 
Criminal Assets) 
2 0 0 1 0 1 2 3 2 1 2 
Torts 3 2 1 2 0 0 0 1 3 1 4 
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Tribunal Engagement with the Convention, ECHR Act 2003 and Charter (2004-2014) 
Body (2004-2014) Convention and/or 
ECHR Act 2003 
Referred to 
Charter Only Referred 
to 
Convention and/or 
ECHR Act 2003 
AND Charter 
Referred to 
Convention/Charter 
Articles Engaged With 
(Number of Mentions) 
Broadcasting Commission 
of Ireland 
1 0 0 None Specified 
Labour Court 3 4 0 Article 23 EUCFR (3) 
Article 33 EUCFR (3) 
ECHR: None Specified 
(3) 
ECHR Act 2003 (1) 
Equality Tribunal 6 1 1 Article 10 EUCFR (1) 
Article 21 EUCFR (1) 
Article 23 EUCFR (1) 
Article 26 EUCFR (1) 
Article 33 EUCFR (1) 
Article 34 EUCFR (1) 
Article 52 EUCFR (1) 
Article 3 ECHR (1) 
Article 6 ECHR (1) 
Article 8 ECHR (4) 
Article 9 ECHR (1) 
Article 14 ECHR (2) 
ECHR Act 2003 (4) 
Irish Information 
Commissioners Decisions 
1 0 0 Article 8 ECHR (1) 
ECHR Act 2003 (1) 
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Irish Data Protection 
Commission 
2 0 0 Article 8 (1) 
Article 10(1) 
ECHR Act 2003 (1) 
Competition Authority of 
Ireland 
0 0 0 N/A 
168 
 
Concurrent application of Convention and/or ECHR Act 2003 and Charter to in judgments of the Irish Superior 
Courts 2004-2014  
Year Convention 
and/or ECHR 
Act 2003 AND 
Charter  
Mentioned 
2004 0 
2005 0 
2006 1 
2007 0 
2008 1 
2009 0 
2010 9 
2011 13 
2012 18 
2013 18 
2014 11 
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District Court (Child Care Law) Engaging with European Rights Instruments 
 
District Court ECHR Referred 
to 
ECHR Act 
Referred to 
ECHR & 
EUCFR 
Referred to  
2009-2014 22 2 3 
Annex 2: Irish Superior Court judgments referencing European Convention on Human Rights, European 
Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 & Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2004-
2014 
 
2004 
Case Articles of ECHR 
Considered in 
Decision 
Sections of the 
ECHR Act 2003 
Considered in 
EU Charter 
Article 
Core Summary Court Core Legal 
Area 
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the Decision 
Sweetman v DPP 
[2004] IEHC 56; 
[2004] 4 JIC 0102 
Article 6(1) 
Article 8 
Section 3  Leave for judicial 
review not 
granted. Complaint 
centred around 
time delay in 
proceeding to trial.  
HC Criminal Law 
Judicial Review 
NWR FM Ltd. v. 
Broadcasting 
Commission of 
Ireland [2004] 
IEHC 109; [2004] 
4 IR 50 
Article 1, Protocol 
1 
None specified  No breach of 
property rights 
under the ECHR 
by the BCI 
refusing to grant 
the applicants a 
broadcasting 
licence. 
HC Media Law 
Administrative 
Law 
Quinn v Judge 
O’Leary & Others 
[2004] IEHC 
232;[2004] IEHC 
103; [2004] 3.I.R. 
128; [2004] 4 JIC 
2306 
Article 1 
Article 6 
Article 10 
Article 13 
  It was in the 
interests of justice 
that an order of 
certiorari would 
issue in respect of 
the conviction 
entered against 
the applicant. 
HC Constitutional 
Law 
Administrative 
Law 
Dublin City 
Council v. 
McGrath  
[2004] IEHC 111; 
[2004] IEHC 45; 
Article 8 Section 2(1) 
Section 3(1) 
 In granting an 
injunction the court 
must take the 
European 
Convention on 
HC Tort Law 
(Trespass) 
Housing Law 
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[2004] 1 IR 216 Human Rights into 
account in addition 
to considering 
whether there was 
a fair question to 
be tried, whether 
damages were an 
alternative remedy 
and where the 
balance of 
convenience lay. 
Maguire v. 
Director of Public 
Prosecutions   
[2004] IESC 53; 
[2004] 3 IR 241; 
[2005] 1 ILRM 53 
Article 5 
Article 6 
Section 2(1)  If the court were to 
be limited to the 
factors set out in 
s2 of the Bail Act 
1997 when 
considering an 
application for bail, 
it would be a 
breach of the 
applicant’s right to 
liberty or to a 
speedy trial in this 
case. 
SC Bail Refusal 
Legal Practice 
and Procedure 
Cronin v The 
Minister for 
Education and 
Science  
Article 13 
Article 2 Protocol 
1  
None specified   Granted a 
mandatory 
injunction on an 
interlocutory basis 
HC Constitutional 
Law 
(Education 
rights) 
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[2004] IEHC 255; 
[2004] 3 IR 205 
directing the first 
named defendant 
to for some of the 
plaintiff’s special 
education needs. 
C(S) and others v 
Minister for 
Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform: 
C(T) and C(A) v 
Minister for 
Justice, Equality 
and Law 
Reform:Joined 
cases   
[2004] IEHC 399 
Article 8 
Article 14 
None specified.  Deportation order 
made against RC 
would be quashed 
as citizenship of 
daughter and wife 
had not been 
considered. In the 
case of AC it could 
not be said that his 
deportation was 
not lawful or was 
contrary to the 
European 
Convention on 
Human Rights and 
relief would be 
denied. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
O'Donoghue v. 
Legal Aid Board 
and Others 
[2004] IESC 413; 
[2006] 4 IR 204 
Article 6   Granted relief in 
relation to legal aid 
against the 
Minister for Justice 
and the Attorney 
General but not 
HC Constitutional 
Law 
Legal Aid 
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the Legal Aid 
Board as it had 
done everything in 
its power to 
provide for the 
plaintiff and not 
acted negligently 
nor in breach of its 
statutory duty. 
Desmond v. 
Moriarty  
[2004] IESC 3; 
[2004] 1 IR 334 
Article 10   Dismissed the 
appeal and 
affirmed the order 
of the High Court 
refusing the relief 
sought by the 
applicant 
concerning the 
references by the 
Tribunal to the 
Glackin Report.  
SC Administrative 
Law 
Criminal Law 
(political 
corruption) 
F. (P.) & Anor v. 
Minister for 
Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform 
[2004] IEHC 8 
 
Article 8   Refused the 
application for 
leave for an order 
quashing the 
decision of the 
Minister to refuse 
to revoke a 
deportation order 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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and also refused 
the further reliefs 
sought to amend 
the statement of 
claim and for 
interlocutory relief. 
McMullen v. 
Farrell & Ors 
[2004] IESC 6 
Article 6.1   Dismissed both 
appeals for review 
of taxation for want 
of prosecution and 
affirmed the two 
orders of the High 
Court as the 
plaintiff has ample 
opportunity to re-
enter the 
proceedings but 
failed to do so. 
SC Revenue Law 
H. (T.) v. D.P.P. & 
Anor  
[2004] IEHC 76 
Article 5.1 
Article 6 
  Granted the 
injunction sought 
as it was believed 
that if this trial 
should proceed 
that there would 
be a real risk of 
the accused 
person not 
obtaining a trial in 
HC Criminal Law 
Administrative 
Law 
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due course of law. 
Morris & Anor v. 
Farrell  
[2004] IEHC 600; 
 
Article 2   No formal 
declaratory order 
in the terms of the 
first relief sought 
by the applicants 
as they had failed 
to establish 
grounds 
warranting the 
quashing of the 
verdict of the jury 
in the inquest in 
this case. 
HC Administrative 
Law 
Superwood 
Holdings Plc & 
Ors v. Sun 
Alliance and 
London Insurance 
Plc t/a Sun 
Alliance 
Insurance Group 
& Ors  
[2004] IESC 19; 
[2004] 2 ILRM 
124 
N/A   The court was 
satisfied that there 
was no alternative 
to striking out the 
plaintiffs' appeal as 
they had not 
placed before the 
court any evidence 
of a realistic 
programme under 
which the 
necessary monies 
for security of 
costs would be 
SC Insurance Law 
Contract Law 
Company Law 
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raised within a 
reasonable time.  
Re Eurofood 
IFSC Ltd.  
[2004] IEHC 607 
Article 6   An order for the 
winding up of the 
company was 
made as the court 
was satisfied that 
on the evidence. 
Eurofood was 
grossly insolvent 
and that the 
creditors were 
entitled to have it 
wound up in 
accordance with 
the legislation in 
force in this state. 
HC Company Law 
S. (J.) v. D.P.P 
[2004] IEHC 100 
Article 6   Held that the 
capacity of the 
applicant to defend 
himself was 
impaired to such 
an extent that the 
trial should be 
halted as there 
was a risk of an 
unfair trial. 
HC Criminal Law 
Livingstone & Ors Article 13   Held that the HC Criminal Law 
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v. Minister for 
Justice & Ors 
[2004] IEHC 58 
plaintiffs have a 
right to discovery 
of documents 
relevant to their 
claim but that the 
court must balance 
that right with the 
public interest in 
not disclosing 
documents in 
respect of which 
public interest 
immunity and 
privilege is 
claimed. 
Disclosure was 
made in relation to 
categories 5, 6, 7 
and 8 of the 
documents. 
Law of Evidence 
Ramsayer v. 
Mahon (Acting 
Coroner for the 
County of Offaly) 
[2004] IEHC 70 
Article 2 
Article 13 
  Application for 
disclosure refused 
as it was held that 
there was no 
evidence that hat 
the applicant was 
prejudiced by the 
absence of such 
HC Administrative 
Law 
Inquest Law 
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disclosure. 
L. (M.J.) v. 
Minister for 
Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform 
[2004] IEHC 81; 
[2004] 2 IR 178 
Article 2 
Article 3 
Section 3  The plaintiff’s 
application for an 
amendment to 
enable the 
challenge of a 
deportation order 
was refused due to 
lack of arguable 
grounds, let alone 
substantial 
grounds, required 
for such a 
challenge. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
C. (D.) v. D.P.P. 
[2004] IEHC 245 
Article 6   Refused the relief 
sought as the 
court was not 
satisfied that the 
applicant had 
advanced a strong 
case or one likely 
to succeed if given 
leave. 
HC Criminal Law 
Holland v. 
Governor of 
Portlaoise Prison 
[2004] IEHC 97; 
[2004] 2 IR 573 
Article 8 
Article 9 
Article 10 
Article 11 
  Set aside the 
relevant decisions 
of the respondent 
Governor not to 
allow access to the 
HC Administrative 
Law 
Criminal Law 
179 
 
media to facilitate 
an investigation of 
an alleged 
miscarriage of 
justice taking the 
view that such an 
agency as 
investigative 
journalism is and 
can be a 
productive and 
probative vehicle 
in the overall 
administration of 
justice. 
Ochre Ridge v 
Cork Bonded 
Warehouses 
[2004] IEHC 160 
Article 8   It was concluded 
that all of the 
documentation, 
excluding the 
account related 
correspondence, 
was privileged on 
the basis of legal 
advice privilege 
only and not 
litigation privilege. 
HC Law of Evidence 
Rooney v. 
Minister for 
N/A 
 
N/A  An order was 
made dismissing 
HC Constitutional 
Law 
180 
 
Agriculture, Food 
and Forestry & 
Ors  
[2004] IEHC 305 
the proceedings as 
the plaintiff 
established no 
actionable wrong 
or liability for 
damages, the 
ECHR could not 
be relied on as it 
could not be 
applied 
retrospectively and 
his claim for 
damages for 
alleged breach of 
his constitutional 
right to privacy 
was wholly 
unstateable and 
devoid of merit.  
Agricultural Law 
Margine v. 
Minister for 
Justice and Law 
Reform & Ors 
[2004] IEHC 127 
Article 8 Section 2 
Section 3 
Section 4 
 Refused the relief 
sought of a 
declaration 
allowing the 
applicant to remain 
in the state or at 
least to remain 
while his residency 
application was 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
181 
 
considered having 
considering the 
merits of the 
application. 
Foley v. Smith 
[2004] IEHC 299 
Article 6   The request for an 
order dismissing 
the plaintiff's claim 
on the grounds 
that the matters 
herein are res 
judicata, was 
denied as an 
injustice would be 
caused to the 
plaintiff if the Court 
were to allow the 
decree of the 
District Court to 
overrule the High 
Court proceedings. 
HC Legal Practice 
and Procedure 
Administrative 
Law 
PJ Carroll & Co 
Ltd & Ors v. 
Minister for 
Health and 
Children & Ors 
[2004] IEHC 310 
N/A   Held that it is not 
open to the 
defendants to seek 
to lead evidence in 
respect of facts 
which have been 
admitted. 
HC Public Health 
Law 
McGonnell v. Article 6   Dismissed the HC Law of Evidence 
182 
 
A.G. & Anor 
[2004] IEHC 312 
claims as it was 
held that the 
overall system of 
taking and reading 
breath specimens 
does not infringe 
any constitutional 
or legal rights of 
the plaintiffs, that a 
further safe guard 
exists and that 
there was no real 
prospect of an 
injustice or of an 
unfair trial in 
respect of the 
charges still 
pending against 
the plaintiffs. 
Road Traffic 
Law 
Criminal Assets 
Bureau v. S. (P.) 
[2004] IEHC 351; 
[2009] 3 IR 9 
Article 6 
Article 14 
  It was held against 
the defendant on 
each of the claims 
that the Criminal 
Assets Bureau Act 
1996 was 
unconstitutional. A 
judgment for the 
amount claimed 
HC Revenue Law 
Criminal Law 
183 
 
was given. 
O'Brien v. 
Moriarty  
[2004] IEHC 362 
None specified   Held that the 
Applicant was not 
entitled to the 
reliefs sought at 
paragraph (xii) of 
the Reliefs Sough 
in the Statement of 
Grounds as the 
evidence failed to 
disclose a fair 
issue to be tried. 
The Applicant was 
not entitled to any 
further or other 
relief as sought at 
paragraph (xiii) of 
the Reliefs Sought 
in the Statement of 
Grounds. 
HC Administrative 
Law 
 
(Appeal heard 
by the SC in 
2005) 
Smyth (An Infant) 
v. Ward & Ors 
[2004] IEHC 370 
Article 6(1)   Held that it was in 
the interests of 
justice to direct 
that a further 
period of two years 
should elapse 
before the action 
be listed for 
HC Tort Law 
Legal Practice 
and Procedure 
184 
 
hearing to enable 
the prognosis in 
respect of the 
Plaintiff to be 
rendered more 
certain. 
D.P.P.-v- Mark 
Desmond  
[2004] IE CCA 46 
Article 6 Schedule 1  Rejected the other 
grounds of appeal 
put forward on 
behalf of the 
Applicant, but 
granted leave to 
appeal on the 
basis of the refusal 
to consider the 
application for the 
adjournment and 
ordered a retrial. 
CCA Criminal Law 
Administrative 
Law 
Gilroy -v- Flynn 
[2004] IESC 98; 
[2005] 1 ILRM 
290 
 None specified   Allowed the 
appeal, set aside 
the order of the 
High Court and 
substituted for it an 
order giving the 
plaintiff one week 
from today’s date 
to file a statement 
of claim on the 
SC Tort Law 
Administrative 
Law 
185 
 
basis of the 
circumstances of 
the case. 
O'Hara v. D.P.P. 
& Anor  
[2004] IEHC 386 
Article 6   Application 
dismissed as it 
was held that the 
applicant’s 
submission 
imposed an 
unreasonable 
burden on the 
Gardaí and went 
far beyond what is 
suggested in the 
Braddish 
judgment. 
HC Law of Evidence 
Criminal Law 
Murphy v. British 
Broadcasting 
Corporation 
[2004] IEHC 420; 
[2005] 3 IR 336 
Article 6 
Article 10 
None specified  The BBC was not 
entitled to a jury as 
the right to a fair 
trial is fully 
achievable without 
a jury. 
HC Criminal Law 
Administrative 
Law 
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2005 
Case Articles of ECHR 
Considered in 
Decision 
Sections of the 
ECHR Act 2003 
Considered in 
the Decision 
EU Charter 
Article  
Core Summary Court Core Legal 
Area 
Dublin City 
Council v Fennell 
[2005] IESC 33; 
[2005] 1 I.R. 604 
Article  6 
Article 8 
Article 13 
Article 1, Protocol 
1 
Section 2 
Section 3 
 The ECHR Act 
2003 does not 
have retrospective 
effect 
SC Housing Law 
Carmody v. 
Minister for 
Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform 
[2005] IEHC 10; 
[2005] 2 ILRM 1 
Article 5 
Article 6 
Article 14 
Section 2 
Section 5 
 Absence of parity 
as regards legal 
representation 
provided for under 
the criminal legal 
aid scheme to an 
accused, did not 
violate Article 6 
ECHR. 
HC Criminal Law 
Legal Aid 
Arra v Governor 
of Cloverhill 
Prison 
[2005] IEHC 12; 
[2005] 1 JIC 
2601 
Article 5 Section 5(1)  Application 
refused. Held that 
the European 
Convention was 
not to be read as 
if it were a 
revenue statute or 
criminal provision 
HC Criminal Law 
187 
 
and the 
applicant’s 
interpretation of a 
document 
embodying 
principles of 
protection of rights 
was too technical. 
Moldovan v 
Minister for 
Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform  
[2005] IEHC 141; 
[2005] 4 JIC 
2903 
Article 6(3)(d)   Refused leave to 
apply for judicial 
review seeking an 
order of certiorari 
quashing the 
decision of the 
RAT refusing 
refugee status 
and a declaration 
that s. 16(11)(a)(i) 
of the Refugee 
Act 1996 was 
repugnant to the 
Constitution as 
there was not 
sufficient evidence 
before the Court 
to support the 
applicant’s 
contentions  
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
188 
 
Clifford v Minister 
for Education and 
Science and 
others  
[2005] IEHC 288 
Article 2 
Article 3 
Article 5 
Article 8 
Article 13 
Article 17 
Article 18 
Article 2 Protocol 
1 
Section 2 
Section 3 
 Order allowing the 
applicant to 
amend the 
pleadings to 
include a claim 
pursuant to the 
European 
Convention on 
Human Rights Act 
2003 and varying 
orders related to 
discovery. 
HC Constitutional 
Law 
Education  
Foley v. Sunday 
Newspapers Ltd. 
[2005] IEHC 14; 
[2005] 1 IR 88 
Article 10 None specified.  Refused  the 
interlocutory 
prohibitory 
injunctive relief 
sought restraining 
the defendant 
newspaper from 
publishing 
material which the 
plaintiff alleged 
constituted a real 
and serious risk to 
his life and/or 
bodily integrity for 
various reasons.  
 Constitutional 
Law 
Media Law 
Adams v. Reilly Article 6   It was held HC Criminal Law 
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[2005] IEHC 133; 
[2005] 3 IR 190 
refusing to grant 
leave, that an 
application for 
judicial review  
should not be 
entertained mid-
trial. 
Cogley v. Radio 
Telefis Eireann    
[2005] IEHC 180; 
[2005] 4 IR 79 
 
None specified.   Refused an 
interlocutory 
injunction to 
prevent the 
broadcast of a 
documentary on 
nursing home 
care by RTE.  
HC Constitutional 
Law 
Media Law 
Gallagher v. 
Casey 
[2005] IEHC 342; 
[2005] 3 IR 548 
Article 6 Section 2  Interim ruling on 
the appeal, that 
while there were 
defects in the 
issuing of the civil 
bill against the 
third defendant 
but they did not 
render the 
proceedings a 
nullity for reasons 
including that 
there was no 
HC Legal Practice 
and Procedure 
190 
 
requirement under 
the European 
Convention on 
Human Rights for 
a court to give 
reasons for its 
decisions at an 
interim stage 
during the course 
of a hearing. 
J.F. v. Director of 
Public 
Prosecutions 
[2005] IESC 24; 
[2005] 2 IR 174 
Article 6   Allowed the 
appeal striking out 
the relevant 
paragraphs of the 
statement of 
opposition and the 
supporting 
affidavits of the 
psychologist and 
the relevant parts 
of the 
complainant's 
affidavit.  
SC Criminal Law 
The People 
(Director of 
Public 
Prosecutions) v. 
Laide   
Article 8   Allowed the 
appeal on the 
conviction for 
manslaughter and 
directed a retrial 
CCA Criminal Law 
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[2005] IECCA 24; 
[2005] 1 IR 209 
and refusing the 
appeal on the 
conviction of 
violent disorder 
against the first 
accused and 
allowed the 
appeal of the 
second accused 
and didn’t order a 
retrial. 
Sweetman v 
Director of Public 
Prosecutions  
[2005] IEHC 435; 
[2005] 12 JIC 
2004 
Article 6(1) None specified   Prohibited the 
further 
prosecution of the 
offences as 
prejudice in 
matters of 
excessive delay 
could be 
presumed in the 
absence of any 
specific prejudice 
and that the 
applicant had 
been deprived of 
his right to an 
expeditious trial 
under the 
HC Criminal Law 
Administrative 
Law 
192 
 
constitution, 
common law and 
article 6(1) of the 
ECHR. 
Ngangtchang -v- 
Refugee Appeals 
Tribunal & anor 
[2005] IEHC 441 
 Section 5(1)  Application for 
leave to seek 
judicial review of 
the decision to 
refuse refugee 
status was 
refused as no 
error of principle 
was evident in the 
case.  
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
C.E.S. (Nee I.) v. 
Minister for 
Justice  
 [2005] IEHC 
104; 
[2006] 2 IR 95 
Article 8 Section 2 
Section 4 
 Granted leave to 
seek judicial 
review as it was 
arguable that the 
decision of the 
respondent 
infringed the 
applicants' rights, 
protected by the 
Constitution 
and/or the 
Convention 
(article 8). 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Brady v. Article 6   Granted SC Criminal Law 
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Houghton and 
Others 
[2005] IESC 54; 
[2006] 1 IR 1 
declaratory relief 
restraining the 
transmission of a 
mobile phone data 
to the Minister for 
Justice for onward 
transmission to 
the United 
Kingdom 
authorities. 
Law of Evidence 
F. (T.) v. D.P.P & 
Anor  
[2005] IEHC 31 
Article 6   Granted relief on 
the basis that 
there had been a 
clear breach of 
the applicant's 
constitutionally 
protected right to 
a trial with 
reasonable 
expedition.  
HC Criminal Law 
Administrative 
Law 
D.P.P.-v- Colm 
Murphy  
[2005] IECCA 1; 
[2005] 2 IR 125 
Article 8 None specified   The court set 
aside the 
conviction of the 
accused on the 
two grounds 
successfully 
argued and direct 
a retrial. 
CCA Criminal Law 
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O'Brien v. 
Personal Injuries 
Assessment 
Board  
[2005] IEHC 100; 
[2007] 2 IR 1 
Section 3 Article 6.1  Held that tghe 
respondent in 
declining to 
accept or act upon 
the authorisation 
dated 16th 
August, 2004 by 
corresponding 
directly with the 
applicant is acting 
in breach of s. 7 of 
the Personal 
Injuries 
Assessment 
Board 2003, or 
without authority 
under any other 
provision of the 
Act. 
 Personal Injuries 
Law  
Administrative 
Law 
McConnell & 
Anor v. Dublin 
City Council & 
Ors  
[2005] IEHC 21 
None specified  None specified  Allowed the stay 
sought but limited 
it  to ten days from 
that date so that 
the matter didn't 
drag its' feet and 
made its way with 
expedition to the 
HC Housing Law 
Administrative 
Law 
195 
 
Supreme Court. 
Law Society of 
Ireland -v- 
Malocco  
[2005] IESC 5 
Article 6(1) 
Article 4, Protocol 
7 
None specified  Rejected all of the 
appellant’s 
contentions in this 
case and 
dismissed the 
appeals as no 
basis had been 
identified nor 
could there be any 
logical argument 
to suggest that 
where a 
professional 
person has been 
convicted of a 
criminal offence 
that the facts 
giving rise to such 
conviction could 
not be considered 
by a professional 
disciplinary body 
to ascertain 
whether or not the 
professional 
person had 
committed 
SC Criminal Law 
 
196 
 
professional 
misconduct. 
In the Matter of 
Article 26 of The 
Constitution & In 
the Matter of the 
Health 
 (Amendment) 
(No. 2) Bill 2004 
[2005] IESC 7, 
[2005] 1 IR 105 
None specified   Held that the 
retrospective 
provisions of the 
Bill contained in s. 
1(b) which provide 
for the insertion of 
subsections (5), 
(6) and (7), and 
subsection (11) 
insofar as it 
defines “relevant 
charge”, in s. 53 
of the Act of 1970, 
are repugnant to 
the Constitution 
and in particular 
Articles 43 and 
40.3.2 thereof. 
SC Constitutional 
Law 
Albatros Feeds 
Ltd -v- Minister 
for Agriculture & 
Food & Ors 
[2005] IEHC 65 
None specified   Certiorari was 
granted to quash 
the Instructions of 
the Minister in 
respect to a 
quantity of a good 
that the applicant 
tried to import into 
HC Agricultural Law 
Administrative 
Law 
197 
 
the State. 
Potts v. Minister 
for Defence 
[2005] IEHC 72 
Article 6 None specified  Granted the reliefs 
sought for various 
reason including 
that it did not 
seem to be 
premature to 
consider whether 
the conduct of the 
process in 
accordance with 
the clear statutory 
rules laid out may 
breach the 
applicant’s right 
either under the 
convention or 
under the 
constitution. 
HC Defence Law 
Burns & Anor v. 
Governor of 
Castlerea Prison 
[2005] IEHC 76 
None specified None specified   Held that the 
applicant prison 
officers were 
denied natural or 
constitutional 
justice, the 
procedure was 
fatally flawed and 
the applicants 
HC Employment 
Law 
Administrative 
Law 
198 
 
were entitled to 
succeed. 
McCoppin v. 
Kennedy & Anor 
[2005] IEHC 194; 
[2005] 4 IR 66 
Article 6 
Article 13 
Section 5 
 
 Quashed the 
order of the first 
named 
respondent made 
on 21st April, 
2004 in so far as 
the costs element 
of that order is 
concerned. No 
order for costs 
was made against 
any party.  
HC Administrative 
Law 
Civil Procedure 
Stephens v. Paul 
Flynn Ltd.  
[2005] IEHC 148 
None specified None specified  Dismissed the 
proceedings on 
the basis of the 
weight to be 
attributed to both 
the delay and its 
excusability 
coupled with the 
moderate degree 
of prejudice and 
the minor 
weighting 
attributable to the 
limited inaction on 
HC Administrative 
Law 
Legal Practice 
and Procedure 
 
(Appeal heard 
by the SC in 
2008) 
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the part of the 
Defendant 
D.P.P. -v- Martin 
Kelly  
[2005] IECCA 50 
Article 6   The argument that 
the Applicant did 
not receive a fair 
trial was rejected. 
Refused leave to 
appeal.  
CCA Criminal Law 
Minister for 
Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform 
v. McArdle 
 [2005] IEHC 222 
Article 13 
Article 35 
  Held that an order 
would be made to 
surrender the 
respondent. There 
was nothing to 
suggest that in 
surrendering the 
Respondent for 
trial in Spain his 
constitutional 
rights or the rights 
enshrined in the  
European 
Convention on 
Human Rights 
would be 
abrogated. 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
Equality Authority 
v. Portmarnock 
Golf Club & Ors 
Article 11 None specified.  Held that the 
plaintiffs' 
constitutional 
HC Equality Law 
Constitutional 
Law 
200 
 
[2005] IEHC 235 arguments cannot 
prevail. Held that 
the Club shall not 
be considered a 
discriminating 
Club for the 
purposes of s. 8 of 
the Equal Status 
Act, 2000. 
M M -v- DPP 
[2005] IEHC 204 
Article 6   Rejected the relief 
sought as it was 
held that the delay 
in the matter was 
such as to not 
deprive the 
applicant of his 
right to an 
expeditious trial. 
HC Administrative 
Law 
Criminal Law 
Cirpaci (nee 
McCormack) & 
anor -v- The 
Minister for 
Justice, Equality 
& Law Reform 
[2005] IESC 42; 
[2005] 4 IR 109 
Article 8    Dismissed the 
appeal and 
affirmed the order 
of the High Court  
as the Minister 
had been shown 
to have given due 
weight to all 
relevant 
information placed 
SC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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before him, it had 
not been shown 
that he acted in 
pursuit of a fixed 
or inflexible policy 
or that his 
decision was 
unreasonable or 
disproportionate. 
Furthermore, his 
decision fell well 
within the margin 
of appreciation 
allowed to 
Member States by 
the European 
Convention. 
Talbot & Anor v. 
Bord Pleanala & 
Ors  
[2005] IEHC 215 
 None specified   Refused the 
application for 
leave to seek 
judicial review in 
respect of the 
reliefs sought and 
on the grounds 
disclosed in the 
Statement of 
Grounds, on the 
basis that no 
HC Planning and 
Development 
Law 
202 
 
benefit could 
result in any event 
from success in 
the application at 
the end of the 
day. 
Rogers v. 
Michelin Tyre plc 
& Anor  
[2005] IEHC 294 
 None specified. 
Held not to be 
relevant.  
 Dismissed the 
proceedings in 
their entirety as 
against the 
Pension Trust but 
in part only as 
against Michelin 
allowing to 
continue that 
aspect of the 
claim which is 
dependent upon 
the plaintiff 
establishing, 
independent of 
the 
representations 
made, an 
entitlement. 
HC Administrative 
Law 
Equity 
Contract Law 
Superwood 
Holdings plc & 
Ors v. Ireland & 
Article 6 
Article 1, Protocol 
1 
Section 6  Dismissed 
Superwood's 
motion for 
HC Court Practice 
and Procedure 
Administrative 
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Anor  
[2005] IEHC 232; 
[2005] 3 IR 398 
Article 14 judgment in 
default of defence 
under O. 27, r. 8 
on the grounds 
that the statement 
of claim therein 
disclosed no 
reasonable cause 
of action against 
the State. 
Law 
A. (P. P.) v. 
Refugee Appeals 
Tribunal & Ors 
[2005] IEHC 237 
Article 6(1) None specified.  Held that the 
applicants were 
entitled to judicial 
review of the 
refusal to give 
them access to  
previous 
determinations 
made by the 
Refugee Appeals 
Tribunal, albeit on 
the narrow and 
confined grounds 
outlined. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
K. (M.) v. Minister 
for Justice, 
Equality & Law 
Reform & Ors 
Article 6.1 Section 3 
Section 5(1) 
 Refused leave  as 
leave to apply for 
judicial review is a 
discretionary 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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[2005] IEHC 247 remedy and 
requires the 
appropriate 
elements of the 
burden of proof to 
be discharged by 
the applicant. 
D.P.P. v. 
Independent 
Newspapers 
(Ireland) Ltd. & 
Ors  
[2005] IEHC 353; 
[2006] 1 IR 366 
Article 10   Held that the 
articles 
complained of in 
this case in 
respect of the 
respondents were 
a contempt of 
court in that they 
were highly 
prejudicial to the 
notice party thus 
interfering in the 
administration of 
justice. 
HC Media Law 
Campbell v. 
O'Donnell & Ors 
[2005] IEHC 266 
 Section 3  Held that the 
Plaintiff was not 
entitled to issue 
these proceedings 
without the 
authorisation of 
the Personal 
HC Tort Law 
Personal Injuries 
Law 
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Injuries 
Assessment 
Board. 
A. -v- Governor 
of Cloverhill 
Prison & Ors 
[2005] IEHC 483; 
[2008] 1 IR 43 
Article 8   Held that the 
applicant was not 
entitled to any of 
the reliefs claimed 
as the situation 
was very largely 
attributable to the 
applicant’s own 
actions and failure 
to take elementary 
and sensible 
steps to prevent a 
foreseeable 
situation. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Constitutional 
Law 
Fowley v. Conroy 
[2005] IEHC 269; 
[2005] 3 IR 480 
 Section 3  Dismissed the 
case as the 
applicant had not 
met the 
exceptionally high 
threshold that 
would be 
necessary to 
entitle her to an 
order of the type 
she sought in this 
HC Administrative 
Law 
206 
 
case. 
R. (E.) v. D.P.P. 
[2005] IEHC 290 
Article 6   Held that the 
applicant was not 
entitled to the 
relief sought as he 
had, by his 
conduct, caused 
the delay which 
has resulted in the 
absence of the 
evidence which he 
then said he 
wished to adduce. 
HC Criminal Law 
Administrative 
Law 
Mahon & Ors v. 
Post Publications 
Ltd. t/a The 
Sunday Business 
Post  
[2005] IEHC 307 
Article 10   Reliefs sought 
were refused as 
there was no 
sound legal basis 
for the wide 
ranging form of 
order which was 
sought in these 
proceedings.  
HC Tribunal Law 
Media Law 
Magee -v- Farrell 
& Ors 
[2005] IEHC 388 
Article 2 
Article 13 
Section 3  Held that due to 
the unfortunate 
circumstances of 
the plaintiff in the 
present case, fair 
procedures under 
HC Legal Aid 
Administrative 
Law 
Constitutional 
Law 
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the Constitution 
require that she 
be provided with 
legal aid for the 
purpose of being 
adequately 
represented at the 
forthcoming 
inquest into her 
son’s death. 
Bolger v. 
Haughton & Ors 
[2005] IEHC 364 
Article 6   An order was 
made for the 
release of the 
applicant/plaintiff 
under s. 
50(2)(bbb) of the 
1965 Act, as 
amended. 
HC Extradition Law 
Administrative 
Law 
Hickey v O 
Dwyer & Ors 
[2005] IEHC 365, 
[2006] 2 ILRM 81 
None specified    Various decisions 
were made in 
relation to the two 
issues concerned. 
It was deemed 
that it was not 
necessary to 
express any view 
on the ECHR 
questions in these 
HC Succession Law 
Property Law 
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proceedings.  
H. (I.) v. Minister 
for Justice, 
Equality and Law 
Reform 
 [2005] IEHC 463 
Article 3   Held that there 
was no other 
basis for 
considering that 
the Minister was 
in any way legally 
wrong in coming 
to the conclusion 
that a deportation 
order should be 
issued. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Makumbi v. 
Minister for 
Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform 
[2005] IEHC 40; 
[2008] 4 IR 417 
Article 2 Section 2 
Section 3 
  Granted 
injunction 
restraining the 
respondent from 
taking any steps 
to transfer the 
applicant to the 
United Kingdom 
pending the 
determination of 
the application 
made on the 28th 
July, 2005, not to 
implement the 
Transfer Order as 
well as making 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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other declarations.  
D.C. -v- DPP 
[2005] IESC 77; 
[2006] 1 ILRM 
348; 
 [2005] 4 IR 281 
Article 6   Affirmed the 
decision of the 
High Court and 
dismissed the 
appeal of the 
applicant to 
prohibit his trial on 
the basis that 
there is a serious 
risk of an unfair 
trial.  
SC Criminal Law 
Administrative 
Law 
F. (S.) v. D.P.P. 
[2005] IEHC 410 
Article 6   Held that the 
applicant was 
entitled to the 
relief which he 
sought as there 
had been 
inordinate and 
excessive delay 
on the part of R.S. 
in reporting the 
offences and the 
delay was not 
referable to the 
conduct of the 
applicant. 
HC Criminal Law 
Administrative 
Law 
Ramseyer -v-  None specified  Allowed the SC Administrative 
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Mahon  
[2005] IESC 82; 
[2006] 1 IR 216, 
appeal and set 
aside the order of 
the High Court to 
the extent 
indicated. Held 
that it was not 
necessary to 
consider the 
Appellant’s 
arguments based 
on the European 
Convention of 
Human Rights. 
Law 
Inquest Law 
D. (C.) v. D.P.P. 
[2005] IEHC 431 
Article 6   Declined the relief 
sought as it was 
held that the 
applicant did not 
suffer specific 
prejudice by 
reasons of the 
absence of the 
evidence specified 
and will not be 
exposed to the 
risk of an unfair 
trial on that 
ground. 
HC Criminal Law 
Atherton v. Article 8 Section 2  Held that the HC Law of Evidence 
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D.P.P. 
 [2005] IEHC 
429; 
[2006] 1 IR 245 
Section 4 evidence by the 
complainant by 
means of the 
video surveillance 
referred to was 
not in breach of 
the constitutional 
rights of the 
accused and that 
the evidence was 
not obtained 
unlawfully. 
Law Society of 
Ireland v. 
Competition 
Authority 
[2005] IEHC 455; 
[2006] 2 IR 262 
Article 6 Section 1(1) 
Section 5 
 Order of certiorari 
quashing a notice 
which offered 
guidance to 
businesses and 
legal practitioners 
on the 
respondent's 
policy in relation 
to the legal 
representation of 
persons attending 
before it as the 
Competition Act 
did not empower it 
to issue such a 
HC Constitutional 
Law 
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notice. 
Dundon -v- The 
Governor of 
Cloverhill Prison 
[2005] IESC 83; 
[2006] 1 IR 518; 
[2006] 1 ILRM 
321 
  Chapter VI Dismissed the 
appeal for delay 
for several 
reasons including 
that the time limits 
of sixty days and 
ninety days have 
no relevance to 
individual rights in 
individual cases. 
SC European Arrest 
Warrant  
Kozhukarov v 
Minister for 
Justice, Equality 
& Law Reform 
[2005] IEHC 424; 
[2005] 12 JIC 
1403 
Article 8    Only entitled to 
challenge 
Minister’s 
deportation order 
decision insofar 
as amounted to a 
disproportionate 
interference with 
the applicants’ 
rights as 
guaranteed under 
Article 8 of the 
Convention. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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2006 
Case Articles of ECHR 
Considered in 
Decision 
Sections of the 
ECHR Act 2003 
Considered in the 
Decision 
EU Charter 
Article 
Core Summary Court Core Legal 
Area 
Minister for 
Justice v 
Stapleton  
[2006] 3 IR 26; 
[2006] IEHC 43 
Articles 3 and 6   The court should 
not order the 
surrender of a 
requested person 
if to do so was not 
compatible with 
the State's 
obligations under 
the Convention. In 
this case, the 
length of time 
between the 
alleged offence, 
suggested the 
applicant may not 
get a fair trial in 
England.  
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
Dada v Minister 
for Justice  
[2006] IEHC 140 
Article 3 
Article 8 
Section 2(1) 
Section 5(1) 
 The weight which 
would have to be 
given to the 
upholding of the 
Asylum and 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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Immigration Laws 
of the State in 
striking a balance 
between any 
Article 8 rights, in 
this case would be 
such, that no 
demonstrable 
ground shown for 
contending that 
the correct 
balance was no 
struck. 
Crowley v Roche 
Products (Ireland) 
Ltd.  
[2006] IEHC 6 
Article 6 None specified   A delay of three 
years from accrual 
of the cause of 
action was prima 
facie a breach of 
the defendant’s 
entitlement to a 
hearing within a 
reasonable time 
pursuant to Article 
6 of the European 
Convention of 
Human Rights. 
HC Legal Practice 
and Procedure 
McFarlane 
(applicant) v 
Article 6(1)   Refused relief as 
no evidence had 
HC Criminal Law 
Administrative 
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Director of Public 
Prosecutions 
(respondent)   
[2006] IEHC 389 
 
been adduced by 
the applicant that 
any risk of an 
unfair trial flowed 
from the delay 
which interfered 
with his right to an 
expeditious trial.   
Law 
W (M) v DPP 
[2006] IEHC 21 
Article 6(1) None specified   There was 
unexplained and 
excessive 
prosecutorial 
delay, in violation 
of Article 6(1) of 
the European 
Convention on 
Human Rights. 
HC Criminal Law 
Constitutional 
Law 
Elukanlo and 
Elukanlo 
(applicants) v The 
Minister for 
Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform 
(respondent) 
[2006] IEHC 211 
Article 8   Certain of the 
relief sought by 
the first named 
applicant could 
not be the subject 
of judicial review 
as the applicant 
never argued that 
there was a failure 
by the respondent 
to observe 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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appropriate 
procedures up to 
the date of the 
making of the 
deportation order 
and the relief 
sought amounted 
to an attack on the 
deportation order 
itself. the second 
named applicant 
was entitled to 
argue that the 
respondent did 
not consider at all 
the rights of the 
second named 
applicant in 
reaching his 
decision under 
s.3(1) and s.3(11) 
of the Immigration 
Act 1999.  
Fares (applicant) 
v Minister for 
Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform 
(respondent)  
Article 8 Section 3(1)  The decision by 
the Minister on the 
application under 
the scheme had 
been taken in 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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[2006] IEHC 343 breach of the 
second applicant’s 
rights under 
Article 40.3 of the 
Constitution and 
under section 3(1) 
of the European 
Convention on 
Human Rights Act 
2003 as it had 
been taken in a 
manner 
incompatible with 
the State’s 
obligations to the 
Irish citizen child 
under article 8 of 
the Convention. 
Irish Municipal 
Public and Civil 
Trade Union v 
Ryanair Ltd  
[2006] IEHC 118; 
[2007] 1 ILRM 45 
Article 11 Section 2 
Section 4 
 Ryanair’s 
application for an 
order striking out 
the proceedings 
on several 
grounds including 
that that there was 
no obligation 
under the 
Constitution or the 
HC Industrial 
Relations Law 
Legal Practice 
and Procedure 
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European 
Convention on 
Human Rights for 
an employer to 
negotiate with a 
union was 
dismissed. The 
proceedings 
involved the 
investigation of 
questions of 
general 
importance in the 
context of recent 
changes in 
domestic law, 
which raised 
issues as to the 
impact of the 
State’s 
international 
obligations on its 
domestic law. 
Menton v DPP  
[2006] 1EHC 234 
 
Article 6 None specified  Relief refused as 
applications as to 
delay such as that 
in this case should 
only proceed by 
HC Administrative 
Law 
Legal Practice 
and Procedure 
219 
 
way of judicial 
review in 
exceptional 
circumstances. 
Adio (applicant) v 
Minister for 
Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform 
(respondent)  
[2006] IEHC 346 
Article 8 
Article 14 
Section 3  Held that the 
Minister’s refusal 
was to consider 
the application 
was an 
interference with 
the child’s right to 
respect for his 
private life within 
the meaning of 
article 8.1 of the 
European 
Convention on 
Human Rights. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Obende v Minister 
for Justice, 
Equality and Law 
Reform  
[2006] IEHC 162; 
[2006] 3 IR 218 
Article 5 Schedule 1  Ordered the 
release of the 
applicant who had 
a deportation 
order made 
against herself on 
terms that the 
applicant had 
established a 
serious question 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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to be tried on the 
application for 
leave to seek 
judicial review. 
P.H. v. Ireland   
[2006] IEHC 40; 
[2006] 2 IR 540 
Article 6 
Article 7.1 
  Dismissed the 
applicant’s claim 
that the 
retrospective 
nature of certain 
provisions of the 
Sex Offenders Act 
2001 was in 
breach of his 
rights under the 
Constitution and 
the Convention.  
HC Constitutional 
Law 
Criminal Law 
B (D.O.) 
(applicant) v 
Minister for 
Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform 
(respondent)  
[2006] IEHC 341 
Article 8 
Article 14 
Section 3  Granted relief to 
parents of an Irish 
citizen that had 
applied for 
residency in the 
State under an 
administrative 
scheme 
established by the 
Minister for 
Justice (“the 
IBC05 scheme”). 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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A.G. v. Dowse & 
Anor  
Dowse v. An Bord 
Uchtala  
[2006] IEHC 64 
and 65; 
[2006] 2 IR 507 
(joined cases) 
Article 6(1)   Cancelled the 
registration of the 
adoption, 
maintaining the 
child’s Irish 
citizenship, 
granting sole 
guardianship and 
custody of the 
child to his natural 
mother and 
making orders in 
respect of 
maintenance and 
succession rights 
as against the 
applicants. 
HC Adoption Law 
O'N -v- Director of 
Public 
Prosecutions 
[2006] IEHC 184; 
[2007] 4 IR 481 
Article 5(3) 
Article 6(1) 
Article 13 
Section 3  Issued an order of 
certiorari quashing 
the order of return 
for trial on the 
grounds of 
prosecution delay 
and the want of 
fair procedures on 
the part of the 
DPP in reversing 
his decision not to 
HC Criminal Law 
Administrative 
Law 
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prosecute. 
Minister for 
Justice v. 
Corrigan 
[2006] IEHC 101 
[2007] 2 IR 448 
Article 6   Article 6 of the 
European 
Convention for the 
Protection of 
Human Rights 
and Fundamental 
Freedoms was not 
directed to the 
lapse of time 
between the 
commission of an 
offence and the 
trial but was 
directed to 
ensuring that 
criminal 
proceedings, once 
initiated, were 
prosecuted 
without undue 
delay 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
McDonagh & 
Others 
(applicants) v 
Kilkenny County 
Council 
(respondents)  
Article 6 
Article 8 
  Held that the right 
of inviolability of 
the dwelling did 
not entitle the 
traveller 
applicants to 
HC Constitutional 
Law 
t Law 
Criminal Law 
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[2007] IEHC 350 invade the lands 
of another. The 
orders of criminal 
trespass made did 
not breach the 
rights of the 
applicants. It was 
therefore held that 
there was no 
basis for orders of 
certiorari or 
mandamus 
against the first 
named 
respondent and 
that the exercise 
by the second 
named 
respondent of the 
powers conferred 
by s. 19 of the 
Criminal Justice 
(Public Order) Act, 
1994 did not 
infringe any of the 
applicants’ 
constitutional 
rights or rights 
224 
 
under the  ECHR 
or any other legal 
right and so relief 
was refused. 
Caldwell v. Mahon  
 [2006] IEHC 86; 
[2007] 3 IR 542 
Article 8 Section 2 
Section 3 
 The constitutional 
right to privacy 
was not an 
absolute right but 
was subject to the 
exigencies of the 
common good 
and any 
constitutional right 
to privacy in 
business dealings, 
in particular 
dealings carried 
on through 
incorporated 
companies, could 
only exist at the 
outer reaches of 
the core personal 
right to privacy. 
HC Constitutional 
Law 
The People 
(Director of Public 
Prosecutions) v. 
Matthews 
Article 6 None specified  Refused the 
application for 
leave to appeal a 
conviction related 
CCA Criminal Law 
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[2006] IECCA 
103; 
[2007] 2 IR 169 
to possession of 
explosives.  
Doherty v. South 
Dublin County 
Council 
[2006] IESC 57; 
[2007] 1 ILRM 
241; 
[2007] 1 IR 246 
 Section 3  Dismissed the 
appeal in holding 
that the Equality 
Authority had the 
statutory power to 
intervene in court 
proceedings. 
SC Constitutional 
Law 
Legal Practice 
and Procedure 
The People 
(Director of Public 
Prosecutions) v. 
Binead   
[2006] IECCA 
147; 
[2007] 1 IR 374 
Article 6   Refused the 
application for 
leave to appeal on 
claims related to 
the evidence 
relied on in the 
case. 
CCA Criminal Law 
Law of Evidence 
Zappone v. 
Revenue 
Commissioners  
[2006] IEHC 404; 
[2008] 2 IR 417 
Article 8 
Article 12 
Article 14 
None specified  The legal 
provisions in 
relation to the 
right to marry and 
to capacity to 
marry in this 
jurisdiction were 
not incompatible 
with the provisions 
of the European 
Convention on 
HC Constitutional 
Law 
226 
 
Human Rights. If 
there was any 
form of 
discriminatory 
distinction 
between same 
sex couples and 
opposite sex 
couples by reason 
of the exclusion of 
same sex couples 
from the right to 
marry, then Article 
41 in its clear 
terms as to 
guarding the 
family provided 
the necessary 
justification. 
Allergan 
Pharmaceuticals 
(Ireland) Ltd. v. 
Noel Deane 
Roofing 
[2006] IEHC 215; 
[2009] 4 IR 438 
Article 6(1)   The court had an 
independent 
obligation 
pursuant to article 
6 of the European 
Convention on 
Human Rights to 
ensure that civil 
cases were 
HC Legal Practice 
and Procedure 
 
On the 18th 
June, 2009, the 
Supreme Court 
dismissed the 
plaintiff's appeal 
ex tempore. 
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determined within 
a reasonable time. 
John E Shirley & 
Ors v A O 
Gorman & Ors 
[2006] IEHC 27 
Article 1, Protocol 
1 
Article 13 
Article 14 
 
Section 4  Dismissed the 
plaintiff’s claim for 
various reasons 
including that the 
very detailed 
provisions 
contained in the 
provisions as to 
what factors are to 
be taken into 
account and what 
factors are to be 
excluded from 
consideration 
represented a 
balanced 
approach to 
valuation of the 
residual interest of 
the landlord, and 
that the figure 
arrived at ensured 
that fair, 
reasonable and 
appropriate 
compensation 
 Landlord and 
Tenant Law 
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would be paid to 
the landlord for 
that interest. 
Cosma v The 
Minister for 
Justice Equality 
and Law Reform 
[2006] IEHC 36 
Article 8 None specified  The EHCR Act 
2003 could not be 
applied 
retrospectively but 
was not irrelevant. 
Dismissed the 
application as the 
applicant had not 
demonstrated any 
defect or 
shortcoming in the 
decision making 
process 
detrimental to the 
applicant’s legal 
or constitutional 
rights. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
D.P.P.-v- E.D. 
[2006] IECCA 3; 
[2007] 1 IR 484 
Article 6 Schedule 1  Dismissed the 
application for 
leave to appeal as 
it was held that no 
miscarriage of 
justice had 
actually occurred. 
CCA Criminal Law 
Thorpe -v- Dpp Article 6   Held on the basis HC Criminal Law 
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[2006] IEHC 319; 
[2007] 1 IR 502 
of Cunningham 
that a breach of 
the peace 
contrary to 
common law is an 
offence known to 
common law, that 
the offence may 
be prosecuted by 
the District Court 
and that the 
penalty resultant 
on conviction is a 
matter for the 
District Court 
acting within the 
sentencing limits 
of the District 
Court. 
Court Practice 
and Procedure 
D.T v F.L  
[2006] IEHC 98 
 
Article 6   Refused the 
reliefs sought by 
the respondent as 
it was held that 
the argument 
based on Article 
39 of the EC 
Treaty was not 
sustainable for 
HC Family Law 
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various reasons.  
Agbonlahor & Ors 
-v- Minister for 
Justice & Anor 
[2006] IEHC 56; 
[2007] 1 ILRM 58 
Article 8 Schedule 1  Granted leave to 
seek an order of 
certiorari by way 
of Judicial Review 
on the sole 
ground that on the 
evidence before 
him, the decision 
of the Minister not 
to revoke the 
deportation orders 
made by him in 
respect of the 
Applicants was a 
violation of their 
rights under 
Article 8(1) of the 
First Schedule of 
the  ECHR Act, 
2003.   
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Byrne & Anor v. 
Radio Telefis 
Eireann  
[2006] IEHC 71; 
[2006] 2 ILRM 
375 
Article 6   It was held that 
the defendant was 
not entitled to the 
relief for 
defamation sought 
in this case.  
HC Tort Law 
Media Law 
Arisukwu -v- The Article 6(1)   Affirmed the SC Asylum and 
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Minister for 
Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform 
& ors 
[2006] IESC 13 
Article 14 judgment of the 
High Court and 
dismissed the 
three grounds of 
appeal advanced 
in this case in 
view of the 
circumstances of 
the case. 
Immigration Law  
Curtin -v- Dail 
Éireann  
[2006] IESC 14; 
[2006] 2 ILRM 99; 
[2006] 2 IR 556 
Article 6   Dismissed the 
appeal and 
affirmed the order 
of the High Court 
on several 
grounds including 
that the adoption 
of the amending 
Act of 2004 was a 
clearly defined 
and lawful means 
by which, in the 
circumstances of 
this case, a 
committee of the 
Oireachtas, in the 
exercise of its 
constitutional 
powers, could 
SC Constitutional 
Law 
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require an 
individual to 
produce his own 
property insofar 
as it is lawfully 
available to him. 
Minister for 
Justice, Equality & 
Law Reform v. 
Biggins  
[2006] IEHC 351 
Article 14  Article 23 Held that the 
Court was 
required to make 
the order sought 
pursuant to s. 
16(1) of the Act, 
having rejected 
the points raised 
by way of 
objection by the 
respondent. 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
D. (G.) (A Minor) 
& Ors v. Minister 
for Justice, 
Equality & Law 
Reform  
[2006] IEHC 344 
Article 8 Section 3  Held that the 
process by which 
the decision was 
taken was in 
breach of the first 
named applicant's 
rights and the 
respondent's 
constitutional and 
statutory 
obligations. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
233 
 
Granted orders of 
certiorari of the 
decisions to 
refuse residency 
and order 
deportation.  
O. (C.P.) & Ors v. 
Minister for 
Justice, Equality & 
Law Reform & 
Ors  
[2006] IEHC 345 
Article 6 Section 3  Held that the 
questions set out 
in the judgment  
were not 
addressed in the 
examination on 
file and 
accordingly the 
decision taken 
must be 
considered to be 
in breach of the 
citizen child's right 
to respect for his 
private /or family 
life under article 8 
and that the 
respondent in 
breach of s. 3 of 
the ECHR  Act of 
2003. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Hakizimana v  None specified   Relief refused as HC Asylum and 
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Minister for 
Justice Equality 
and Law Reform 
& Ors 
[2006] IEHC 355; 
[2009] 4 IR 474 
it was held that 
the second named 
Defendant had not 
erred in law and 
had not acted 
contrary to the 
Applicant’s right to 
fair procedures 
under Article 40.3 
of the Constitution 
or under the 
ECHR Act 2008. It 
was also held that 
there had not 
been any unlawful 
exercise of 
discretion contrary 
to the Refugee 
Act 1996. 
Immigration Law 
E. (A.) (A Minor) & 
Anor v. Minister 
for Justice, 
Equality & Law 
Reform  
[2006] IEHC 347 
Article 3, Protocol 
4 
Article 8 
Section 3  Dismissed the 
application as of 
the submissions 
made under s. 3 
of the ECHR Act 
2003 or Article 8 
ECHR supported 
a mandatory 
obligation on the 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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Minister to include 
in administrative 
procedures 
determined to 
"revised 
arrangements for 
considering 
applications for 
permission to 
remain in the 
State" to people 
not resident in the 
State at the date 
of application 
under the 
scheme. 
Oviawe & Ors v. 
Minister for 
Justice, Equality & 
Law Reform & 
Ors  
[2006] IEHC 342 
Article 8 Section 3(1)  The decision of 
the Minister on the 
IBC/05 application 
of Oviawe was 
unlawful as it was 
in breach of the 
Minister's 
obligations under 
s. 3(1) of the 
ECHR Act, 2003 
as it was not 
taken in a manner 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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of which was 
compatible with 
the State's 
obligations under 
article 8 of the 
Convention. 
D. (G.D.) & Ors v. 
MJELR 
[2006] IEHC 348 
Article 8 Section 3(1)  It was held that 
the decisions of 
the Minister on the 
applications under 
IBC/05 of the first 
and second 
named applicants 
communicated 
were unlawful as 
they were taken in 
breach of the 
Minister's 
obligations under 
section 3(1) of the 
ECHR  Act, 2003, 
as they were 
taken in a manner 
which is not 
compatible with 
the State's 
obligations to the 
third named 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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applicant under 
article 8 of the 
Convention. 
A.D v The 
Director of Public 
Prosecutions 
[2006] IEHC 135 
None specified    Held that the 
applicant was 
entitled to a 
declaration that 
the continued 
prosecution of the 
applicant was in 
breach of Article 
38.1 of the 
Constitution of 
Ireland and the   
European 
Convention on 
Human Rights. 
HC Criminal Law 
Director of Public 
Prosecutions -v- 
Sean Kenny 
[2006] IEHC 330 
Article 6   Held that it would 
not be appropriate 
for the court to 
find the accused 
guilty both of an 
offence under 
Section 49(4) and 
Section 50 of the 
1961 Road Traffic 
Act as the proper 
and effective 
HC Criminal Law 
Road Traffic 
Law 
238 
 
exercise of the 
discretion in this 
regard is 
necessary to 
comply with the 
constitutional 
requirement of fair 
 
procedures and 
the provisions of 
Article 6 of the 
First Schedule of 
the  ECHR. 
Heywood v The 
Attorney General 
[2006] IEHC 455 
Article 6   The Court 
considered the 
application of 
Article 6 ECHR 
and stated that 
must be borne in 
mind that the 
ECtHR had 
determined that 
Article 6 of the 
Convention is not 
applicable to 
extradition 
decisions, given 
that such cases 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
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do not concern 
the determination 
of a person's civil 
rights or 
obligations or of a 
criminal charge. 
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2007 
Case Articles of 
ECHR 
Considered in 
Decision 
Sections of the 
ECHR Act 2003 
Considered in 
the Decision 
EU Charter 
Article  
Core Summary Court Core Legal 
Area 
Gifford v Dublin 
City Council 
[2007] IEHC 387 
Article 6 
Article 8 
Article 13 
Article 14 
Section 2 
Section 5 
 Interlocutory relief 
refused as regards 
preventing DCC 
from taking 
possession of 
plaintiff’s property 
HC Housing Law 
Agbonlahor v. 
Minister for 
Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform 
[2007] IEHC 166; 
[2007] 4 IR 309 
Article 3 
Article 8 
Section 3  The deportation of 
a family with a 
child with Attention 
Deficit 
Hyperactivity 
Disorder (ADHD), 
was not contrary to 
the right for 
respect for private 
and family life 
under Article 8 of 
ECHR.  
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Foy v An 
tArdChlaraitheoir 
& Ors (No 2) 
[2007] IEHC 470; 
Article 8 
Article 12 
Section 2 
Section 3 
Section 5 
 The court issued a 
declaration of 
incompatibility 
pursuant to 
HC Gender Law 
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[2012] 2 IR 1. Section 5 of the 
2003 Act against 
Sections 25, 63 
and 64 of the Act 
of Civil 
Registration Act 
2004, as the 
applicant’s right to 
private and family 
life (as regards 
recognition of her 
acquired gender) 
was violated. 
Existing laws could 
not be interpreted 
in a Convention 
compliant manner.  
O’Donnell (minor) 
v. South Dublin 
County Council 
[2007] IEHC 204; 
[2011] 3 IR 417. 
Article 8 Section 2 
Section 3 
Section 5 
 In failing to provide 
for the plaintiffs’ 
housing needs, the 
defendants had 
breached the 
applicant’s right to 
private and family 
life. In remedying 
breach, damages 
were awarded to 
enable the 
HC Housing Law 
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plaintiffs to buy a 
mobile home. 
Doherty and ors v 
South Dublin 
County Council 
and ors [2007] 
IEHC 4; 
[2007] 2 IR 696 
Article 8 Section 2 
Section 3 
Section 5 
 The failure to 
provide an elderly 
Traveller couple 
with caravan 
accommodation, 
when bricks and 
mortar 
accommodation 
was offered, was 
not contrary to 
Article 8 ECHR.  
HC Housing Law 
 
His Honour Judge 
Mahon v Post 
Publications Ltd. 
[2007] IESC 15; 
[2007] 2 ILRM 1; 
[2007] 3 IR 338 
Article 10(2)   The confidentiality 
orders sought 
would restrict 
freedom of 
expression and 
were not required 
by law pursuant to 
Article 10(2) of the 
European 
Convention on 
Human Rights. 
SC Constitutional 
Law 
T (G) v O (K.A.)  
[2007] IEHC 326 
Article 8 
Article 14 
Section 2 
Section 3  
Section 4 
Section 5 
 An unmarried 
father, who has 
performed duties 
and accepted 
HC Family and Child 
Law 
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responsibilities in 
relation to his child 
- which are 
indistinguishable 
from those carried 
out by a married 
father, should be 
recognised for the 
purposes of article 
2 of the Regulation 
as having `rights of 
custody' in respect 
of that child 
pursuant to article 
8. 
His Honour Judge 
Mahon v Keena 
and Kennedy 
[2007] IEHC 348 
Article 10    Relief granted to 
tribunal as 
defendants’ 
privilege against 
disclosure of 
sources was 
overwhelmingly 
outweighed by the 
pressing social 
need to preserve 
public confidence 
in the Tribunal. 
HC Constitutional 
Law 
Banzuzi  Section 3(1)  Held that credibility HC Asylum and 
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(applicant) v 
Refugee Appeals 
Tribunal, Minister 
for Justice, 
Equality and Law 
Reform, Attorney 
General, Ireland 
(respondents) 
[2007] IEHC 2  
and adverse 
findings were 
deduced by the 
Tribunal since the 
applicant’s version 
of events was not 
plausible. 
Immigration Law 
Director of Public 
Prosecutions 
(Walsh) 
(prosecutor) v 
Cash (accused) 
[2007] IEHC 108; 
[2008] 1 ILRM 443 
Article 6 
Article 8 
  A system of 
exclusion of 
improperly 
obtained evidence 
had to be 
implemented on 
the basis of a 
balancing on 
interests in light of 
Article 6 ad 8 of 
the European 
Convention on 
Human Rights. 
The entire 
rationale for the 
exclusionary rule 
had been 
replaced. Evidence 
resulting from a 
HC Constitutional 
Law 
Criminal Law 
Law of Evidence 
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detention based 
upon a suspicion 
that could not be 
proved as entirely 
lawful was not for 
that reason 
unlawful. 
Director of Public 
Prosecutions v 
Monaghan 
[2007] IEHC 92 
Article 8   The fact that the a 
different person 
complained that 
the person 
ultimately 
prosecuted or the 
fact that the 
person who first 
complained was 
himself 
prosecuted, did not 
affect the ultimate 
interest of the 
community in 
having crime 
punished. 
HC Criminal Law 
Minister for 
Justice v. Busjeva   
[2007] IEHC 341; 
[2007] 3 IR 829 
Article 3   It was necessary 
for clear and 
cogent evidence to 
be established of 
such inhuman or 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
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degrading 
treatment or 
punishment and 
that mere 
speculation or 
uncorroborated 
assertions were 
insufficient. 
Ward v. Minister 
for Justice   
[2007] IEHC 39; 
[2007] 2 IR 726 
Article 6(3)(b) Section 1  The applicant had 
been afforded all 
reasonable access 
to his legal 
advisors to have 
private 
consultations and 
that the actions of 
the prison 
authorities in 
requiring the 
applicant to remain 
handcuffed even if 
he wished to 
speak with his 
legal advisors was 
not unreasonable 
or in breach of his 
legal or 
constitutional 
HC Constitutional 
Law 
Criminal 
Proceedings 
247 
 
rights. 
The Health 
Service Executive 
(plaintiff) v S.S. (A 
minor) 
represented by his 
Guardian Ad 
Litem and next 
friend M.L. 
(defendant)  
[2007] IEHC 189; 
[2008] 1 IR 594 
Article 3 
Article 5 
None specified.  In order to comply 
with rights under 
the Convention 
and the 
Constitution the 
rationale for an 
order for detention 
must be clearly 
identified, must 
have a therapeutic 
or welfare 
purpose, and be 
exercised only in 
circumstances 
where it is for the 
minimum duration. 
The jurisdiction to 
detain a minor may 
only be exercised 
on an interim or 
interlocutory basis 
and only, with 
regular review by 
the courts. 
HC Constitutional 
Law 
Family and Child 
Law 
Grace (plaintiff) v 
Ireland 
(defendant) 
Article 6.1 Section 3  Dismissed the 
plaintiff’s claim that 
a declaration of 
HC Constitutional 
Law 
248 
 
[2007] IEHC 90; 
[2007] 2 ILRM 283 
incompatibility with 
the State’s 
obligations under 
article 6 of the 
European 
Convention on 
Human Rights of 
the relevant 
requirements in 
section 85(4) of 
the Act of 1988 
before he could be 
discharged from 
bankruptcy. 
SOC (minor) 
(plaintiff) v The 
Minister for 
Education and 
Science & Others 
(defendants)  
[2007] IEHC 170 
None specified Section 3  The Minister for 
Education did not 
fail to provide for 
education for an 
autistic child. The 
Minister is obliged 
under the 
Constitution to 
‘provide for 
education’ not to 
‘provide 
education’. As long 
as provision is 
made by the 
HC Constitutional 
Law (Education) 
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Minister for 
‘appropriate 
education’ the 
constitutional duty 
is discharged. 
General and 
special damages 
were ordered in 
some categories.  
Murphy v. Director 
of Public 
Prosecutions 
[2007] IEHC 349; 
[2007] 4 IR 403 
Article 6(1)   Refused the relief 
sought as insofar 
as there was delay 
in this period, it 
was entirely the 
fault of the 
applicant who 
failed to lodge his 
grounds of appeal 
or progress his 
application for 
legal aid 
expeditiously. 
HC Criminal Law 
O (O) (plaintiff) v 
Minister for 
Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform 
(defendant) 
[2007] IEHC 275 
Article 8 
Article 14 
Section 3(1)  Granted leave but 
refused the 
application for an 
interlocutory 
injunction pending 
the determination 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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of the proceedings 
as the threshold by 
which the reliefs 
were considered 
was the low one of 
arguability and not 
that of substantial 
grounds. 
Nascimento v. 
MJELR   
[2007] IEHC 358; 
[2011] 1 IR 1 
 
 
Article 5 Section 5  Refused to give an 
order quashing the 
transfer order as 
the Convention on 
the Transfer of 
Sentenced 
Persons did not 
confer an 
automatic right of 
transfer on a 
sentenced person 
and that the 
decision had not 
been ultra vires or 
irrational.  
HC Criminal Law 
Faherty -v- 
Minister for 
Defence & ors 
[2007] IEHC 371 
Article 6(1)   The Court struck 
out the 
proceedings on the 
basis of inordinate 
and inexcusable 
HC Administrative 
Law 
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delay. 
B. -v- Minister for 
Justice Equality 
and Law Reform 
& ors 
[2007] IEHC 273 
 Section 2 
Section 3 
Section 5 
Section 6 
 Refused the 
applicant leave 
and an order for 
costs was made in 
respect of the 
respondents as the 
judge did not 
accept that the 
proposition that the 
refusal of asylum 
was based upon 
her failure to 
establish that she 
is from Liberia. 
 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Bode (A Minor) v 
Minister for 
Justice [2007] 
IESC 62; 
[2008] 3 IR 663 
Article 8 
Article 14 
Section 3(1)  The IBC 05 
scheme did not 
address any 
constitutional or 
conventional 
rights; there was 
no interference 
with those. The 
making of a 
deportation order 
under s. 3 of the 
Act of 1999 was a 
Supreme Court Asylum and 
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sufficiently wide 
ranging process 
for the respondent 
to exercise his 
duty to consider 
the constitutional 
or convention 
rights of the 
applicants, which 
had yet to be done 
in this case. 
GT v KAO  
[2007] IEHC 326; 
[2007] IESC 55; 
[2008]  3 I.R. 567 
Article 8 
Article 14 
Section 2 
Section 5 
 SC dismissed the 
appeal and 
substituting for the 
order of the High 
Court a single 
declaration that the 
retention by the 
respondent of the 
children in England 
was a wrongful 
retention within the 
meaning of article 
3 of the Hague 
Convention as it 
was in breach of 
rights of custody 
attributed to the 
HC 
SC 
Family and Child 
Law 
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District Court.  
Whelan v. Minister 
for Justice 
[2007] IEHC 374; 
[2008] 2 IR 142 
Article 3 
Article 5 
Article 6 
Section 2 
Section 5 
 Refused the relief 
sought by the 
plaintiffs who had 
been convicted of 
murder holding 
amongst other 
things that hat the 
mandatory life 
sentence provided 
for by s. 2 of the 
Act of 1990 did not 
constitute inhuman 
or degrading 
treatment so as to 
offend article 3 of 
the European 
Convention on 
Human Rights. 
HC Constitutional 
Law 
S.S. (A Minor) v. 
Health Service 
Executive 
[2007] IEHC 189; 
[2008] 1 IR 594 
Article 3 
Article 5 
  The court 
discharged the 
minor to a high 
support unit 
subject to a very 
high level of 
therapeutic and 
educational care 
and with provision 
HC Constitutional 
Law 
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for psychiatric and 
psychological 
supervision. 
D.F. v. McGarty  
[2007] IEHC 467; 
[2009] 3 IR 142 
Article 6 None specified  In circumstances 
where a plaintiff, 
as a matter of 
probability, had 
difficulties with 
repressed memory 
and of coming to 
terms with the 
nature and extent 
of alleged abuse 
as perpetrated 
upon him or her, 
delay by him or her 
in prosecuting his 
claim even if 
inordinate, might 
be excusable. 
HC Legal Practice 
and Procedure 
Institutional 
abuse 
Rockrohan Estate 
Ltd & Richard 
Wood (applicants) 
v Assistant 
Examiner 
Kinironis 
(respondent)  
[2007] IEHC 112 
Article 6 Schedule 1 
Section 5 
 It was held in 
refusing the reliefs 
sought that there 
was no issue of 
unfairness arising. 
HC Banking Law 
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Mannion -v- Legal 
Aid Board & Ors 
[2007] IEHC 413 
Article 6 
Article 13 
Article 14 
None specified   Refused the relief 
sought as it was 
held that there was 
no failure on the 
part of the 
respondents to 
meet the 
requirements of 
natural or 
constitutional 
justice. It was held 
that no case had 
been made out to 
show that the 
provisions of the 
Act were 
repugnant to the 
Constitution or that 
the applicant’s 
constitutional 
rights have been 
violated in anyway 
by any of the 
respondents. 
HC Legal Aid 
Shanaghan & Ors 
-v- P J carroll & 
Ors  
Article 8 None specified   Held that there 
was no alternative 
but to dismiss the 
HC Tort Law 
Administrative 
Law 
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[2007] IEHC 229 plaintiff’s claim for 
want of 
prosecution by 
reason of lapse of 
time pursuant to 
the inherent 
jurisdiction of the 
Court. 
Comcast 
International 
Holdings Inc. & 
Ors -v- Minister 
for Public 
Enterprise & Ors 
[2007] IEHC 297 
Article 6 None specified   Dismissed the 
plaintiff’s claim 
against the State 
as it was held that 
for the Court to be 
asked in 2009 to 
determine primarily 
issues of fact that 
would have 
occurred at the 
time of the 
prospective 
hearing date some 
14 years 
previously, gave 
rise to a basic 
unfairness of 
procedures, 
undermined the 
defendants’ ability 
 Criminal Law  
Administrative 
Law 
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to have a fair trial, 
created a clear 
and patent 
unfairness in 
asking the 
defendants to 
defend the action, 
and clearly failed 
to provide the 
defendants with a 
hearing within a 
reasonable time of 
the alleged cause 
of action having 
occurred. 
A. & Anor -v- 
MJELR & Ors 
[2007] IEHC 393 
Article 1 
Article 2 
Article 3 
Article 8 
None specified   Held that the order 
restraining 
deportation of the 
applicants must be 
discharged: it is a 
matter for the 
Minister to decide 
on the place, time 
and manner of 
deportation of the 
first named 
applicant. Also 
held that there was 
HC Asylum and 
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no “substantial 
ground” for 
contending that the 
Minister’s decision 
was “invalid or 
ought to be 
quashed”. Relief 
refused.  
S.K. & Anor -v- 
Minister for 
Justice Equality & 
Law Reform & Ors 
[2007] IEHC 216 
Article 8 Section 3(1)  The application 
based on the 
applicant’s claim 
for a right of 
residency was 
dismissed as the 
applicant could 
have argued that 
his application 
should be 
examined in this 
State rather than 
Belgium but chose 
not to do so. 
Furthermore, it 
was held that he 
was being 
transferred to a 
jurisdiction that 
would 
HC Asylum and 
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acknowledge, 
respect and have 
due regard to his 
rights under the 
ECHR and there 
was no evidence 
of any difficulty in 
his EU citizen wife 
joining him in 
Belgium.  
M. & Anor -v- 
MJELR & Ors 
[2007] IEHC 234 
Article 3 
Article 8 
  Held that the 
Minister had not 
acted in breach of 
constitutional 
justice and that the 
first named 
applicant had not 
been subjected to 
degrading 
treatment under 
Article 3 of the  
ECHR. Further, it 
was held that the 
degree of delay in 
the case had not  
so prejudiced the 
applicants as to 
breach their rights 
HC Asylum and 
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under Article 41 of 
the Constitution, 
and under Article 8 
of the ECHR. 
Application 
dismissed. 
I. -v- Refugee 
Appeals Tribunal 
& Ors  
[2007] IEHC 72 
 Section 5(1)  Leave to seek 
judicial review was 
granted for various 
reasons including 
that the adverse 
findings contained 
in the decision 
may not have been 
put to the applicant 
and so it was held 
that there is an 
arguable case that 
issues of fair 
procedures and 
Convention rights 
apply in this 
regard. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
McD (J) V L 
(P)M(B)  
[2007] IESC 81; 
[2010] 2 I.R. 199 
Article 8 Section 2 
Section 3 
Section 4 
Section 5 
 The High Court 
had no jurisdiction 
to apply Article 8 
as to the status of 
the respondents 
HC 
SC 
Family Law 
Constitutional 
Law 
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and the child. The 
concept of a de 
facto family did not 
exist under Irish 
law, pursuant to 
Article 8 ECHR. 
Article 8 was not 
engaged as 
regards the 
relationship 
between the father 
and the child. SC 
upheld.  
S. & Ors -v- 
MJELR  
[2007] IEHC 398 
Article 8   Refused relief as it 
was held that there 
had been no 
breach of S’s 
rights under the 
ECHR or the 
Constitution and 
that the decision of 
the Minister was 
taken pursuant to 
the lawful 
operation of 
immigration 
control. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Kennedy -v-  Section 3  The application for  Criminal Law 
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D.P.P. & Anor 
[2007] IEHC 3 
judicial review and 
for directions as 
brought in these 
proceedings was 
refused for various 
reasons.  
Corruption Law 
MJELR -v- 
Raustys 
[2007] IEHC 370 
None specified    Held that the 
respondent had 
not established the 
facts necessary to 
ground his 
submission that 
there were 
reasonable 
grounds for 
believing that his 
fundamental rights 
would be breached 
if he were 
surrendered to 
Lithuania. 
Surrender ordered.  
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
D.P.P.-v- Vincent 
Kelly  
[2007] IECCA 110 
Article 6   Leave to appeal 
was refused as it 
was held that each 
of the 
circumstances 
surrounding the 
CCA Criminal Law 
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applicant’s arrest 
considered in 
isolation, whilst of 
themselves not 
capable of leading 
to a conviction, 
nonetheless 
formed part of a 
matrix of facts to 
which the court 
was entitled to 
have regard 
together with other 
evidence and all of 
which taken 
together would be 
sufficient for a jury 
properly directed 
to convict. 
S. -v- Refugee 
Applications 
Commissioner & 
Ors 
[2007] IEHC 338 
None specified    Refused the 
application as it 
was held that there 
were no 
substantial 
grounds for 
arguing that the 
Applicant’s 
Convention rights 
HC Asylum and 
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had been 
breached by the 
application of the 
O’Keeffe 
principles. 
MJELR -v- M. 
[2007] IEHC 443 
None specified    An order for 
surrender was 
made as it was 
held that there was 
no reason under 
Part III of the Act 
or the Framework 
Decision to prohibit 
the surrender of 
the respondent. 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
Fingal County 
Council -v- Gavin 
& Ors 
[2007] IEHC 444 
None specified    Dismissed the 
defendants’ 
counterclaim as it 
was held that the 
manner in which 
the plaintiff council 
had conducted 
itself in the 
circumstances of 
this case cannot 
be seen as an 
infringement or 
breach of its 
HC Housing Law 
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ECHR obligations 
and duties to the 
defendants, 
provided that in 
deciding upon its 
policies and 
decisions the 
Council had acted 
reasonably which it 
had.  
Muldarry -v- The 
Officer 
Commanding 29th 
Infantry Group 
Kosovo & Ors 
[2007] IEHC 57 
Article 6   Refused the 
application for 
judicial review as it 
was held that the 
applicant’s 
repatriation was for 
legitimate 
administrative 
purposes. 
HC Defence Law 
Administrative 
Law 
D.P.P.-v- Kenneth 
Donohue  
[2007] IECCA 97; 
[2008] 2 IR 193 
Article 6   Held that the 
applicant had not 
made out a case 
that the decision 
involved a point of 
law of exceptional 
public importance 
or that it was 
desirable in the 
CCA Criminal Law 
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public interest that 
an appeal should 
be taken to the 
Supreme Court 
pursuant to 
Section 29 of the 
Courts of Justice 
Act 1924. 
Domican v Axa 
Insurance Limited 
[2007] IEHC 14 
 None specified   The Court was of 
the opinion that the 
actions of AXA 
could not be said 
to be in breach of 
the right to privacy 
guaranteed by the 
ECHR as applied 
in Ireland by the 
ECHR Act 2003. 
Dismissed the 
plaintiff’s claim. 
HC Tort Law 
Constitutional 
Law 
O. & Ors -v- 
MJELR & Ors 
[2007] IEHC 289 
Article 8   Held that no 
substantial 
grounds had been 
established by the 
applicants for relief 
by way of 
declaration, or 
damages or 
HC Asylum and 
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otherwise on the 
Article 8 ECHR 
ground.  
B. -v- Commission 
to Inquire into 
Child Abuse 
[2007] IEHC 376 
Article 6   The refusal of the 
respondents to 
furnish the record 
of Mr. B’s evidence 
was not a breach 
of the applicant’s 
rights under Article 
6(1) as it was held 
that the absolute 
prohibition in s. 
27(1) of the 
Commission to 
Inquire into Child 
Abuse Act of 2002 
is there for sound 
reasons of public 
policy and it does 
not infringe any 
provision of the 
Constitution of 
Ireland or of the 
ECHR and 
correctly construed 
means that the 
respondents could 
HC Institutional/Child 
Abuse Law 
Administrative 
Law 
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not lawfully grant 
the applicant’s 
request for the 
record of Mr. B.’s 
evidence. Relief 
refused.  
Wymes v. Roche 
& Ors  
[2007] IEHC 411 
Article 8   The Court 
accepted that 
Article 8 of the 
ECHR did not 
support the 
plaintiff's claim to 
maintain these 
proceedings. 
HC Contract Law 
G. -v- Minister for 
Justice Equality & 
Law Reform 
[2007] IEHC 231 
Article 8   It was held that an 
injunction would 
not be granted as 
the applicant’s 
Article 8 ECHR 
argument ignored 
the fact that there 
was a valid 
deportation order 
in existence and 
no steps had been 
taken to challenge 
it or to seek its 
revocation on the 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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grounds that it was 
excessive or 
disproportionate or 
otherwise. 
Moreover, it was 
not clear that the 
deportation of the 
applicant would 
see the family 
being sundered 
apart. 
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2008 
Case Articles of ECHR 
Considered in 
Decision 
Sections of the 
ECHR Act 2003 
Considered in 
the Decision 
EU Charter 
Article 
Core Summary Court Core Legal 
Area 
Stephens v Paul 
Flynn  
[2008] IESC 4; 
[2008] 4 IR 31; 
[2008] 4 IR 3 
Article 6  Referred to 
enactment giving 
effect to ECHR 
 Following ECHR 
Act 2003, the 
courts, quite 
independently of 
the action or 
inaction of the 
parties, have an 
obligation to ensure 
that rights and 
liabilities, civil or 
criminal, are 
determined within a 
reasonable time. 
SC Legal Practice 
and Procedure 
(Delay) 
Donegan v Dublin 
City Council  
[2008] IEHC 288 
Article 8 Section 2 
Section 3 
Section 5 
 S. 62 of the Act of 
1966 was 
incompatible with 
Article 8 ECHR and 
the incompatibility 
could not be 
circumvented by 
reason of s. 2 of 
the Act of 2003. S. 
HC Constitutional 
Law 
Housing Law 
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3 of the Act of 2003 
provided no 
comfort to the 
plaintiff. May be 
remedy for 
damages pursuant 
to s5(4) of 2003 
Act. 
Oguekwe v 
Minister for 
Justice   
[2008] IESC 25; 
[2008] 3 IR 795 
Article 8 Section 3  The Minister is 
required in this 
process to consider 
the constitutional 
and Convention 
rights of the 
applicants. This 
includes express 
consideration of, 
and a reasoned 
decision on, the 
rights of the Irish 
citizen child. 
SC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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Pullen & Others v 
Dublin City 
Council & Others 
[2008] IEHC 379 
Article 6 
Article 8 
Article 14 
Article 1 Protocol 
1 
Section 2 
Section 3(1) 
Section 5 
 The defendants 
were an organ of 
the State for the 
purposes of s. 3 of 
the Act of 2003 and 
the use of s. 62 of 
the Housing Act did 
not afford the 
plaintiffs an 
opportunity to 
dispute the 
lawfulness or the 
proportionality of 
the decision of the 
defendant to evict 
them and was thus 
in breach of Article 
8 ECHR. 
HC Housing Law 
Landlord and 
Tenant Law 
B.J.N. v Minister 
for Justice 
[2008] IEHC 8; 
[2008] 3 IR 305 
Article 2 
Article 8 
Article 5 
Article 13 
Section 2 
Section 3 
 In the absence of a 
positive obligation 
on the State to 
provide medical 
treatment, there 
was no interference 
by the respondent, 
in making or 
refusing to revoke 
the deportation 
HC Asylum and 
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order, with the 
exercise of the 
applicant's right to 
respect for her 
private life as 
protected by article 
8. 
Leonard v Dublin 
City Council 
[2008] IEHC 79 
Article 3 
Article 6 
Article 8 
Article 13 
Article 14 
Section 5  The European 
Court of Human 
Rights had 
established that a 
wide margin of 
appreciate was 
afforded to a State 
in allocating 
housing resources 
and balancing 
conflicting interests 
in this regard. 
HC Housing Law 
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Kelly v Director of 
Equality Tribunal 
[2008] IEHC 112 
Article 6 Section 3   S3 of the 2003 Act 
only brought the 
plaintiffs 
entitlement to 
damages into being 
as and from the 1st 
day of January, 
2004. Court had 
regard to the 
events that 
preceded this time 
but not to award 
damages in respect 
thereof as the 
delay in hearing the 
case was not 
unreasonable. 
HC Equality Law 
Dublin City 
Council v Liam 
Gallagher 
 [2008] IEHC 354 
Article 6 
Article 8 
Section 5  Granted a 
declaration 
pursuant to section 
5 of the 2003 Act 
that s. 62 of the 
Housing Act 1966 
was incompatible 
with the 
Convention. 
Breach of Articles 6 
and 8 rights.  
HC Housing Law 
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A (P) and E (E) 
(minor) 
(applicants) . v. 
Minister for 
Justice, Equality 
& Law Reform & 
Others 
(respondents) 
and Human 
Rights 
Commission 
(notice party)  
[2008] IEHC 359 
Article 8 Section 3  Relief refused as 
the unity of the 
family was never in 
danger therefore 
there was no 
potential 
interference with 
the applicant’s 
rights under Article 
8 of the European 
Convention on 
Human Rights. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Minister for 
justice, Equality 
and Law Reform 
(applicant) v 
McCague 
(respondent) 
[2008] IEHC 154; 
[2010] 1 IR 456 
Article 13 Section 4 None 
specified  
Ordered surrender 
on the basis that 
the respondent was 
fully represented by 
both solicitor and 
counsel when he 
sought an 
adjournment and it 
had to be 
presumed that the 
procedures 
available in the 
issuing state met 
the minimum 
standards 
HC Criminal Law 
European Arrest 
Warrant 
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guaranteed under 
the Convention 
 
Weston 
(applicant) v An 
Bord Pleanala 
(respondent) 
[2008] IEHC 71; 
[2008] 2 ILRM 
542 
Article 1 Protocol 
1 
Section 3  Granted order for 
judicial review as 
there was an 
obligation to state 
reasons for the 
condition clearly, 
cogently, in a 
manner to 
eliminate a 
reasonably held 
doubt as to 
whether there had 
been an error in 
law, a 
misunderstanding 
or other unlawful 
basis for the 
condition. 
HC Planning Law 
 
277 
 
O’C. (R) 
(applicant) v. 
Minister for 
Justice, Equality 
& Law Reform 
(respondent)  
[2008] IEHC 367 
Article 8   There was no 
breach of the 
principle of family 
unity under the 
Article 8 rights of a 
failed asylum 
seeker who was 
the father of Irish 
citizen children.  
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Constitutional 
Law 
O (OL) (Minor) 
(applicant) v. 
Refugee 
Applications 
Commissioner 
(respondent)  
[2008] IEHC 307 
Article 8   The proposed 
deportation of the 
Irish citizen 
children’s mother’s 
cousin was not an 
interference with 
their private life so 
as to engage 
Article 8 of the 
European 
Convention on 
Human Rights. 
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D(J) (applicant) v. 
Residential 
Institutions 
Review 
Committee 
(respondent)   
[2008] IEHC 350; 
[2009] 2 ILRM 65 
Article 8 
Article 13 
Article 14 
Section 2  Definition of “child” 
in Residential 
Institutions 
Redress Act 2002 
struck down as the 
setting of an age 
limit was inherently 
discriminatory and 
the burden of proof 
had shifted to the 
State to justify the 
distinction. It had 
not been 
demonstrated that 
the decision to limit 
the scheme to 
those under 
eighteen years of 
age had a 
legitimate 
legislative purpose. 
HC Constitutional 
Law 
Equality Law 
279 
 
I (J) (applicant) v 
Refugee Appeals 
Tribunal and 
Others 
(respondents)  
[2008] IEHC 395 
 Section 3(1)  Refused the 
respondent's 
application for 
leave to appeal as 
the point of law 
arising in order to 
justify the granting 
of leave to appeal 
must be one of 
more than usual 
general 
importance. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
O'Sullivan v. 
Superintendent in 
Charge of Togher 
Garda Station  
[2008] IEHC 78; 
[2008] 4 IR 212 
Article 7   Held the applicants' 
right to apply for 
restoration accrued 
after the repeal of 
the old s. 29 of the 
Act of 1961, they 
acquired the right 
to apply prior to its 
repeal and 
therefore 
maintained their 
entitlement to apply 
to the District Court 
for the restoration 
of their driving 
licences. 
HC Road Traffic 
Law 
280 
 
McFarlane v. 
Director of Public 
Prosecutions 
[2008] IESC 7; 
[2008] 4 IR 117 
Article 6 None specified   Dismissed the 
appeal of the HC’s 
decision that no 
consequences 
flowed from the 
delays in the 
proceedings which 
interfered with any 
interest which the 
applicant's right to 
an expeditious trial 
was intended to 
protect. 
SC Criminal Law 
I. -v- Refugee 
Appeals Tribunal 
& ors 
[2008] IEHC 345 
Article 13 Section 3(1) 
Section 5(1) 
 Application for 
leave to apply for 
judicial review was 
refused as the 
decision of the 
Tribunal member 
was rational and 
lawful.  
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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Gibbons -v- 
Governor of 
Wheatfield Prison 
[2008] IEHC 206 
 Section 3  Refused an order 
of certiorari 
quashing the order 
of the Governor 
made in 
disciplinary 
proceedings 
conducted by the 
respondent in 
respect of an 
allegation of 
misconduct against 
the applicant in 
Wheatfield Prison. 
HC Administrative 
Law 
F.N. v. Minister 
for Justice    
[2008] IEHC 107; 
[2009] 1 IR 88 
Article 3 
Article 8 
Section 3(1)  Nothing in Council 
Directive No. 
2004/83/EC 
required that the 
decision making 
process as to 
whether a non-
citizen was entitled 
to subsidiary 
protection should 
be the same as 
that for refugee 
status. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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Ayavoro 
(applicant) v. 
Health Service 
Executive and 
Minister for Social 
and Family Affairs 
(respondent) 
[2009] IEHC 66 
Article 3 
Article 13 
  The relief sought 
would be refused in 
both sets of 
proceedings as 
there was no 
negligence on the 
part of the officials 
as to the 
entitlement to the 
social welfare 
allowance and the 
reliance on article 3 
was wholly 
misplaced. 
HC Social Welfare 
Law 
M.N. v. R.N. 
(hearing a child) 
[2008] IEHC 382; 
[2009] 1 IR 388 
  Article 24  Granted an 
interlocutory order 
that the child be 
provided with an 
opportunity to be 
heard during the 
proceedings in 
accordance with 
article 11(2) of 
Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 
2201/2003. 
HC Family and Child 
Law 
283 
 
N(M) (applicant) 
v. N(R) 
(respondent)  
[2008] IEHC 382 
  Article 24 An order was made 
to allow the child to 
be heard and the 
Court would obtain 
a professional 
assessment of the 
maturity of the 
child.  
HC Family and Child 
Law 
R. -v- R. [2008] 
IEHC 162 
  Article 24 Held that the 
applicant is entitled 
to a declaration 
that the minor was 
wrongfully removed 
from the jurisdiction 
of the Republic of 
Latvia within the 
meaning of Article 
3 of the Hague 
Convention and 
made an order for 
the return of the 
minor to the 
Republic of Latvia. 
However a stay 
was put on this 
order subject to 
conditions until the 
HC Family and Child 
Law 
Child Abduction 
Law 
284 
 
matter comes 
before the Latvian 
Court. 
Dimbo -v- 
Minister for 
Justice Equality 
and Law Reform 
[2008] IESC 26 
Article 8 Section 3(1)  It was held that the 
criteria of the IBC 
05 Scheme 
included a 
requirement of 
continuous 
residence and the 
Minister was acting 
within the 
parameters of the 
Scheme in refusing 
residence on that 
basis and so the 
appeal of the 
Minister was 
allowed and the 
High Court decision 
reversed.   Affirmed 
the decision of the 
HC Asylum and 
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High Court as to 
the orders for 
deportation but for 
somewhat different 
reasons to the High 
Court judge. 
Mc D. -v- L. & 
Anor  
[2008] IEHC 96; 
[2010] 2 IR 199 
Article 1 
Article 8 
Article 13 
Article 35 
Section 2 
Section 5 
 The application by 
A for an order 
appointing him 
guardian of an 
infant, D, whom he 
had helped to 
conceive by way of 
a sperm donation 
was refused as the 
infant D was being 
brought up by a 
single sex couple 
forming a de facto 
family and it was 
held by the Court, 
taking account of 
the paramount 
welfare interests of 
the child, that it 
HC Family and Child 
Law 
286 
 
was highly 
probable that the 
integrity of this 
family would be 
seriously and even 
possibly fatally 
broken by such 
guardianship 
orders in this case.  
Montemuino -v- 
Minister for 
Communications 
& Ors 
[2008] IEHC 157; 
[2009] 1 ILRM 
218 
Article 6 
Article 13 
Article 14 
Section 5(1)  Held that the 
mandatory sanction 
is a proportionate 
penalty and that 
the applicant had 
failed to establish a 
breach of rights or 
an entitlement to 
any of the reliefs 
sought in these 
proceedings. 
HC Fisheries Law 
Administrative 
Law 
287 
 
E. & Anor -v- 
MJELR 
[2008] IEHC 68; 
[2008] 3 IR 760 
Article 8 None specified   Held that this was 
precisely the type 
of case that 
merited the 
granting of an 
injunction given 
that the purpose of 
the proceedings is 
to seek to vindicate 
and protect the 
applicant’s 
constitutional rights 
to the care and 
support of his 
natural father. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Dooley & Ors -v- 
Killarney Town 
Council & Anor 
[2008] IEHC 242 
Article 3 
Article 8 
Article 14 
  Held that there had 
not been a breach 
of Convention 
rights under Article 
3 or Article 8 of the 
Convention as it 
had not been 
established that the 
respondents were 
simply permitting 
the applicants to 
needlessly 
languish, without 
HC Housing Law 
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any justification, in 
conditions which 
are such as to 
amount to inhuman 
or degrading 
treatment, or 
lacking in respect 
for their private and 
family life.  
S. -v- Refugee 
Applications 
Commissioner & 
Anor 
[2008] IEHC 399 
Article 6(1)   Held that the 
applicant not 
established 
substantial grounds 
for contending that 
the procedure at 
the ORAC stage 
was so flawed as to 
require intervention 
by way of judicial 
review and that no 
arguable grounds 
had been 
established for 
suggesting that the 
statute that so 
provides is 
unconstitutional, or 
incompatible with 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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the ECHR. Leave 
refused.  
Bula Ltd (in 
receivership) & 
Ors -v- Tara 
Mines Ltd & Ors 
[2008] IEHC 437 
Article 6   Granted the relief 
sought by the 
Minister as it was 
held there was 
good reason for the 
delay on the part of 
the Minister in 
relation to the 
failure to execute 
before the period of 
six years had 
elapsed since the 
judgment or order 
was made and that 
there was no 
relevant prejudice 
suffered by Bula as 
a result of the 
delay. 
HC Court Practice 
and Procedure 
Administrative 
Law 
Receivership 
Law 
290 
 
MJELR -v- 
Gheorgie & Anor 
[2008] IEHC 115 
Article 8   An order for 
surrender was 
made on the basis 
of several reasons 
including there 
could be no basis 
for the contention 
that persons, who 
have by 
absconding settled 
in another 
jurisdiction, could 
not be the subject 
of a surrender 
order pursuant to 
extradition or 
surrender 
arrangements 
entered into 
between states. 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
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I. & Ors -v- 
MJELR  
[2008] IEHC 23 
Article 3   Held that the 
applicants had 
failed to establish 
any basis for 
judicial review and 
refused the relief 
sought.  
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
B. -v- Mental 
Health (Criminal 
Law) Review 
Board & Ors 
[2008] IEHC 303 
Article 5 Section 2(1) 
Section 3(1) 
 Held that the 
applicant’s current 
status did not 
offend against 
Article 5 of the 
Convention for the 
Protection of 
Human Rights and 
Fundamental 
Freedoms, 1950 
and that s. 13 of 
the Criminal Law 
(Insanity) Act of 
2006 was not 
incompatible with it. 
HC Criminal Law 
Mental Health 
Law 
292 
 
U. & Ors -v- 
MJELR & Ors 
[2008] IEHC 385 
Article 8   Held that the 
applicants had not 
established 
substantial grounds 
and refused to 
grant leave. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
N. -v- MJELR & 
Ors 
[2008] IEHC 8 
Article 2 
Article 3 
Article 5 
Article 8 
Article 13 
Section 2  Refused relief as it 
was held that that 
there would be no 
interference by a 
public authority 
with the exercise of 
the applicant’s right 
to respect for his 
private life in the 
absence of a 
positive obligation 
upon the State to 
provide medical 
treatment of the 
kind which the 
applicant was 
undergoing, and 
even if there was 
such interference 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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the consequences 
were not of such 
gravity as to 
engage the 
operation of article 
8. 
Ahern -v- Judge 
Mahon & Ors  
[2008] IEHC 119; 
2009] 1 ILRM 
458; [2008] 4 IR 
704 
Article 6   Mr. Ahern was 
entitled to a 
declaration that he 
is entitled to claim 
Legal Professional 
Privilege, as 
protected by Article 
6 ECHR, in respect 
of the documents 
set forth in the 
second part of the 
First Schedule to 
his affidavit of 
discovery. 
HC Constitutional 
Law 
Administrative 
Law 
294 
 
T. -v- MJELR 
[2008] IEHC 361 
Article 8   The Court 
concluded that 
save for 
exceptional 
circumstances, a 
two year delay in 
arranging the 
reunification of the 
family of a person 
granted refugee 
status is an 
acceptable delay in 
the light of both 
Article 8 of the 
ECHR and the role 
of the family which 
is enshrined at the 
heart of the Irish 
Constitution. Held 
that the Minister 
has acted 
unlawfully and in 
breach of fair 
procedures and 
granted the reliefs 
sought. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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MJELR -v- Ollsen 
[2008] IEHC 37 
None specified    Held that the 
respondent had not 
satisfied the Court 
that there was 
reason to believe 
that his 
constitutional or 
ECHR rights would 
be breached if he 
was surrendered. 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
T. -v- MJELR & 
Ors  
[2008] IEHC 384 
Article 8   Held that the 
analysing officer’s 
consideration of the 
applicant’s right to 
respect for his 
private life under 
Article 8 ECHR 
was wholly 
sufficient. 
Substantial 
grounds had not 
been established. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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O. & Ors -v- 
MJELR  
[2008] IEHC 80 
Article 8   Granted leave to 
the applicant G.O. 
to argue that the 
refusal of the 
Minister to revoke 
the deportation 
order was in 
breach of the family 
rights of the Third 
to Seventh 
applicants 
guaranteed by 
Article 8 of the 
ECHR. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Evans & Ors -v- 
Carlyle 
[2008] IEHC 143; 
[2008] 2 ILRM 
359 
   The right to 
freedom of 
expression is 
protected both by 
article 10 of the 
ECHR and by 
Article 40.6.1. of 
the Irish 
Constitution. It was 
the opinion of the 
Court that it, 
therefore, should 
be very slow to 
restrict, either prior 
HC Constitutional 
Law 
Planning and 
Development 
Law 
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to or after 
publication, the 
continuing exercise 
of this right. 
Lawlor -v- 
Planning Tribunal 
[2008] IEHC 282 
None specified   Held that there was 
no claim in these 
proceedings for a 
declaration of 
incompatibility with 
the ECHR. 
HC Planning and 
Development 
Law 
O. & Ors -v- 
MJELR & Ors 
[2008] IEHC 433 
Article 8   Held that if there 
was any 
requirement to 
have regard to the 
applicants’ right 
under Article 8 
ECHR to respect 
for their private life, 
the analysing 
officers complied 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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with that 
requirement. 
 
 
 
 
2009 
Case Articles of 
ECHR 
Considered in 
Decision 
Sections of the 
ECHR Act 2003 
Considered in 
the Decision 
Charter 
Article 
Core Summary Court Core Legal 
Area 
Byrne v Dublin City 
Council 
 [2009] IEHC 122 
Article 6 
Article 8 
Article 13 
Article 14 
Section 1 
Section 3 
 Interlocutory 
injunction granted 
preventing 
removal of 
applicant from 
local authority 
accommodation 
HC Housing Law 
Carmody v Minister  Section 5  The question of SC Criminal Law 
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for Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform 
[2009] IESC 71; 
[2010] 1 ILRM 157; 
[2010] 1 IR 635 
the compatibility of 
s. 2 with s. 5 of the 
Act of 2003 did not 
accordingly arise 
in light of the 
conclusions of the 
Court. 
Legal Aid 
Pullen v. Dublin City 
Council (No. 3) 
[2009] IEHC 452 
 
 
Article 6 
Article 8 
Article 13 
Section 2 
Section 3 
Section 4 
Section 5(2)(a) 
 Awarded damages 
to recompense 
them for all of the 
effects of the 
wrongful breach by 
the defendant of 
their Convention 
rights. 
HC Landlord and 
Tenant Law 
D (J) v Residential 
Institutions Redress 
Committee  
[2009] IESC 59 
Article 8 
Article 14 
Section 5  Pursuant to 
Section 5 of the 
Act of 2003 that 
the definition of a 
child in section 1 
of the Residential 
Institutions 
Redress Act of 
2002 was 
compatible with 
the obligations of 
the State pursuant 
to the European 
SC Constitutional 
Law 
Equality Law 
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Convention on 
Human Rights. 
The alleged abuse 
had occurred 
before the entry 
into force of the 
Act of 2003, which 
did not apply 
retrospectively. 
F(S) (applicant) v. 
Her Honour Judge 
Yvonne Murphy, 
Director of Public 
Prosecutions, 
Ireland and the 
Attorney General 
(respondent) 
 [2009] IEHC 497 
Article 6 Section 2 
Section 3 
Section 4 
Section 5 
 Held that the trial 
judge’s decision 
did not violate he 
presumption of 
innocence. The 
trial judge acted 
fairly and correctly. 
HC Criminal Law 
Administrative 
Law 
E.H. v. Clinical 
Director of St. 
Vincent's Hospital 
[2009] IESC 46; 
[2009] 3 IR 774; 
[2009] 2 ILRM 149 
Article 5(1) Section 2(1)  Appeal dismissed 
on grounds that 
the definition of 
voluntary patient 
was not framed in 
terms of a person 
who freely and 
voluntarily gave 
consent to an 
admission order 
SC Mental Health 
Law 
301 
 
but rather 
someone who was 
not the subject of 
an admission or 
renewal order. 
A (M) (applicant) v 
Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law 
Reform (respondent) 
[2009] IEHC 245 
 
Article 8 Section 3  Relief granted as 
the respondent 
had failed to make 
a sufficiently 
considered 
assessment of 
whether the 
proposed 
deportation would 
breach Article 8 of 
the European 
Convention on 
Human Rights. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Henry Ugbelase and 
Others applicants) v 
Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law 
Reform (respondent) 
[2009] IEHC 598; 
[2010] 4 IR 233 
Article 8   Respect for private 
life and family life 
under Article 8 of 
the ECHR did not, 
as such, preclude 
the exercise by the 
State of its 
sovereign right to 
control the entry 
and presence in 
HC Constitutional 
Law 
302 
 
the State of foreign 
nationals 
including, in 
necessary cases, 
the expulsion from 
the State of a non-
national parent of 
such a child. 
Elena Nkem Falvey, 
Nathan Eze Iwuoma 
and Steve Chidi 
Iwuoma (applicants) 
v Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law 
Reform 
(respondents)  
[2009] IEHC 528 
Article 8   The third-named 
applicant, having 
failed in an 
application for 
asylum, was not 
entitled to assert a 
choice of 
residence. The 
examination of the 
relevant file 
showed a careful 
and extensive 
examination of the 
rights of the 
applicants, their 
circumstances and 
the effect on them 
of a deportation 
order. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
V (P). (a minor) v Article 6 None specified  The proceedings HC Family and 
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The Courts Service, 
Minister for Justice 
and Others  
[2009] IEHC 321 
were moot as the 
applicant’s mother 
had already 
obtained relief in 
the District Court 
in the form of an 
order for her to 
retain the 
applicant’s 
passport to 
prevent the 
applicant’s father 
from removing him 
from the 
jurisdiction. 
Child Law 
Murphy v. Director of 
Public Prosecutions 
[2009] IESC 53; 
[2009] 3 IR 821 
Article 6(1)   Allowed the appeal 
as regards the 
membership of an 
unlawful 
organisation 
charge an granted 
an injunction 
prohibiting trial on 
that charge but 
dismissed the 
appeal on all other 
grounds as the the 
delay in the 
SC Criminal Law 
304 
 
prosecution could 
not be described 
as inordinate, nor 
was it 
blameworthy.  
V. (I.) (Minor) 
(applicant) v Minister 
for Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform 
(respondents)  
[2009] IEHC 108 
Article 8   Refused relief in 
the form of leave 
to seek judicial 
review of the 
decisions 
deporting them 
from the State and 
held that the rights 
of the applicants 
under article 8 of 
the Convention 
had been 
addressed. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
S.(W) (applicant) v 
Adoption Board 
(respondent)  
[2009] IEHC 429 
Article 6 
Article 8 
Section 2 
Section 3 
 Granted an order 
of certiorari of the 
decision of the 
respondent 
making an 
adoption order in 
respect of the 
applicant’s 
daughter to her 
mother's new 
HC Adoption Law 
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husband on the 
grounds that it had 
failed to notify him 
of the application 
for the said 
adoption order as 
an article 8 
relationship 
existed between 
the natural father 
and his daughter. 
I (S) (applicant) v 
Refugee Appeals 
Tribunal 
(respondent)  
[2009] IEHC 8 
Article 8 Section 3  Refused leave to 
seek judicial 
review of the 
decisions of to 
refuse their 
appeals against 
the 
recommendation 
of the Refugee 
Applications 
Commissioner that 
they be refused 
asylum and the 
decisions to refuse 
their applications 
for subsidiary 
protection and to 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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deport them. 
L (CL) (applicant) v. 
Refugee Appeals 
Tribunal and Minister 
for Justice Equality 
and Law Reform 
(respondents)  
[2009] IEHC 26 
Article 8 Section 3  Refused leave to 
seek judicial 
review of the 
decisions of to 
refuse their 
appeals against 
the 
recommendation 
of the Refugee 
Applications 
Commissioner that 
they be refused 
asylum and the 
decisions to refuse 
their applications 
for subsidiary 
protection. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
E. F. I. v Refugee 
Appeals Tribunal 
and MJELR 
[2009] IEHC 94 
Article 8 Section 3  Refused leave to 
seek judicial 
review of the 
decisions of to 
refuse their 
appeals against 
the 
recommendation 
of the Refugee 
Applications 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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Commissioner that 
they be refused 
asylum and the 
decisions to refuse 
their applications 
for subsidiary 
protection. 
O.F. v. Judge 
O’Donnell 
[2009] IEHC 142; 
[2012] 3 IR 483  
Article 2 
Article 3 
Article 6 
Article 13 
Section 2 
Section 5 
 Refused to make 
the costs orders 
sought as a judge 
should not be 
joined as a 
respondent in 
judicial review 
proceedings 
unless there was 
an allegation of 
mala fides or 
impropriety and an 
order for costs 
should not be 
made against a 
judge. 
HC Administrative 
Law 
Family Law 
L. & Anor -v- MJELR 
& Anor 
[2009] IEHC 107 
Article 8 
Article 13 
Section 5(1)  Application 
dismissed as there 
was no error of law 
on the part of the 
Minister and his 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
308 
 
decision was a 
rational exercise of 
his discretion 
which the court 
cannot interfere. 
Carmody v Minister 
for Justice  
[2009] IESC 71; 
[2010] 1 IR 635 
 Section 5  Appeal allowed 
and in declaring 
that the plaintiff 
had a 
constitutional right 
to apply, prior to 
being tried, for 
legal aid to include 
solicitor and 
counsel in criminal 
proceedings 
brought against 
him in the District 
Court and to have 
that application 
heard and 
determined on its 
merits. 
SC Constitutional 
Law 
Legal Aid 
J.D. v Residential 
Institutions Redress 
Review Committee 
[2009] IESC 59; 
[2010] 1 IR 262 
Article 8 
Article 14  
Section 2  The provisions of 
the European 
Convention on 
Human Rights Act 
2003 did not have 
SC Constitutional 
Law 
Equality Law 
309 
 
the effect of 
retrospectively 
applying the 
provisions of the 
Convention to 
abuse that 
occurred prior to 
its entry into force. 
Ugbelase v. Minister 
for Justice  
[2009] IEHC 598; 
[2010] 4 IR 233 
Article 8   Relief refused on 
the grounds that 
that the 
Constitution did 
not accord to the 
unborn child any of 
the unspecified 
personal rights 
enjoyed by the 
child when born a 
citizen. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Constitutional 
Law 
O. & Ors -v- MJELR 
[2009] IEHC 448; 
[2010] 2 IR 144 
Article 8 Section 3  Dismissed an 
application to 
quash the 
deportation order 
as the Minister, 
when considering 
making a 
deportation order, 
required a 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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substantial reason 
which had to be 
one associated 
with the common 
good and was 
proportionate to 
the end sought to 
be achieved. 
Mahon v. Keena  
and Kennedy 
[2009] IESC 64 and 
78; 
[2010] 1 IR 336; 
[2009] 2 ILRM 373 
Article 10 Section 2(1) 
Section 3(1) 
Section 4 
 Allowed the appeal 
by the journalist 
defendants holding 
that they were did 
not have to 
disclose their 
sources as they 
were protected by 
journalistic 
privilege.  
SC Media Law 
Walsh v. Minister for 
Justice   
[2009] IEHC 102; 
[2010] 2 IR 463 
Article 1 
Article 6(3)(c) 
Article 13 
Article 14 
Section 2  Relief refused to a 
barrister who had 
not been paid for 
legal aid given 
under reg. 11(5), 
as his name had 
not been on the 
legal aid panel 
when the trial 
commenced and 
HC Criminal Law 
Legal Aid 
311 
 
who submitted that 
the provision 
should be given be 
given a purposive 
interpretation.  
Alli (a minor) v. 
Minister for Justice    
[2009] IEHC 595; 
[2010] 4 IR 45 
Article 8 None specified   Refused to make 
an order quashing 
the deportation of 
the father of an 
Irish citizen child 
and refused 
declaratory relief 
that there had 
been a breach of 
Constitutional or 
Convention family 
rights. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
The People (DPP) v. 
Norris 
[2009] IECCA 27; 
[2011] 2 IR 112 
Article 6(1)   Refused leave to 
appeal against 
conviction  as the 
test to be applied 
in considering 
objective bias of a 
juror had not been 
met. 
CCA Criminal Law 
Constitutional 
Law 
N. -v- N. 
[2009] IEHC 213 
  Article 24(3) Held in the light of 
the judgments 
referred to and the 
HC Family and 
Child Law 
 
312 
 
court’s finding in 
relation to the 
child’s objection, 
that the Court 
should exercise its 
discretion in favour 
of the applicant in 
directing the return 
of the child to 
Lithuania. A stay 
was placed on the 
order to allow the 
matter to be heard 
by the Lithuanian 
Court.  
Roche -v- Roche & 
ors 
 [2009] IESC 82 
  Article 3  It was held that the 
applicant did not 
succeed on any of 
the constitutional 
or contractual 
grounds in relation 
to the frozen 
embryos and so 
the appeal was 
dismissed.  
SC Constitutional 
Law 
Li. -v- La.  
[2009] IEHC 585 
  Article 24(3) Held that there 
was insufficient 
evidence to justify 
HC Family and 
Child Law 
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not returning the 
children at this 
time.  
Redmond -v- Ireland 
& Anor  
[2009] IEHC 201; 
[2009] 2 ILRM 419 
Article 6 None specified   Held that s. 3(2) of 
the Offences 
Against the State 
(Amendment) Act 
1972 is not 
unconstitutional or, 
indeed, contrary to 
the Convention on 
Human Rights. 
HC Criminal Law 
O. -v- MJELR  
[2009] IEHC 1236/ 
[2009] IEHC 148 
Article 8   Refused leave for 
Judicial Review as 
it was held that 
that there were no 
substantial 
grounds for 
arguing that there 
was any 
entitlement to 
assert family life 
rights under Article 
8 of the European 
Convention in the 
particular 
circumstances of 
this case and that 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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the analysis 
conducted on 
behalf of the 
respondent 
Minister was not 
incorrect. 
DPP -v- Don 
Bullman 
[2009] IECCA 84 
Article 6 Section 2 
Section 4 
 The applicant was 
refused leave to 
appeal on each of 
the grounds upon 
which he relied on 
the application for 
leave for various 
reasons including 
that the court was 
satisfied that the 
provisions of 
section 3 of the 
OAS (Amendment) 
Act 1972, properly 
applied, and 
having regard to 
the protections 
enumerated in the 
decision did not 
infringe Article 6 of 
the ECHR. 
CCA Criminal Law 
Administrative 
Law 
S. -v- Refugee Article 8 Section 1  The reliefs sought HC Asylum and 
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Appeals Tribunal 
[2009] IEHC 17 
Section 3 were refused as it 
was held that the 
applicant’s Article 
8 rights arise for 
consideration at 
the pre-deportation 
order stage and 
not at the RAT 
stage and 
therefore the 
Tribunal Member 
acted in 
compliance with 
fair procedures 
and in accordance 
with natural and 
constitutional 
justice; she did not 
act in breach of 
her obligations 
under s.3 of the 
ECHR Act of 2003. 
Immigration Law 
O'Neill & Ors -v- An 
Taoiseach & Ors 
[2009] IEHC 119 
Article 2   Allowed the 
defendants’ appeal 
as it was held that 
the plaintiffs had 
failed to establish 
that discovery of 
 Constitutional 
Law 
Court Practice 
and Procedure 
316 
 
the archive of the 
MacEntee 
Commission was 
either relevant or 
necessary in the 
context of the 
substantive 
proceedings. It 
was further held 
that the archive is 
subject to statutory 
privilege which 
prohibits its 
disclosure to the 
plaintiffs. 
Curtin & Ors -v- The 
Irish Coursing Club 
[2009] IEHC 175 
Article 6 Schedule 1  Held that an Order 
for discovery in the 
terms sought 
would go far 
beyond what fair 
procedures would 
require, and what 
the case law 
considered proper. 
 Administrative 
Law 
Civil Procedure 
Mc Cann -v- Judges 
of Monahan District 
Court & Ors 
[2009] IEHC 276; 
Article 1, 
Protocol 4 
Article 6 
Section 2 
Section 3(2) 
Section 5 
 Held that s. 6 of 
the Act of 1940 
was invalid having 
regard to the 
HC Criminal Law 
Court Practice 
and Procedure 
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[2009] 4 IR 200 provisions of the 
Constitution and, 
in particular, the 
provisions of 
Article 34, Article 
40.3 and Article 
40.4.1. This finding 
of invalidity in 
relation to s. 6 
means that the 
District Court had 
no jurisdiction to 
make the 2005 
order. An order 
was thus made to 
quash the order.  
O'B. [a minor] -v- 
MJELR & Ors 
[2009] IEHC 423 
Article 8   Reliefs sought 
were refused as it 
was held that the 
lack of a public 
register for 
guardianship 
agreements was 
not a breach of 
any of the 
applicant’s 
Constitutional or 
Convention rights. 
HC Family and 
Child Law 
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C. (A. P. U. M. ) -v- 
Mc. G. & Ors 
 [2009] IEHC 438 
Article 6(1) Section 4  Held that the delay 
in this case was 
excusable, and 
even if it were not 
that this was a 
case where the 
balance of justice 
favoured 
permitting the 
plaintiff to proceed. 
HC Administrative 
Law 
Institutional 
Abuse 
Pop & Ors -v- Judge 
Smyth & Ors  
[2009] IEHC 523 
Article 6 
Article 8 
  Held that the 
respondents acted 
at all relevant 
times within 
jurisdiction and 
that the applicants 
had failed to 
demonstrate that 
there were any 
reasonable, 
arguable or 
weighty grounds 
that would justify 
granting any of the 
reliefs claimed. 
 Criminal Law 
Administrative 
Law 
I. & Ors -v- MJELR 
[2009] IEHC 61 
Article 3   Refused the 
application for 
several reasons 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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which included 
that it was held 
that the 
respondent gave 
sufficient reasons 
for his decision, 
having regard to 
his limited role and 
that his decision 
was a correct 
application of the 
law.  
O. B. & Ors -v- 
MJELR 
[2007 IEHC 430] 
None specified   Held that the 
applicants were 
not entitled to 
engage in forum 
shopping by 
seeking a new 
hearing in a new 
venue in the hope 
of getting a 
different result, 
they had not made 
out a case for 
judicial review and 
so the reliefs 
sought were 
declined.  
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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K. - M. & Anor -v- 
MJELR & Ors  
[2009] IEHC 125 
Article 3   Refused to extend 
the time in favour 
of the second 
named applicant 
for the bringing of 
an application to 
seek leave to 
commence judicial 
review 
proceedings and 
held that there was 
insufficient 
persuasive weight 
in any of the points 
raised in the 
application for 
judicial review that 
were ably argued 
on behalf of the 
first and second 
named applicants. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Fortune -v- The 
Revenue 
Commissioners 
[2009] IEHC 28 
Article 6   Refused the reliefs 
sought for various 
reasons including 
that the applicant’s 
arguments under 
Article 6 ECHR 
failed.  
HC Revenue Law 
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I. & Anor -v- MJELR 
[2009] IEHC 334 
Article 3 
Article 8 
Section 3(1)  Held that none of 
the grounds had 
been made out 
and the application 
was therefore 
refused. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Walsh Western 
Computer Services -
v- Companies Acts 
[2009] IEHC 505 
Article 6   Granted the relief 
sought and 
dismissed the 
proceedings on 
the basis of 
inordinate and 
inexcusable delay, 
pursuant to the 
inherent 
jurisdiction of the 
court to control its 
own procedure. 
HC Company Law 
Greenstar Ltd -v- 
Dublin City Council 
& Ors 
[2009] IEHC 589 
Article 6   Rejected the 
arguments made 
by Greenstar and 
came to various 
conclusions 
including that by 
failing to provide 
an oral hearing 
during the 
consultation 
HC Waste 
Management 
Law 
Administrative 
Law 
322 
 
process, the 
respondents had 
not breached fair 
procedures or any 
constitutional or 
conventional rights 
of the applicant. 
H. -v- Clinical 
Director of St. 
Vincents Hospital & 
Ors 
[2009] IEHC 69 
Article 5 Section 2  Held that the 
admission order 
made pursuant to 
s. 24[3] of the 
Mental Health Act 
of 2001, was in all 
respects valid and 
so there was no 
basis for 
suggesting that the 
detention of the 
applicant pursuant 
to the renewal 
order was illegal. 
HC Mental Health 
Law 
Constitutional 
Law 
DPP -v- Feichín 
Hannon  
[2009] IECCA 43; 
[2009] 4 IR 147; 
[2009] 2 ILRM 235 
Article 3, 
Protocol 7 
Section 2 
Section 2 
Schedule 5 
 The court held, 
having considered 
Article 3 Protocol 7 
ECHR, that the 
applicant was 
entitled to a 
certificate since a 
CCA Criminal Law 
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fact which is both 
new and newly 
discovered - the 
complainant’s 
confession of 
having fabricated 
the allegation - 
shows that his 
conviction was a 
miscarriage of 
justice. 
J. Harris Assemblers 
-v- D. P. P.  
[2009] IEHC 344 
Article 6   The Court 
recognised the 
clear and 
unmistakable duty 
on the State under 
Article 6 ECHR, to 
conduct the 
administrative 
aspects of a 
criminal 
investigation 
efficiently and 
without undue 
delay but held that 
that the period of 
blameworthy delay 
which did occur in 
HC Health and 
Safety Law 
Criminal Law 
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the present case 
was not of 
sufficient gravity to 
warrant the 
prohibition of the 
applicant’s trial 
given the public 
interest in the 
matter. 
O'F. [otherwise F.] -
v- MJELR & Ors 
[2009] IEHC 496 
Article 6   Held that to allow 
a trial to proceed 
in such 
circumstances 
would be in clear 
violation of the 
constitutional 
requirements of 
fairness of 
procedures and 
the State’s 
international 
obligations under 
Article 6 of the 
ECHR for a trial 
within a 
reasonable time. 
HC Criminal Law 
Administrative 
Law 
Asibor (a minor) & 
Ors -v- MJELR 
Article 8   It was clear to the 
Court from the 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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[2009] IEHC 594 jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR on the 
Article 8 rights of 
persons who seek 
to resist 
deportation or 
expulsion 
demonstrate that 
the Minister acted 
in accordance with 
law when he 
assessed the 
proportionality of 
the decision to 
deport Mr Asibor 
by reference to 
those questions. 
Kudelska -v- An 
Bord Altranais  
[2009] IEHC 68 
Article 6   The Court rejected 
the applicant’s 
submission that 
she has been 
denied her rights 
of natural and 
constitutional 
justice, or indeed 
those under Article 
6 of the ECHR as 
she was afforded 
HC Fitness to 
Practice  
Employment 
Law 
326 
 
every possible 
opportunity to 
make her case 
throughout the 
proceedings. 
Minister for Justice 
Equality and Law 
Reform -v- 
Gheorghe & anor 
[2009] IESC 76 
Article 8   With regard to 
Article 8 ECHR, it 
was held that no 
authority had been 
produced to 
support the 
proposition that 
surrender was to 
be refused where 
a person will, as a 
consequence, 
suffered 
disruption, even 
severe disruption 
of family 
relationships. 
SC European Arrest 
Warrant 
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2010 
Case Articles of 
ECHR 
Considered in 
Decision 
Sections of the 
ECHR Act 2003 
Considered in 
the Decision 
Charter 
Article 
Core Summary Court Core Legal 
Area 
Quinn v Athlone 
Town Council & 
Others  
 [2010] IEHC 270 
Article 8 None specified   When the local 
authority reaches 
a decision to serve 
a notice to quit, 
this is the time at 
which a person's 
article 8 rights are 
engaged and is 
the point in time 
where an 
applicant should 
move to challenge 
the decision of the 
local authority but 
the applicant 
delayed here and 
so was out of time. 
HC Constitutional 
Law 
Administrative 
Law 
Housing Law 
O(S) O(O) & Others 
O(O) v Minister for 
Justice, Equality and 
Law Reform  
[2010] IEHC 343  
Article 8 None specified   No substantial 
grounds had been 
made out as to the 
illegality of the 
Contested Order. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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Khalimov (applicant) 
v. Minister for 
Justice, Equality & 
Law Reform, Ireland 
and the Attorney 
General 
(Respondents)  
[2010] IEHC 91;  
Article 8 Section 3(1)  Relief refused as 
the applicant could 
not impugn the 
validity of the 
decision refusing 
him a long stay 
visa on the basis 
that the failure to 
consider his 
Article 8 family 
rights as such 
rights did not exist 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
A (O) (applicant) v 
Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law 
Reform (respondent) 
[2010] IEHC 268 
Article 3 
Article 8 
Schedule 1  Refused the 
application as 
having considered 
the country of 
origin information 
it was rationally 
and reasonably 
open to the 
respondent to 
reach the 
conclusions he 
arrived at 
regarding Articles 
3 and 8 of the 
Convention. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
J. McB. v. L.E. Article 8  Article 7 An unmarried HC Family and 
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[2010] IEHC 123; 
[2010] 4 IR 433 
Article 14 Article 21 father’s right to 
respect for family 
life had not been 
breached by the 
removal of his 
children from the 
jurisdiction and his 
rights had been 
protected by the 
provision of a 
procedure under 
which he could 
have applied to 
the courts for 
guardianship. 
Child Law 
E.T. v. Clinical 
Director, Central 
Mental Hospital   
[2010] IEHC 378; 
[2010] 4 IR 403 
Article 3 
Article 8 
  It was held that 
the delay in 
admitting the 
psychiatrically ill 
applicant 
combined with the 
conditions of her 
confinement in an 
approved centre 
and the availability 
of better treatment 
in the Central 
Mental Hospital 
HC Mental Health 
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did not constitute 
a breach of her 
rights.  
Minister for Justice 
v. Gorman 
[2010] IEHC 210; 
[2010] 3 IR 583 
Article 8 
Article 5(1)(f) 
Section 2 
Section 4 
 Refused to order 
the surrender of 
the respondent to 
the UK authorities 
as the surrender 
of the respondent 
would constitute 
an interference 
with his family 
rights. 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
Moore and Moore v 
Dun Laoghaire - 
Rathdown County 
Council  
[2010] IEHC 466 
Article 8 Section 2 
Section 4 
 Refused to issue 
an order to quash 
a warrant as doing 
so would not be 
disproportionate 
and the court in its 
discretion would 
refuse the reliefs 
being sought by 
the applicants. 
HC Land Law 
Administrative 
Law 
Landlord and 
Tenant Law 
S. (O.O.) (applicant) 
v Minister for 
Justice, Equality & 
Law Reform 
(respondent)  
Article 8   Refused leave to 
seek judicial 
review of the 
decision of the 
respondent 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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[2010] IEHC 173 refusing his 
application for 
leave to remain in 
the State as no 
information had 
been put before 
the respondent to 
support the view 
that the situation 
between the 
applicant and his 
purported father 
went beyond 
normal emotional 
ties. 
S (F. K.) (applicant) 
v The Refugee 
Appeals Tribunal 
and the Minister for 
Justice, Equality and 
Law Reform 
(respondent) 
[2010] IEHC 136 
Not actually 
raised in the 
pleadings.  
  Application 
rejected as the 
issue raised was 
only a procedural 
one which did not 
affect rights 
generally or the 
validity of the 
asylum process as 
a whole. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Constitutional 
Law 
L (Q) & Y (Y) 
(applicants) v. 
Minister for Justice, 
Article 8 Section 3  Court order 
granting leave to 
seek the 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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Equality & Law 
Reform (respondent)  
[2010] IEHC 223 
declaratory relief 
sought but leave 
was refused by 
way of mandamus 
and no 
interlocutory 
inunction was 
granted. 
Neville v. South 
Dublin County 
Council 
[2010] IEHC 67; 
[2010] 4 IR 309 
Article 8   Granted a 
declaration that 
the eviction of the 
applicant was 
unlawful and held 
that as the County 
Council had 
exercised its 
statutory function 
in doing so that it 
was amenable to 
judicial review.  
HC Housing Law 
Landlord and 
Tenant Law 
Collins B. Oladapo 
and Ors (applicants) 
v Minister for 
Justice, Equality and 
Law Reform 
(respondents)  
[2010] IEHC 88 
Article 8 Section 3  Application for 
leave to seek 
judicial review was 
refused as a 
detailed and 
meticulous 
consideration had 
been given to all 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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the matters that 
had been put 
before the 
Minister. 
Criminal Assets 
Bureau (applicant) v. 
MacAviation Limited 
and McG. & McG. 
(Respondents)  
[2010] IEHC 121 
Article 6(1) None specified  Held that there 
was no basis for 
contending that 
the hearing would 
imperil the right to 
a fair trial as 
publicity centred 
on the applicants 
in another 
jurisdiction would 
not prejudice the 
trial.  
HC Constitutional 
Law 
Civil Procedure 
O'Sullivan v. Irish 
Prison Service   
[2010] IEHC 301; 
[2010] 4 IR 562 
Article 6(1) 
Article 13 
Article 14 
 Article 47 Dismissed the 
application 
alleging breaches 
of the applicant’s 
rights and found 
that s. 16(12) of 
the European 
Arrest Warrant Act 
2003, as 
amended, was not 
repugnant to the 
provisions of the 
HC Legal Practice 
and Procedure 
European Arrest 
Warrant 
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Constitution. 
Minister for Justice, 
Equality & Law 
Reform (applicant) v. 
Pollak (respondent)  
[2010] IEHC 209; 
[2010] 3 IR 699 
Article 2 
Article 3 
Article 15 
 Article 18 
Article 19 
Held that there 
could be no 
question but that 
the surrender of 
the respondent 
was prohibited by 
reason of his 
extant refugee 
status 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Lynch (appellant) 
and Whelan 
(appellant) v. 
Minister for Justice, 
Equality & Law 
Reform, Ireland and 
the Attorney General 
(Respondents)   
[2010] IESC 34; 
[2012] 1 IR 1 
Article 3 Section 5  A mandatory life 
sentence issued 
was ruled not to 
be incompatible 
with ECHR law.  
SC Constitutional 
Law 
Criminal Law 
Foy v Governor of 
Cloverhill Prison  
[2010] IEHC 529; 
[2012] 1 IR 37 
Article 8   Refused the 
application as 
there were 
weighty factors to 
justify the 
restriction on 
physical contact 
between prisoners 
HC Administrative 
Law 
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and family 
members and 
those factors were 
not contradicted 
by the applicant by 
way of expert 
evidence or 
otherwise. 
J.E. v. Minister for 
Justice   
[2010] IEHC 372; 
[2011] 1 IR 574 
Article 3 
Article 8 
  Refused leave to 
seek an order of 
certiorari quashing 
the deportation 
order as the 
obligation on the 
respondent to give 
reasons for a 
decision did not 
involve the need 
for any detailed or 
narrative 
statement. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Digital Rights Ireland 
Ltd. v. Minister for 
Communications 
[2010] IEHC 221; 
[2010] 3 IR 251 
Article 6(1) 
Article 8 
Article 10 
Article 12 
 Article 7 
Article 8 
Article 11 
Article 41 
Granted the 
plaintiff locus 
standi to bring an 
actio popularis 
;refused the 
defendants' 
motion for security 
HC Constitutional 
Law 
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for costs; and 
granted the 
plaintiff's motion 
for a reference to 
the European 
Court of Justice.  
Kelly v. National 
University of Ireland 
(U.C.D.) 
[2010] IEHC 48; 
[2011] 4 IR 478 
Article 6   Refused as 
application 
seeking an 
amendment on the 
basis that the 
order failed to 
reflect the court's 
ruling or intention 
the court had 
jurisdiction to alter 
or amend a 
perfected order 
where there had 
either been an 
accidental slip in 
the order as drawn 
up or, in 
exceptional 
circumstances, 
where the order 
did not accurately 
represent the 
HC Legal Practice 
and Procedure 
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judgment and 
intention of the 
court. 
The People (DPP) v. 
Smyth Snr. 
[2010] IECCA 34; 
[2010] 3 IR 688 
Article 6(2)   Allowing the 
appeal and 
ordering a retrial 
of both accused 
as s. 29(2) of the 
Misuse of Drugs 
Act 1977 cast a 
burden of proof on 
the accused which 
was discharged on 
the lowest 
standard of proof, 
namely that of 
proving a 
reasonable doubt 
that the accused 
did not know, and 
had no reasonable 
ground of 
suspecting that 
what he had in his 
possession was a 
controlled drug. 
CCA Criminal Law 
Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law 
Article 3   Outlined the 
appropriate test to 
CCA European Arrest 
Warrant 
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Reform -v- Rettinger 
[2010] IESC 45 
be used and 
remitted the 
matter to the trial 
judge to apply the 
test.  
Mannion -v- Legal 
Aid Board & anor 
[2010] IESC 9 
Article 6 
Article 13 
Article 14 
Section 3(1)  Dismissed the 
appeal and 
affirmed the 
decision of the 
High Court in 
relation to the 
applicant’s legal 
aid.  
HC Legal Aid 
Ugbo & Anor -v- 
MJELR & Ors 
[2010] IEHC 355 
Article 8 
Article 13 
  Application was 
refused as the 
Court is not 
satisfied that the 
point of law 
identified by the 
applicants 
warrants 
certification under 
s. 5(3) of the 
Illegal Immigrants 
(Trafficking) Act of 
2000. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law  
Rodenhuis and 
Verloop B.V. v HDS 
Article 6  None specified  The principles 
applicable to the 
HC Legal Practice 
and Procedure 
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Energy Ltd.  
[2010] IEHC 465; 
[2011] 1 IR 611 
exercise by the 
court of its 
inherent 
jurisdiction to 
dismiss 
proceedings for 
delay were a rule 
of law in the sense 
given to that 
phrase by the 
European 
Convention on 
Human Rights Act 
2003. 
Contract Law 
Doherty v 
Government of 
Ireland 
[2010] IEHC 369; 
[2011] 2 I.R. 222 
Protocol 1, Article 
3 
Section 2  The applicant was 
entitled to seek 
judicial review in a 
limited declaratory 
form on the issue 
as to whether or 
not a lengthy 
delay in moving 
the writ for the by-
election in 
question might be 
said to infringe his 
rights to 
representation and 
HC Constitutional 
Law 
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equality of political 
representation.  
Byrne v. An 
Taoiseach  
 [2010] IEHC 353; 
[2011] 1 IR 190 
Article 2 
Article 6 
Article 13 
Section 2 
Section 3 
Section 4 
Section 5 
Section 9 
 ECHR provisions 
were enforceable 
under domestic 
law in Irish courts 
only insofar as 
they were 
statutorily 
enforceable under 
the provisions of 
the European 
Convention on 
Human Rights Act 
2003. the 
European 
Convention on 
Human Rights Act 
2003 could not be 
seen as having 
retrospective 
effect or as 
affecting past 
events. 
HC Constitutional 
Law 
The People (DPP) v. 
O’Brien 
[2010] IECCA 103; 
[2011] 1 IR 273 
Article 6 Section 2 
Section 4 
 Refused leave to 
appeal as there 
were no grounds 
upon which it 
CCA Constitutional 
Law 
Criminal Law 
Law of Evidence 
341 
 
could be said that 
there was any 
infringement of 
any constitutional 
right arising from 
the alleged breach 
of the guarantee 
that a trial would 
be "in due course 
of law", since the 
right to cross-
examine was fully 
vindicated. 
Dellway Investments 
Ltd. v. NAMA  
[2010] IEHC 364, 
[2011] IESC 4, 
[2011] IESC 13 & 
[2011] IESC 14; 
[2011] 4 IR 1  
Article 6 Section 5 Article 47 Allowed the 
appeal on the 
grounds that no 
valid decision to 
acquire the loans 
had been made by 
NAMA. 
HC 
SC 
Constitutional 
Law 
Land Law 
L. v. Kennedy  
[2010] IEHC 195;  
[2011] 2 IR 124 
Article 5(1)   Upheld the legality 
of the applicant's 
detention as there 
was no absolute 
right to discharge 
where a person 
who was 
sentenced to 
HC Criminal Law 
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detention pursuant 
to the Criminal 
Law (Insanity) Act 
2006 then ceased 
to suffer from a 
mental disorder 
within the meaning 
of the Mental 
Health Act 2001. 
Lynch & Whelan v. 
Minister for Justice   
[2010] IESC 34; 
[2012] 1 IR 1 
Article 3 
Article 5 
Article 6 
Section 5(1)  A mandatory life 
sentence imposed 
in accordance with 
law as punishment 
for an offence was 
not in itself 
prohibited by or 
incompatible with 
any article of the 
European 
Convention on 
Human Rights and 
would not offend 
against article 3 of 
the Convention 
where the national 
law afforded the 
possibility of 
review of a life 
SC Constitutional 
Law 
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sentence with a 
view to its 
commutation, 
remission, 
termination or the 
conditional release 
of the prisoner. 
Adeniron & Others 
(applicants) v. 
Minister for Justice, 
Equality & Law 
Reform, Attorney 
General and Ireland 
(respondents)  
[2010] IEHC 92 
Article 8 Section 3(1)  The Court was 
satisfied that the 
applicants had not 
established 
substantial 
grounds for leave 
and the suspicion 
remained that the 
challenge was a 
delaying tactic. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Minister for Justice 
v. Dillon 
[2010] IEHC 196; 
[2011] 3 IR 536 
  Article 50 Granted consent 
to proceedings 
being brought 
against the 
respondent in the 
United Kingdom 
as double 
jeopardy did not 
apply.  
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
(Appealed to the 
SC and heard 
on 17th 
November 
2010; appeal 
dismissed and 
HC order 
affirmed). 
Tagni -v- MJELR Article 6  Article 41 grant the applicant HC Asylum and 
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[2010] IEHC 85 a Declaration that 
the respondent 
was guilty of a 
failing to render 
his decision on the 
review 
commenced on 
the 27th of 
November 2008 
within a 
reasonable time 
but dismissed all 
other aspects of 
the applicant’s 
claim.  
Immigration Law 
An Taoiseach -v- 
Commissioner for 
Environmental 
Information  
[2010] IEHC 241 
Articles 6-13  Article 47 Allowed the 
appeal, set aside 
the determination 
of the respondent 
and granted 
several 
declarations. 
HC Environmental 
Law 
J. McB. -v- L.E. 
[2010] IESC 48 
Article 8 Section 2 
Section 4(1)(a) 
Article 7 
Article 52.3 
Held that there 
was nothing in the 
text of Regulation 
No 2201/2003 or 
in Article 7 of the 
Charter of 
SC Family and 
Child Law 
345 
 
Fundamental 
Rights to suggest 
that a natural 
father should be 
recognised as 
having custody 
rights for the 
purposes of 
decisions on 
wrongful removal 
in cases of child 
abduction in the 
absence of a 
judgment of a 
court made in the 
country of habitual 
residence of the 
children 
determining such 
rights. 
Mc Dermott -v- 
Governor of 
Cloverhill Prison & 
Ors  
[2010] IEHC 324 
Article 13 Section 5(2)(a) Article 47 Held that the 
applicant did not 
have locus standi 
to challenge the 
adequacy of the 
Attorney General’s 
Scheme, such 
challenge being a 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
346 
 
jus tertii, and in 
circumstances 
where s. 16(12) 
EAWA 2003 is not 
a prima facie 
breach of any of 
the applicant’s 
rights, there was 
no need to enter 
into a 
consideration of its 
proportionality. 
A.Bu. -v- J.Be.  
[2010] IESC 38; 
 [2010] 3 IR 737 
  Article 24 Affirmed the 
decision that it 
was inappropriate 
that the child be 
heard and refused 
the application to 
the Court. 
HC Child Abduction 
Law 
Family and 
Child Law 
Murray -v- 
Newsgroup 
Newspapers Ltd & 
Ors [2010] IEHC 248 
Article 8 
Article 10 
Section 1 
Section 2(1) 
Section 3 
 Held that the 
plaintiff had not 
demonstrated by 
the necessary 
evidence that 
there was a real 
risk to his life or 
that he was likely 
to succeed at the 
 Constitutional 
Law 
Media Law 
347 
 
trial of the action 
in further 
prohibiting the 
publication of 
information 
concerning him by 
the defendant 
newspapers and 
so the reliefs 
sought were 
refused as the 
applicant had not 
demonstrated that 
he was entitled to 
them.  
C. A. B. -v- O'Brien 
& Anor 
[2010] IEHC 12 
Article 8(2) Section 3(1)  It was held that 
the applicant’s 
application for a s. 
3 order in relation 
to the second 
named 
respondent’s 
family home was 
not improper and 
in seeking such an 
order the applicant 
was performing its 
functions in a 
HC Criminal Assets 
Law 
348 
 
manner 
compatible with 
this State’s 
obligations under 
the ECHR Act 
2003.  
Meadows -v- 
Minister for Justice 
Equality and Law 
Reform 
[2010] IESC 3; 
[2010] 2 IR 701; 
[2010] 2 IR 201 
None specified   Held that the 
O’Keeffe standard 
is the correct 
standard to be 
applied in a case 
such as the 
present and 
refused leave to 
seek judicial 
review for various 
reasons.  
SC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Mulligan -v- 
Governor of 
Portlaoise Prison & 
Anor  
[2010] IEHC 269 
Article 3 
Article 8 
Section 3  Held that the case 
fails as there is no 
jurisprudence from 
the ECtHR, 
Northern Ireland, 
or Scots Courts 
which makes out 
the proposition 
that the absence 
of in-cell sanitation 
or “slopping-out” 
HC Constitutional 
Law 
349 
 
per se constitutes 
a violation of 
Article 3 and that 
there is no breach 
of Article 8 by 
reference to any 
case law.  
Dowling & Ors -v- 
Judge Brennan & 
Anor 
[2010] IEHC 522 
Article 6.3   Held that there 
had been no 
breach of Article 
6.3 ECHR and the 
Court therefore 
reject the first 
named applicant’s 
application. It was 
further held that 
the second, third 
and fourth named 
applicants had not 
established that 
they faced a real 
or serious risk of 
an unfair trial and 
their application 
was dismissed 
accordingly.  
HC Administrative 
Law 
Road Traffic 
Law 
Dokie -v- D. P. P. 
[2010] IEHC 110 
Article 6   Granted an 
injunction 
 Criminal Law 
350 
 
restraining the 
respondent from 
taking any further 
steps in the 
prosecution 
proceedings and 
also a declaration 
that s.12 of the 
Immigration Act 
2004 was 
inconsistent with 
the provisions of 
Bunreacht na 
hEireann and in 
particular Article 
38.1 and Article 
40.4.1. 
D.P.P.-v- Derek 
Wade  
[2010] IECCA 114 
Article 8 Section 2 
Section 4 
 Held that the 
learned trial judge 
had acted within 
the law as regards 
the handling of the 
evidence. 
Application 
dismissed.  
CCA Criminal Law 
Criminal Assets 
Bureau -v- W. & 
Anor 
Article 8 Section 2(1)  Held that all of the 
items identified in 
the schedule to 
HC Criminal Assets 
Law 
351 
 
[2010] IEHC 166 the originating 
notice of motion 
were purchased or 
obtained or funded 
either directly or 
indirectly from the 
criminal activities 
of the first named 
respondent and 
constituted 
proceeds of crime. 
It was held that a 
s. 3 order should 
be made in 
respect of each of 
the six items set 
forth to the 
originating notice 
of motion. 
F. & Ors -v- MJELR 
[2010] IEHC 457 
Article 8 
Article 13 
None specified   Held that the 
points of law 
raised did not give 
rise to any issues 
which would meet 
the criteria for a 
certificate to be 
granted. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
H. -v- A. None specified    Held that relief HC Family Law 
352 
 
[2010] IEHC 497 could not be 
granted for several 
reasons including 
that polygamous 
marriage is at 
odds with the 
institution of 
marriage as 
understood in this 
country and 
protected by the 
Constitution. 
Matrimonial Law 
X. & Anor -v- MJELR 
[2010] IEHC 446 
Article 8 Section 5(1)  Quashed the 
decision of the 
Minister for 
various reasons 
including that it 
was held that so 
far as the 
dependency 
criterion was 
concerned, the 
Minister had 
applied the wrong 
legal test. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
N. & Ors -v- MJELR 
& Ors 
 [2010] IEHC 250 
Article 8   There was not a 
breach of Article 8 
ECHR rights here 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
353 
 
as the Court found 
that the 
memorandum 
analysis was 
clearly correct in 
concluding that, 
should they have 
wished to do so, 
the applicants as a 
family had an 
available choice of 
maintaining the 
family as a unit. 
B. (a minor) & Ors -
v- MJELR 
 [2010] IEHC 296 
Article 8 
Article 13 
  It was the opinion 
of the Court that 
the scope of the 
jurisdiction of the 
High Court in 
reviewing the 
legality of a 
decision made 
under s. 3 of the 
1999 Act clearly 
fulfils the criteria 
established by the 
case law of the 
Strasbourg Court 
for the provision of 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
354 
 
an effective 
remedy before a 
national authority 
in accordance with 
Article 13. 
A. (a minor) & Ors -
v- MJELR & Ors 
[2010] IEHC 297 
Article 8   Held no fair issue 
has been 
established under 
Article ECHR or 
otherwise for trial 
in this case. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Kangethe -v- MJLR 
[2010] IEHC 351 
Article 8   Held that no 
arguable case 
under Article 8 
ECHR or 
otherwise had 
been made out 
here to 
demonstrate that 
the 
implementation of 
the deportation 
had become illegal 
by reason of the 
changed 
circumstances. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
S. & Ors -v-MJELR 
[2010] IEHC 433 
Article 8   Held that even if it 
is accepted that in 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
355 
 
appropriate 
circumstances a 
child in foster care 
can assert an 
entitlement to the 
protection of rights 
in the nature of 
“family life” for the 
purposes of Article 
8 of the ECHR the 
Minister had not 
failed to consider 
fully and correctly 
the substance of 
the relationships 
which formed the 
subject of the 
representations 
made to him in the 
request for 
revocation. 
O. (a minor) & Ors -
v- MJLR  
[2010] IEHC 521 
Article 8 Section 5  Held that no 
arguable case had 
been made out as 
regards Article 8 
of the ECHR and 
therefore there 
was no arguable 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
356 
 
case for judicial 
review. 
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2011 
Case Articles of ECHR 
Considered in 
Decision 
Sections of the 
ECHR Act 2003 
Considered in 
the Decision 
EU Charter 
Article 
Core Summary Court Core Legal 
Area 
EFE v. The 
Minister for 
Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform 
[2011] IEHC 214, 
[2011] 2IR 798 
Article 8 
Article 13 
Section 5  Judicial Review 
mechanisms for 
receipt of new 
evidence 
compatible under 
art 13 of ECHR 
therefore no basis 
for granting a 
declaration of 
incompatibility 
pursuant to s. 5(2) 
of the Act of 2003. 
HC Constitutional 
Law 
Immigration 
Law of Evidence 
 
Wadria v. 
Minister for 
Justice   
[2011] IEHC 60; 
[2011] 3 IR 53 
Article 3 
Article 8 
Section 3  The Minister had 
fulfilled his 
undertaking to 
reconsider the 
implementation of 
the transfer order 
of an asylum 
seeker and had 
acted lawfully in 
exercising such 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
358 
 
function as 
required to be 
discharged under 
art. 20(1) of the 
Dublin II 
Regulation in a 
manner 
compatible with 
his duty under s. 3 
of the European 
Convention on 
Human Rights Act 
2003. 
O'Connor -v- 
Judge O'Neill & 
Ors  
[2011] IEHC 118; 
[2011] 4 IR 578 
Article 5 
Article 6 
  That under article 
5(2) it was 
sufficient if a 
detainee was 
informed in 
general terms of 
the reasons for the 
arrest and any 
charge against 
him or her. Under 
art. 6(3)(a), he 
protection 
guaranteed did not 
extend to the 
provision of details 
HC Criminal Law 
(Road Traffic) 
359 
 
of any possible 
defences to the 
charge. Article 
6(3)(b) protected, 
inter alia , the right 
to adequate 
facilities for the 
preparation of a 
defence, which 
entailed that the 
accused should 
have the 
opportunity to 
organise his or her 
defence properly. 
E.D. (A MINOR) 
v. Refugee 
Appeals Tribunal   
[2011] IEHC 431;  
[2011] 3 IR 736 
Article 2 Protocol 
1 
 Article 14 The potential 
denial of a basic 
education to the 
applicant if 
returned to their 
country of origin 
constituted a 
sufficiently severe 
violation of basic 
human rights 
amounting to 
persecution within 
the meaning of s. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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2 of the Refugee 
Act of 1996. 
Murphy v Ireland  
[2011] IEHC 536 
Article 6 
Article 13 
Article 14 
Section 1  The plaintiff had 
not established 
any locus standi to 
maintain the 
action which was 
that the certificate 
issued by the DDP 
and sending him 
forward for trial by 
the Special 
Criminal Court 
operated to 
deprive him of the 
constitutional right 
to a trial before a 
judge and jury. 
HC Criminal Law 
Albion Properties 
Ltd. v. Moonblast 
Ltd   
[2011] IEHC 107; 
[2011] 3 IR 563 
Article 13 Section 3(1)  Granted a 
mandatory 
interlocutory 
injunction to order 
a tenant to vacate 
a retail unit as in 
circumstances 
where the first 
defendant was in 
clear default in 
HC Landlord and 
Tenant Law 
361 
 
respect of its 
obligation to pay 
rent, it was 
appropriate to 
grant mandatory 
interlocutory relief. 
The Minister for 
Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform 
(applicant) v 
Marcin Sawczuk 
(respondent)  
[2011] IEHC 41 
Article 3   Granted the order 
of surrender to the 
Polish authorities 
as up to date 
information had 
been submitted to 
dispel any 
concerns raised 
by the respondent 
regarding his 
rights under the 
European 
Convention on 
Human Rights. 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
Egan (applicant) 
v. An Bord 
Pleanala 
(respondent) and 
Athlone Town 
Council (Notice 
Party)  
[2011] IEHC 44 
Article 6(1) None specified  Leave for review 
was refused as 
decision of the 
Board consenting 
to the notice 
party's compulsory 
acquisition of a 
property pursuant 
HC Planning and 
Development 
Law 
362 
 
to s. 16 Derelict 
Sites Act 1990 
was well within its 
jurisdiction and the 
challenge brought 
was 
unsustainable. 
Health Service 
Executive 
(plaintiff) v J. O'B 
(A Person of 
Unsound Mind 
Not So Found) 
(respondent)  
[2011] IEHC 73 
 
Article 5(1)   An order for 
detention at the 
Central Mental 
Hospital was 
made as where an 
adult lacked 
capacity and 
where there was a 
legislative lacuna 
the Court had 
jurisdiction to 
intervene. 
HC Mental Health 
Medical Law 
Noel Brohoon 
(plaintiff) v 
Ireland, The 
Attorney General 
and The Director 
of Public 
Prosecutions 
(defendants) 
 [2011] IEHC 74 
Article 6 
Article 14 
  It was held in 
dismissing the 
case that 
procedural 
disparities might 
be appropriate to 
take account of 
the quite different 
considerations 
HC Criminal Law 
Constitutional 
Law 
363 
 
facing prosecution 
and defence and 
the absence of a 
right of appeal for 
a defendant would 
not necessarily 
offend the equality 
guarantee 
contained in 
Article 40.1 of the 
Constitution. 
E (O) (applicant) 
v Refugee 
Appeals Tribunal 
and Others 
(respondents)  
[2011] IEHC 149 
 None specified  Dismissed the 
application as the 
applicant had not 
shown good and 
sufficient reasons 
to allow the court 
to exercise its 
discretion to 
extend the time for 
the bringing of the 
application 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
S (B) and others 
v The Minister for 
Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform 
 [2011] IEHC 417 
Article 8   Granted the relief 
sought in 
quashing the 
deportation order 
as the 
identification of the 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
364 
 
constitutional 
rights involved and 
the significantly 
changed 
circumstances 
was not followed 
by a true 
examination of the 
case. 
Minister for 
Justice v. D.L. 
[2011] IEHC 248; 
[2011] 3 IR 145 
Article 8  Article 24 Refused the 
application for 
postponement, of 
surrender to the 
Polish authorities 
as an applicant for 
postponement of 
surrender has to 
adduce evidence 
of humanitarian 
grounds 
warranting the 
postponement. 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
In the Matter of 
Cathriona 
McAnaspie and 
Others  
[2011] IEHC 477 
Article 2 
Article 6(1) 
  It was held that a 
care order expired 
upon the death of 
the child 
concerned and 
that whether the in 
HC Family and Child 
Law 
365 
 
camera rule 
applied 
mandatorily or by 
way of judicial 
discretion did not 
affect the authority 
of the court to 
permit disclosure 
of protected 
information where 
justice required it. 
A (T) and Others 
(applicants) v 
Minister for 
Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform 
(respondent)  
[2011] IEHC 9 
Article 8   Leave for an order 
of certiorari to 
quash the 
deportation was 
given for the first 
applicant as the 
Minister did not 
pay due regard to 
the unusual 
features of the 
particular family. 
Relief was refused 
for the second 
applicant as his 
case was 
distinguishable 
from that of the 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
366 
 
first named 
applicant.  
Health Services 
Executive v. M.X.   
[2011] IEHC 326; 
[2012] 1 IR 81 
Article 3 
Article 5 
Article 6 
Article 8 
Article 13 
Article 14 
Section 2 
Section 3 
Section 4 
Section 6 
 It was clear that 
the primary 
constitutional 
values engaged 
were the necessity 
for safeguarding 
the defendant's life 
and health. It was 
the duty of the 
court to apply an 
objective test as to 
best interests. The 
evidence 
coercively showed 
that the proposed 
medical regime 
was in the 
plaintiff's best 
interest. The 
vindication of 
those rights had to 
take precedence 
over autonomy 
and liberty. 
HC Mental Health 
Law 
Markey v. 
Minister for 
Article 6   Refused the 
declaration sought 
HC Constitutional 
Law 
367 
 
Justice 
[2011] IEHC 39; 
[2012] 1 IR 62 
in holding that 
there was no rule 
of law or 
requirement in the 
Constitution that 
the procedures 
available to an 
accused person 
must be identical 
to those available 
to the prosecution. 
Equality  
Minister for 
Justice v. Adams 
[2011] IEHC 366; 
[2012] 1 IR 140 
Article 6   Ordered the 
surrender of the 
respondent to the 
United Kingdom 
authorities.  
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
Arklow Holidays 
Ltd. v. An Bord 
Pleanala  
[2011] IESC 29; 
[2012] 2 IR 99 
Article 6   Dismissed the 
applicant’s appeal 
which had been 
based on the 
application of the 
rule in  Henderson 
v. Henderson  
(1843) 3 Hare 100 
to the planning 
process. 
SC Planning and 
Development 
Law 
Legal Practice 
and Procedure 
Lofinmakin [a 
minor] & Ors -v- 
Article 8 
Article 13 
Section 5(1) Article 24 Leave was 
refused as it was 
 Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
368 
 
MJELR & Ors 
[2011] IEHC 38 
held that no case 
of any substance 
could be made 
that the Minister’s 
decision not to 
acquiesce, in 
effect, in Mr. 
Lofinmakin’s 
abuse of the 
immigration rules 
could be 
considered 
contrary to 
common sense, 
unreasonable or 
disproportionate 
as encroaching 
upon private or 
family life to a 
degree that is 
unlawful. 
L. (a minor) & 
Ors -v- MJELR & 
Ors  
[2011] IEHC 282 
Article 8 
Article 13 
Section 5 Article 24(3) Held that the 
applicants were 
not entitled to an 
injunction for 
various reasons 
including that the 
applicants had not 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
369 
 
satisfied the first 
limb of the 
Campus Oil test. 
MJELR -v- Adam 
[2011] IEHC 68 
Article 5.3 
Article 6 
Article 8 
Article 13 
 Article 7 
Article 47 
Held that the 
surrender of the 
respondent is not 
prohibited by Part 
3 of the 2003 Act, 
or by the 
Framework 
Decision. 
 European Arrest 
Warrant  
Lofinmakin [an 
infant] & Ors -v- 
MJELR & Ors 
[2011] IEHC 116 
  Article 24 The Court decided 
to grant a 
certificate but 
reformulated the 
terms of the 
certificate as 
compared with the 
draft put forward 
on behalf of the 
applicants. The 
Court also set out 
the points of law 
which would form 
the basis of the 
certificate. 
HC Family and Child 
Law 
MJELR -v- Mc 
Guinness  
Article 6  Article 47 Dismissed the 
objection raised by 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
370 
 
[2011] IEHC 289 the respondent to 
his surrender and 
ordered the 
surrender of the 
respondent to the 
issuing State 
under s.16 of the 
European Arrest 
Warrant Act of 
2003. 
Mallak -v- MJELR 
[2011] IEHC 306 
Article 13  Article 41(2) 
Article 47 
Held that the 
grounds for which 
leave was granted 
had not been 
made out and the 
application for 
judicial review 
would therefore be 
refused. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
A. (a minor) -v- 
MJELR  
[2011] IEHC 323 
  Article 18 
Article 24.2 
Refused the 
application for a 
certificate, and 
held that the 
question of a 
reference did not 
arise.  
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
O. K. -v- K. 
 [2011] IEHC 360 
  Article 24(3) Held that the 
Mother and the 
HC Family and Child 
Law 
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Father should 
have joint custody 
of the Child.  
O. (a minor) -v- 
Refugee 
Applications 
Commissioner & 
Ors 
 [2011] IEHC 446 
Article 13  None 
specified 
The applications 
to amend the 
proceedings were 
dismissed as it 
was held that the 
applications to 
dismiss brought by 
the respondents 
were well founded 
and should be 
granted. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
S. (a minor) & 
Ors -v- MJELR & 
Ors 
[2011] IEHC 31 
Article 13 Section 1 
Section 5 
Article 24 
Article 52(1) 
Allowed the 
amend insofar as 
the applicants 
sought to contend 
that the common 
law judicial rules 
were 
unconstitutional 
and disallowed the 
application insofar 
as it concerned 
reliance on the 
Charter. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Salaja (a minor) Article 8  Article 24 Refused the relief  Asylum and 
372 
 
& Anor -v- 
MJELR  
[2011] IEHC 51 
sought by the 
Minister in the 
preliminary motion 
as it was held that 
that Mr. Salaja’s 
circumstances 
were 
indistinguishable 
in principle from 
those of the 
respondent Board 
in O’Brien and that 
the case, 
accordingly, is not 
moot. 
Immigration Law 
Odia & Ors -v- 
MJELR Odia & 
Ors -v- MJELR 
[2011] IEHC 48 
Article 8 None specified  None 
specified  
The application for 
an interlocutory 
injunction 
restraining the 
Minister from 
exercising a 
deportation order 
was refused as it 
was held that no 
fair issue was 
raised to the effect 
that 
implementation of 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
373 
 
the order in the 
circumstances 
would be unlawful 
and that the 
applicant’s 
unlawful conduct 
constituted a 
compelling reason 
not to exercise 
jurisdiction in this 
matter.  
V. -v- U. 
[2011] IEHC 519 
Article 8  Article 7 
Article 24(3) 
The application by 
the mother to 
relocate the 
children to Spain 
was refused as it 
was held that the 
consequence of 
making the order 
sought runs a 
substantial risk of 
very substantially 
reducing the 
contact which the 
boys have with 
one parent, in this 
case, the father 
and that this 
 Family and Child 
Law 
374 
 
relationship 
outweighs the 
other apparent 
advantages of 
relocation.  
A. -v- MJE & Ors 
[2011] IEHC 381 
Article 13  Article 47 Held that the test 
for the granting of 
an interlocutory 
injunction in this 
case had not been 
made out and the 
application must 
be refused. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
O. -v- MJE & Ors 
[2011] IEHC 472 
None specified   None 
specified  
It was held that 
the applicant had 
not made out 
grounds for leave 
in respect of either 
the decision 
refusing subsidiary 
protection or the 
decision issuing 
the deportation 
order.  
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Aslam -v- MJE & 
Ors 
[2011] IEHC 512 
  Article 1 Granted the 
applicant an 
interlocutory 
injunction 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
375 
 
restraining her 
transfer by either 
sea or by air to the 
United Kingdom. 
However the Court 
would not restrain 
the Minister from 
transferring her by 
road to Northern 
Ireland under 
Article 7 of the 
Dublin Regulation 
on the 
understanding that 
she would not be 
removed from the 
island of Ireland 
pending the 
delivery of the 
child. 
Gilligan & Anor -
v- Murphy & Ors 
[2011] IEHC 465 
Article 6 
Article 7 
Section 2 
Section 3 
Section 5 
 The claims of both 
plaintiffs relating to 
the ECHR were 
dismissed on the 
basis that neither 
plaintiff could rely 
on the provisions 
of the ECHR Act 
HC Criminal Law 
Criminal Assets 
Law 
376 
 
of 2003. 
MJE -v- Siwy 
[2011] IEHC 252 
Article 3 
Article 5(3) 
Article 41 
Article 46 
  Held that the 
respondent’s 
surrender was not 
prohibited by Part 
3 of the European 
Arrest Warrant Act 
of 2003, or by the 
Framework 
Decision 
(including the 
recitals thereto) 
and so the 
respondent should 
be surrendered to 
the issuing State. 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant  
MJELR -v- Zych 
[2011] IEHC 161 
Article 3 
Article 6 
  Held that he 
respondent had 
not demonstrated 
that his surrender 
would be 
incompatible with 
the State's 
obligations under 
the ECHR in any 
respect and in the 
case of both 
warrants, the 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
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Court directed his 
surrender to the 
issuing state. 
MJELR -v- 
Wlodarcyzk 
[2011] IEHC 209 
Article 3   The Court ordered 
the surrender  of 
the respondent to 
the issuing state 
on foot of both 
European Arrest 
Warrants for 
several reasons 
including that it 
was held that 
there was no real 
risk of a breach of 
Article 3 ECHR in 
making such an 
order.  
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
Tighe (a minor) -
v- Judge 
Haughton & Anor 
[2011] IEHC 64 
Article 6  Section 2(1)  Held that the 
Judge Haughton 
had acted within 
jurisdiction and 
has adhered to the 
principles of 
natural and 
constitutional 
justice. It was 
further held that 
HC Legal Aid 
378 
 
the provisions of 
the Criminal 
Justice (Legal Aid) 
Act of 1962, as 
amended, and the  
ECHR Act 2003, 
had been properly 
applied and 
therefore the 
applicant had not 
been denied his 
right to be tried in 
due course of law 
in accordance with 
Article 38 of the 
Constitution.  
C. (a minor) & 
Anor -v- MJELR 
[2011] IEHC 112 
Article 8 
Article 13 
  Held that the 
applicants had 
established 
arguable grounds 
for leave to 
challenge by 
judicial review the 
decision of the 
respondent to 
affirm the 
deportation order. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Murphy -v- Article 8   Held that there HC Criminal Assets 
379 
 
Gilligan & Ors 
[2011] IEHC 62 
was no basis for 
concluding that 
the existing s. 3 
order caused an 
injustice or that in 
refusing to 
discharge or vary 
the s. 3 order that 
the Court would 
be acting in a 
disproportionate 
manner. The 
Court was 
satisfied that the 
relevant properties 
were purchased, 
funded and 
developed by 
funds which were 
generated by 
crime and 
represented 
proceeds of crime 
and the 
respondents, other 
than for the one 
exception, have 
failed to discharge 
Law 
380 
 
the onus on them 
in a s. 3(3) 
application to 
establish that such 
funds came from 
proceeds which 
were not the 
proceeds of crime. 
McGuinn v The 
Commissioner of 
an Garda 
Siochana & ors  
[2011] IESC 33 
Article 6 Section 2 
Section 4 
 Dismissed the 
appeal as it was 
held that the 
interests of justice 
require that a 
plaintiff be entitled 
to rely on a default 
judgment when no 
challenge is 
brought within a 
reasonable time to 
the entry of such 
judgment. 
HC Constitutional 
Law 
Administrative 
Law 
Kennedy -v- D. P. 
P. 
 [2011] IEHC 311 
Article 6   Held that in the 
circumstances of 
the case, the 
delay was 
excusable. In 
relation to any 
prejudice the 
HC Criminal Law 
Administrative 
Law 
381 
 
applicant may 
encounter, it was 
held that there 
was ample judicial 
authority for the 
proposition that 
such prejudice 
may be overcome 
or countered by 
means of 
appropriate 
directions or 
warnings from the 
trial judge. 
Dunnes Stores -
v- Revenue 
Commissioners & 
Ors  
[2011] IEHC 469 
Article 6   Reliefs refused as 
it was held that 
section 72 (5)(b) 
of the Waste 
Management Act 
provides quite 
specifically for the 
adaptation of the 
tax acts for the 
purpose of 
collecting the 
plastic bag levy 
and that regulation 
15 does just 
 Revenue Law 
Waste 
Management 
Law 
382 
 
exactly that. 
MJELR -v- 
Ciechanowicz 
[2011] IEHC 106 
Article 8   Held that in the 
circumstances of 
the case, the 
surrender of the 
respondent is not 
prohibited by Part 
3 of the European 
Arrest Warrant 
2003 Act, or by 
the Framework 
Decision.  
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
Callan -v- Ireland 
& Anor 
[2011] IEHC 190 
 Section 1 
Section 2 
Section 5 
 The plaintiff’s 
claim was 
dismissed for 
several reasons 
including that it 
was held that 
having been 
repealed by the 
Act of 1990, s. 1 of 
the Criminal 
Justice Act of 
1861 Act was not 
in force 
immediately 
before the passing 
of the ECHR Act 
HC Criminal Law 
383 
 
of 2003 and so 
could not be the 
subject of a 
declaration of 
incompatibility 
under s. 5 of the 
Act of 2003. 
W. -v- W. 
[2011] IEHC 201 
Article 6   Granted the 
application to 
dismiss the claim 
on the grounds of 
both the Statute of 
Limitations and for 
want of 
prosecution. 
HC Criminal Law 
MJELR -v- Sliwa 
[2011] IEHC 271 
None specified    Held that the 
respondent had 
not made out the 
objections raised 
by him under s.37 
of the European 
Arrest Warrant Act 
of 2003, either 
under the 
Convention, or 
under the 
Constitution, and 
that it was 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
384 
 
appropriate to 
direct his 
surrender to the 
issuing state. 
Cosgrave -v- D. 
P. P. & Ors 
[2011] IEHC 312 
Article 6   Held that the 
applicant’s honest 
belief that this was 
the end of matters 
was not a 
reasonable belief 
for either him or 
his advisers to 
hold, nor was it 
nor could it be 
such that could 
constitute a 
representation. 
Relief refused. 
HC Criminal Law 
MJELR -v- 
Puskas 
[2011] IEHC 80 
None specified    Ordered the 
surrender of the 
applicant to the 
issuing State as it 
was held that any 
interference with 
his family life 
would be in 
accordance with 
the Convention 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
385 
 
and its Protocols 
and that his 
surrender was 
being sought in 
pursuit of a 
legitimate aim or 
objective.  
DPP v David 
Timmons 
[2011] IECCA 13 
Article 8   Refused an 
application for 
leave to add an 
additional appeal 
ground, that the 
“surveillance” in 
question was 
excessive, even 
oppressive, and 
that it thereby 
infringed rights of 
the applicant 
pursuant to Article 
8 of the European 
Convention on 
Human Rights  as 
the Court could 
not find on the 
evidence 
adduced, that the 
surveillance of the 
CCA Criminal Law 
386 
 
applicant was 
oppressive. 
Oboh (a minor) & 
Ors -v- MJELR & 
Ors 
 [2011] IEHC 102 
Article 8   Held that the 
applicants had 
established 
substantial 
grounds for 
contending that 
the Minister did 
not conduct a full 
and fair 
assessment of 
their having regard 
to their rights 
under Article 8 
ECHR. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Fahy & Anor -v- 
Sanlon & Anor 
[2011] IEHC 293 
Article 6   Held that the 
proceedings 
should be struck 
out on the grounds 
of inordinate and 
inexcusable delay 
in line with the 
provisions of 
Article 6 ECHR.  
HC Tort Law 
Contract Law 
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2012 
Case Articles of 
ECHR 
Considered in 
Decision 
Sections of the 
ECHR Act 2003 
Considered in 
the Decision 
Charter 
Article 
Core Summary Court Core Legal 
Area 
O’Driscoll v 
Limerick City 
Council  
[2012] IEHC 594 
Article 6 
Article 8 
Article 10 
Article 13 
Section 4 
Section 5 
 Judicial review 
proceedings were 
determined to be 
an adequate 
remedy to satisfy 
Article 8 of the 
European 
Convention on 
Human Rights to 
deal with this case 
as to the 
proportionality of 
the Council’s 
opinion. 
HC Administrative 
Law 
Housing Law 
PL v Clinical 
Director of St. 
Patrick’s University 
Hospital  
[2012] IEHC 547 
Article 5 
Article 13 
  Given the three 
criteria identified 
by reference to 
established ECHR 
Article 5 case-law 
for determining 
HC Mental 
Health/Mental 
Capacity 
388 
 
whether a 
deprivation of 
liberty has 
occurred or not, it 
is necessary to 
establish, inter 
alia, “that the 
applicant has not 
validly consented 
to the confinement 
in question”. That 
is not established 
in this case. 
Minister for Justice 
v Staniak  
[2012] IEHC 508 
Article 3 
Article 8 
  Evidence is not 
sufficient to 
establish that the 
respondent’s 
surrender would 
represent a 
disproportionate 
interference with 
his right, and the 
rights of his 
partner and child, 
to respect for 
family life or that 
the respondent’s 
rights would not be 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant  
389 
 
respected if 
imprisoned by the 
receiving state. 
Arrest warrant 
granted.  
M.E.O. v Minister 
for Justice  
[2012] IEHC 394 
Article 3  
Article 8 
  As a non-national, 
the State had no 
obligation to 
continue to treat 
the applicant 
under Article 3 
unless it was 
shown that 
deportation would 
result in a critical 
deterioration in her 
condition. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Administrative 
Law 
Sivsivadze v 
Minister for Justice 
& Others 
[2012] IEHC 137 
Article 8 Section 5(2)  Granted leave to 
seek judicial 
review as the 
applicants had 
made out 
substantial 
grounds insofar as 
it was claimed that 
the application of a 
deportation order 
of (at least) 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
 
390 
 
potentially 
indefinite duration 
would infringe 
Article 8 ECHR. 
Dowling & Ors -v- 
Minister for 
Finance & Ors 
[2012] IEHC 436 
  Article 17 Refused the 
present application 
to set aside the 
Direction Order 
made by the 
President of the 
High Court on the 
28th March 2012. 
HC Financial Law 
Administrative 
Law 
Dowling v Minister 
for Finance  
[2012] IESC 32 
 Section 1(1)  Dismissed the 
appeal. The 
timeline had been 
adjusted to the 
maximum extent 
possible in favour 
of the lay 
applicants. 
SC Legal Practice 
and Procedure 
McArdle v DPP  
[2012] IEHC 286 
 
Article 6   Relief refused as 
the applicant 
himself was 
responsible for 
much of the delay 
and had not 
pointed to any 
specific prejudice 
HC Criminal Law 
Constitutional 
Law 
391 
 
that raised a real 
risk of an unfair 
trial. 
M.X. v. Health 
Service Executive  
[2012] IEHC 491; 
[2012] 3.I.R. 254 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 8 Section 5  Refused relief as 
under the 
provisions of s. 60 
of the Mental 
Health Act of 
2001, the right to 
independent 
review and 
independent 
determination of 
capacity were 
already recognised 
statutory 
procedural rights, 
and the provisions 
gave effect to the 
duty of the State to 
vindicate the 
plaintiff's personal 
capacity rights. 
HC Constitutional 
Law 
M.D. (a minor) v. 
Ireland  
 [2012] IESC 10; 
[2012] 1 IR 697 
Article 6 
Article 6 
Article 14 
Section 2  Dismissed appeal 
on grounds that 
Article 40.1 of the 
Constitution 
recognised that 
SC Constitutional 
Law 
Criminal Law 
392 
 
perfectly equal 
treatment was not 
always achievable 
and that applying 
the same 
treatment to all 
human persons 
was not always 
desirable because 
it could lead to 
indirect inequality 
due to inherent 
differences of 
capacity, physical 
and moral and of 
social function. 
Minister for Justice 
v Nolan  
[2012] IEHC 249  
Article 3 
Article 5 
Article 14 
 Article 6 The respondent 
demonstrated that 
his surrender 
would be 
prohibited by the 
Constitution. 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
Enright v DPP  
[2012] IESC 54 
Article 6 
Article 13 
  The appellant had 
accepted the 
agreed sum as a 
"final resolution" of 
his complaint to 
the European 
SC Constitutional 
Law 
Criminal Law 
393 
 
Court of Human 
Rights and in so 
doing had waived 
any further claim 
against Ireland 
arising from the 
facts giving rise to 
his application. 
M.A. U-H. 
[Pakistan] v 
Minister for Justice  
[2012] IEHC 572 
Article 8   Leave to seek 
judicial review 
granted on the 
basis that the 
subsidiary 
protection and 
deportation 
decisions insofar 
as they were 
based on the 
country reports 
relied upon were 
irrational and 
unreasonable. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
DPP v Donnelly 
[2012] IECCA 78; 
[2012] 7 JIC 3002 
Article 6   Appeal arguing 
breach of rights 
dismissed as the 
appellants were 
correctly informed 
of the offences for 
CCA Criminal Law 
Constitutional 
Law 
394 
 
which they were 
being arrested for. 
The court had 
been entitled to 
conclude that the 
failure to answer 
questions material 
to the investigation 
was capable of 
amounting to 
corroboration of 
the evidence of the 
belief of the chief 
superintendent. 
P. v Q.  
[2012] IEHC 593; 
[2012] 3 IR 805 
Article 8   Interim order for 
discovery affirmed 
It was held that the 
respondent 
parent’s 
questionable 
sexual activities of 
the respondent 
had the potential 
to have an effect 
on the child 
HC Family Law 
Butcher v Minister 
for Justice   
[2012] IEHC 347; 
Article 8    Held that whilst the 
power of the 
Minister in this 
HC Extradition of 
Prisoners 
395 
 
[2012] 4 IR 401 matter was 
discretionary, the 
applicant's art 8 
rights were 
affected and 
should have been 
duly considered 
and balanced by 
the respondent. 
Final decision 
withheld until the 
conclusion of 
further hearing of 
the parties. 
Nash v DPP  
[2012] IEHC 598 
Article 6 
Article 13 
Section 3  Refused relief for 
delay as it was not 
a case where 
nothing had 
happened for an 
unexplained 
extended period of 
time such as 
would give rise to 
a finding that the 
applicant’s rights 
under the 
Constitution and 
the ECHR had 
HC Criminal Law 
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been breached. 
Walsh v. News 
Group 
Newspapers Ltd   
[2012] IEHC 353; 
[2012] 3 IR 136 
Article 10 None specified.  Allowed Louis 
Walsh’s 
application for 
discovery but 
excluding any 
documents that 
might lead to the 
identification of a 
source other than 
the complainant or 
members of An 
Garda Síochána. 
HC Media Law 
I.P. v. T.P 
[2012] IEHC 31; 
[2012] 1 IR 666 
Article 8   Refused the 
summary return of 
a child that had 
been removed to 
Ireland by her 
father to Poland 
for various 
reasons.  
HC Family and Child 
Law 
T.M. v Refugee 
Appeals Tribunal 
[2012] IEHC 284 
 
Article 13 Section 3(1) None 
specified 
Refused relief to 
the applicants 
judicially reviewing 
the tribunal’s 
decision as the 
applicants had not 
established that 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
397 
 
the tribunal 
member acted in a 
manner that was 
so unreasonable 
as to render his 
decision unfair or 
fundamentally 
flawed. The 
appropriate 
process and 
procedures were 
applied by the first 
named respondent 
in reaching the 
decision as to 
credibility. 
Lowry v. Smyth  
[2012] IEHC 22; 
[2012] 1 IR m 
Article 6   Dismissed the 
appeal in relating 
to the refusal of 
relief for 
defamation as a 
high threshold was 
required to be met 
when seeking 
relief pursuant to 
s. 34 of the 
Defamation Act of 
2009. 
HC Tort Law 
398 
 
A.M.S (Somalia) -
v- MJE & A.K 
(Afghanistan) -v- 
MJE   
[2012] IEHC 72 
Article 8 
Article 13 
  Granted leave to 
seek certiorari by 
way of judicial 
review of the 
decisions refusing 
their applications 
for family 
reunification as 
there had been no 
indication of any 
proportionate 
analysis of the 
impact upon the 
rights of the 
applicants 
pursuant to Article 
8 of the European 
Convention on 
Human Rights. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Donegan v. Dublin 
City Council   
[2012] IESC 18; 
[2012] 3 IR 600 
Article 6 
Article 8 
Article 13 
Article 14 
Section 2 
Section 3 
Section 4 
Section 5 
 Dismissed the 
appeal in Donegan 
v. Dublin City 
Council  [2008] 
IEHC 288 and 
allowed the appeal 
in  Dublin City 
Council v. 
Gallagher  [2008] 
SC Housing Law 
Landlord and 
Tenant Law 
399 
 
IEHC 354 and 
dismissed the 
cross-appeal 
therein on various 
grounds. 
Health and Service 
Executive v L.N.  
[2012] IEHC 611 
Article 6(1)   It was held that the 
District Court 
judge had been 
correct on the first 
3 issues and on 
the forth issue that 
the sentence 
passed was lawful 
in the 
circumstances.  
HC Criminal Law 
Media Law 
Kennedy v. DPP   
[2012] IESC 34; 
[2012] 3 IR 744 
Article 3 
Article 6 
Section 3  Dismissed the 
appeal holding that 
the court should 
only prohibit 
criminal 
proceedings where 
prosecutorial delay 
infringed a 
person's 
constitutional right 
o an expeditious 
trial where the 
delay was 
SC Criminal Law 
Administrative 
Law 
400 
 
inordinate, 
inexcusable and 
the balance of 
justice lay in 
favour of 
prohibition. 
Minister for Justice 
v. Bailey 
[2012] IESC 16; 
[2012] 4 IR 1 
None specified    Allowed the appeal 
and refused to 
order surrender as 
a warrant issued 
for the purposes of 
investigation of an 
offence alone, in 
circumstances 
where that 
investigation might 
or might not result 
in a prosecution, 
was insufficient 
under s. 21A. 
SC European Arrest 
Warrant 
Minister for Justice 
v. Tobin 
[2011] IEHC 72; 
[2012] IESC 37; 
[2012] 4 IR 147 
Article 5 
Article 6 
Article 8 
  Allowed the appeal 
of the HC’s order 
of surrender in 
holding that while 
the dismissal of an 
application for 
extradition on 
technical grounds 
HC 
SC 
European Arrest 
Warrant  
401 
 
did not constitute a 
res judicata so as 
to prevent a 
second 
application, the 
second application 
might still be 
refused on the 
ground that it 
amounted to an 
abuse of process 
or an infringement 
of a right acquired 
under s. 27(1)(c) 
of the 
Interpretation Act 
2005. 
Sister Mary 
Christian & Ors -v- 
Dublin City Council 
[2012] IEHC 163; 
[2012] 2 IR 506 
None specified  None specified  Held in quashing 
the aspects of the 
development plan 
which dealt with 
the impugned 
zoning category 
Z15 that local 
authorities were 
entitled to have 
planning policies 
provided that such 
 Planning and 
Development 
Law 
402 
 
policies were in 
conformity with 
planning 
legislation and 
their means of 
implementation 
were carried out in 
accordance with 
law. 
Caffrey v Minister 
for Justice   
[2012] IEHC 313 
Article 3 
Article 5 
Section 1(1) 
Section 3(1) 
 The reliefs sought 
were refused as 
even if the 
proceedings were 
entitled to 
succeed, the 
reliefs sought 
would still be 
refused on the 
grounds of wavier 
and acquiescence. 
HC Criminal Law 
Minister for Justice 
v Machaczka 
[2012] IEHC 434 
Article 2 
Article 3 
Article 5 
Article 8 
  Refused to order 
the surrender of 
the applicant to 
Polish authorities 
as it would be a 
disproportionate 
interference with 
the rights of the 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
403 
 
respondent and 
his family. 
RP -v- SD  
[2012] IEHC 188 
  Article 24 It was held that it 
was inappropriate 
on the facts of this 
case, and having 
regard to the rights 
of the child, to 
directly involve the 
child who was on 
the cusp of 5 years 
in the Hague 
return application 
by giving her an 
opportunity to be 
heard. 
HC Family and Child 
Law 
O.J (Nigeria) -v- 
Minister for Justice 
and Equality & 
Anor 
 [2012] IEHC 71 
Article 13 Section 3 Article 47 Refused all reliefs 
save granting 
leave for the 
judicial review on 
the grounds as the 
subsidiary 
protection order is 
invalid and so as a 
consequence the 
deportation order 
is also invalid. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
V.N (Cameroon) -   Article 47 The Court held HC Asylum and 
404 
 
v- Minister for 
Justice and Law 
Reform & Anor 
[2012] IEHC 62 
Article 51 that the ground for 
leave had not 
been made and 
the application 
must be refused. 
Immigration Law 
Smith & Ors -v- 
The Minister for 
Justice and 
Equality & Ors 
[2012] IEHC 113 
Article 8  Article 7 
Article 21 
Article 33 
Held that no 
stateable case had 
been made out for 
the grant of leave 
and that even if 
there had been, 
the applicant’s 
history of 
disregard for the 
law would be 
ample ground for 
refusing the 
application.  
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Minister for Justice 
and Equality -v- 
Marjasz  
[2012] IEHC 233 
Article 6  Article 47 In all the 
circumstances of 
the case including 
that the 
respondent was 
not represented by 
a lawyer, the Court 
was not satisfied 
to make an order 
pursuant to s.16(1) 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
405 
 
of the Act of 2003 
surrendering the 
respondent, and 
declined to do so. 
The Attorney 
General -v- 
O'Gara 
 [2012] IEHC 179 
Article 3 
Article 13 
 Article 4 
Article 47 
Held that the 
evidence fell short 
of demonstrating 
that the particular 
respondent in this 
case would, if 
extradited, be 
exposed to a real 
risk that his 
fundamental rights 
would be 
breached. 
HC Extradition Law 
Gilani & Anor -v- 
The Minister for 
Justice Adn 
Equality  
[2012] IEHC 193 
  Article 24 Held that no 
arguable case had 
been made for the 
grant of leave to 
apply for an order 
of mandamus 
upon the basis 
proposed. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
The Minister for 
Justice and Law 
Reform -v- 
Petrášek 
Article 6   Held that the Court 
was disposed to 
make s.16 Orders 
and to surrender 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
406 
 
2012 IEHC 212 the respondent to 
the issuing state 
on foot of all three 
European arrest 
warrants. 
Afolabi & Ors -v- 
The Minister for 
Justice and 
Equality & Ors 
[2012] IEHC 192 
Article 8 
Article 13 
 Article 47 Held that the 
decisions sought 
to be challenged 
had been validly 
reached and were 
sound in 
substance. For 
those reasons 
leave was granted 
to apply for judicial 
review of the 
deportation orders 
only and upon the 
sole ground that 
they were invalid 
"by reason of the 
first named 
respondent not 
having personally 
considered 
whether the 
State's non-
refoulement 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
407 
 
obligations would 
be breached by 
the deportation of 
the applicants". 
A.A -v- Minister for 
Justice & Ors 
[2012] IEHC 222 
  Article 47 
Article 51 
Held that no 
substantial ground 
had been made 
out in the relevant 
case for the 
granting of leave 
to challenge the 
deportation order 
on the basis that 
the conclusions 
reached in the file 
note are either 
unintelligible or 
irrational. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Minister for Justice 
& Equality -v- Rajki 
[2012] IEHC 270 
Article 3 
Article 8 
  Held that the 
evidence adduced 
by the respondent 
lacked the degree 
of cogency 
necessary to 
displace the 
presumption that 
the issuing state 
would respect the 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
408 
 
respondent's 
fundamental rights 
including his rights 
under articles 3 
and 8 of the 
Convention, 
respectively, and 
his rights under 
the Constitution. 
An order of 
surrender was 
made.  
EMI Records 
(Ireland) Ltd & Ors 
-v- The Data 
Protection 
Commissioner & 
Anor  
[2012] IEHC 264 
Article 8 
Article 10 
 Article 8 
Article 11 
Article 16 
Article 17(2) 
Held that in all the 
circumstances of 
the case that 
judicial review was 
properly and 
appropriately 
invoked. Held that 
the enforcement 
notice of 11 
January 2012 was 
invalid in failing to 
give reasons and 
was therefore 
quashed. 
HC Data Protection 
Law 
Administrative 
Law 
Pringle -v- The 
Government of 
  Article 47 Held that that the 
ESM Treaty was 
HC Constitutional 
Law 
409 
 
Ireland & Ors 
[2012] IEHC 296 
not incompatible 
with the 
Constitution and 
that an 
amendment of the 
Constitution 
approved of by the 
people in a 
referendum was 
not necessary 
before it could be 
ratified. It was also 
held that the ESM 
Act of 2012 was 
not invalid having 
regard to the 
provisions of the 
Constitution. 
European Union 
Law 
O -v- Minister for 
Justice & Ors 
[2012] IEHC 457 
Article 3 
Article 8 
 Article 47 Refused the 
applicant's 
application 
seeking leave to 
apply for judicial 
review on all 
grounds and 
discharged the 
injunction made in 
this case as the 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
410 
 
facts of the case 
did not support a 
stateable ground 
or provide the 
basis for an 
arguable one. 
M -v- L & Ors 
[2012] IEHC 485 
Article 3 
Article 13 
 Article 47 Leave was refused 
on the majority of 
the grounds 
canvassed in the 
judgment. 
However, the 
Court did grant 
leave to pursue 
arguments relating 
to the manner in 
which effect was 
given to the right 
to apply for 
subsidiary 
protection. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Okunade v 
Minister for Justice 
Equality and Law 
Reform & the 
Attorney General 
[2012] IESC 49 
Article 8  Article 47(1) Allowed the appeal 
against the refusal 
of Cooke J. to 
grant an 
interlocutory 
injunction but 
made no order in 
 Law of Equity 
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substitution 
therefor by virtue 
of the fact that 
events had 
overtaken the 
necessity for any 
such order in 
substitution. 
O & Anor -v- 
Minister for Justice 
& Ors  
[2012] IEHC 458 
Article 8(1) Section 3(1) Article 9 
Article 47 
Held that the 
application was 
refused in its 
entirety and the 
injunction was 
discharged for 
various reasons 
including that the 
application was 
made well outside 
the time limited by 
O. 84 of the Rules 
of the Superior 
Courts. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
The Minister for 
Justice and 
Equality -v- D.M 
[2012] IEHC 472 
Article 8  Article 7 
Article 24 
Held that the 
respondent was 
not able to adduce 
evidence of 
sufficient cogency 
to satisfy the Court 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
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that to surrender 
him would 
disrespect either 
his, or his child’s, 
right to respect for 
family life under 
Article 8 E.C.H.R..  
Mallak v Minister 
for Justice Equality 
& Law Reform 
[2012] IESC 59 
Article 13  Article 41(2) 
Article 51 
Allowed the appeal 
and would grant 
an order of 
certiorari quashing 
the decision of the 
Minister refusing 
the application for 
a certificate of 
naturalisation as it 
was held that the 
Minister was under 
a duty to provide 
the appellant with 
the reasons for his 
decision to refuse 
his application for 
naturalisation. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Administrative 
Law 
H.N. -v- MJELR & 
Ors  
[2012] IESC 58 
  Article 41 Referred to the 
Court of Justice of 
the European 
Union for 
SC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
413 
 
preliminary ruling 
on whether it is 
compatible with 
the Qualification 
Directive for Irish 
law to provide that 
an application for 
subsidiary 
protection will not 
be considered 
unless the 
applicant has 
already have 
applied for and 
been refused 
refugee status. 
Ervis Troci & Anor 
-v- The Minister for 
Justice & Equality 
and Ors 
 [2012] IEHC 542 
Article 8  Article 1 
Article 7 
Article 47 
Article 49 
Article 51(1) 
An extension of 
time was granted 
in relation to the 
subsidiary 
protection decision 
and leave was 
granted on 
grounds 4, 5 and 
11(a), (b) and (c) 
to seek reliefs 1, 5, 
6, 7, 9, 14, 15, 19 
and 20 with 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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reference only to 
the subsidiary 
protection 
decision. Leave 
was refused on 
ground 2.  
P. -v- MJE & Ors 
[2012] IEHC 18 
  Article 51 The application for 
leave by way of 
certiorari against 
the decisions 
refusing subsidiary 
protection and 
issuing a 
deportation order 
was refused for 
various reasons.  
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
A.O -v- Minister for 
Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform, 
Ireland and the 
Attorney General 
(No. 3) 
 [2012] IEHC 104 
  Article 24 
Article 51(1) 
Granted the 
applicant leave to 
amend his 
pleadings to assert 
the relief 
discussed in the 
judgment insofar 
as it concerned the 
rights of Baby C 
under Article 41 
and Article 42 of 
the Constitution 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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and, if necessary, 
Article 8 ECHR, 
granted leave to 
apply for judicial 
review and an 
interlocutory 
injunction 
restraining 
enforcement of the 
deportation order.  
NO2GM Ltd -v- 
Environmental 
Protection Agency 
& Anor 
[2012] IEHC 369 
Article 6  Article 41(2) Declined to grant 
the relief sought as 
to do so, without 
notice to other 
parties actually or 
potentially affected 
by such order 
would infringe 
fundamental 
principle of fair 
procedures as 
understood by the 
Constitution, the 
European 
Convention of 
Human Rights and 
the EU Charter of 
the Fundamental 
HC Environmental 
Law 
416 
 
Rights. 
O'Connor -v- 
Environmental 
Protection Agency 
& Anor  
[2012] IEHC 370 
Article 6  Article 41(2) Declined to grant 
the relief sought as 
to do so, without 
notice to other 
parties actually or 
potentially affected 
by such order 
would infringe 
fundamental 
principle of fair 
procedures as 
understood by the 
Constitution, the 
European 
Convention of 
Human Rights and 
the EU Charter of 
the Fundamental 
Rights. 
HC Environmental 
Law 
The Minister for 
Justice and 
Equality -v- 
Zbigniew 
Bednarczyk  
[2012] IEHC 154 
Article 7  Article 49 Held that the Part 
3 objections raised 
by the respondent 
with respect to 
correspondence 
were not made 
out, save in the 
case of the second 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
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offence on the 
third warrant in 
time and so the 
surrender of the 
applicant ordered 
for all of the 4 
warrants but the 
third one.  
W.A (DRC) -v- 
Minister for Justice 
& Anor  
[2012] IEHC 251 
Article 8 
Article 13 
 Article 47 Held that the 
applicant be 
granted leave to 
apply for orders of 
certiorari in 
respect of the 
refusal of the 
application for 
subsidiary 
protection and the 
deportation order 
by reference to 3 
of the grounds 
outlined. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Sivsivade & Ors -
v- Minister for 
Justice & Ors 
[2012] IEHC 244 
Article 8 Section 5  Relief refused as it 
was held that 
s.3(1) of the 
Immigration Act 
1999 is not per se 
incompatible with 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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the Convention, 
particularly when 
that provision is 
assessed in 
association with 
the provisions 
contained in s.3(6) 
and s.3(11) of the 
Act. 
The Attorney 
General -v- Martin 
 [2012] IEHC 442 
Article 2 
Article 3 
  In all the 
circumstances, the 
Court dismissed 
the objections to 
the respondent’s 
extradition and 
made an order 
committing the 
respondent to a 
prison there to 
await the order of 
the Minister for his 
extradition to 
Florida. 
HC Extradition Law 
The Minister for 
Justice and 
Equality 
[2012] IEHC 533 
Article 8   Held that the 
respondent had 
not established a 
breach or a real 
risk of a breach of 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
419 
 
any of his other 
fundamental 
rights, whether 
arising under the 
European 
Convention or 
under the 
Constitution and 
therefore his 
surrender to the 
issuing State was 
ordered. 
MEO -v- Minister 
for Justice, 
Equality and Law 
Reform 
[2012] IEHC 545 
Article 3 
Article 8 
  Held that s Ms. 0. 
had established 
substantial 
grounds in relation 
to the ECHR 
grounds as well as 
the constitutional 
grounds for 
contending that 
the Minister's 
decision was 
vitiated by material 
error of fact and 
that there may be 
a breach of her 
rights in deporting 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
420 
 
her. Leave 
granted. 
DPP -v- Cormac 
Fitzpatrick and 
Terry McConnell  
[2012] IECCA 74 
Article 6   Held that in all the 
particular 
circumstances of 
this case no 
miscarriage of 
justice had actually 
occurred and so 
the Court refused 
the appellant’s 
application for 
leave to appeal 
against his 
conviction. 
CCA Criminal Law 
E (A Minor) -v- 
The Minister for 
Justice and 
Equality  
[2012] IEHC 100 
Article 3   Held that the 
applicant had not 
made out 
substantial 
grounds on the 
application for 
leave to challenge 
the deportation 
order, and 
therefore must fail. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Quinn & Ors -v- 
Irish Bank 
Resolution 
Article 6(1)   Held that Mr. 
Quinn had not 
demonstrated that 
HC Bankruptcy Law 
 
421 
 
Corporation Ltd & 
Ors 
[2012] IEHC 261 
his rights under 
Article 6(1) of the 
Convention were 
infringed or likely 
to be infringed by 
answering the 
question posed at 
the outset of this 
judgment in the 
negative. 
Joel -v- DPP & Ors 
[2012] IEHC 295 
 Section 3  Held that on 
deciding if the test 
for judicial review 
is met, the court is 
also entitled to 
look at any 
answers that are 
given to any points 
that are made and 
to assess on that 
basis as to 
whether arguable 
grounds have 
been made out. It 
was decided 
having done this 
and having heard 
all sides, to refuse 
HC Criminal Law 
Administrative 
Law 
422 
 
the application. 
O'Leary & Ors -v- 
The Minister for 
Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform 
[2012] IEHC 80 
Article 8   Held that there 
had been an 
inadequate 
consideration 
given to a 
proportionate 
balancing of the 
interests of the 
State in 
maintaining the 
integrity of the 
Asylum and 
Immigration Laws 
as against the 
entitlement of the 
first and second 
named applicants 
to invoke the 
protection of their 
family interests 
under Article 41 of 
the Constitution.  
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Mc Keogh -v- John 
Doe 1 & Ors 
[2012] IEHC 95 
Article 13   Held that the 
plaintiff was not 
deprived of an 
effective remedy 
as guaranteed 
 Tort Law 
Media Law 
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under the 
Constitution or 
under Article 13 of 
the ECHR and 
relief was refused. 
Ninga MBI -v- 
Minister for Justice 
and Equality & Ors  
[2012] IEHC 125 
Article 8   The conclusion of 
the decision maker 
had been that 
refoulement was 
not found to be an 
issue and that no 
issue arose under 
s. 4 of the Act of 
2000 or in relation 
to private and 
family rights under 
Article 8 ECHR 
and the Court 
found that no 
ground for judicial 
review of that 
decision had been 
made.  
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
McCarthy -v- 
Brandon 
Construction & 
Anor  
[2012] IEHC 413 
Article 6   Held that the 
application should 
not be dismissed 
as 1. Although the 
proceedings were 
HC Tort Law 
424 
 
instituted only 
days before the 
third anniversary 
of the plaintiff’s 
fall, he was under 
age for most of the 
period, 2. There 
was an 
explanation for the 
delay that had 
some basis in fact, 
even though it was 
inadequate and 3. 
the defendant was 
itself responsible 
for substantial 
delay and default 
by its own conduct 
in taking more 
than two years to 
deliver its defence. 
Khaled Islam 
Khattak -v- 
Refugees Appeals 
Tribunal & Ors 
[2012] IEHC 569 
Article 8 
Article 13 
  Held that there 
was no evidential 
basis for 
concluding that he 
enjoys any form of 
private or family 
life in Ireland for 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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2013 
Case Articles of ECHR 
Considered in 
Decision 
Sections of the 
ECHR Act 2003 
Considered in 
the Decision 
EU Charter 
Article 
Core Summary Court Core Legal 
Area 
Trevor Webster v 
The 
Commissioner of 
An Garda 
Síochána, Ireland 
and the Attorney 
General [2013] 
IEHC 449; [2014] 
2 I.L.R.M. 144 
Not specified Section 3 
Section 5 
 Case revolved 
around legality of 
Garda Vetting 
system. 
Proceedings struck 
out as an abuse of 
process.  
HC Administrative 
Law; 
Human Rights 
Law; 
Employment 
Law 
 
[under appeal] 
Martin Corbally v 
The Medical 
Article 6(1) Section 5  Whether the 
findings made and 
HC Administrative 
Law 
the purposes of 
Article 8 ECHR. 
Substantial 
grounds for judicial 
review had not 
been established.  
426 
 
Council, Ireland 
and the Attorney 
General and the 
Irish Human 
Rights 
Commission 
(notice party) 
[2013] IEHC 500; 
[2014] 1 I.L.R.M. 
272 
 
sanction imposed 
by the Medical 
Council were 
proportionate to the 
facts of a case can 
be considered by 
the High Court.  
 
XY (a minor 
suing by her 
guardian ad 
litem, Raymond 
McEvoy) v Health 
Service 
Executive and 
the Attorney 
General and Irish 
Human Rights 
Commission 
(notice parties) 
(No.2) [2013] 
IEHC 490; [2014] 
1 I.L.R.M. 170 
Not specified Section 5  Court refused to 
make an order that 
Section 25(6) of the 
Mental Health Act 
2001 was 
repugnant to the 
Constitution and/or 
the ECHR 
HC Mental Health 
Law 
Administrative 
Justice 
Child Law 
Minister for 
Justice and 
Article 5 
Article 8 
Section 2 
Section 4 
 Only in exceptional 
circumstances, 
SC European Arrest 
Warrant 
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Equality v 
Jaroslaw 
Ostrowski [2013] 
IESC 24; [2014] 
1 I.L.R.M. 88 
Section 8 would Article 8 
ECHR prevent 
removal of an 
accused by virtue 
of a European 
Arrest Warrant. No 
exceptional 
circumstances 
existed in this case. 
Extradition  
Marie Fleming v 
Ireland, the 
Attorney General 
and the Director 
of Public 
Prosecutions and 
the Irish Human 
Rights 
Commission 
(Amicus Curiae) 
[2013] IEHC 2; 
[2013] 2 I.L.R.M. 
9 
Article 2 
Article 3 
Article 8 
Article 14 
Section 2 
Section 3 
Section 5 
 The absolute 
prohibition as 
regards assisting 
another individual 
to take her own life 
is neither 
unconstitutional nor 
in violation of the 
ECHR. It is for the 
State to regulate 
and determine 
issues relating to 
assisted suicide. 
HC Criminal Law 
Constitutional 
Law 
Health Law 
Marie Fleming v 
Ireland, the 
Attorney General 
and the Director 
of Public 
Prosecutions and 
Article 2 
Article 3 
Article 8 
Article 14 
Section 2 
Section 3 
Section 5 
 The absolute 
prohibition as 
regards assisting 
another individual 
to take her own life 
is neither 
SC Criminal Law 
Constitutional 
Law 
Health Law 
428 
 
the Irish Human 
Rights 
Commission 
(Amicus Curiae) 
[2013] IESC 19; 
[2013] 2 I.L.R.M. 
73. 
unconstitutional nor 
in violation of the 
ECHR. It is for the 
State to regulate 
and determine 
issues relating to 
assisted suicide.  
In the matter of 
Article 40.3 of the 
Constitution and 
Article 41 of the 
Constitution and 
in the matter of 
section 25 of the 
Mental Health 
Act 2001, in the 
matter of XY, a 
minor: Health 
Service 
Executive v JM 
and RP [2013] 
IEHC 12; [2013] 
1 I.L.R.M. 305 
Article 6 
Article 8 
Article 13 
Section 2 
Section 3 
Section 4 
 Taking of a blood 
sample ordered by 
the High Court. Not 
in violation of XY’s 
rights under the 
constitution or 
ECHR. 
HC Medical Law 
Reid v Industrial 
Development 
Agency  
[2013] IEHC 433 
Article 8 Section 3  Although the 
applicant's property 
rights and his rights 
under Article 8 of 
the Convention 
HC Administrative 
Law (land 
acquisition) 
429 
 
carried undoubted 
weight, the test of 
proportionality 
favoured the 
compulsory 
acquisition decision 
was very much in 
the public interest 
and in keeping with 
the objectives of 
the Industrial 
Development Act 
1986. 
Minister for 
Justice v Holden 
[2013] IEHC 62 
Article 3  Chapter VI The Court would 
not regard the 
theoretical 
possibility of a short 
term return to 
police detention  as 
giving rise to 
substantial grounds 
for believing that 
the respondent 
would face a real 
risk of being 
subjected to 
inhuman or 
degrading 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
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treatment, 
alternatively breach 
of his rights to 
bodily integrity and 
to be treated with 
human dignity, 
without evidence of 
particular 
vulnerability in his 
case. Arrest 
warrant granted.  
Minister v Justice 
v P.G.  
[2013] IEHC 54 
Article 8   Arrest warrant 
granted as it had 
not been 
persuaded that 
surrendering the 
respondent would 
breach his right 
and/or the rights of 
his immediate 
family under article 
8 ECHR to respect 
for private and 
family life. 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
Minister for 
Justice v B.H. 
[2013] IEHC 443 
 
Article 8    Where there is a 
risk of breach of 
article 8 rights, he 
Court must decide 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
431 
 
 whether the 
proposed 
interference to 
those rights was 
outweighed by the 
relevant public 
interest in having 
the individual 
extradited. 
J.A. v Refugee 
Appeals Tribunal 
[2013] IEHC 244 
Article 3   Leave was given to 
allow the applicant 
to amend the 
statement of 
grounds to include 
a challenge to the 
deportation order 
but only on the 
ground that the 
deportation order 
had failed to 
address the 
applicant’s rights 
under Article 3 the 
ECHR in relation to 
possible life 
imprisonment and 
prison conditions. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Health Service None specified   Appeal dismissed. SC Family Law 
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Executive v M.W. 
[2013] IESC 38 
It could not 
therefore be argued 
that Council 
Regulation 
EC/2201/2003 was 
in conflict with the 
freedom of 
movement right. 
Teehan v Health 
Service 
Executive 
 [2013] IEHC 383 
Article 8   Relief refused as 
made it clear that 
there was no 
statutory right to a 
home birth and the 
applicant had been 
unable to 
sufficiently 
demonstrate that 
the HSE’s policy on 
VBAC in a home 
setting was wholly 
unreasonable. 
HC Administrative 
Law  
Childbirth  
Minister for 
Justice v Gordon  
[2013] IEHC 515 
Article 6  Article 47 Whilst Article 6 of 
the European 
Convention on 
Human Rights 
entitled the 
respondent to “a 
fair and public 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
433 
 
hearing within a 
reasonable time by 
an independent 
and impartial 
tribunal established 
by law”, it did not 
necessarily follow 
that a delay in the 
trial process 
amounted to a 
breach of this right. 
I.D. v Minister for 
Justice 
 [2013] IEHC 281 
 
Article 8   The Tribunal’s 
decision failed to 
answer the 
applicant’s 
supplemental 
submission 
claiming that he 
had become a 
refugee “sur place” 
and so an order of 
certiorari was made 
quashing the 
decision.  
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Quinn v Irish 
Bank Resolution 
Corp Ltd   
[2013] IEHC 116 
 Section 2(1)  Held that the stay 
on proceedings 
under s. 6(2)(a) of 
the Irish Bank 
HC Commercial Law 
Legal Practice 
and Procedure 
434 
 
 Resolution 
Corporation Act, 
2013  was intended 
to be subject to 
being lifted on 
application to the 
courts. 
H.K. [Pakistan] v 
Minister for 
Justice 
[2013] IEHC 479 
None specified    Decision of the 
Refugee Appeals 
Tribunal quashed 
as the applicant’s 
claim had not been 
considered in full 
and a forward 
looking test had not 
been applied. 
Appeal remitted for 
fresh consideration. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
X.Y., A Minor v 
Health Service 
Executive  
[2013] IEHC 490 
None specified  Section 5  Held that there was 
no need to make 
any of the 
declarations sought 
on behalf of the 
minor with bi polar 
disorder as many of 
them had already 
been catered for or 
were not 
HC Mental Health 
435 
 
necessary.  
R.T.K. v Refugee 
Appeals Tribunal  
[2013] IEHC 108 
 Section 3(1)  Application for 
leave to seek 
judicial review was 
refused as a 
rational and well-
reasoned decision 
had been given by 
the Tribunal and 
the court could find 
no flaws in the 
conclusions 
reached in the 
case. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
A.C. v Minister 
for Justice  
[2013] IEHC 105 
 
Article 2 
Article 8 
Section 5 Article 4 
Article 9 
Article 10 
As such, it was 
held that a 
substantial ground 
as regards her 
medical 
condition/disability 
had not been 
advanced by the 
applicant in this 
regard. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Director of Public 
Prosecutions -v- 
McConnell 
[2013] IECCA 45 
Article 6 None specified   The application for 
appeal to the 
Supreme Court 
was dismissed as it 
CCA Criminal Law201 
436 
 
was held that the 
applicant in this 
case falls far short 
of the relevant test 
for certification of a 
point of appeal 
under s.29 of the 
Courts of Justice 
Act 1924. 
Smith & anor 
(minors) -v- 
Minister for 
Justice & 
Equality & ors 
[2013] IESC 4 
Article 8 Section 3(1) Article 7 Dismissed the 
appeal as the trial 
judge was correct 
in concluding that 
there were no 
arguable grounds 
established for 
challenging the 
Minister's second 
decision not to 
revoke the 
deportation order. 
SC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
N.J. -v- Minister 
for Justice 
Equality & Law 
Reform & ors 
[2013] IEHC 603 
 Section 3(1)  Made an order of 
certiorari quashing 
the deportation 
order as the 
applicant had 
successfully made 
out her complaint 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
437 
 
that a failure to 
consider the Keane 
report breached the 
provisions of s. 3 
(6) of the 1999 Act. 
Minister for 
Justice v 
McGuigan  
[2013] IEHC 216 
Article 3   Surrender of the 
applicant was 
prohibited as the 
strength of the 
evidence created 
reasonable 
grounds for 
believing that the 
surrender would 
pose a real risk to 
the respondent of 
exposure to 
inhuman or 
degrading 
treatment. 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
A.N. v Minister 
for Justice  
[2013] IEHC 480 
Article 8  Article 7 
Article 51 
The applicants had 
not established an 
entitlement to the 
relief sought and 
the application 
would fail as there 
was no information 
was before the 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
438 
 
Minister which 
would warrant the 
conclusion that it 
would be 
unreasonable to 
expect MS and her 
child to relocate to 
Albania. 
Minister for 
Justice v Kelly 
aka Nolan 
[2013] IESC 54 
Article 5.1   Dismissed the 
appeal as it was 
held that the 
respondent should 
not be surrendered 
to serve a term of 
imprisonment 
which had been 
found to be 
contrary to the 
ECHR. 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
D.F & anor -v- 
Garda 
Commissioner & 
Ors  
[2013] IEHC 5 
 Section 3(2) Article 51(2) Held that the 
plaintiff is entitled to 
jury trial in respect 
of the claims 
contained in the 
general 
endorsement of 
claim but that all 
issues touching on 
HC Legal Practice 
and Procedure 
Tort Law 
439 
 
or concerning the 
legality of the arrest 
and detention of 
the plaintiff by 
members of An 
Garda Siochana 
are to be 
determined by the 
trial judge alone. 
The Minister for 
Justice and 
Equality -v- 
Jermolajevs 
[2013] IEHC 102 
Article 3 
Article 6 
Article 8 
 Article 7 
Article 47 
An order was made 
directing the 
surrender of the 
respondent in 
respect of offences 
1, 2, 4, 6, and 7 but 
not in in respect of 
offences 3 and 5. 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
The Minister for 
Justice and 
Equality -v- 
Ciesielski 
 [2013] IEHC 101 
Article 8  Article 7 
Article 14 
Article 15 
Article 24 
Article 33 
Article 45 
Held that in 
circumstances 
where the Court 
has seen fit to 
uphold Point of 
Objection No 1 in 
the absence of an 
undertaking for the 
purposes of s. 45 of 
the Act of 2003, 
where such an 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
440 
 
undertaking is 
required, the Court 
must regard the 
surrender of the 
respondent as 
being prohibited 
under Part 3 of the 
Act of 2003. 
E.B & Ors -v- 
The Minister for 
Justice & Anor 
[2013] IEHC 246 
Article 8 
Article 14 
 Article 7 
Article 21 
Article 24 
Article 45 
Article 52(3) 
Held that the 
application for 
leave to apply for 
judicial review 
should be refused 
on several grounds. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
M.A.H -v- 
Minister for 
Justice & Ors 
[2013] IEHC 240 
Article 6  Article 2 
Article 47 
Article 51 
The application 
was refused as it 
was not for the 
High Court to make 
any observations in 
relation to the 
merits or otherwise 
of the Supreme 
Court appeal.  
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Gilligan -v- 
Ireland & ors 
[2013] IESC 45 
  Article 49(3) The appeal was 
dismissed for 
various reasons 
including that there 
was a rational 
SC Criminal Law 
441 
 
connection 
between the nature 
of the penalty and 
the harm it sought 
to address. 
F.B.A. & ors -v- 
Minister for 
Justice and 
Equality & ors 
[2013] IEHC 554 
Article 3 
Article 8 
Article 13 
 Article 24(2) 
Article 47 
Held that it would 
not be fair or just to 
refuse an extension 
of time to enable 
the applicants to 
seek relief and that 
it was appropriate 
that the deportation 
orders in this case 
would not be acted 
upon pending the 
completion of these 
proceedings and 
that the then 
present position 
should be 
maintained. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Administrative 
Law 
K.N. & anor -v- 
Minister for 
Justice and 
Equality  
[2013] IEHC 566 
Article 8  None 
specified 
Held that the 
balance of 
convenience lay 
against the granting 
of an injunction and 
refused leave to 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
442 
 
apply for judicial 
review. 
Browne -v- Fingal 
County Council 
[2013] IEHC 630 
  Article 47 The application 
was refused for 
several reasons 
including that the 
Court was not 
satisfied that under 
Aarhus the 
applicant was 
entitled to the sort 
of blanket costs 
indemnity order he 
sought in advance 
of bringing his 
application for 
leave to seek 
judicial review. 
HC Planning and 
Development 
Law 
M.H.A. -v- A.P. 
[2013] IEHC 611 
  Article 24(3) The Court made 
several 
interlocutory orders 
pending further 
order or the 
determination of 
these proceedings 
in the High Court. 
HC Child Abduction 
Law 
Family and Child 
Law 
Dos Santos & 
Ors -v- The 
Article 2 
Article 8 
 Article 4 
Article 9 
Held that if there 
was a deficiency in 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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Minister for 
Justice & Ors 
[2013] IEHC 237 
Article 10 
Article 51 
the deportation 
orders of the 
children it must be 
arguable that such 
defect tainted the 
decisions taken in 
the parent's cases 
and the balance of 
justice favoured 
restraining the 
deportation of the 
entire family in this 
instance.  
J.G & Anor -v- 
The Refugee 
Applications 
Commissioner & 
Ors 
[2013] IEHC 248 
None specified  None 
specified  
Held that even if 
granted leave to 
apply for judicial 
review, the 
applicants could 
not succeed in 
establishing the 
grounds relied 
upon and would not 
on the evidence 
have been able to 
establish that the 
respondents’ 
decisions were 
unlawful and so 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
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relief was refused. 
Applications by 
Coffey & others v 
Environmental 
Protection 
Agency & anor 
[2013] IESC 31 
Article 6  Article 41(2) Held that the 
learned trial judges 
of the High Court 
were acting within 
their jurisdiction, 
and were correct in 
law and under the 
Constitution in 
refusing to grant a 
costs order against 
parties without 
notice to those 
parties and in their 
absence from the 
Court. Affirmed the 
judgments and 
orders of the High 
Court and 
dismissed the 
appeals.  
SC Environmental 
Law 
Administrative 
Law 
Maria Caldaras & 
Anor v An tArd 
Chlaraitheoir 
(Registrar 
General)  
[2013] IEHC 275 
 Section 2  Held that the 
applicant was 
entitled to the relief 
sought and to have 
the birth register 
amended 
accordingly. 
HC Civil 
Registration Law 
Administrative 
Law 
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A.J & Ors -v- The 
Minister for 
Justice and 
Equality  
[2013] IEHC 296 
Article 13  Article 41 Held that as A.J. 
was granted leave 
to remain on 
humanitarian 
grounds referable 
to the submissions 
made on his mental 
health, it would be 
left to another day 
and another court 
to consider whether 
the blanket refusal 
of family 
reunification to 
those granted leave 
to remain can 
survive 
constitutional or 
Convention 
scrutiny. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
J.J -v- L Mc L 
[2013] IEHC 549 
Article 8 Section 2  The application 
was refused as it 
was held that the 
respondent has not 
only established 
that it is in the best 
interests of the 
child that he not be 
 Family and Child 
Law 
Child Abduction 
Law 
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returned to 
Belgium, but has 
also established 
that the child would 
be exposed to a 
grave risk of 
psychological harm 
if returned to 
Belgium at this 
stage of his 
development. 
Minister for 
Justice Equality 
& Law Reform -v- 
Strzelecki (No. 2) 
[2013] IEHC 477 
Article 13  None 
specified  
The Court held in 
favour of the 
applicant as it was 
held that even 
where our courts 
might potentially be 
entitled to intervene 
and refuse 
surrender they will 
not necessarily do 
so if the remedy 
being sought ought 
to be more 
appropriately 
pursued before the 
courts of the 
issuing state. 
HC European Arrest 
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Minister for 
Justice and 
Equality -v- 
Kasprowicz 
[2013] IEHC 531 
Article 8  None 
specified  
Held that the Court 
was not disposed 
to certify any of the 
three questions 
proposed in relation 
to the surrender of 
the applicant and 
the order sought by 
the respondent 
certifying that the 
Court’s order or 
decision involved a 
point of law of 
exceptional public 
importance and 
that it was 
desirable in the 
public interest that 
an appeal be taken 
to the Supreme 
Court. 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
Minister for 
Justice and 
Equality -v- T.E. 
[2013] IEHC 323 
Article 8  Article 24 Held that the court 
was obliged by the 
terms of s. 21A of 
the Act of 2003 to 
refuse to surrender 
the respondent. 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
Webster & Anor - Article 8   Reliefs sought HC Housing Law 
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v- Dun Laoghaire 
Rathdown 
County Council & 
Ors 
[2013] IEHC 119 
refused. It was held 
that in this case an 
eviction order could 
not give rise to a 
finding of 
incompatibility on 
the grounds of non-
consideration of the 
proportionality of 
the eviction 
measure. 
Landlord and 
Tenant Law 
McNulty -v- 
Ireland & Ors 
[2013] IEHC 357 
Article 6 Section 5  Refused the reliefs 
sought for various 
reasons including 
that the plaintiff had  
not satisfied the 
Court that s. 41 of 
the Criminal Justice 
Act 1999 was 
incompatible with 
Article 6 of the 
ECHR. 
HC Criminal Law 
B.M. (Eritrea) -v- 
The Minister for 
Justice and 
Equality  
[2013] IEHC 324 
Article 3 
Article 13 
  Held that the 
applicant had 
established that the 
decision to refuse 
to revoke the 
deportation order 
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Immigration Law 
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was in all the 
circumstances 
fundamentally 
flawed on grounds 
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 
11 of the amended 
statement of 
grounds. Therefore, 
an order of 
certiorari quashing 
the decision of the 
respondent was 
granted and the 
matter was remitted 
to be determined 
by the respondent 
in accordance with 
the applicable legal 
principles. 
A.S.M.A & anor -
v- Minister for 
Justice & 
Equality & ors 
[2013] IEHC 381 
Article 8 Section 3  Granted leave to 
apply for judicial 
review on several 
grounds including 
that the Minister in 
deciding to deport 
the second named 
applicant failed to 
have any or any 
HC Asylum and 
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adequate regard for 
the best interests of 
the child and/or to 
consider the child’s 
best interests as 
the primary 
consideration in the 
making of the 
decision contrary to 
Article 8 of the  
ECHR and Article 
3.1 of the United 
Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the 
Child. 
F.E (A Minor) & 
Ors -v- The 
Minister for 
Justice and Law 
Reform  
[2013] IEHC 93 
Article 8 Section 3  Held that the 
decision of the 
Minister and the 
examination of file 
complied fully with 
the terms, spirit and 
purpose of the 
Oguekwe 
guidelines and that 
the applicants had 
failed to establish 
for the reasons set 
out in the judgment 
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that the decision to 
deport M.E. was 
unreasonable, 
irrational or 
disproportionate. 
Akpekpe -v- The 
Medical Council 
& Ors 
[2013] IEHC 38 
Article 6 Section 5  Refused to grant 
the reliefs sought 
for reasons 
including that it was 
held that no 
declaration of 
incompatibility had 
been sought 
pursuant to s. 5 of 
the ECHR Act of 
2003 and the 
applicant is simply 
not entitled to seek 
declarations that 
statutory provisions 
themselves deny 
the applicant tights 
enshrined in the 
Convention in 
circumstances 
where that 
Convention has no 
direct effect in 
HC Medical Law 
Administrative 
Law 
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national law. 
Minister for 
Justice and 
Equality -v- B.H. 
[2013] IEHC 443 
Article 8   Held that the 
surrender of the 
applicant would not 
constitute a breach 
of his rights under 
Article 8 ECHR and 
that the private 
interests of a 
respondent and a 
dependent child do 
not outweigh public 
interest in 
extradition. 
Surrender to 
issuing state was 
ordered. 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant  
The Minister for 
Justice and 
Equality -v- 
Eglitis  
[2013] IEHC 215 
Article 6   The Court 
concluded that it 
had sufficient 
information to 
enable it to 
determine whether 
the respondent had 
put before it 
sufficiently cogent 
evidence to put the 
Court upon enquiry 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant  
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as to whether or 
not the trial of the 
respondent leading 
to the conviction 
and sentence upon 
which the 
European arrest 
warrant is based 
was fair with 
reference to Article 
6 ECHR but it was 
held that the Court 
lacked the 
necessary 
documentation to 
exercise its powers 
under the 
European Arrest 
Warrant Act 2003.  
Minister for 
Justice and 
Equality -v- 
Horváth 
[2013] IEHC 534 
Article 2, Protocol 
7 
  Held that as the 
Court was not in 
receipt of an 
undertaking from 
the Hungarian 
authorities in the 
form required by s. 
45 of the European 
Arrest Warrant Act 
HC European Arrest 
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of 2003, it had to 
refuse to make an 
order pursuant to s. 
16(1) of the Act of 
2003 and discharge 
the respondent 
from his bail. 
D.O.M. & ors -v- 
Minister for 
Justice and Law 
Reform  
[2013] IEHC 193 
Article 8   Held that the 
Minister had 
considered 
extensively the 
facts and materials 
and that the 
applicants had 
failed to establish 
that the decision 
made was 
fundamentally 
flawed as contrary 
to reason or 
common sense or 
disproportionate in 
the sense 
indicated. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
The Minister for 
Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform 
-v- M.M.  
Article 8   Held that the 
proposed surrender 
did not constitute a 
disproportionate 
HC European Arrest 
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[2013] IEHC 330 measure in the 
circumstances of 
this case and would 
not operate to 
disrespect the 
rights of the 
respondent, and his 
children, in breach 
of Article 8 of the 
E.C.H.R. 
In the Matter of 
Applications for 
Orders in 
Relation to Costs 
in Intended 
Proceedings by 
Coffey and 
others  
[2013] IESC 11 
None specified    Held that there was 
no warrant for the 
claim that, in the 
application of EU 
law or the ECHR, 
specifically either 
by the Court of 
Justice or the 
ECtHR, there is 
any obligation on 
the court of a 
Member State to 
permit a litigant to 
be represented by 
a person other than 
a duly qualified 
lawyer. 
SC Legal 
Representation  
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2014 
Case Articles of ECHR 
Considered in 
Decision 
Sections of the 
ECHR Act 2003 
Considered in 
the Decision 
EU Charter 
Article 
Core Summary Court Core Legal 
Area 
Gormley and 
Whyte v. DPP 
[2014] IESC 17 ; 
[2014] 1 I.L.R.M. 
377 
Article 6 Section 2  There is a 
constitutional (and 
implicitly a right 
under the ECHR) 
to access legal 
advice before 
questioning of a 
criminal suspect 
commences.   
SC Criminal Law 
Thomas Murphy 
v Ireland, the 
Attorney General 
and the Director 
of Public 
Prosecutions 
[2014] IESC 19; 
[2014] 1 I.L.R.M. 
457 
 
 
Article 6 Section 2  The ECHR does 
not specify the 
manner in which 
criminal trials 
should be 
provided, and does 
not confer a right 
to trial by jury in all 
circumstances. 
SC Criminal Law 
C.I. & Others v 
Minister for 
Article 8   Interference with 
private life and 
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Justice  
[2014] IEHC 447 
family life is 
necessary in a 
democratic society  
therefore 
something other 
than the 
termination of the 
applicants private 
life in the deporting 
state was required 
if the 
proportionality 
analysis were to 
yield a positive 
result for the 
applicant. A similar 
sort of approach 
was appropriate in 
relation to family 
life. 
Minister for 
Justice v 
O’Donnell  
[2014] IEHC 138 
Article 8 
Article 4 of 
Protocol 2 
  Respondent’s 
private interests do 
not outweigh the 
strong public 
interest in 
respondent’s 
extradition, and his 
surrender would 
HC European Arrest 
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not breach his 
rights under article 
8 of the ECHR. 
Damache v DPP  
[2014] IEHC 114 
Article 3 
Article 5 
Article 6 
Article 8 
Article 13 
Section 3 
Section 5 
 The Applicant’s 
contention that the 
refusal to 
prosecute him 
within Ireland was 
unreasonable, 
disproportionate 
and made without 
proper regard to 
the impact that the 
extradition of the 
applicant would 
have on his 
constitutional and 
Convention rights, 
was unstateable. 
HC Criminal Law 
Attorney General 
v Piotrowski   
[2014] IEHC 540 
Article 1 
Article 3 
Article 6 
Article 8 
  Extradition of the 
respondent to the 
Ukraine refused as 
where the Court 
had upheld the 
respondent’s 
objection to his 
extradition based 
upon article 3 
HC Extradition  
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ECHR, the Court 
was not disposed 
to make a 
committal order 
under the 
Extradition Act 
1965. 
L.K. (infant) v 
Minister for 
Justice  
[2014] IEHC 521 
Article 8   Held that the 
applicant had 
established a 
substantial ground 
upon which to 
grant leave to 
apply for judicial 
review of the 
deportation order 
not entitled to relief 
on any of the other 
grounds advanced 
so therefore the 
application was 
refused. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Ryan v Clare 
County Council   
[2014] IESC 67 
Article 6 
Article 8 
Article 1 Protocol 
1 
Section 2 
Section 4 
Section 5 
 Reversed the 
judgment of the 
High Court  due to 
an error in the 
judge’s discretion 
in refusing relief 
 Planning and 
Development 
Law 
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via judicial review, 
and granted the 
declaration and 
mandatory orders 
sought. 
Minister for 
Justice v Balmer  
[2014] IEHC 459 
 
Article 5   Held that it would 
be appropriate to 
surrender the 
respondent in 
respect of the 
offence to which 
the European 
arrest warrant 
related. 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
Cerkovska v 
Minister for 
Justice  
[2014] IEHC 258 
Article 8   The applicant’s 
claim was 
dismissed in limine 
as she applicant 
could not establish 
that she had 
suffered, or would 
inevitably suffer 
any actual 
unfairness or 
breach of her 
rights in the 
circumstances. 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
Tougher v None specified    The judge HC Administrative 
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Tougher's Oil 
Distributors 
Limited (No 1)   
[2014] IEHC 254 
indicated there 
was no reason at 
all to doubt the 
integrity of the 
former solicitor but 
that he was bound 
to follow the 
established rule 
which was that 
only a qualified 
barrister or solicitor 
has the right, if 
duly instructed, to 
represent a litigant 
before the courts. 
Justice 
Constitutional 
Law 
S.A.B. -v- 
Refugee Appeals 
Tribunal & ors 
[2014] IEHC 495 
 Section 3(1)  Issued an order 
quashing the 
decision of the 
RAT and referring 
it back for decision 
by another 
Tribunal member 
as the decision 
was deficient in 
several ways.  
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
C.B. -v- Refugee 
Appeals Tribunal 
& ors 
 Section 3(1)  Decision quashed 
and referred back 
to the RAT for 
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[2014] IEHC 496 consideration by 
another Tribunal 
member as the 
decision did not 
refer explicitly to 
the COI in the form 
of the two internet 
articles. 
C.C. -v- Refugee 
Appeals Tribunal 
& ors 
[2014] IEHC 491 
 Section 3(1)  Held that the 
orders made by 
the Tribunal and 
the Minister should 
be quashed and 
the matter remitted 
for further hearing 
before a different 
tribunal member 
due to issues with 
the evidential 
basis. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
S.E. (a minor) -v- 
Refugee Appeals 
Tribunal & ors 
[2014] IEHC 240 
 Section 3(1)  Application for 
leave to seek 
judicial review was 
refused as the 
court was not 
satisfied that the 
applicant has 
established any 
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substantial 
grounds for 
allowing relief.  
Killeen -v- 
Governor of 
Portlaoise & ors 
[2014] IEHC 77 
None specified    None of the reliefs 
were granted save 
for a declaration 
which could be 
made on consent 
that the detention 
of the applicants 
from 26th January, 
2013 to 25th 
October, 2013 was 
not in accordance 
with rule 62 of the 
Prison Rules. 
HC Constitutional 
Law 
Minister for 
Justice v Rostas 
[2014] IEHC 391 
 
Article 6 
Article 8 
Article 14 
 Article 7 
Article 20 
Article 21 
Article 47 
Article 48 
Article 49 
The court refused 
to surrender the 
applicant as it 
determined that 
there was a real 
risk that the 
respondent 
suffered a flagrant 
denial of justice in 
respect of her trial 
resulting in the 
conviction and 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant  
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sentence that led 
to the European 
Arrest Warrant 
being issued. 
S.L. v Minister 
for Justice  & 
Equality & ors 
[2014] IEHC 16 
Article 8 
Article 14 
 Article 7 Application was 
dismissed as the 
applicants had 
failed to establish 
that the decision to 
affirm the 
deportation order 
was fundamentally 
flawed on the 
grounds advanced. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
F.E. (A Minor) v 
Minister for 
Justice  
[2014] IEHC 62 
Article 8 
Article 13 
Section 5  Certification under 
section 5 (3) (a) of 
the 2000 Act was 
refused as the 
argument of the 
applicants 
regarding 
proportionality was 
incorrect, did not 
give rise to a point 
of law of 
exceptional public 
importance, and 
that an appeal was 
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not in the public 
interest. 
F.B. v Minister 
for Justice  
[2014] IEHC 427 
Article 8   The court was 
satisfied that there 
was an error of law 
as regards the 
application of the 
test for 
dependency and 
the application of 
article 8 to the 
circumstances 
therefore the 
applicant was 
entitled to the relief 
claimed and the 
order was 
quashed.  
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
K.I. (a minor) & 
ors -v- Minister 
for Justice and 
Equality & ors 
[2014] IEHC 83 
Article 8  Article 7 
Article 24 
Article 51 
Article 52(3) 
Held that the 
applicants had not 
established that 
the first named 
respondent’s 
decision in 
refusing to revoke 
the deportation 
order pursuant to 
s. 3(11) was 
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vitiated on any of 
the grounds 
advanced and 
therefore the 
application was 
refused. 
J.S. & ors -v- 
Minister for 
Justice and 
Equality & anor 
[2014] IEHC 195 
Article 3 
Article 8 
 Article 7 
Article 24 
Article 51 
Held that the 
refusal to revoke 
the deportation 
order challenged in 
this case was not 
fundamentally 
flawed on any of 
the three grounds 
advanced and that 
Minister in 
considering the 
additional material 
submitted on 
behalf of the 
applicants adopted 
a fair approach.  
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
T.D. -v- Minister 
for Justice 
Equality and Law 
Reform  
[2014] IESC 29 
  Article 18 Dismissed the 
appeal against the 
Order of the High 
Court for various 
reasons.  
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
D.F. -v- Garda Article 3 Section 3(2) Article 3 Held that the HC Tort Law 
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Commissioner & 
ors (No.3) 
 [2014] IEHC 213 
Article 5 Article 4 
Article 6 
Article 7 
Article 51(2) 
claims for 
declaratory relief in 
aid of these 
common law 
claims was 
inappropriate and 
potentially 
confusing given 
that that action 
was set down for 
trial before a jury 
and so struck them 
out. Several other 
conclusions were 
also made. 
K.A. (a minor) -v- 
Refugee Appeals 
Tribunal & ors 
[2014] IEHC 223 
Article 8  Article 24.2 Refused the 
application but will 
list this matter for 
early hearing in the 
new term as Mr J 
McDermott was 
not satisfied to 
dismiss this case 
on the basis of the 
inherent 
jurisdiction of the 
court 
notwithstanding 
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the suggested 
infirmities of the 
grounds to be 
advanced by the 
applicant. 
A.P. -v- Minister 
for Justice and 
Equality (No. 2) 
[2014] IEHC 241 
  Article 41 An order of 
certiorari was 
made quashing the 
decision of the 
respondent 
refusing to grant a 
certificate of 
naturalisation to 
the applicant for 
various reasons 
including a lack of 
reasons being 
furnished to the 
applicant.  
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Schrems -v- 
Data Protection 
Commissioner 
[2014] IEHC 310 
  Article 7 
Article 8 
Held that the 
present 
proceedings must 
stand adjourned 
pending the 
outcome of the 
Article 267 
reference to the 
Court of Justice. 
HC Data Protection 
Law 
Intellectual 
Property Law 
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A.M & Anor -v- 
The Refugee 
Appeals Tribunal 
& Ors  
[2014] IEHC 388 
Article 9  Article 10 
Article 51(1) 
Article 52(3) 
Held that the 
applications should 
be refused as A.M. 
is entitled to apply 
for an exemption 
on the same basis 
as her brother 
before the Military 
Committee and the 
error by the 
tribunal member in 
relying upon s. 
39(c) does not 
affect that reality 
and is not such as 
to warrant the 
quashing of the 
decision. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Dowling & Ors -
v- The Minister 
for Finance 
[2014] IEHC 418 
None specified  Section 3 Article 17 A preliminary 
ruling was sought 
from the Court of 
Justice on whether 
it would resile 
from, qualify or 
affirm the 
jurisprudence 
outlined on the 
Directive. Several 
HC Law of Finance 
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findings of law and 
fact were also 
made. 
C.A. & anor -v- 
Minister for 
Justice and 
Equality & ors 
[2014] IEHC 532 
Article 3 
Article 8 
Article 14 
Article 2, Protocol 
4 
 Article 1 
Article 3 
Article 4 
Article 7 
Article 15 
Article 20 
Article 21 
Article 24 
Article 41 
Held that the 
applicants failed to 
establish that 
‘direct provision’ 
because of 
cumulative effects, 
with or without a 
temporal element, 
breached their 
human rights 
whether arising 
under the 
Constitution or the 
European 
Convention on 
Human Rights. 
They succeeded in 
their claims that 
some of the RIA 
House Rules were 
unlawful and in 
their claim that the 
complaints 
handling 
procedure was 
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unlawful. 
D.A. (infant) 
(Nigeria) -v- 
Minister for 
Justice and 
Equality & ors 
[2014] IEHC 600 
  Article 24(2) Held that the 
applicant had not 
established any 
substantial 
grounds upon 
which leave to 
apply for judicial 
review might be 
granted in this 
case and the 
application was 
therefore 
dismissed. 
 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
J.M.O. -v- The 
Refugee 
Applications 
Commissioner & 
Ors 
[2014] IEHC 467 
Article 3 
Article 8 
 
 Article 1 
Article 4 
Article 52(3) 
Held that the 
respondents 
properly 
considered all 
relevant matters in 
accordance with 
the Dublin II 
Regulation and the 
provisions of the 
ECHR and the 
Charter of 
Fundamental 
Freedoms, and the 
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decision to return 
the applicant to 
Slovakia under 
Article 3 was 
correct in law. 
Celtic Salmon 
Atlantic (Killary) 
Ltd -v- Aller 
Acqua (Ireland) 
Ltd & Anor 
[2014] IEHC 421 
  Article 41 
Article 47 
Article 48 
Article 51 
Held that it would 
not be contrary to 
the scheme of the 
Brussels 
Regulation to 
permit Celtic 
Atlantic to pursue 
its claim for breach 
of contract and 
negligence as 
against Aller 
Ireland in this 
jurisdiction and, 
where necessary, 
to sue Aller 
Denmark for 
negligence on the 
sole basis that the 
fish feed as so 
supplied was 
inherently 
unsuitable for fish 
of this nature, 
 European Union 
Law 
Contract Law 
Tort Law 
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irrespective of 
contractual 
specifications. 
I.O. (Nigeria) -v- 
Minister for 
Justice and Law 
Reform & ors 
[2014] IEHC 598 
  Article 24(2) Dismissed the 
application for 
judicial review as 
the applicant had 
not established 
substantial 
grounds for the 
contention that the 
decision ought to 
be quashed.  
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
S.K.T. (DRC) -v- 
Refugee Appeals 
Tribunal & ors 
[2014] IEHC 572 
  Article 41 
Article 47 
Held that the 
decision of the 
RAT must be 
quashed due to 
the inordinate 
delay in holding 
the hearings 
before the RAT 
and the lengthy 
delay in the 
delivery of its 
decision. It was 
also held that a 
number of the 
Tribunal’s findings 
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were unsound and 
so were also 
struck down. 
M.O.I -v- The 
Refugee Appeals 
Tribunal & Ors 
[2014] IEHC 291 
Article 6 
Article 15(2) 
Section 1 
Section 2 
Section 3 
Section 4 
None 
specified 
Held that nothing 
the applicant had 
persuaded the 
Court that merely 
because of the 
existence of the 
Procedures and 
Qualification 
Directive as 
instruments of 
Community law, 
that this somehow 
triggered a 
requirement on a 
decision maker to 
consider the 
Articles of the 
Convention and 
whether the 
conduct sought 
thereby to be 
outlawed should 
be somehow 
assessed to see 
whether the 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
475 
 
conduct 
complained of in 
the claim 
constituted such 
category of 
conduct. Leave to 
seek judicial 
review refused.  
F. -v- G. 
[2014] IEHC 152 
Article 8   Held that the Court 
could not accede 
to the applicant’s 
claim for an order 
appointing the 
respondent as the 
child’s guardian 
under section 6A 
of the 1964 Act as 
no such 
application on the 
part of a mother, 
such as the 
applicant, could 
succeed because 
the section 
concerned only 
permits an 
application to be 
made by a father, 
HC Family and Child 
Law 
476 
 
such as the 
respondent. 
Director of Public 
Prosecutions -v- 
Idah  
[2014] IECCA 3 
Article 8   .As relevant and 
inadmissible 
evidence was 
been placed 
before the jury, it 
was held that the 
court had no 
alternative but to 
quash the 
conviction and 
order a retrial. 
CCA Criminal Law 
Gorry & anor -v- 
Minister for 
Justice & 
Equality  
[2014] IEHC 29 
Article 8   Held that the legal 
and constitutional 
rights of the 
applicants had 
been infringed by 
the failure to 
acknowledge, 
weigh and 
consider those 
rights. An order of 
certiorari was 
made quashing the 
decision of the 
respondent to 
affirm a 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
477 
 
Deportation Order 
made against the 
first named 
applicant.  
Q.L. -v- Minister 
for Justice and 
Equality & ors  
[2014] IEHC 507 
Article 8 
 
  Refused the reliefs 
sought as it was 
held that the 
scheme provided 
for in s. 3 of the 
Immigration Act 
1999, safeguards 
the right for the 
applicant to make 
representations to 
the Minister prior 
to any Deportation 
Order being made, 
is a sufficient 
protection to the 
applicant to make 
representations 
under Article 41 of 
the Constitution 
and Article 8 of the 
ECHR meaning 
there was no 
breach of the 
applicant’s rights.  
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
478 
 
Javed -v- 
Minister for 
Justice and 
Equality & ors 
[2014] IEHC 508 
Article 8 
Article 13 
  Refused the reliefs 
sought as it was 
held that the 
absence of a gap 
between the 
considering of the 
representations 
and if 
unsuccessful, the 
making of the 
deportation order 
was not a breach 
of the applicant’s 
constitutional 
rights or rights 
under Article 8 of 
the ECHR. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Edward 
Lattimore v 
Dublin City 
Council  
[2014] IEHC 233 
Article 8 Section 2  Held that the 
decision made was 
not in any sense 
disproportionate as 
appropriate 
alternate 
accommodation 
had been offered 
to the applicant 
and the correct 
application of the 
HC Housing Law 
479 
 
proportionality 
principle in this 
case also means 
that there was no 
breach of the 
applicant’s rights 
under Article 40.5 
of Bunreacht na 
hÉireann. 
Jordan -v- 
Minister for 
Children and 
Youth Affairs & 
ors  
[2014] IEHC 327 
Article 3 
Article 6 
Article 10 
Article 13 
Article 14 
Section 1  The plaintiff’s claim 
regarding the 
Referendum Act 
and public 
spending was 
dismissed for 
various reasons 
including that it 
was held that there 
was nothing in the 
terms of Article 6, 
10, 13 or 14 of the 
European 
Convention or the 
Venice Code with 
which the 
McKenna 
principles or the 
remedies provided 
 Constitutional 
Law 
Referendum 
Law 
480 
 
under the 
Referendum Act 
1994, as 
interpreted by the 
Supreme Court, 
were incompatible. 
McCormack & 
Anor -v- Rouse 
[2014] IEHC 396 
Article 6 Section 2  Held that the 
balance of justice 
favours the 
dismissal of the 
plaintiff’s 
proceedings for 
various reasons 
including that there 
was a substantial 
risk that it was not 
possible to have a 
fair trial of the 
action and that 
there was  likely to 
be serious 
prejudice to the 
defendant in the 
conduct of his 
defence. 
HC Administrative 
Law 
 
Dos Santos & 
ors -v- Minister 
for Justice & 
Article 8   It was held that the 
applicants had 
failed to establish 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
481 
 
Equality & ors 
[2014] IEHC 559 
that the 
deportation orders 
were 
fundamentally 
flawed and so the 
applications were 
refused.  
A.M.S. -v- 
Minister for 
Justice and 
Equality 
[2014] IEHC 57 
Article 8 None specified   Granted an order 
of certiorari in 
respect of the 
decision for 
several reasons 
including that it 
was held that no 
lawful 
proportionality 
assessment was 
conducted. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
A.L. -v- Minister 
for Justice and 
Equality & ors  
[2014] IEHC 503 
Article 8   Refused the 
application for 
relief as it was held 
that  the absence 
of a gap between 
the considering of 
the 
representations 
and if 
unsuccessful, the 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
482 
 
making of the 
deportation order 
was not a breach 
of the applicant’s 
constitutional 
rights or rights 
under Article 8 of 
the ECHR. 
Ryan -v- Danske 
Bank A/S t/a 
Danske Bank & 
anor  
[2014] IEHC 236 
 None specified   Held that the 
plaintiff had not 
made out an 
arguable prima 
facie case that he 
has rights under 
the ECHR which 
are capable of 
being protected 
and ought now to 
be preserved by 
way of 
interlocutory 
injunctive relief. 
Relief refused.  
 Commercial Law 
Receivership 
Law 
M.C. -v- The 
Provincialate 
[2014] IEHC 101 
Article 6   Held that the court 
would not dismiss 
the plaintiff’s 
proceedings on the 
grounds of 
HC Institutional 
Abuse 
Administrative 
Law 
483 
 
inordinate and 
inexcusable delay 
having regard to 
the balance of 
justice including 
prejudice to the 
defendant and the 
defendant’s rights 
under natural and 
common law, the 
ECHR and 
Bunreacht na 
hÉireann. 
Sweeney -v- 
Governor of 
Loughlan House 
Open Centre & 
ors 
[2014] IEHC 150 
Article 5   Relief refused as it 
was held that the 
continued 
detention of the 
applicant pursuant 
to the terms of the 
warrant issued by 
the Court in 
November 2008 
was in accordance 
with law and would 
remain so after the 
29th March 2014. 
 Penal Law 
Administrative 
Law 
Morrissey & Anor 
-v- National 
 Section 3  Refused admission 
to the Commercial 
HC Commercial Law 
484 
 
Asset 
Management 
Agency & Ors 
[2014] IEHC 343 
List as it was held 
that this litigation 
was fundamentally 
a constitutional 
action. 
Clarke -v- The 
Health Service 
Executive & Ors 
[2014] IEHC 419 
None specified    Held that this was 
not an appropriate 
case for an 
intervention by the 
courts in refusing 
the relief sought.  
HC Penal Law 
Administrative 
Law 
B.S. -v- Minister 
for Justice & Ors  
[2014] IEHC 502 
Article 8   Refused to make 
an order quashing 
the deportation 
order for reasoning 
including that it 
was held it was 
open to the 
Minister to reach 
the conclusion that 
there was not a 
"real and 
substantial" risk of 
suicide and 
accordingly, the 
Minister was 
entitled to form the 
opinion that the 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
485 
 
deportation order 
should not be 
revoked on this 
ground. 
R.B -v- Minister 
for Justice & Law 
Reform & anor 
[2014] IEHC 570 
Article 8   Quashed the 
decision of the 
respondent for 
several reasons 
including that it 
was held that it 
was appropriate 
that when 
considering 
whether the 
applicant had 
established a 
private life in the 
State, the decision 
maker should have 
regard to the 
length of time that 
the applicant had 
been in the State 
when making the 
decision whether 
or not to revoke 
the deportation 
order. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
486 
 
O'C & Anor -v- 
Udaras Uchtála 
na hÉireann 
[2014] IEHC 580 
None specified    An order was 
made under s. 92 
that the adoption in 
this case be 
entered in the 
Register of Inter 
Country Adoptions. 
HC Adoption Law 
Cassidy -v- 
Martin Butterly 
and Company 
Ltd & ors 
[2014] IEHC 203 
Article 6   Dismissed the 
application as the 
Judge felt that it 
should be left open 
to the defendant 
and the other 
defendants to 
prove at the 
hearing any 
express prejudice 
that arose and to 
revisit the question 
of dismissal of the 
action in evidence, 
argument and 
submissions at the 
trial. 
HC Employment 
Law 
M.C.A. -v- 
Refugee Appeals 
Tribunal & Ors 
[2014] IEHC 504 
Article 3   Held that the 
portion of the 
decision which 
impliedly required 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
487 
 
the applicant to 
show a likelihood 
that he would 
suffer treatment in 
breach of Article 3 
of the ECHR i.e. 
torture or inhuman 
or degrading 
treatment was an 
error of law as the 
applicant was only 
required to show a 
well-founded fear 
of persecution, not 
that he was likely 
to suffer torture, 
inhuman or 
degrading 
treatment.  
McClean -v- 
Sunday 
Newspapers Ltd 
[2014] IEHC 304 
Article 6   Dismissed Mr. 
McClean’s claim 
on the grounds of 
inordinate and 
inexcusable delay 
in the prosecution 
of his action as it 
was held that 
based on Article 
HC Tort Law 
Media Law 
488 
 
6(1) ECHR, the 
defendant ought 
not to be subjected 
to the continuance 
of the proceedings.  
Minister for 
Justice and 
Equality -v- 
J.A.T.  
[2014] IEHC 320 
Article 8   The Court was not 
disposed to uphold 
the s. 37 European 
Arrest Warrant Act 
2003 objection 
based upon article 
8 of the ECHR and 
an order for 
surrender to the 
issuing state was 
made. 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
The Minister for 
Justice and 
Equality -v- Craig 
[2014] IEHC 460 
Article 8   The Court was not 
disposed to uphold 
the respondent’s s. 
37(1)(a) European 
Arrest Warrant Act 
2003 objection 
based upon his 
rights, and those of 
his wife, under 
article 8 of the 
ECHR.  
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
O'Brien v Article 6   Dismissed the HC Constitutional 
489 
 
Director of Public 
Prosecutions 
[2014] IESC 39 
application as it 
was held that very 
long period has 
elapsed since the 
public remarks 
were made and 
that this period 
was sufficient to 
allow public 
memory to fade. It 
was thus held that 
there was no real 
risk in the 
circumstances to a 
fair trial and so no 
breach of rights 
under Article 6 
ECHR. 
Law 
Media Law 
Minister for 
Justice & 
Equality -v- 
Leskiewicz 
[2014] IEHC 584 
Article 8   Held that the 
respondent had 
failed to adduce 
evidence of 
sufficient cogency 
to demonstrate 
that to surrender 
him would 
represent a 
disproportionate 
HC European Arrest 
Warrant 
490 
 
interference with 
his rights to 
respect for family 
life in breach of 
article 8 of the 
ECHR. 
M.R. and 
D.R.(suing by 
their father and 
next friend O.R.) 
& ors -v- An t-
Ard-Chláraitheoir 
& ors  
[2014] IESC 60 
Article 8   In overturning the 
order of the HC 
that the biological 
parents were 
entitled to be listed 
on the children’s 
birth certs as their 
parents after they 
had been delivered 
by a surrogate 
mother, the Court 
relied on an 
ECtHR ruling that 
subject to the 
terms of Article 8, 
there was no 
prohibition on a 
member state 
legislating against 
surrogacy insofar 
as such legislation 
was in accordance 
SC Surrogacy Law 
491 
 
with the law, and 
necessary in a 
democratic 
society, in the 
circumstances 
outlined in Article 
8.2 ECHR. 
Doyle -v- Dunne 
[2014] IESC 69 
Article 6.1 
Article 13 
None specified   It was held that 
while the outcome 
which flowed from 
the decision of the 
Court may justify a 
sense of 
disappointment, 
even grievance, on 
the part of the 
beneficiaries of the 
appellant’s estate 
and of her legal 
advisers, it did not 
contravene 
provisions of the 
ECHR including 
Article 6.1 or 
Article 13 or the 
ECHR Act 2003 as 
it was the outcome 
which ensued from 
SC Tort Law 
492 
 
the decision the 
Court had to make, 
having regard to 
the relevant 
provisions, which 
were clear and 
unambiguous and 
had been in force 
for over fifty years. 
P.B. N. (DR 
Congo) -v- 
Minister for 
Justice and 
Equality 
[2014] IESC 9 
Article 3   Held that there 
was failure on the 
part of the 
respondent to 
ensure the 
necessary 
protection for the 
rights of the 
appellant under 
Article 3 of the 
ECHR so as to 
expose her to a 
real risk of 
suffering serious 
harm on 
deportation. 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
Khan & ors -v- 
Minister for 
Justice and 
Article 8   Held that the 
Minister was 
entitled to come to 
HC Asylum and 
Immigration Law 
493 
 
Equality  
[2014] IEHC 533 
the view that even 
where Article 41 
and Article 8 rights 
arose and were 
engaged, the 
countervailing 
interest of the 
State in 
maintaining the 
integrity of the 
immigration 
process ought to 
prevail over those 
rights. 
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Annex 3: References in judgments of the Irish District Court to European Convention on Human Rights, 
European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 & Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union 2004-2014 
 
Case Articles of ECHR 
Considered in 
Decision 
Sections of the 
ECHR Act 2003 
Considered in 
the Decision 
EU Charter 
Article 
Core Summary Court Core Legal 
Area 
DP v KS (Access 
Variation and 
Burden of Proof for 
Sexual Abuse) 
[2009] IEDC 3 (18 
May 2009) 
None specified None Specified None 
Specified 
In a breach of an 
access order 
decision, the Court 
referred to Kilkelly, 
Children’s Rights 
in Ireland: Law, 
Policy and 
Practice (Tottel 
Publishing, 2008). 
In considering the 
burden of proof as 
regards allegations 
of sexual abuse, 
the Court 
appeared to 
accept, albeit 
quoting from 
Kilkelly, that it 
must take into 
DC Child Care Law 
Evidence: 
Sexual Abuse 
495 
 
account principles 
emerging from the 
case-law of the 
European Court of 
Human Rights. 
Specific mention 
was made of TP 
and KM v. United 
Kingdom [2001] 2 
FLR 549. In this 
case, the DC 
found, as a matter 
of probability, the 
father had sexually 
abused Child 1.  
  
Health Service 
Executive v SK & 
anor (Costs) [2010] 
IEDC 2 (09 June 
2010) 
   Emergency and 
Interim Care 
Orders are subject 
to the statutory 
welfare principle 
(Child Care Act 
1991) and 
pursuant to 
constitutional and 
ECHR obligations. 
Legal assistance 
for a respondent 
DC Child Care Law 
Legal Aid 
496 
 
parent may be 
necessary in order 
for the Court to 
carry out a proper 
inquiry. If a 
respondent parent 
cannot afford 
representation 
(outside the 
Scheme of the 
Legal Aid Board), 
the HSE may have 
to fund reasonable 
costs for this legal 
representation.  
Health Service 
Executive v M & 
anor (Children 
Request Solicitor) 
[2010] IEDC 4 (01 
November 2010) 
Article 8   Child 1 (16) and 
Child 2 (15) 
requested a 
solicitor to 
represent them in 
court proceedings 
and that they be 
joined as parties to 
the proceedings. 
The District Court 
judge was satisfied 
that through the 
guardian ad litem 
 Child Care Law 
Fair Procedures 
Rights of the 
Child 
Convention on 
the Rights of the 
Child 
Voice of the 
Child 
497 
 
and the ability of 
the children to 
meet with the 
judge, satisfies the 
requirements of 
fair procedures 
under Article 8 
ECHR and under 
Article 12 CRC. 
Health Service 
Executive v SM & 
anor (Change of 
Placement and 
Wishes of Child) 
[2010] IEDC 1 (13 
May 2010) 
Article 8 ECHR 
(incidentally)  
  In deciding on 
moving a child 
from a care 
placement, the 
Court must have 
significant regard 
to the wishes of 
the child (relying 
on Bronda v Italy & 
Hokkanen v 
Finland). 
Significant 
planning is 
necessary as 
regards preparing 
a child for change. 
There was no 
evidence in this 
case that the HSE 
DC Child Care Law 
Rights of the 
Child 
Voice of the 
Child 
498 
 
had engaged in 
such planning. 
Financial 
limitations do not 
justify (in this 
particular case) 
how the HSE 
sought to move a 
child to a different 
care placement.  
Health Service 
Executive v L & 
anor (Supervision 
Order - Corporal 
Punishment) 
[2012] IEDC 2 (13 
January 2011) 
 
Article 3   In interpreting 
Section 19 of the 
Child Care Act 
1991, the Court 
made reference to 
the concept of ill-
treatment under 
Article 3 ECHR 
and the case of A 
v United Kingdom. 
The Court 
appeared to 
accept that 
reasonable 
chastisement of 
children might be 
permitted under 
Irish law. However, 
DC Child Care Law 
Supervision 
Corporal 
Punishment 
Ill-Treatment 
499 
 
ill-treatment for the 
purposes of 
Section 19 of the 
1991 Act does not 
have to equate 
with a criminal act. 
In making a 
supervision order, 
the Court 
considered that ill- 
treatment must 
reach a minimum 
level of severity, 
and this depends 
on all the 
circumstances of 
the case, such as 
the nature and 
context of the 
treatment, its 
duration, its 
physical, its mental 
effects, and in 
some cases the 
sex, age, and state 
of health of the 
victim. 
Health Service Article 8   In assessing DC Child Care Law 
500 
 
Executive v RB & 
anor (Care Order - 
CSA Allegations) 
[2011] IEDC 5 (30 
September 2011) 
whether the 
continuance of a 
care order should 
be permitted, the 
Court had regard 
to Article 8 ECHR 
and obligation for 
intervention within 
families to be 
provided for by 
law, legitimate, 
proportionate and 
necessary.  
Proportionality 
Health Service 
Executive v LL & 
ors (Full Care 
Order - NAI) [2011] 
IEDC 6 (11 October 
2011) 
Article 6 
Article 8 
  Interventions into 
family life must be 
provided for by 
law, proportionate, 
and for the 
protection of 
children. While 
granting a full care 
order, the Judge 
directed the HSE 
to re-evaluate the 
need for restricted 
supervised access 
of the children with 
the mother.  
DC Child Care Law 
Proportionality 
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Health Service 
Executive v ON & 
anor (Care Order - 
Corporal 
Punishment) [2011] 
IEDC 8 (01 
November 2011) 
Article 8   In noting a difficult 
relationship 
between a mother 
and father, and 
two of their 
children who were 
in care, the Court 
had to consider 
Article 8 ECHR. 
The Court stated 
that where contact 
with a child would 
harm the interests 
of a child or 
interfere with the 
child’s Article 8 
rights, a 
proportionate 
balance must be 
struck. In this 
case, significant 
reports existed 
showing the 
dangers of 
reunification. 
Access of the two 
children to their 
parents and other 
DC Child Care Law 
Proportionality 
502 
 
siblings, while at 
the discretion of 
the HSE, should 
be supported, 
flexible and 
phased, including 
overnight access.   
SB & anor v 
Health Service 
Executive 
(Direction to 
Prevent Change 
of Placement) 
[2011] IEDC 10 
(08 December 
2011) 
Article 8 Section 2 
Section 3 
Section 4 
 Section 47 
directions that a 
child remains in 
her current 
residential unit, 
after significant 
number of moves 
in a very short 
period of time. The 
Judge noted that 
the HSE was an 
‘organ of State’ for 
the purposes of 
Section 3 of the 
ECHR Act 2003. 
There is a positive 
obligation on the 
State to ensure 
Convention rights 
are real, and not 
DC Child Care Law 
Socio-Economic 
Rights 
Care Placement 
503 
 
illusory or 
theoretical. Courts, 
including the 
District Court, can 
take judicial notice 
of decisions of the 
ECtHR. While the 
HSE has to deal 
with financial 
difficulties, the 
Court noted that it 
had an obligation 
to maintain the 
mental and 
emotional integrity 
of the child.  
Health Service 
Executive v ED & 
anor (CO and SO 
- Neglect and 
Abuse) [2012] 
IEDC 1 (13 
January 2012) 
Article 8   Section 18 of the 
Child Care Act 
1991, provides 
sufficient 
protection against 
interference with 
the family under 
the Constitution 
and under Article 8 
ECHR. The Court 
stated that where 
contact with a child 
DC Child Care Law 
Care Order 
504 
 
would harm the 
interests of a child 
or interfere with 
the child’s Article 8 
rights, a 
proportionate 
balance must be 
struck.  
Health Service 
Executive v CB & 
anor (Care Order 
- Neglect and 
Abuse) [2012] 
IEDC 5 (24 
February 2012) 
Article 8  Article 7 
Article 24 
Where a care 
order is granted, in 
general, a child will 
have a right to 
continued (if 
limited) access to 
birth parents, if it is 
in the best 
interests of the 
child to do so. In 
making orders, the 
District Court will 
be guided by 
principles relating 
to proportionality in 
interference with 
family life. 
DC Child Care Law 
Care Order 
505 
 
Health Service 
Executive -v- AM 
& anor (Care 
Order - Neo Natal 
Abstinence and 
ALTE) [2012] 
IEDC 9 (30 April 
2012) 
Article 8   Care orders, which 
are only granted 
once statutory 
grounds and 
evidentiary 
requirements are 
met, are a 
proportionate 
interference with 
families’ rights 
under Article 8 
ECHR.  
DC Child Care Law 
Care Order 
Proportionality 
Health Service 
Executive -v- YG 
(Care Order - 
Physical Abuse 
and Neglect) 
[2012] IEDC 25 
(10 December 
2012) 
   The Judge stated, 
“Section 47 of the 
Child Care Act 
places the 
interests of the 
child above all 
other right”. In this 
case, the Judge 
decided it was 
proportionate in 
the circumstances. 
To order the 
mother to produce 
an inappropriate 
video/recording of 
a child. This was 
DC Child Care Law 
 
506 
 
stated in spite of 
counsel for the 
mother arguing 
that the matter of 
under Garda 
investigation, and 
the mother had a 
right against self-
incrimination, right 
to silence and fair 
procedures.  
Health Service 
Executive v ME & 
anor (Moving 
Jurisdictions) 
[2013] IEDC 3 (30 
January 2013) 
   Regard was had to 
the specified and 
unspecified rights 
of the child under 
the Constitution. 
Mention was also 
made of rights of 
the child under the 
ECHR and 
EUCFR. The 
Judge agreed with 
a care proposal for 
the grandmother to 
care for the 
children outside 
the jurisdiction.  
DC Child Care Law 
Care Order 
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Health Service 
Executive v SB 
(Care Order - 
Homelessness & 
Addictions) [2013] 
IEDC 6 (05 March 
2013).  
   Domestic law, 
along with the 
ECHR and 
EUCFR require 
courts to carefully 
examine and be 
satisfied that a 
Care Order is a 
reasonable and 
proportionate 
interference in 
family life and is 
necessary in order 
to protect the best 
interests of the 
child.  
DC Child Care Law 
Care Order 
 
Health Service 
Executive v M, X 
& ors (Joining of 
Party) [2013] 
IEDC 9 (25 March 
2013) 
 
Article 2 
Article 3 
Section 2 
Section 3 
 X made an 
accusation of 
sexual abuse 
against M. A 
number of M’s 
children are in 
care, some reside 
in a residential unit 
with X. X is a 
vulnerable young 
man, with 
significant mental 
DC Child Care Law: 
Section 47 
Disclosure of 
Accusation 
(Sexual Abuse) 
Evidence 
Positive 
Obligations 
 
508 
 
health challenges 
with on-going 
suicidal ideation as 
a response to 
stresses. After 
considering 
whether X could 
gain an order to 
block information 
on the sexual 
abuse allegation 
being made 
available to M, the 
Court took into 
account the 
obligations upon it 
under Section 2 of 
the ECHR Act 
2003. In refusing 
to block 
disclosure, the 
Court noted that 
there was a 
positive duty to 
prevent a loss of 
life and preserve 
bodily integrity. 
This had to be 
509 
 
viewed in light of 
M’s significant due 
process rights. In 
this case, the high 
threshold for 
refusing to 
disclose 
information to M 
had not been met. 
X had in place 
significant 
supports to assist 
in his dealing with 
this disclosure to 
M.    
Health Service 
Executive v AM & 
anor (Care Order 
- Mental Illness) 
[2013] IEDC 10 
(23 April 2013)  
 
 
Article 8  Article 24 
EUCFR 
In deciding to 
grant a full care 
order, the Judge 
took cognisance of 
Article 8 ECHR 
obligations (and 
relevant domestic 
legislation), along 
with the obligation, 
so far as is 
possible, to take 
into account the 
views of the child 
DC Child Care Law 
Proportionality 
Voice of the 
Child 
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under the Child 
Care Act 1991 and 
Article 24 EUCFR. 
       
Health Service 
Executive -v- B & 
anor (Lifting In 
Camera Rule) 
[2013] IEDC 13 
(28 May 2013). 
 
 
Article 6 
Article 8 
  In determining 
whether a mother 
who participated in 
child care 
proceedings 
before the District 
Court is entitled to 
costs, the Court 
considered: (i) the 
Mother continues 
to benefit from a 
variety of rights 
DC Child Care Law 
Access to 
Justice 
Costs 
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under the 
Constitution, 
ECHR and 
EUCFR, even 
when her children 
are in state care; 
(ii) Protection of an 
individual’s right to 
access justice 
under Article 6(1) 
ECHR may be 
engaged. In this 
case, costs would 
not be granted for 
the Mother’s 
participation in the 
review of the care 
order as the issues 
considered were 
not legally 
complex. 
However, costs 
were granted for 
the proceedings 
presently before 
the District Court.  
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Health Service 
Executive v LC & 
ors (Child Care 
Proceedings – 
Costs) [2013] 
IEDC 22 (27 
November 2013) 
 
 
Article 6 
Article 8 
  (Child 1 not being 
a child of a marital 
family; Child 2 
being a child of the 
marital family, both 
children sharing a 
birth mother). In 
making a care 
order, Article 8 
ECHR, affords a 
wide margin of 
appreciation in 
balancing the 
importance of child 
protection, with the 
aim of family 
reunification. The 
Care Order was 
granted, along with 
directions for 
supports to be 
provided to the 
Mother and Father 
of Child 2.  
DC Child Care Law 
Marital Family 
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Child and Family 
Agency (CFA) -v- 
H (Care Order - 
Psychological 
Assessment) 
[2014] IEDC 01 
(17 January 
2014) 
   Respondent 
submitted that the 
preparation of 
expert reports 
must be conducted 
in a rights (ECHR 
& constitutional) 
compliance 
manner that 
ensures 
procedural 
fairness. The 
Judge noted that 
the respondent 
must be permitted 
to object, deny or 
rebut matters in 
social work 
reports.  
 Child Care Law 
Assessments 
Child and Family 
Agency -v- CG & 
anor (Care Order 
- Proportionality) 
[2014] IEDC 06 
(29 May 2014) 
Article 8 ECHR   In making a Care 
Order for a 
duration of two 
years, the District 
Court was directed 
by the 
requirements of 
the Constitution 
and Article 8 
DC Child Care Law 
Care Order 
Proportionality 
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ECHR. The Judge 
noted, in line with 
ECtHR decisions, 
obligations to 
maintain family 
relationships (in so 
far as possible) 
and for restrictions 
(including 
issuance of the 
Care Order) to be 
subject to strict 
requirements of 
proportionality. 
Only in exceptional 
circumstances 
may a Court 
interfere with 
family life, and 
those 
circumstances are 
set down in 
legislation. The 
Judge also 
mentioned the 
protections under 
the EUCFR. 
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Child and Family 
Agency and JO & 
Anor (Care Order 
- Proportionality) 
[2014] IEDC 11 
(12 August 2014) 
 
Article 8   There is a 
requirement under 
the Constitution, 
ECHR and 
EUCFR to have 
due regard to the 
rights of the 
parents and family. 
There should not 
be a presumption 
in favour of 
permanent 
separation of a 
parent-child 
relationship 
(unless there are 
exceptional 
circumstances). In 
granting a Care 
Order until 18 for 
three children, 
Daly J. in the 
District Court 
engaged in an 
analysis of Article 
8 ECHR and 
requirements of 
proportionality. 
DC Child Care Law 
Care Order 
Proportionality 
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Best interests of 
the child may 
override rights of 
the parents. 
Child and Family 
Agency and KC & 
Anor (Care Order 
- Proportionality) 
[2014] IEDC 12  
Article 8   Relying in part on 
CFA v CG & anor 
[2014] IEDC 06, 
Daly J. after 
considering Irish 
law, Article 8 
ECHR and ECtHR 
jurisprudence 
decided that a 
three year care 
order was an 
appropriate, 
proportionate and 
necessary order to 
grant in this case.  
DC Child Care Law 
Care Order 
Proportionality 
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Child and Family 
Agency and CD & 
Anor (Care Order) 
[2014] IEDC 15 
(17 October 
2014) 
 
Article 8   In granting a Care 
Order until the age 
of 18, Daly J. 
relying in part on 
CFA v CG & anor 
[2014] IEDC 06, 
found that this was 
a proportionate 
response in line 
with Article 8 
ECHR and 
jurisprudence of 
ECtHR. 
DC Child Care Law 
Care Order 
Proportionality 
Tusla: Child and 
Family Agency 
and COS & Anor 
[2014] IEDC 16 
(31 October 
2014) 
 
Article 8   In granting a care 
order for one year, 
Daly J. noted that 
parents and 
children have 
significant rights 
under the 
Constitution and 
ECHR. “Immense 
care” is needed 
before granting a 
care order until 
children reach 
majority. In this 
case, the evidence 
DC Child Care Law 
Care Order 
Proportionality 
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presented by the 
CFA fell short of 
the requirements 
of Section 18(1)(b) 
of the Child Care 
Act 1991.  
Tusla: Child and 
Family Agency 
and AC & Anor 
(Care Order - 
Proportionality) 
[2014] IEDC 17 
(05 November 
2014) 
 
Article 8   The CFA is under 
a duty to protect 
the rights of the 
Child (by virtue of 
the Constitution, 
ECHR and 
EUCFR). 
However, there is 
a commensurate 
obligation on the 
CFA to consider 
family reunification 
and take steps to 
potentially enable 
this (subject to this 
not being 
detrimental to the 
child).  Horgan P. 
also stated it was 
not in the best 
 Child Care Law 
Care Order 
Proportionality 
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interests of the 
child to be told that 
his current foster 
family were his/her 
“forever family”.  
Child and Family 
Agency and NC & 
Anor (Care Order 
- Proportionality) 
[2014] IEDC 18 
(11 November 
2014) 
Article 8   Daly J granted a 
care order until a 
child reached the 
age of 18. In 
reaching this 
decision, Daly J. 
considered the 
obligations upon 
the District Court 
to engage in an 
assessment of 
Article 8 ECHR, 
balancing the 
rights of the child 
and the rights of 
the parents. In 
doing so, Daly J. 
stated that there 
were a number of 
distinguishing 
DC Child Care Law 
Care Order 
Proportionality 
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factors, that 
merited the 
granting of the 
care order until 18 
(referring to the 
proportionality 
assessment 
conducted in CFA 
v CG & JB [2014] 
IEDC 06) 
Child and Family 
Agency and GM 
& Anor (Care 
Order) [2014] 
IEDC 19 (12 
November 2014) 
Article 8   Family rights 
under the 
Constitution, 
ECHR and 
EUCFR were 
considered by 
Daly J. granting a 
Care Order in the 
case of three 
teenage children  
until they reached 
majority. Daly J. 
permitted the GAL 
to bring certain 
matters to the 
attention to the 
Ombudsman for 
Children as 
 Child Care Law 
Care Order 
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regards alleged 
inaction of the 
HSE, National 
Education and 
Welfare Board and 
the Gardaí prior to 
the three children 
effecting their own 
escape from the 
family home in 
August 2013.  
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Annex 4: References to the European Convention on Human Rights and European Convention on 
Human Rights Act 2003 and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights in decisions of other Irish 
Tribunals and Quasi-Judicial Bodies 2004-2014 
Determinations of Appeal Commissioners under Section 994A of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 
Four decisions post the introduction of the ECHR Act 2003, none that have raised Convention related issues.  
 
Broadcasting Commission of Ireland 
One complaint has mentioned the European Convention on Human Rights (Mr. Seán Ascough Ref. No. 02/13), however the 
decision was not based on a determination of any arguments forwarded as regards Convention compliance and broadcasting law 
and policy.  
 
Work Place Relations & Equality Determination Mechanisms 
 
Case/Date Articles of ECHR 
Considered in 
Decision 
Sections of the 
ECHR Act 2003 
Considered in 
the Decision 
Articles of 
EUCFR 
Considered 
Core Summary Tribunal Core Legal 
Area 
Determination 
No.EDA0417,  
Italian Embassy v 
Damery 
(December 2004) 
None specified None specified  The ECHR does 
not change pre-
existing public 
international law 
as regards claims 
for diplomatic 
Labour Court Employment 
Law 
Sovereign 
Immunity 
523 
 
immunity under 
the Vienna 
Convention on 
the Law of 
Treaties.  
Recommendation 
No. LCR18364, 
Dunnes Stores 
Tralee and 
Mandate 
(November 2005)  
None specified. The decision 
mentions the 
2003 Act, and 
may be referring 
to Section 2 of 
the 2003 Act 
(rather than 
Article 2 ECHR) 
 No consideration 
of ECHR 
argument.  
Labour Court Employment 
Law 
Decision No. REA 
1120, MDY 
Construction 
Limited and  
Building and Allied 
Trade Unions  
(February 2011) 
None specified None specified  Dispute is 
between two 
companies 
neither of which 
are human 
persons. 
Therefore, parties 
cannot come 
within the scope 
of the 
Convention. 
Labour Court Employment 
Law 
Determination No. 
EDA128, 
Trailer Care 
Holdings v Healy 
  Article 23 
Article 33 
The EUCFR is 
primary EU law, 
with the same 
constitutional 
Labour Court Employment 
Law 
Industrial 
Relations Acts, 
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(March 2012)  status as the EU 
Treaties. In 
interpreting EU 
law on dismissal 
on basis of 
pregnancy, the 
CJEU has 
interpreted 
exisiting legal 
obligations in light 
of the EUCFR. LC 
affirmed decision 
of Equality 
Authority.  
1946 To 1990 
Section 83, 
Employment 
Equality Acts, 
1998 to 2011: 
Gender 
Pregnancy 
Determination No. 
EDA1314, Ger 
Lally & Associates 
v Siniecka Rusek 
(July 2013) 
  Article 23 
Article 33 
The EUCFR is 
primary EU law, 
with the same 
constitutional 
status as the EU 
Treaties. In 
interpreting EU 
law on dismissal 
on basis of 
pregnancy, the 
CJEU has 
interpreted 
exisiting legal 
obligations in light 
Labour Court Employment 
Equality Acts, 
1998 to 2011; 
Gender; 
Pregnancy 
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of the EUCFR. LC 
overturned the 
decision of 
Equality 
Authority, and 
awarded Ms 
Rusek €20,000.  
Determination No., 
EDA1329, Gillick 
t/a Twist Foods v 
Rosploch 
(November 2013) 
  Article 23 
Article 33 
The EUCFR is 
primary EU law, 
with the same 
constitutional 
status as the EU 
Treaties. In 
interpreting EU 
law on dismissal 
on basis of 
pregnancy, the 
CJEU has 
interpreted 
exisiting legal 
obligations in light 
of the EUCFR. 
Decision of 
Equality Tribunal 
affirmed.  
Labour Court Employment 
Equality Acts, 
1998 to 2011; 
Gender; 
Pregnancy 
Determination No. 
EDA1416, 
Moonlite Cleaning 
  Article 23 
Article 33 
The EUCFR is 
primary EU law, 
with the same 
Labour Court Employment 
Equality Acts, 
1998 to 2011; 
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Services Limited v 
Drabik (May 2014) 
constitutional 
status as the EU 
Treaties. In 
interpreting EU 
law on dismissal 
on basis of 
pregnancy, the 
CJEU has 
interpreted 
exisiting legal 
obligations in light 
of the EUCFR. 
Decision of 
Equality Tribunal 
varied in part. 
Gender; 
Pregnancy 
 
Equality Tribunal 
 
Case/Date Articles of ECHR 
Considered in 
Decision 
Sections of the 
ECHR Act 2003 
Considered in 
the Decision 
Articles of 
EUCFR 
Considered 
Core Summary Tribunal Core Legal 
Area 
DEC-S2005/200, 
Sharkey v Danny 
Minnie's 
Restaurant, 
Article 6 Section 3  Equality Tribunal 
decision maker 
under a duty to 
consider Irish law 
ET Discrimination 
Law 
Equal Status 
Acts 2000-2004 
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Donegal, 
December 2005 
in Convention 
compliant 
manner. Delay of 
3 years in hearing 
of dispute did not 
adversely affect 
the respondents. 
Equality Law: 
Race 
DEC-S2006-077, 
2 Named 
Complainants v 
Department of 
Education and 
Science, 
November 2006.  
Article 8 Section 3  Complainant’s 
right to privacy not 
violated as 
regards identifying 
a person as 
having a received 
certain exam 
supports, due to a 
disability, on the 
Leaving 
Certificate 
examination 
results form. 
However, the 
complainant 
succeeded on 
other grounds of 
complaint.    
ET Discrimination 
Law 
Equality Law 
Equal Status Act 
Disability 
DEC-S2008-113, 
Mr Thomas 
O’Donnell v 
Article 3 Section 2  The Equality 
Tribunal is not the 
appropriate forum 
ET Discrimination 
Law 
Equality Law 
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Roscommon 
County Council 
(2 December 
2008) 
in which to seek a 
determination as 
to whether a 
complainant 
suffered inhuman 
and degrading 
treatment under 
the ECHR. To 
make such a 
determination, the 
Equality Tribunal 
would be acting 
ultra vires.  
Equal Status Act 
2000 
Membership of 
the Travelling 
Community 
DEC-E2010-147, 
Laurentiu Eugen 
Iocob v The 
Central Hotel (3 
August 2010)  
Article 8   There was no 
finding of 
discrimination in 
this case against 
the respondents. 
Despite 
arguments of the 
respondents that 
covert voice 
recordings (taking 
by the 
complainant), 
violated the 
Constitution 
and/or the ECHR 
ET Discrimination 
Law 
Equality Law: 
Employment 
Equality Acts 
1998-2008 
 Race 
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and/or the Data 
Protection Act 
1988, the Equality 
Officer listened to 
the recordings. 
DEC-S2010-053, 
A Patient v 
Health Service 
Provider and A 
Hospital (1 
December 2010) 
Article 8 
Article 14 
Section 3  The Equality 
Tribunal has no 
jusridiction under 
Section 3 of the 
ECHR Act 2003. 
Arguments that 
mental health 
services were 
provided in a 
gender 
discriminatory 
manner was not 
accepted. 
 Equality Law 
Equal Status 
Acts 2000 to 
2008 
Gender 
Mental Health 
Law 
DEC-E2013-188, 
Mr L v A Medical 
Technology 
Enterprise , (20 
December 2013) 
None Specified None Specified  The Equality 
Tribunal did not 
have jurisdiction 
to consider 
whether ‘closed 
shop agreements’ 
were contrary to 
the ECHR. 
 Equality Law 
Employment 
Equality Acts 
1998 to 2011 
Race 
Disability 
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DEC-E2014-045, 
John McAteer v 
South Tipperary 
County Council 
(24 June 2014) 
Article 9 
Article 14 
None specified Article 10 
Article 52 
The complainant 
was discriminated 
against on the 
basis of his 
religion. In coming 
to this decision, 
the Equality 
Officer had regard 
to the right to 
religious belief, 
including the right 
to communicate 
about religious 
beliefs. Significant 
reference was 
made to ECtHR 
jurisprudence.  
The Equality 
Officer stated that 
there was an 
obligation upon 
her to consider 
domestic law in 
light of Article 10 
EUCFR and EU 
Framework 
Directive 2000/78 
which prohibits 
ET Equality Law 
Employment 
Equality Acts 
1998 to 2011 
Religion 
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inter alia 
discrimination 
both direct and 
indirect on the 
grounds of 
religion or 
religious belief 
DEC-E2014-050, 
Ms Z. v A 
Government 
Department (9 
July 2014) 
  Article 21 
Article 23 
Article 26 
Article 33 
Article 34 
The failure to 
provide the 
applicant with 
maternity leave or 
adoptive leave for 
her child born 
through a 
surrogacy 
arrangement (with 
the child being Ms 
Z’s genetic child) 
did not violate 
domestic or EU 
law. This decision 
was made after a 
preliminary ruling 
by the CJEU in C-
363/12, Z. v. A 
Government 
Equality 
Tribunal 
Equality Law 
Employment 
Equality Acts 
1998 to 2011 
Disability 
Gender 
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Department and 
The Board of 
Management of a 
Community 
School. 
 
 
 
Irish Information Commissioners’ Decisions 
Case Articles of ECHR 
Considered in 
Decision 
Sections of the 
ECHR Act 2003 
Considered in 
the Decision 
Articles of 
EUCFR 
Considered 
Core Summary Court Core Legal 
Area 
Case No. 
000478 & 
000549, Mr X 
and the former 
Eastern Health 
Board (the 
Board), 17 
November 
2005 
Article 8 Section 2 
Section 3 
 Article 8 ECHR 
rights are not 
engaged when a 
person who is not 
a parent seeks 
access to a 
child’s social work 
and other records 
relating to an 
allegation of 
sexual abuse. 
N.B. The 2005 
determination 
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was set aside by 
Clarke J. in F.P. 
v Information 
Commissioner, 
13 July 2009, but 
did not make 
comment on the 
Information 
Commissioner’s 
interpretation of 
the ECHR/ECHR 
Act 2003. 
 
 
Irish Data Protection Commission Case Studies (until 2013) 
Case Articles of ECHR 
Considered in 
Decision 
Sections of the 
ECHR Act 2003 
Considered in 
the Decision 
Articles of 
EUCFR 
Considered 
Core Summary Court Core Legal 
Area 
Case Study 13 
of 2011: 
Access to 
reports 
compiled by 
private 
investigators 
None specified None specified None specified Engaging a 
private 
investigator to 
investigate a 
named individual 
“carries a very 
serious risk” of 
IDPC Data 
Protection 
Privacy 
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(2011) breaching the 
Data Protection 
Acts, and rights to 
privacy under the 
ECHR, EUCFR 
and Bunreacht na 
hEireann.   
Case Study 6 
of 2006 : News 
of the World: 
Limits of the 
Media 
Exemption 
Article 8 
Article 10 
Section 3 None Specified Data Protection 
Commissioner is 
obliged to 
interpret Irish 
Data Protection 
law in a manner 
compliant with the 
ECHR. With 
regard to ECtHR 
jurisprudence on 
privacy, there 
was a data 
protection breach 
by the News of 
World (Irish 
edition). This 
came about 
through the taking 
of pictures of a 
child of a well 
known Irish 
IDPC Data 
Protection, 
Privacy, 
Right to 
private life, 
Right to Family 
life 
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celebrity, without 
permission.  
 
 
Competition Authority of Ireland (now Competition and Consumer Protection Commission) 
The Competition Authority have not considered any arguments as regards the ECHR, ECHR Act 2003 or the EUCFR. 
 
 
 
 
